FULL RECOMMENDATION
SECTION 77, EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998 PARTIES : A FIRM OF SOLICITORS - AND - A WORKER (REPRESENTED BY THE EQUALITY AUTHORITY) DIVISION : Chairman: Mr Duffy Employer Member: Mr Keogh Worker Member: Mr O'Neill |
1. Alleged unfair dismissal under Section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998.
BACKGROUND:
2. The respondents are a firm of solicitors. The complainant was employed by the respondent as a legal secretary from July 1999 until 9th May 2000 when she was dismissed. The complainant claimed that her dismissal resulted from the decision of the respondent to employ a younger person and that this constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Section 8 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (the Act). She referred a complaint to the Court pursuant to Section 77 of the Act. A Labour Court hearing took place on 2nd May 2001.
DETERMINATION:
Having considered the submissions of the parties and having evaluated the evidence adduced the Court has reached the following conclusions:
There was a sharp conflict between the parties as to whether thecomplainant's employment was temporary or permanent in nature. The respondent regarded the complainant as temporary and this was a factor which was taken into account in selecting her for dismissal. For her part the complainant believed that following an initial period in which she was providing holiday covers for other staff, she was in permanent employment.
The complainant had never been provided with a statement particularising the status and conditions of her employment as is required by the Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994. Section 3(1)(f) of that Act provides that where a contract of employment is temporary, this should be specified in writing together with the expected duration of the employment. Had such a statement been provided the nature of the complainant's tenure would have been made clear.
However, in the Courts view it is of no consequence to the outcome of the present case, whether thecomplainant's employment was temporary or permanent if, as alleged, the reason for her dismissal was related to her age. For that reason the Court finds it unnecessary to make any finding on this question.
The Court accepts that at some time before thecomplainant's dismissal the senior partners of the firms came to a decision to engage a young person who could be trained to provide quasi-legal services together with secretarial services. The complainant was never considered for that position despite her prior experience both as a legal secretary and in undertaking quasi legal functions in relation to convayencing and probate. The Court is satisfied as a matter of fact that the dominant reason why the complainant was not considered for this position was because the firm had decided that it wished to employ a person of a significantly younger age that that of the complainant. Having decided to recruit a new member of staff the firm then decided to dispense with the services of the complainant.
There was a further sharp conflict between the complainant and the partner who dismissed her on what was said at the meeting held to inform her of thefirm's decision. The complainant maintained that the partner told her that it had been decided to“take on a young girl who could be trained to do her job”. In his evidence to the Court the partner in question confirmed that he told the complainant that it was intended to take on a young girl but strenuously denied saying that she would be trained to do the complainants job.
Thecomplainant's version of what was said at this meeting is supported by the content of correspondence between the parties immediately following the dismissal. On the following day (10thMay 2000) the complainant wrote to a senior partner of the respondent in relation to her dismissal and recited her version of what he had conveyed to her in relation to the firms intention to train a young person to do her job. She went on to express her surprise that such a statement would have been made by a Solicitor. By letter dated 12thMay 2000 the senior partner of the responded replied to the complainant but did not demur from her assertion as to the verbatim content of what he had said on the material point.
It is clear to the Court that the decision to dismiss the complainant flowed directly from the decision to take on a new employee to fill a redesigned post. This post effectively replaced the position in which the complainant was employed. Notwithstanding her long experience and apparent suitability for training in quasi-legal functions, the respondent never considered redeploying the complainant into the redesigned post as an alternative to dismissal. The Court is satisfied that this arose because the firm had decided that the redesigned post would be reserved for a young person and that the complainant, by reason of her age, did not meet this requirement.It follows that there was a causal connection between the dismissal of the complainant and her
age. In these circumstances the Court finds that the respondent did discriminate against the
complainant on the age ground contrary to Section 8 in terms of Section 6(2)(f) of the
Employment Equality Act 1998.
Redress.
The Court is satisfied that the most appropriate form of redress in this case is an award of compensation. Taking all the circumstances of the case into account the Court considers that the amount of compensation, which is reasonable in this case, is £6,000. An order will be made directing the respondent herein to pay the complainant compensation in that amount.
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Kevin Duffy
21st May, 2001______________________
HMCD/CCDeputy Chairman
NOTE
Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Helena McDermott, Court Secretary.