Labour Court Database __________________________________________________________________________________ File Number: AEP9010 Case Number: DEP914 Section / Act: S8(1)AD Parties: GLANMIRE INDUSTRIES LIMITED - and - SERVICES INDUSTRIAL PROFESSIONAL TECHNICAL UNION |
Appeal by the Union against Equality Officer's Recommendation No. EP12/1990 concerning a claim by a named female worker that she is entitled to the same rate of remuneration as that paid to a named male worker.
Recommendation:
7. The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and
oral evidence presented at the hearing. In its deliberations the
Court took account of the following facts:-
- The Company records show that the claimant is the first
woman employed in the Laboratory but the use of
experience and practical knowledge as a basis for pay was
used when only men were employed there. Therefore the
method of pay is not sex-based.
The work in the Laboratory has a considerable element of
research and development as evidenced by the list of
projects submitted by the Company. The Court accepts
that in such work relevant experience and practical
knowledge are factors to take into account in determining
pay.
- The Comparator's experience and practical knowledge are
relevant to the work and are greater than that of the
claimant. The Court considers that this is a valid
ground other than sex for a difference in pay.
- The Union is correct in stating that a formal method of
evaluating experience and practical knowledge is not
applied in the Company, but this does not invalidate the
use of these factors in establishing pay rates. The
Court does not consider the absence of a pay-scale
unusual where there is a very small work-group involved.
- The Court does not regard the question of titles as
having any bearing on the case.
Resulting from its deliberations, the Court is satisfied that the
recommendation of the Equality Officer was well grounded and that
she took account of all relevant information available to her,
that she interpreted Section 2(3) of the Act correctly and was
correct in concluding that the Company had satisfied the onus of
proof under that Section.
Accordingly the Court does not uphold the Union appeal.
Division: CHAIRMAN Mr Brennan Mr Rorke
Text of Document__________________________________________________________________
AEP9010 DETERMINATION NO. DEP491
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION (PAY) ACT, 1974
DETERMINATION NO. 4 OF 1991
PARTIES: GLANMIRE INDUSTRIES LIMITED
(REPRESENTED BY THE FEDERATION OF IRISH EMPLOYERS
and
SERVICES INDUSTRIAL PROFESSIONAL TECHNICAL UNION
SUBJECT:
1. Appeal by the Union against Equality Officer's Recommendation
No. EP12/1990 concerning a claim by a named female worker that she
is entitled to the same rate of remuneration as that paid to a
named male worker.
BACKGROUND:
2. On 29th January, 1990 the Union requested an investigation by
an Equality Officer of a dispute as to whether or not a named
female worker of the Company is entitled under the Act to the same
rate of remuneration as a named male worker of the Company. Both
the named female worker and named male worker are employed in the
laboratory in the Company. The female worker is paid #185 per
week and the male worker #230 per week. It has been accepted by
the Company that both workers are employed on 'like work.'
Therefore, arguments in this dispute relate to Section 2(3) of the
Act.
3. The Company's position is that there are grounds other than
sex which justify the differences in the rates of pay of these
workers. The Company submits that these grounds are differences
in the experience of the workers and the value of this experience
to the Company. The Union's position is that both workers are
performing like work, that there are no grounds other than sex for
the difference in the rates of pay of the female worker and the
male worker and that the claimant is therefore entitled to equal
pay with the male worker.
4. The conclusions and recommendation of the Equality Officer
which issued on 30th November, 1990 are attached at Appendix 1.
Labour Court Investigation:
5. On 13th December, 1990 the Union appealed the recommendation
of the Equality Officer to the Labour Court. The Union's grounds
of appeal were as follows:-
That the Equality Officer
1. Erred in failing to take account of all the information
available to her.
2. Erred in concluding that the Company had satisfied the onus
of proof under Section 2(3) of the Act.
3. Erred in her interpretation of Section 2(3).
4. Any other grounds which may arise during the hearing.
6. The Court heard the appeal on 25th April, 1991. The written
submissions to the Court are attached as Appendices 2 and 3.
DETERMINATION:
7. The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and
oral evidence presented at the hearing. In its deliberations the
Court took account of the following facts:-
- The Company records show that the claimant is the first
woman employed in the Laboratory but the use of
experience and practical knowledge as a basis for pay was
used when only men were employed there. Therefore the
method of pay is not sex-based.
The work in the Laboratory has a considerable element of
research and development as evidenced by the list of
projects submitted by the Company. The Court accepts
that in such work relevant experience and practical
knowledge are factors to take into account in determining
pay.
- The Comparator's experience and practical knowledge are
relevant to the work and are greater than that of the
claimant. The Court considers that this is a valid
ground other than sex for a difference in pay.
- The Union is correct in stating that a formal method of
evaluating experience and practical knowledge is not
applied in the Company, but this does not invalidate the
use of these factors in establishing pay rates. The
Court does not consider the absence of a pay-scale
unusual where there is a very small work-group involved.
- The Court does not regard the question of titles as
having any bearing on the case.
Resulting from its deliberations, the Court is satisfied that the
recommendation of the Equality Officer was well grounded and that
she took account of all relevant information available to her,
that she interpreted Section 2(3) of the Act correctly and was
correct in concluding that the Company had satisfied the onus of
proof under that Section.
Accordingly the Court does not uphold the Union appeal.
~
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Kevin Heffernan
__________________________
16th July, 1991. Chairman
U.M./J.C.
APPENDICES
CONTENTS
1. Appendix 1 - Equality Officer's Conclusions and Recommendation.
2. Appendix 2 - Union's submission.
3. Appendix 3 - Company's submission.
APPENDIX 1
EQUALITY OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF 30TH NOVEMBER, 1990.
Conclusions
13. I note that the Company accepts that Ms. Cherry and Mr. Cogan
are employed on like work. Section 2(1) of the Act provides for
entitlement to the same rate of remuneration between men and women
employed on like work in the same place by the same employer.
However, the Company contends that under the terms of Section 2(3)
of the Act it is not obliged to pay the same rate of remuneration
to Ms. Cherry and Mr. Cogan. Section 2(3) of the Act provides:
"Nothing in this Act shall prevent an employer from paying to
his employees who are employed on like work in the same place
different rates of remuneration on grounds other than sex."
The question to be decided by me is whether there are grounds
other than sex, within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, for
the difference in the rates of pay of Ms. Cherry and Mr. Cogan.
14. The onus of proof, under Section 2(3) of the Act, rests with
the employer, to show that the difference in pay rates is on
grounds other than sex. The Company contends that the pay rates
of Ms. Cherry and Mr. Cogan reflect their experience and their
value to the Company. It contends that experience is the relevant
factor in the difference between their salaries.
15. Having considered the submissions of both parties and the
wage histories (Appendix 2) submitted by the Company, I am
satisfied that the Company's normal practice is to make a pay
differential for experience. The Appendix includes details of the
two persons previously employed on the same work as the claimant
and comparator viz. Mr. Martin and Mr. O'Neill. The claimant, in
fact, replaced Mr. O'Neill. Mr. Martin who had a Certificate in
Chemical Technology and a Diploma in Food Technology and Mr.
O'Neill who had no qualifications, commenced at the general
operative rate and their rates increased above the basic general
operative rate with experience. Their starting rate was somewhat
lower than that of Ms. Cherry who had a degree, and considerably
lower than that of Mr. Cogan, who had a Certificate in Chemical
Technology and ten years working experience. Mr. O'Neill received
a rate 9% above the basic general operative rate after almost four
years experience in the laboratory. Ms. Cherry received 19.6%
above the general operative rate after one year.
I consider that the Company's practice, to make a pay differential
for experience, which is applied to both males and females
irrespective of their sex, is not discriminatory on the basis of
sex and that as Ms. Cherry and Mr. Cogan are paid in accordance
with this practice there are valid grounds other than sex within
the meaning of Section 2(3) to justify the difference in their
rates of pay.
APPENDIX 1
Recommendation
16. In view of my conclusions in the preceding paragraphs, I find
that Ms. Cherry does not have an entitlement under the terms of
the Act to equal pay with Mr. Cogan.