DEP886

Labour Court Database __________________________________________________________________________________ File Number: AEP875 Case Number: DEP886 Section / Act: S8(1)AD Parties: KAYFOAM WOOLFSON LIMITED - and - SEVEN FEMALE EMPLOYEES;THE AMALGAMATED TRANSPORT

Subject:
Appeal by the Company and the Union against Equality Officer's recommendation number EP4/87 concerning a claim by seven named female workers for an equal basic rate of pay with certain named male employees on the basis that they are performing, or have performed, work equal in value to that of the named males. The claimants are also claiming an entitlement to be paid machine money on the same basis as the named males.

Recommendation:
26. In view of my conclusions, and in accordance with the
provisions of section 8(5) of the Act, I recommend that:

(i) Ms. C. Brady, Ms. J. Brady and Ms. C. Costigan are
entitled to be paid the same basic rate as that paid to
Mr. A. Piggott.

(ii) Ms. A. Brady, Ms. B. Dixon, Ms. B. Kavanagh and Ms. V.
Bailey are entitled to be paid the same basic rate as
that paid to Mr. P. Bowden.

(iii) I also recommend that each of the claimants have an
entitlement to be paid machine money of #3.75 per week.

This recommendation is effective from 25th March, 1983, the date
three years prior to the reference of this dispute to me.

In the case of Ms. B. Kavanagh the recommendation is effective
from 25th March, 1983 to the date her employment with the Company
terminated."

6. On the 5th June, 1987 the Company appealed against the
Equality Officer's recommendation in accordance with Section 8(i)
of the Act on the basis that the Equality Officer had erred in law
on a number of issues. The Union lodged an appeal for a
determination dated 10th June, 1987 on the grounds of the
Company's failure to implement the Equality Officer's
recommendation.

7. The Court heard the appeal on 23rd July, 1987, and visited the
factory on the 5th October and 20th November, 1987 to carry out a
work inspection.


8. Copies of the submissions to the Court are printed separately
as appendices 1 and 2 can be had on request. The parties enlarged
on their submissions at the Court hearing and during the visit to
the Company.


10. DETERMINATION:
Due to technical reasons the Determination on this case cannot
appear in the Recommendation field of the Database. However,
it is available if the full text option is chosen.

Division: Ms Owens Mr Shiel Mr O'Murchu

Text of Document__________________________________________________________________

AEP875 DETERMINATION NO. DEP688
EP4/1987
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION (PAY) ACT, 1974
SECTION 8(1)(A)


PARTIES: KAYFOAM WOOLFSON LIMITED
(REPRESENTED BY THE FEDERATED UNION OF EMPLOYERS)

and

SEVEN FEMALE EMPLOYEES
(REPRESENTED BY THE AMALGAMATED TRANSPORT
AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION)

SUBJECT:
1. Appeal by the Company and the Union against Equality Officer's
recommendation number EP4/87 concerning a claim by seven named
female workers for an equal basic rate of pay with certain named
male employees on the basis that they are performing, or have
performed, work equal in value to that of the named males. The
claimants are also claiming an entitlement to be paid machine
money on the same basis as the named males.

BACKGROUND:
2. The Company is engaged in the manufacture of polyurethane
foam, the cutting of polyurethane foam to specific customer
measurements and the manufacturing of pillows and bedding.

3. On 25th March, 1986, the Union requested an investigation by
an Equality Officer of a dispute concerning a claim by seven named
female employees for equal pay with five named male employees. A
further male comparator was nominated by the Union and submitted
to the Equality Officer by letter dated 24th July, 1986. The
Equality Officer held a preliminary hearing of the dispute on 17th
April, 1986. Having received and exchanged written submissions
from both parties the Equality Officer carried out a work
inspection on 18th, 19th, 20th, November, 1986. At a joint
hearing of the parties held on 11th December, 1986 both sides
indicated that they would be making further submissions. These
were subsequently received and exchanged as well as the
observations each party had on each others submissions. A further
work inspection was carried out on 12th February, 1987. Following
final submissions received the Equality Officer issued her
recommendation on 29th April, 1987.


4. Each of the claimants contends that her work is equal in value
to that performed by each of the following four males:

Mr. P. Bowden, Mr. P. Kavanagh, Mr. A. Piggott and Mr. P.
McGeough.

In addition, two of the claimants, Ms. V. Bailey and Ms. B.
Kavanagh contend that their work is equal in value to that
performed by Mr. D. Corrigan while the other five claimants
contend that their work is equal in value to that performed by Mr.
R. Leddy.

5. Each of the claimants, with the exception of Ms. Bailey, is
paid a basic rate of #112.40. Ms. Bailey finishes work at 3.00
p.m. and is paid a pro rata rate of #89.92. The basic rate of the
males is #131.64. In addition, four of the males, Messrs. Bowden,
Piggott, Corrigan and Leddy, are paid machine money of #3.75 per
week. At the time the claim was lodged Mr. P. McGeough was on the
juvenile rate of pay and attained the full basic rate of #131.64
in April, 1986.

On completing the investigation the Equality Officer on 29th
April, 1987 issued the following conclusions and recommendation.

"Conclusions of the Equality Officer:

10. Sections 2(1) and 3(c) of the Act state as follows:

2(1) "Subject to this Act, it shall be a term of the contract
under which a woman is employed in any place that she shall be
entitled to the same rate of remuneration as a man who is
employed in that place by the same employer, if both are
employed on like work."

3. Two persons shall be regarded as employed on like work -

(c) "where the work performed by one is equal in value to
that performed by the other in terms of the demands it makes
in relation to such matters as skill, physical or mental
effort, responsibility and working conditions."

11. The first question to be decided in the case here concerned
is whether or not the work performed by each one of the claimants
is equal in value in terms of Section 3(c) of the Act with that
performed by each or by any of the males with whom each of the
claimants is claiming an entitlement to the same rate of
remuneration. In order to establish whether or not the work
performed by each of the claimants is equal in value to that
performed by each of the males concerned I examined and considered
the work performed by each claimant and by each named male. There
are conflicting opinions between the parties as to whether or not
certain tasks are performed, the importance of certain tasks and


how often certain tasks are undertaken by both the comparators and
the claimants. The Company argue that their submissions detail
the jobs most frequently and regularly performed by each employee
concerned and outline other jobs which they are and/or have been
required to perform. The Union argue that while all employees,
including the claimants, are subject to transfers the work
described in the job descriptions prepared by the I.C.T.U.
Advisory Service relates to what had been the normal assignments
for a number of years prior to the equal pay claim being made.

12. Because of the differences mentioned above between the
parties on the actual work carried out by the claimants and the
comparators I have prepared a summary of the work performed,
compiled from the submissions of both parties and verified by me
during my work inspection. This summary is set out in detail in
Appendices 4 to 12 which also includes my evaluation of the work
performed by the claimants and the named comparators. Having
examined and considered the work concerned I have come to the
following conclusions:

(i) The work performed by Ms. C. Brady, Ms. J. Brady and Ms.
C. Costigan is equally demanding to that performed by Mr.
A. Piggott and is therefore equal in value to that
performed by him in terms of the demands of the work.

(ii) The work performed by Ms. A. Brady and Ms. B. Dixon is
equally demanding to that performed by Mr. P. Bowden
prior to his assignment to the contour cutting machine.
The work performed by Mr. Bowden on the contour cutting
machine is more demanding than that performed by him
previously and is also more demanding than the work
performed by the claimants. I note however that this
difference in demands did not attract a difference in his
basic rate of pay. It is evident, therefore, that the
Company treated the demands of his work both before and
after his move to the contour cutting machine as being
equal in value in terms of basic pay. Consequently, the
work performed by him since his move to the contour
cutting machine is also equal in value in terms of the
demands of the work to that performed by both Ms. A.
Brady and Ms. B. Dixon.

(iii)Ms. V. Bailey and Ms. B. Kavanagh claimed an entitlement
to the same rate of remuneration as that paid to Messrs.
Corrigan, Bowden, Kavanagh, Piggott and McGeough. I have
not compared the demands of Mr. Corrigan's work with that
of the claimants because, for the reasons set out in
Paragraph 18 below, I accept that in Mr. Corrigan's case
there are grounds other than sex within the meaning of
section 2(3) of the Act to justify the difference in
rates. Having assessed the work performed by Ms. V.


Bailey and Ms. B. Kavanagh I consider that their work is
more demanding than that performed by Messrs. Bowden,
Kavanagh, Piggott and McGeough.

13. In deciding whether or not, in the light of the differences
in demands noted at Appendix 12 the work performed by Ms. Bailey
and Ms. Kavanagh in respect of basic pay is equal in value in
terms of Section 3(c) of the Act with that performed by the named
comparators it is necessary to address the question of what is
meant by equal in value. I am of the opinion that the value of
the work in terms of the demands specified in Section 3(c) of the
Act is the value which is or which would be reflected in the rates
of remuneration in the absence of discrimination on the basis of
sex. If it is found that the female employee would be paid the
same rate as the male employee but for her sex then the work is
clearly equal in value in terms of section 3(c) of the Act and any
differences in demands, which are differences which, in the case
of the male employees, do not warrant a different rate of
remuneration, are not relevant.

14. I consider that in terms of assessing whether two jobs are
equal in value for the purposes of the Act the point to be
addressed is whether or not there are differences in demands
between two jobs which would have convinced the Company to
allocate the jobs to different grades had both jobs been performed
by males. Job evaluation cannot be viewed as an exact science.
One of its functions is to provide, in a fair way, equal pay for
jobs which make broadly similar demands on the job holder. In
this regard it is concerned with the ordering of what are
essentially value judgements about the monetary worth of a series
of jobs within an organisation. The question of whether or not
two jobs are considered to merit the same rate of pay is usually
determined by deciding the question of whether they would be
regarded as falling within the range of jobs in a particular
grade.

15. Having examined the work of the claimants and the comparators
I am satisfied that there are a range of jobs which the Company
treats as equal for pay purposes even though within each range not
all the jobs are equally demanding. It became evident during my
examination of the work that there are differences in demands in
the range of jobs performed by the claimants. The work of Ms.
Bailey is more demanding than the work of the claimants in the
pillow section yet they are all in receipt of the same basic rate
of pay. There are also differences in demand in the range of jobs
which are performed by the comparators. The work of Mr. Leddy is
more demanding than that of Mr. Piggott yet they each are in
receipt of the same basic rate of pay. I consider the question to
be decided in considering whether or not the work of a female
employee is equal in value to that of a male employee is whether
or not the female would be paid the same as the male but for her
sex.


16. It is a fact in this case that the claimants are on a pay
scale which is exclusively female. The comparators likewise are
on a pay scale which is exclusively male. It is also a fact that
the range of jobs which receive the higher rate of basic pay
corresponds to the range of jobs performed by the males while the
range of jobs which receive the lower rate of basic pay
corresponds to the range of jobs performed by the females. Having
evaluated the work of all the claimants and comparators in this
case I have found in terms of the factors mentioned at Section
3(c) of the Act that the work performed by each individual
claimant is no less demanding than the work performed by Mr. A.
Piggott and no more demanding than the work of Mr. R. Leddy. It
appears to me, therefore, that there is clear evidence of a
company policy of grading for pay purposes and that the Company's
perception of what job falls within a particular range of jobs for
grading purposes and merits the higher or lower basic rate relates
specifically to the sex of the worker concerned. In other words,
there is no material difference other than the sex of the worker
between the demands of the work performed by each individual
claimant and the demands of the work performed by the males which
warrants a difference in their basic rates of pay. Consequently,
I consider the work performed by Ms. V. Bailey and Ms. B. Kavanagh
is equal in value to that performed by Mr. P. Bowden.

17. The second issue for consideration in this case concerns the
claimants' contention that they have an entitlement to be paid
machine money on the same basis as the male comparators. Machine
money is paid by the Company to all but two of the named
comparators. The Company contend that machine money is paid to
the males on the following basis:-


(i) that the male employee is working on a machine which
qualifies for machine money,

(ii) that the male employee has completed a training period
of 3 months and is deemed to be capable of operating the
machine,

(iii) that the male employee is required to carry out routine
maintenance on his machine, and

(iv) that under the terms of Clause 12 of the registered
agreement the male worker is liable at any time to work
on the particular machine again.

In relation to the criteria which the Company contend form the
basis on which machine money is paid:-


(i) I note that machine money is paid solely to male
operatives. It is paid to the operative once he has
operated a machine.

(ii) I accept that it is paid to a male who has been trained
and is considered competent to operate a particular
machine.

(iii) I accept that the male employee working on a machine is
required to carry out routine maintenance involving
oiling the machine and carrying out minor adjustments to
the machine. I am satisfied, however, that this is a
general requirement and also applies to the female
operatives.

(iv) I accept that under the terms of Clause 12 of the
registered agreement the male worker is liable to work
at the particular machine again and therefore retains
the machine allowance in accordance with normal
industrial relations practice.

It appears to me, therefore, that the actual basis on which
machine money is paid is that a male has operated a machine, is
deemed competent to operate the particular machine by the Company
and may be requested to do so at some stage in the future.

18. Having established the actual basis on which the machine
allowance is paid to the comparators' it appears to me that the
next question for consideration is whether the work performed by
each of the claimants is equal in value to the work performed by
any one of the male comparators in respect of which he receives
machine money. During my examination of the machine operations on
which the comparators are engaged it became evident that, as with
the non-machine work, there was a range of machine work which the
Company treats as equal for pay purposes even though within this
range not all the machine operations were equally demanding. The
level of skill demanded of the male employee to operate the
machines competently varied greatly yet the allowance is paid at a
standard rate. In other words, the allowance is paid to the males
irrespective of the individual demands a particular machine makes
on the operator. I note that if an operative shows no sings of
becoming competent on a machine he will be removed from it and
returned to non-machine work while retaining his basic rate of
pay. I also note that each of the claimants in this case has
operated a machine. Having evaluated the work of the claimants in
this case with the work in respect of which the comparators
receive machine money I have found that the level of demand made
on Mr. Piggott when operating the downs breaker machine is low and
does not compare with the level of demand made on Mr. Leddy in
operating the tape edging machine competently. Having evaluated
the work of the claimants and the machine work of the comparators


in terms of the factors mentioned at Section 3(c) of the Act I
have found that the work of each of the claimants is no less
demanding than the work of Mr. Piggott on the downs breaker
machine and no more demanding than the work of Mr. Leddy on the
tape edging machine.

19. It appears to me, therefore, that as with the payment of the
basic rate, the manner in which the machine allowance is paid
corresponds to the Company's perception of what constitutes a
machine for the purpose of paying machine money. This perception
relates specifically to the sex of the worker concerned and I do
not see any material difference, other than sex, between the range
of work performed by each of the claimants and the range of
machine work performed by each of the comparators which warrants
the payment of a machine allowance to male operatives only.

Grounds other than sex:

20. Having decided that each of the claimants is performing like
work with a named comparator the next question for consideration
is whether there are grounds other than sex within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the Act to justify the difference between the rate
of remuneration paid to the males and that paid to the claimants.

Section 2(3) of the Act states as follows:-

"Nothing in this Act shall prevent an employer from paying to
his employees who are employed on like work in the same place
different rates of remuneration on grounds other than sex."

In the case of one of the comparators, Mr. Corrigan, I accept the
Company's contention that he has a range of duties and a rate of
pay which does not apply to the general factory operatives. Mr.
Corrigan is classified as "staff" and is paid on this basis rather
than on the general operative rate. I accept the Company's
contention that there are grounds other than sex for paying Mr.
Corrigan his rate of pay.

21. In the context of Section 2(3) of the Act the Company also
argue that it could not operate efficiently in the absence of the
flexibility afforded to it by its male operatives. The Company
contend that the interdependence of all the Company's operations
makes the requirement for flexibility essential in the case of
male operatives. The Company further argue that the flexibility
afforded to it by all the comparators is of much greater value to
it in operating efficiently than that which could be afforded to
it by the claimants. The Company maintain that the claimants
cannot give it the same kind of flexibility as can the comparators
and therefore their work is not economically as valuable to the
Company as the work of the males. In terms of Section 2(3) of the


Act the Company contend that the payment of higher rate to the
comparators is the only means by which the required flexibility
could have been achieved by the Company and it is this reason and
not the sex of the workers which accounts for the difference in
the pay rates of the male and female operatives.

22. It appears to me that the crucial question for consideration
in this case is whether the difference in the rates paid to the
male and female operatives is attributable, as the Company
suggests, to objectively justified factors in no way related to
any discrimination based on sex or, as the Union suggest, to the
existence of sex discrimination in the pay rates. The Company
argue in the context of Section 2(3) of the Act, that the payment
of a higher basic rate was the only means by which flexibility
could be achieved. In this regard I consider that the first point
which must be established, as a matter of fact, is whether or not
the higher rate was paid to the males in respect of flexibility.
In this regard, I asked the Company to supply evidence of the wage
negotiations which took place to assign the higher rate to the
males in return for this flexibility.

23. In their evidence on this point the Company admitted that no
specific amount was ascribed to the liability to be flexible in
the rate struck for male operatives but the Company submitted that
in striking the rate for the comparators the issue of flexibility
was high in the minds of the negotiators. The Company contend
that the rate struck for the male operatives recognised the fact
that they were liable to be flexible as and when required to be by
the Company. The Union does not accept the Company's account of
the negotiations which took place concerning the
interchangeability clause in the collective agreements. The Union
point out that in 1980 the 22nd pay round agreements involved
flexibility clauses for all the Company's operatives. The Union
argue that there is no evidence to support the Company's
contention that the flexibility clause in the collective agreement
was ever intended to have a more onerous application in the case
of the male operatives and for which liability they are being
remunerated at a higher rate.

24. I am satisfied that there was never any understanding between
the Company and the Union that the male operatives were being
remunerated at a higher rate because Clause 12 of the
Company/Union registered agreement imposed an extra liability on
the males. It is a fact in this case that the contractual
liability to be interchangeable as per Clause 12 of the collective
agreement is one which applies to both male and female operatives.
I also note that any males who are, in fact, flexible on the
entire range of duties actually receive in excess of the basic
rate viz they receive machine money. Any males who are not in
receipt of machine money do not interchange on machine work
(except during the trail period on machines). In other words, not
all male operatives are, in fact, interchangeable on a Company


wide basis as there is a variety of machine work on which
operatives, deemed not to be competent, could not be asked to be
interchangeable on.

25. In view of my considerations in the previous paragraph I can
find no evidence to support the Company's contention that the
higher basic rate paid to the male operatives was paid in respect
of a more onerous liability to be flexible than applied in the
case of female operatives. I cannot accept, therefore, that the
difference in the pay rates is based on grounds other than sex.

Recommendation

26. In view of my conclusions, and in accordance with the
provisions of section 8(5) of the Act, I recommend that:

(i) Ms. C. Brady, Ms. J. Brady and Ms. C. Costigan are
entitled to be paid the same basic rate as that paid to
Mr. A. Piggott.

(ii) Ms. A. Brady, Ms. B. Dixon, Ms. B. Kavanagh and Ms. V.
Bailey are entitled to be paid the same basic rate as
that paid to Mr. P. Bowden.

(iii) I also recommend that each of the claimants have an
entitlement to be paid machine money of #3.75 per week.

This recommendation is effective from 25th March, 1983, the date
three years prior to the reference of this dispute to me.

In the case of Ms. B. Kavanagh the recommendation is effective
from 25th March, 1983 to the date her employment with the Company
terminated."

6. On the 5th June, 1987 the Company appealed against the
Equality Officer's recommendation in accordance with Section 8(i)
of the Act on the basis that the Equality Officer had erred in law
on a number of issues. The Union lodged an appeal for a
determination dated 10th June, 1987 on the grounds of the
Company's failure to implement the Equality Officer's
recommendation.

7. The Court heard the appeal on 23rd July, 1987, and visited the
factory on the 5th October and 20th November, 1987 to carry out a
work inspection.


8. Copies of the submissions to the Court are printed separately
as appendices 1 and 2 can be had on request. The parties enlarged
on their submissions at the Court hearing and during the visit to
the Company.


10. DETERMINATION:
Due to technical reasons the Determination on this case cannot
appear in the Recommendation field of the Database. However,
it is available if the full text option is chosen.
~

1) The Company listed 13 points of appeal against the Equality
Officer's findings in this case. All points of appeal come
for determination under Section 2 and Section 3 of the
Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974. The Court intends to
deal first with the points of appeal under Section 3(c) of the
Act. In order to apply 3(c) the Court is of the view that an assessment of
comparators in accordance with the terms of 3(c), i.e. in
terms of the demands it makes in relation to such matters as
skill, physical or mental effort, responsibility and working
conditions, is required. The Equality Officer carried out
such an assessment, details of which are included in her
Report. However as the content and conclusions of this
assessment was challenged by the Company on a number of points
the Court decided to carry out its own investigation and
assessment. This was carried out and included two visits to
the factory where the different tasks performed by the
claimants and comparators were examined. Both parties
expressed satisfaction at the nature and extent of the Court's
examination. Having assessed the various tasks according to
the criteria set out in Section 3(c) of the Act the Court
agrees with the Equality Officer's finding in relation to the
demands of the work performed by the claimants vis a vis the
demands of the work performed by the comparators.


2) The Court notes that the demands made on certain of the
claimants are not equal inter se (as they are also not equal
on certain of the comparators inter se) in strict mathematical
terms. In comparing the claimants and the comparators for the
purpose of interpreting Section 3(c) the Court, therefore,
took note of the statement in the High Court by Mr Justice
Keane in the case Murphy and Others -V- Bord Telecom when he
stated:-

"the word equal in value should not be used so as to
require a mathematical exactitude of equality having
regard to the statutory context in which they are used".

The Court also notes the recent European Court decision in the
same case which stated that equal in value must be taken to
include situations where the comparator is performing less
demanding work.

Deciding whether differences in demands are such that the work
may not be regarded as equal in value must be a matter of
judgement. The Court considers it is sensible to base that
judgement on whether the differences in demands are such that
they could be used as a basis for establishing a different
grade, salary scale or rate of pay irrespective of the sex of
the workers concerned. The Court notes that in the case of
the male comparators herein concerned, the differences in


demands did not result in the establishment of a different
grade. The Court is satisfied, on the basis of the inspection
carried out, that each of the claimants is doing work at least
as demanding as A. Piggott in terms of the factors laid down
in Section 3(c) of the Act and therefore a priori are
performing work of equal value to that performed by him.

The Court accordingly rejects the appeals made under Section 3
of the Act.

3) Appeal Under Section 2(3)
The Company places considerable emphasis on the importance of
flexibility in the factory, maintaining that the females
cannot give the same flexibility as the males and therefore
their work is not economically as valuable to the Company.
Reference was made to a Company/Union agreement made in 1980
which placed a contractual liability on employees to be
interchangeable. The Court considers it advisable to quote
the relevant clause which states:

"Interchangeability
Both parties agree that interchangeability of labour is
fundamental to the continuing progress of the company and
the security of employment. The nature of the business
requires changes in assignment from time to time to
perform specific functions and/or complete a production


schedule. The Union accepts the principle of full
interchangeability of employees between jobs within the
plant. Where mobility of employees is required it is a
condition of employment that the workers concerned will
provide no objection to changing jobs, provided there is
no down-grading of the rates of pay for the standard of
performance."

This clause applies to all employees, men and women alike.
The Company maintain that the payment of higher basic rate to
the males was the only means by which flexibility could be
achieved. This contention was not supported by any factual
evidence, rather it was contended that it was in the mind of
the negotiators at that time. This contention is denied by
the Union.

Following examination of all the points made by the parties,
the Court does not find the Company's arguments under Section
2(3) of the Act sustained and accordingly rejects the appeal
under Section 2.

4) Payment of Machine Money
The Court has considered the submissions made by the parties
on this point of the appeal. As the work performed by each of
the claimants has been found to be like work with that


performed by Mr Piggott each of the claimants is entitled to
the same rate of remuneration as paid to Mr Piggott unless
there are grounds other than sex to justify the difference.
The definition of remuneration clearly encompasses machine
money, and Mr Piggott is paid machine money. Consequently the
claimants are entitled to machine money unless as already
stated there are grounds other than sex to justify the non
payment to them of machine money.

Having carefully considered the matter the Court can find no
grounds in the context of Section 2(3) of the Act to justify
the payment of machine money to Mr Piggott and not paying
machine money to the claimants. Machine money is paid solely
to male operatives and the allowance is paid to the males
irrespective of the individual demands a particular machine
makes on the operator. The males retain their machine money
even when taken off machine work. Each of the claimants has
operated a machine and the Court is satisfied, having
considered all aspects of Mr Piggott's work including his
machine work, that the work of each of the claimants is no
less demanding than the work of Mr Piggott. In these
circumstances the Court is satisfied that the Company has no
grounds other than sex for determining who is entitled to
machine money.


The Court accordingly rejects the Company's appeal with regard
to the payment of machine money.

5) The Court has dealt, in paragraphs 1-4 above, with the major
grounds of appeal. Any other issues raised are not such as
would alter the Court's determination.

6) In conclusion the Court, having considered all the submissions
received from the parties and having examined the jobs of each
of the claimants and each of the comparators on the basis of
the criteria set out in Section 3(c) of the Act, is satisfied
that each of the claimants are entitled to be paid the same
basic rate as A. Piggott and that each of the claimants is
also entitled to be paid the same rate of machine money as
paid to Mr Piggott. The claimants are entitled to the rates
concerned with effect from 25th March, 1983, i.e. the date
three years prior to the date of reference of the dispute to
an Equality Officer.
~

Signed on behalf of the Labour Court

Evelyn Owens
_________________________
21st November, 1988 Deputy Chairman.
M.D./J.C.