Labour Court Database __________________________________________________________________________________ File Number: CD91168 Case Number: LCR13292 Section / Act: S26(1) Parties: IARNROD EIREANN - and - NATIONAL BUS AND RAIL UNION |
Claim by the Union on behalf of locomotive drivers in receipt of the One Person Operation (O.P.O.) allowance for the inclusion of the allowance in basic pay and in the calculation of disability and pension entitlement.
Recommendation:
8. Having considered the submissions made by the parties the
Court does not consider that any circumstances exist which would
warrant any change in the standard pension or disability
arrangements for the workers concerned. The Court therefore does
not recommend concession of the Union's claim.
Division: Mr O'Connell Mr McHenry Mr Walsh
Text of Document__________________________________________________________________
CD91168 RECOMMENDATION NO. LCR13292
THE LABOUR COURT
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTS 1946 TO 1990
SECTION 26(1), INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1990
PARTIES: IARNROD EIREANN
AND
NATIONAL BUS AND RAIL UNION
SUBJECT:
1. Claim by the Union on behalf of locomotive drivers in receipt
of the One Person Operation (O.P.O.) allowance for the inclusion
of the allowance in basic pay and in the calculation of disability
and pension entitlement.
BACKGROUND:
2. Since the inception of the D.A.R.T. service seven years ago,
the drivers of these trains, which are O.P.O. are paid a special
allowance of 20.50% of their basic rate for operating guardless
trains. The Union claims that the 20.50% allowance which it says is
part of the normal weekly rate of pay should be taken into account
for the purpose of calculation of payments made under the
locomotive drivers disablement scheme. The Company states that
its statutory pension scheme provides for basic pay only to be
taken into account for pension purposes. It also states that the
claim, which was first submitted by the Union in August 1990, is
precluded under the terms of the Programme for National Recovery.
The issue could not be resolved at local discussions and was
referred to the conciliation service of the Labour Relations
Commission on the 22nd November, 1990. A conciliation conference
was held on the 22nd February, 1991 but no agreement was reached.
The dispute was referred to the Labour Court by the Labour
Relations Commission on the 6th March, 1991. A Court hearing was
held on the 7th May, 1991.
UNION'S ARGUMENTS:
3. 1. The drivers on the D.A.R.T. operate in an isolated link
situation. They are not allowed to drive any other type of
train and are permanently engaged in One Person Operation
(O.P.O.). It was on the insistence of the Company that this
isolated link was established.
2. The 20.50% allowance is part of the drivers normal
earnings and they set their standards in line with their
permanent earnings. This is perfectly natural in view of
their isolated link agreement. They are entitled to commit
themselves financially in line with their minimum earnings.
3. The increased pressures related to O.P.O. drivers does
nothing for the health of these workers. They now must deal
directly with any irate passengers, a duty for which the
workers concerned have not been trained. They come face to
face regularly with acts of violence and vandalism which is
an increasing problem. The same drivers are required to
present themselves for periodic medical examination.
Unfortunately there is a relatively high failure rate among
drivers at these examinations. The Locomotive Drivers
Disablement Scheme has a claims rate of 16% at this time.
the normal rate would be less than 1%.
4. There has been a continuous shortage of drivers on the
D.A.R.T. from the beginning of operations. There is a
shortage at the present time resulting in drivers working a
high degree of overtime. While this may increase the level
of the workers' earnings it also inevitably increases
pressure and a higher likelihood of the drivers concerned
failing the medical examination than the drivers engaged in
conventional train working. When drivers fail their medical
they lose not only overtime earnings but also the 20.50% bonus
which was part of permanent minimum earnings on which they
set their standards.
5. The Locomotive Drivers Disablement Scheme was
established so that drivers who were required by law to sit
for periodic medical examinations and who subsequently failed
the medical examination would enjoy income continuance at
100% of their basic rate. The basic rate standard was set
prior to the introduction of O.P.O.
6. It is grossly unjust that the drivers, who are operating
the D.A.R.T. services who are in the senior links and would
expect to remain there until retirement, are being denied the
benefit of their basic earnings by not having the 20.50%
bonus-included in their basic rate.
COMPANY'S ARGUMENTS:
4. 1. The C.I.E. Pension Scheme covering operative grades is a
statutory scheme which is a joint contributory one. Both the
amount of contribution and the amount of pension are directly
related to basic pay which is defined by the Statutory
Instrument as:
"The standard weekly pay without regard to any
differential, allowance, bonus or other additional
payment immediately before retirement".
2. The existing basic rate of pay of a locomotive driver is
#196.89 per week and the corresponding pension is #39.50 per
week. Inclusion of the 20.50% D.A.R.T. bonus for pension
purposes would increase the pension to #40.50 per week. The
pension is not co-ordinated with Social Welfare payments so
that the full pension is always paid in addition to full
Social Welfare entitlements. A recent review of the pension
scheme resulted in an increase of #3.00 per week in pension
paid to locomotive drivers with effect from 1st February
last; this review in pensions cost C.I.E. an additional
#190,000 per annum.
3. The Union has argued that as the D.A.R.T. bonus is paid
on a regular basis, it should count for pension purposes.
However, there are numerous other bonuses and allowances paid
to various grades on a regular basis throughout the Company
which are not included for pension purposes. (Details
supplied to the Court). If these allowances were included
for pension purposes it would mean an additional cost on the
Company by way of increased contributions and in respect of
parity increases in pensions.
4. Parity increases in pensions are paid entirely by the
Company. For example, a D.A.R.T. driver who retired in 1985
got a pension from the Scheme of #16.50 per week. He is
still drawing this amount from the Scheme but in addition the
Company pays a supplement of #23.00 per week to bring the
pension to #39.50. The Pension Scheme is funded and adequate
but funds must be invested at all times to meet liabilities.
Accordingly, parity increases are paid solely by the Company
and the current cost of this implementation for operative
staff is #2.9 million.
5. There is a disablement scheme in operation for
locomotive drivers which is in effect an income continuance
scheme. This ensures the driver's basic rate of pay at the
time he goes on the scheme until retirement age of 65 years.
(Details supplied to the Court). The scheme is underwritten
by an Assurance Company and the premium (8.9% of basic pay)
is paid 50% by the Company and 50% by the employee. For
1990, the scheme cost the Company #148,500. An increase in
basic pay means an automatic increase in the amount of the
premium paid by the Company.
6. All locomotive drivers, Mainline and D.A.R.T., receive
the same rate of pension and are paid disablement benefit on
the same basis. This would no longer be the case if the
Union's claim were to be conceded. There are 307 mainline
drivers/probationary drivers and 49 D.A.R.T. drivers. In
1984, when the question of different rates of pay arose for
D.A.R.T. and mainline drivers with regard to the payments to
be made for the introduction of CAWS and train radios, the
I.C.T.U. Group of Unions specifically said in writing that
they would "not accept any proposals which lead to a
variation in basic rate of pay between locomotive drivers".
7. The agreement with the trade unions for payment of the
wage round increases under the P.N.R. specifically provide
that no cost increasing claims will be served or
implemented". Accordingly, this claim is precluded under
this agreement and should not have been served. The
accumulated cost of the PNR amounts to #16.8 million. In
1989, the Labour Court investigated a claim by the N.B.R.U.
for the inclusion of the O.P.O. bonus for pension purposes in
the case of road passenger drivers employed in Bus Eireann.
This is relevant in so far as Bus Eireann has a similar
agreement with the trade unions in relation to the payment of
the PNR increases. The Court in Recommendation No. 12247
stated "the Court finds validity in the Company's argument
that the terms of the agreement on pay for the 27th Round,
reached between the N.B.R.U. and the Company which
incorporates the terms of the PNR, preclude these claims".
RECOMMENDATION:
8. Having considered the submissions made by the parties the
Court does not consider that any circumstances exist which would
warrant any change in the standard pension or disability
arrangements for the workers concerned. The Court therefore does
not recommend concession of the Union's claim.
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Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
24th May, 1991 John O'Connell
T.O'D. / M.O'C. _______________
Deputy Chairman