Labour Court Database __________________________________________________________________________________ File Number: AEE898 Case Number: DEE904 Section / Act: S21EE Parties: NENAGH URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL - and - MS. GRAINNE MCNALLY;THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC;SERVICES UNION AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY AGENCY |
Appeal by the Council against Equality Officer's Recommendation No. EE6/1989 concerning a claim by Ms. McNally that Nenagh Urban District Council discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in relation to its assessment of her for the post of swimming pool superintendent and its decision not to select her for appointment to that post.
Recommendation:
The Determination in this case is too long for the Determination
Field of the Database. It is held in the Document Field.
Division: MrMcGrath Mr Keogh Ms Ni Mhurchu
Text of Document__________________________________________________________________
AEE898 DETERMINATION NO. DEE490
THE LABOUR COURT
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1977
PARTIES: NENAGH URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL
and
MS. GRAINNE McNALLY
(Represented by the Local Government and Public
Services Union and the Employment Equality Agency)
SUBJECT:
1. Appeal by the Council against Equality Officer's
Recommendation No. EE6/1989 concerning a claim by Ms. McNally that
Nenagh Urban District Council discriminated against her on the
basis of her sex in relation to its assessment of her for the post
of swimming pool superintendent and its decision not to select her
for appointment to that post.
BACKGROUND:
2. A vacancy for the post of Superintendent at Nenagh Swimming
Pool arose in 1988 following the resignation of the previous
Superintendent, who had been on leave of absence since January,
1987. Ms. McNally, who had been working as acting Superintendent
during the previous holders leave of absence, applied for the post
along with two other people. The selection procedure consisted of
a practical test and an interview. Ms. McNally and a Mr. X were
successful at the practical test and were subsequently
interviewed.
3. Ms. McNally was notified by letter dated 24th August, 1988
that she had been unsuccessful. She subsequently learned that Mr.
X had been appointed with effect from 1st September, 1989. Ms.
McNally was very surprised by this result as she considered she
had done a good interview and that her qualifications and work
experience were better than those of Mr. X. Ms. McNally was given
no reason as to why her application was unsuccessful and concluded
that the only explanation was that the Council preferred a male
for the post and discriminated against her on the basis of her
sex.
4. Ms. McNally referred a case to the Labour Court under the
Employment Equality Act, 1977, alleging that Nenagh Urban District
Council discriminated against her on grounds of her sex and under
Section 19(2) of the Act the Court referred the dispute to an
Equality Officer for investigation and recommendation. Details of
the Equality Officer's investigation are provided at Appendix I.
5. The conclusions and recommendation of the Equality Officer are
as follows:-
"Conclusions of the Equality Officer:
17. An initial issue arose as to whether or not the dispute
was referred within the terms of Section 19(5) of the Act.
Section 19(5) states:
"Save only where a reasonable cause can be shown, a
reference under this section shall be lodged not later
than six months from the date of the first occurrence of
the act alleged to constitute the discrimination."
Both sides made written and verbal submissions on this issue.
Having considered the submissions made I have reached the
following conclusions:
(a) I am satisfied that the alleged act of discrimination
occurred on 1st September, 1988, i.e. the date on which
Mr. X was appointed. I do not accept the Union's
submission that the relevant date is the date on which
Ms. McNally was informed of the appointment. The
referral was received at the Labour Court on 9th March,
1989 which was 8 days outside the six month time limit.
(b) It follows that the reference can only proceed if it can
be shown that there was reasonable cause for the delay.
The Act gives no guidance as to what can or cannot be
accepted as reasonable cause. In this case Ms. McNally
has stated that she made every effort to ensure that the
case would be submitted in time. She states that she
only became aware of her rights under the Act in early
February, 1989 at which time she initiated a process
which resulted in the preparation of a statement of
claim, its consideration by the local Union committee and
its submission to the Union area head office in Cork
where it was received on 28th February, 1989. I note
that there is only one full time Union official based in
the Cork office and that that official was not at the
Cork office on the 28th February or for a full week after
that, with the result that there was no one present to
deal with Ms. McNally's case and to take steps to have it
referred within the time limit by, for example, faxing it
to the Labour Court or having a Dublin officer deliver a
reference. I note that the claim was referred by the
Union official immediately on his return to the Cork
office.
(c) I am satisfied that Ms. McNally did attempt to have her
case referred within the time limit and that but for the
absence of her full time Union official the case would
have been served within time. I consider that the
absence of the full time Union official from the Cork
office constitutes reasonable cause for the delay in
referring the dispute. I am satisfied, therefore, that
the reference has been made within the terms of Section
19(5).
18. The next issue to be decided is the central issue of
whether or not the Council discriminated against Ms. McNally
on the basis of her sex. Ms. McNally submits that on the
basis of her work experience she was the obvious choice for
the post. She submits that no reasonable explanation has
been put forward for her non-selection and that it must be
concluded, therefore, that she was discriminated against on
the basis of her sex. The Council submits that its decision
was not based on experience alone and that Mr. X's general
suitability and superior performance at the practical test
more than balanced Ms. McNally's experience and resulted in
his selection for the post. I have considered all the
evidence available with a view to deciding, on the balance of
evidence, whether or not discrimination on the basis of sex
took place.
19. As part of my investigation I spoke to all three members
of the interview panel with a view to determining the actual
basis on which the decision was made. During my discussion
with the members of the interview board, I ascertained that
there had been a pre-interview discussion with Mr. McCormack,
the Town Clerk during which they were given a sheet on which
they were to indicate how each candidate scored under the
headings Educational Qualifications, Experience, Practical
Test and General Suitability. The interview board confirmed
that there had been no discussion regarding particular
candidates at the pre-interview discussion and stated that
there selection decision was based on performance at
interview alone. After the interviews there was a short
discussion during which each member indicated a preference
for Mr. X. Having made their decision they then realised
they would have to score the candidates on the Council's form
and they proceeded to allocate marks in such a way as to
reflect the basis for the decision.
20. I am satisfied that the decision to select Mr. X rather
than Ms. McNally was based on a totally subjective assessment
of the performance of the two candidates. No effort was made
to objectively assess each of the candidates under specific
factor headings, such as those given to the interviewers at
the pre-interview stage discussion, and the final selection
decision was based on an overall impression that Mr. X was
more suitable. I accept the Council's submission that,
whilst the interview board's action in failing to mark the
candidates prior to selection was naive, it does not in
itself constitute evidence of discrimination based on sex.
However, it is widely recognised that a subjective decision,
not based on any predetermined criteria, can facilitate
unintentional discrimination. In addition, the failure to
base its selection on an assessment of the candidates under
predetermined criteria makes it more difficult for the
interview board to show that its decision not to select Ms.
McNally was not related to her sex, particularly in the light
of her superior work experience.
21. The interview board did complete a score sheet in
respect of both candidates subsequent to deciding to
recommend Mr. X. They submit that the marks allocated to
the candidates on this sheet reflect the basis for their
selection decision and show clearly that Mr. X was selected
because of his higher scoring in the Practical Test and under
General Suitability. I have considered the marks allocated
to the candidates under each heading and my conclusions are
set out below. The marks awarded were as follows:
_____________________________________________________________
Education/ Experience Practical General Total
Qualifications
_____________________________________________________________
Maximum 50 150 200 200 600
_____________________________________________________________
Mr. X 40 75 160 125 400
Ms. McNally 45 80 140 110 375
_____________________________________________________________
Education/Qualifications and Experience
22. The interview board indicated that it acknowledged Ms.
McNally's higher qualifications and her greater experience
and that this had been reflected in the higher marks awarded
to her under these headings. I have considered the marks
awarded under each of these headings. Both candidates were
well qualified with Ms. McNally having the additional
relevant (although not necessary) qualification as an
Instructor. I consider that this situation is fairly
reflected in the award to both candidates of high marks with
an additional five marks allocated to Ms. McNally.
23. The Council acknowledge that Mr. X's relevant work
experience was limited and submit that this was acknowledged
by the board who awarded him the minimum 50% pass mark of 75
marks. Ms. McNally, however, whose work experience was
substantially greater and more relevant than Mr. X's, scored
only 5 points more than he did under this heading. I note
that the interview board did not question Ms. McNally
regarding her experience as acting Superintendent. I find it
difficult to understand that, having been given a scoresheet
specifying experience as one of the four areas to be
assessed, the board paid so little attention to the
consideration of experience. Furthermore, in view of the
fact that Ms. McNally's work experience is significantly
greater than that of Mr. X, I cannot accept that the marks
allocated by the board are a fair or reasonable reflection of
the experience of the two candidates relative to each other.
I consider that the fact that the board failed to reflect Ms.
McNally's obviously superior work experience in their marking
weighs heavily in favour of the allegation that there was
discrimination against her in the selection process.
Practical Test:
24. The Council has pointed to the importance of practical
ability to the job of Pool Superintendent and submits that
the duties include the safety and, where necessary, the
rescue of swimmers. I note that a qualified life guard is
always present at the same time as the Superintendent to be
involved in a rescue and that it is important therefore that
the Superintendent be a competent lifesaver. I note that in
the Conditions of Employment for the post of Pool
Superintendent, issued by the Council in May, 1988, it states
that "Applicants may be required to undergo a practical test
in lifesaving." The Council submitted that a practical test
would be held where it was felt necessary to test a
candidate's competence. In this case Ms. McNally was fully
qualified, with over four years experience as a Lifeguard and
one and a half years experience as a Superintendent.
However, the Council considered that it was necessary to test
her to ensure that her abilities were still up to standard.
The interview board states that as a result of the test they
were satisfied with regard to Ms. McNally's competency but
that they scored Mr. X higher under this heading because he
performed a better test.
25. I note that the test applied in the practical test was a
standard life-saving test which involved timed swimming,
timed towing of a person over a distance, dealing with
swimmers in distress and theory. Mr. Corcoran of the Irish
Water Safety Association carried out the test and stated that
he marked both candidates in the normal way for a lifesaving
test. I note that the Council agree that physique is not
important for the Superintendent post and that it is only
essential that candidates demonstrate basic competency. Yet
Mr. Corcoran has acknowledged that physique did effect
performance in this test as Mr. X was stronger and faster in
the water with the result that he obtained higher marks.
26. I note that the objective of the practical test was to
establish a candidate's competency. I am satisfied that Ms.
McNally proved her competency at the practical test. It is a
fact that males, because of their larger physique, can in
general swim faster than females and would therefore score
higher on a timed test. I am satisfied that the fact that
Ms. McNally was marked lower than Mr. X in the practical test
was directly related to her sex in that she was unable
to match his speed and strength. I consider that if, in a
selection process, a person is awarded higher marks as a
result of an attribute or ability related to his sex, it must
be established that the attribute or ability is necessary for
the job. In this case the Council has agreed that it was
only necessary to establish competence as a lifesaver. In
these circumstances I consider that additional marks awarded
to Mr. X, over and above marks for competency, were not
necessary to the assessment of suitability for a post as
Superintendent and that, where these marks related to
physique and swimming speed, they resulted in less favourable
treatment of Ms. McNally because of her sex.
General Suitability:
27. In view of my conclusions that Ms. McNally was treated
less favourably in the assessment of experience and in the
practical test, I consider that an onus rests with the
Council to be specific and clear on the reasons why Mr. X's
general suitability outweighed Ms. McNally's experience.
28. The interview board indicated that under the heading of
general suitability they considered such factors as knowledge
of pool/maintenance, promotion of pool, personality and
organisational ability. There is very little objective
evidence as to how each candidate was assessed, the only
indication being that Mr. X scored a total of 125 marks and
Ms. McNally scored 110 marks. The interview board emphasised
that they had been more impressed with Mr. X's ideas and
enthusiasm for the promotion of the pool. They agreed that
Ms. McNally's personality was more impressive than that of
Mr. X. They indicated that Mr. X had responded better to
questions in relation to the use of chemicals and pool
maintenance and they indicated that Mr. X gave more positive
answers than Ms. McNally in relation to organisation of the
pool.
29. In response to my questions regarding assessment of
general suitability, I consider that the members of the
interview board were vague and non-specific. They simply
stated that they were more impressed with Mr. X's ideas in
relation to promotion of the pool, his knowledge of chemicals
and his organisational ability. No details of the responses
he gave as against the responses given by Ms. McNally were
provided and no record of responses of the candidates were
kept. I note that the interview board did not question Ms.
McNally during the interview regarding the performance of her
duties, or her experience, as acting Superintendent. In
these circumstances I consider that there is some doubt as to
whether or not Ms. McNally was given full credit for her
organisational ability, use of chemicals and promotion of the
pool, as shown by her during her one and a half years as
acting Superintendent, during which time, she submits, there
were no difficulties or complaints.
30. Having considered the subjective nature in which general
suitability was assessed, the vagueness of the statements of
the interview board that they were more impressed with Mr. X
and in view of the doubt as to whether or not full credit was
given for the performance of the duties by her during her
time as acting Superintendent, I consider that there is no
basis on which it would be reasonable for me to accept the
interview board's submission that Mr. X deserved higher marks
than Ms. McNally under the heading of general suitability.
31. In summary, I have concluded that the decision not to
select Ms. McNally was made in a most subjective manner, on
the basis of a general impression gained at the interviews,
and I consider that this poses difficulties for the Council
in explaining why, despite her superior work experience, Ms.
McNally was not selected. The only evidence of the basis for
the interviewers' impression is the marks allocated
subsequent to the selection decision, which are claimed to
reflect the basis for the decision. I have examined these
marks and I have given the interview board an opportunity to
explain the marks awarded to each candidate. I am satisfied
that Ms. McNally's significantly superior work experience was
not reflected in the marks awarded to her, that because of
her sex she was treated less favourably than Mr. X in the
practical test and that the Council cannot explain the
selection of Mr. X by reference to his general suitability.
In all of these circumstances I am satisfied that Ms. McNally
was discriminated against and that but for discrimination
against her she would have been recommended for the post.
32. The final question which arises is whether or not the
discrimination against Ms. McNally was based on her sex. I
note that the Court of Appeal for Northern Ireland in the
case of Wallace v. South Eastern Education and Library Board
(1980, IRLR, 193) found that -
"Once discrimination is proved, as it was in the
present case, the fact that the successful candidate
was a man and the unsuccessful but better candidate
was a woman is itself evidence of discrimination on
grounds of sex."
Taking the finding of the Northern Ireland Appeal Court into
account and in view of the obvious discrimination against Ms.
McNally in the marks awarded for experience and the fact that
her lower score in the practical test was related to her sex,
I am satisfied that Ms. McNally was discriminated against on
the basis of her sex. I am also satisfied that but for the
sex discrimination she would have been selected as Swimming
Pool Superintendent.
.RECOMMENDATION:
33. Where it has been established that but for sex
discrimination an individual would have been appointed to a
post, I consider that, normally, the best remedy would be to
put the person in the position they would have held but for
the discrimination. However, in this case Ms. McNally is not
seeking appointment to the post because of her concern for
the disruption and resentment this would cause in view of the
fact that Mr. X has now been employed in the post for almost
one full year. Instead, Ms. McNally is seeking compensation
for loss of earnings, mental anguish and the loss of status
resulting from the discrimination. Had Ms. McNally been
appointed on 1st September, 1988 she would have received
#159.87 per week. However, because of the discrimination she
was forced to revert to her old position of Lifeguard at
#121.29 per week. It follows that she has suffered a loss of
earnings at a rate of #38.58 per week.
34. The Council states that in April, 1989 Ms. McNally
applied for voluntary redundancy for domestic/family reasons
and submits that her loss of earnings should not continue
beyond the date on which her voluntary redundancy takes
effect. Ms. McNally submits that she applied for the
voluntary redundancy because of her loss of status at her
place of employment, which made it difficult for her to
continue, and because as a result of her loss of earnings she
could not longer afford the expense of a child minder.
35. I am satisfied that Ms. McNally would have experienced a
significant level of difficulty in coping with a situation
where after one and a half years as acting Superintendent she
was reverted to Lifeguard and was replaced by a person who
had worked to her as a temporary Lifeguard during the
previous summer. Her distress must have been increased by
her belief that she had been discriminated against by her
employer and was suffering financial difficulties as a result
of that discrimination. I consider that in these
circumstances, it is reasonable to believe that Ms. McNally's
decision to take voluntary redundancy was influenced by the
loss of status and reduction in salary resulting from the
discrimination. I consider therefore that the compensation
for loss of earnings resulted from the discrimination should
not be confined to covering the period prior to the date of
her redundancy. I consider that Ms. McNally is entitled to
compensation for loss suffered to date and in view of the
fact that her loss is ongoing she is also entitled to
compensation in respect of future loss. I consider the
amount of #5,000 to be fair and reasonable compensation for
future loss.
36. In all of the circumstances of this case I recommend
that Nenagh Urban District Council should pay Ms. McNally the
sum of #7,852 as compensation under the terms of the
Employment Equality Act, 1977, which sum is made up of #1,852
(#38.52 X 48 weeks) in respect of loss of earnings to date,
#5,000 in respect of future loss of earnings and #1,000 as
compensation for the distress and loss of status suffered as
a result of the discrimination."
6. Nenagh Urban District Council appealed the Equality Officer's
Recommendation on the following grounds:
(1) A challenge on matters of fact.
(2) A challenge on matters of law.
(3) That the case should have been allowed at all being
outside the six months time limit.
(4) That the amount is excessive.
The Court heard the appeal in Nenagh on 15th November, 1989. The
submissions from the Council and the Union are attached as
appendices to this Determination. The parties expanded orally on
these submissions at the hearing.
*DETERMINATION:
7. The Court heard the grounds of appeal given in the written
notice of appeal dated 31st August, 1989, submissions, both
written and verbal made at the hearing and the further written
submissions made by the parties.
The substantial grounds of appeal concerned (1) the application of
the time limit for lodging a complaint (2) the Equality Officer's
assessment and decision in relation to the interview procedure and
recommendation and (3) the amount of compensation recommended.
The Court having considered the case made finds as follows:-
1. Section 19(5) Employment Equality Act, 1977.
The Court has fully considered the reasons put forward by
the claimant for the delay in lodging the complaint.
The Court considers the grounds put forward show
reasonable cause for delay as required under the above
section of the Act.
Further the Court considers, given all the circumstances,
that to decide otherwise would be to unreasonably deny
the complainant the opportunity to seek redress under the
legislation.
Interview Procedure
It was argued by the Urban Council that the interview
system was designed to objectively assess each of the
candidates.
To aid the interview board in this task, and to more
easily enable the obligation of the board to be fulfilled
(i.e. to recommend the best or none of the candidates for
the post), specific factor headings and markings were
allocated at the pre-interview stage. There were 4
factors with marks to be allocated under each heading and
totalled.
Max
Education Qualifications 50
Experience 150
Practical Test 200
General Suitability 200
____
600 Max Total
The interview board in this case did not use the aid
provided as anticipated under the system.
Instead following the interview the board held a
discussion during which each member indicated a
preference for Mr. X. Only at this time did the board
proceed to allocate marks in respect of the
pre-determined factors.
Marking of the Factors
The Court fully considered the submissions of the parties
in respect of the marking of the factors and finds as
follows:-
(i) Education/Qualifications
The Equality Officer in his report summed up fairly
the situation as it applied under this factor.
The Court notes the parties are not challenging his
findings under this heading.
(ii) Practical Test
The Court in considering the submissions of the
parties under this factor noted that both applicants
were qualified lifeguards and that the complainant
held the post of lifeguard at the pool for four
years and Mr. X for 4 months.
The Court also notes the Urban District Council has
agreed with the Equality Officer that for the purpose of
the job concerned it was only necessary to establish
competence as a lifesaver.
The Court further noted that the interview board stated
to the Equality Officer that as a result of the test the
board was satisfied with regard to the competency of the
complainant but the board had scored the other candidate
higher under this heading because he performed a better
test.
The Court also noted that the tester acknowledged to the
Equality Officer that physique did affect performance and
that Mr. X was stronger and faster in the water and as a
consequence was awarded higher marks.
The Court finds that the objective of the practical test
- namely competency, was established in respect of both
candidates but that the candidates were marked
differently as a consequence of attributes not relevant
to competency but of relevance to the sex of the
candidate.
The Court concurs with the finding of the Equality
Officer that the additional marks awarded for this
ability above those necessary for competency were not
necessary to the assessment under this heading and
resulted in the complainant receiving less favourable
treatment because of her sex.
Experience
The job for which the interviews were held was Pool
Superintendent.
The complainant in so far as the interview board were
aware, had filled the vacancy of Pool Superintendent in a
temporary capacity satisfactorily for some 18 months and
had worked at the Pool as a lifeguard for a period of
four years prior to taking up the temporary position.
By contrast Mr. X had been employed as a temporary
lifeguard for a period of four months.
The Court finds in the light of the above that the
difference in marking on this factor allocated by the
interview board does not adequately reflect the
difference in the experience of the two candidates.
The Court concurs with the report of the Equality Officer
that the fact that the board failed to reflect the
complainants work experience weighs heavily in favour of
the allegation that there was discrimination against her.
In arriving at the above conclusion the Court has
considered the contention of the Urban District Council
that "previous experience was not necessary" and "that
there are several cases of persons being appointed to
posts without any previous experience." The Court would
however draw attention to the fact that specific factor
headings were given to the interviewers at the pre
interview stage for the conduct of the interview and that
25% (150) of the total marks (600) were allocated for the
factor of experience.
General Suitability
The Court has considered the submissions and the Equality
Officers report regarding the factor of general
suitability.
The Court has difficulty in establishing precisely what
sub factors were used to assess general suitability.
Matters such as mechanical knowledge, marketing and ideas
to promote the pool; ability to deal with the public, and
enthusiasm were listed in the appeal. While under the
heading of experience matters such as technical
competence, promotion of pool, personal attributes - were
raised. The U.D.C. were vague and imprecise as to how
these matters were assessed and if they were assessed
twice both under the heading of Experience and General
Suitability.
No records of the interview other than personal
recollection were made available to the Court or indeed
at the Equality Officer hearing.
The Court accordingly had no documentary evidence
available to it to support or refute the points raised by
the parties.
In the light of the submissions made at the hearing, and
bearing in mind the evidence presented to the Equality
Officer was at a time when recollections of the details
of the interview process would have been clearer, the
Court agrees with the conclusions of the Equality Officer
that the assessment of the Interview Board under this
heading which awarded higher marks to Mr. X was
subjective.
Other Issues
The U.D.C. argued that members of the interview board
were not aware of the significance of the Equality
Officer hearing and were therefore less conscious of the
impact or importance of their evidence. The Court does
not accept this argument.
The Urban District Council representative was present at
the Equality Officer hearing and the Council had
assistance at the hearing from a representative of the
Local Government Staff Negotiating Board.
Determination
The interview system was used as a basis to assess the
candidates.
It is the function of the Court to determine whether as
concluded by the Equality Officer the sex of candidates
influenced the choice of the interview board.
The Court having examined the evidence as a whole and the
submissions by the parties holds that there was
discrimination against the complainant.
The Court further finds that had this act of
discrimination not occurred the claimant would have been
recommended to the County Manager for appointment.
Any question of whether or not a recommendation in her
favour would or would not have been approved by the
County Manager based on information not available to the
interview board, and not the subject of the Equality
Officer Recommendation under appeal, is hypothetical and
is not accepted as a valid point of appeal.
The Court further finds no grounds for altering the
amount of the compensation recommended by the Equality
Officer.
Therefore, pursuant to its powers under Section 22(c) of
the Employment Equality Act, 1977 the Court awards
compensation to the complainant, Ms. Grainne McNally, in
the sum of #7,852.00 which is the amount it thinks
reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the
case.
DETERMINATION:
The Determination in this case is too long for the Determination
Field of the Database. It is held in the Document Field.
~
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Tom McGrath
_______________________
4th October, 1990. Deputy Chairman.
M.D./J.C.
APPENDIX I
Details of the Equality Officer's Investigation
9th March, 1989 - The Local Government and Public
Services Union referred the dispute to
the Labour Court.
31st March, 1989 - The Labour Court referred the dispute
to an Equality Officer for
investigation and recommendation.
7th April, 1989 - The Equality Officer requested the
parties to forward submissions on the
question of whether or not the dispute
had been referred within the terms of
Section 19(5) of the Act. A
preliminary meeting to discuss this
issue was arranged for 25th April,
1989.
20th April, 1989 - Submissions were received from both
sides on the Section 19(5) issue and
were exchanged between the parties.
25th April, 1989 - Preliminary joint meeting held.
2nd May, 1989 - The Equality Officer wrote to both
parties indicating that he was
satisfied that the dispute had been
referred within the terms of Section
19(5) and requesting a full submission
to be forwarded before 24th May, 1989.
24th May, 1989 - Written submissions forwarded by both
parties.
26th May, 1989 - The Equality Officer exchanged the
submissions between the parties and
requested the Council to forward
additional details. He also requested
the Council to arrange to have each of
the members of the interview board
present at the joint meeting arranged
for 21st June, 1989.
13th June, 1989 - Additional details were forwarded by
the Council and copied to the Union.
21st June, 1989 - The final joint meeting was held.