Labour Court Database __________________________________________________________________________________ File Number: CD88274 Case Number: LCR11869 Section / Act: S20(1) Parties: ROADSTONE GROUP - and - IRISH TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION |
Claim by the Union for the interpretation of a Procedural Agreement.
Recommendation:
6. The Court, in considering the submissions and in particular
the Procedural Agreement, has come to the conclusion that as
presently written either party to the Agreement has the right to
refer any issue which it may desire to a full hearing once it has
proceeded through the preliminary sections of the Agreement, even
if the other party is of the opinion that the issue has been
satisfactorily resolved.
Division: Mr O'Connell Mr Collins Mr Walsh
Text of Document__________________________________________________________________
CD88274 RECOMMENDATION NO. LCR11869
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTS, 1946 TO 1976
SECTION 20(1)
PARTIES: ROADSTONE GROUP
and
IRISH TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION
SUBJECT:
1. Claim by the Union for the interpretation of a Procedural
Agreement.
BACKGROUND:
2. During December, 1987 and January, 1988, discussions took
place between the Company and Union, concerning the Company's
requirement for 9 redundancies among the clerical staff due to a
continued decline in business. During these discussions the
Company modified its requirement to 7 redundancies. In relation
to the two outstanding redundancies the Company proposed that a
worker in the Huntstown stores would transfer to the Huntstown
block plant and in relation to the Allen Works the Company would
accept a work sharing arrangement until the end of July, 1988.
These proposals were rejected by the Union. On 28th January,
1988, the matter was referred to the conciliation service of the
Labour Court. At a conciliation conference on 10th February,
1988, it was proposed that 5 voluntary redundancies be accepted,
the redundancy at the Allen Works would be resolved by
implementing a work sharing arrangement until July and the
redundancy at the Huntstown stores be referred to the Labour Court
for investigation. Subsequently the Union on 26th February, 1988,
requested that the following matters be referred to the Court:
_ the Company's failure to honour the procedural aspects of
the Procedural Agreement;
- the disputed store job in Huntstown;
- the staffing of the Allen Works and selection of a clerk in
a manner contrary to Agreement;
- the right of clerks to hold onto 2 days in wages and 3/4
days in Public Bodies.
3. The Company declined to agree to a Court investigation on the
matters. It maintained that the only matter agreed to be referred
to a Court hearing was the disputed stores job at Huntstown and
the clerk concerned had in the meantime opted for voluntary
redundancy. The Company would not allow the Union to selectively
raise issues which had already been resolved in an overall
settlement at conciliation.
The Union stated that all other issues had not been resolved and
regarded the Company's decision not to agree to attend a Labour
Court hearing as a breach of the Procedural Agreement which states
that "should the dispute still remain unresolved the parties will
request a conciliation conference or Rights Commissioner's
hearing, and if subsequently necessary a full Labour Court
hearing." On 21st March, 1988, the Union, under Section 20(1) of
the Industrial Relations Act, 1969, referred the interpretation of
the Procedural Agreement to the Labour Court. A Court hearing
took place on 3rd May, 1988.
UNION'S ARGUMENTS:
4. 1. The Company has deliberately gone out of its way to
frustrate the operation of the Agreement by refusing to allow
a case go to the Court.
2. A range of issues were discussed at conciliation,
resulting in proposals on a number of issues. The Union then
convened a meeting of its members concerned, arising from
which there were a number of items on which agreement could
not be reached. The Union therefore identified these items
for the Court and requested a Court hearing. The Company
vetoed the reference of the residual items to the Court. The
Company is attempting to define on what items the Union feels
aggrieved and on what it requires the benefit of a Court
hearing.
3. The Procedural Agreement is very clear on the intention of
the parties; the full gambit of the machinery was to be
utilised before either side took precipitative action. The
Agreement provides a step by step approach on how to deal with
'differences,' (details supplied to the Court).
4. The Agreement provides for the reference of issues to
conciliation and 'if subsequently necessary a full Labour
Court hearing.' The Union deemed it necessary to avail of a
Court hearing. Nowhere does the Agreement infer the right of
veto by any party or infer that grievances or disputes must
first be mutually agreed. One party is invariably quite happy
as things stand before the grievance and therefore could
frustrate the procedures if agreement had to be reached on the
existence of the grievance.
5. It was clearly the intention of the parties that neither
side would unilaterally impose change, if agreement could not
be secured the status quo would be maintained pending the
issue of a Labour Court Recommendation. A recommendation can
only follow from a full hearing and that can only arise where
the aggrieved party secures the co-operation of the other
party to participating in same. There can be no ambiguity
about the Union's interpretation.
COMPANY'S ARGUMENTS:
5. 1. The Company did not veto a Court hearing and would not
attempt to veto a full hearing on a genuine issue. The
Company went through each stage of the procedures in a genuine
effort to resolve the problem.
2. Following the conciliation conference on 10th February,
1988, the Company was of the opinion that the two issues
outstanding were the position at the Allen works and the
position at Huntstown. At conciliation work sharing at the
Allen Works was agreed pending the resolution of the problem
by the end of July, 1988. By letter on 19th February, 1988,
the Union confirmed this (details provided to the Court). The
Company agreed to a Court hearing in relation to the Huntstown
position, however, on the 26th February, 1988, the worker
concerned at Huntstown confirmed his intention to accept the
redundancy package. For this reason the Company genuinely
believed that the substantive issues had been resolved and
that there was no necessity to have a Court hearing.
3. The Company regards the Union's insistance in seeking a
Court hearing as an abuse of the Procedural Agreement and
indeed, of the Court itself. In seeking the Court hearing and
in misrepresenting the facts concerning issues outstanding,
the Union was clearly in breach of the spirit, if not the
letter of any procedures.
4. The essential question was not whether redundancies were
necessary but rather the mechanism to be employed to implement
the redundancies. All the relevant facts were presented to
the Union. The Company has the responsibility and duty to
match the staffing levels and structure to meet the level of
business and the market. The Company must not be prevented or
hindered in carrying out its responsibilities.
5. The Company believes that the matter cannot be looked at
in isolation. The circumstances, background and sequence of
events must also be considered. Then it will be seen that the
Company was not in breach of procedures.
RECOMMENDATION:
6. The Court, in considering the submissions and in particular
the Procedural Agreement, has come to the conclusion that as
presently written either party to the Agreement has the right to
refer any issue which it may desire to a full hearing once it has
proceeded through the preliminary sections of the Agreement, even
if the other party is of the opinion that the issue has been
satisfactorily resolved.
~
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
John O'Connell
_____________________
25th May, 1988. Deputy Chairman
B.O'N/J.C.