Mr. Brendan Sheeran, Dublin V Office of Public Works
Headnotes
Equal Status Act, 2000 - Direct Discrimination, Section 3(1)(a) - The Religion ground,
Section 3(2)(e) - Provision of services, Section 5(1) - Obligations under the Constitution
The complainant referred a claim to the Director of Equality Investigations under the
Equal Status Act 2000. In accordance with her powers under section 75 of the
Employment Equality Act, the Director then delegated the case to me, Bernadette
Treanor, an Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise
of other relevant functions of the Director under Part III of the Equal Status Act.
Summary of the Complainant's case
The complainant objects to the ringing of the Angelus bells by the Chapel Royal as it is
an inappropriate use of public property since the ringing of the bells is a call to prayer.
He is a Humanist but was a former Roman Catholic (RC). He believes he lives in a
republic that has no official religion. He believes that Church and State should be entirely separate. The RC Church has historically dominated this State and has been seen as oppressive. By ringing the bell in this manner the State is saying some people are welcome and others are not. The complainant stated that he admired the work done
generally by the OPW. He is not against such bells being rung by religious groups generally.
Background, submitted by Respondent
The Chapel Royal was constructed in or about 1807-1814 and is, apart from anything
else, a historic building of very considerable value and interest. In its earliest centuries
the Chapel was used for worship by members of the Church of Ireland. It was taken over
by the State in 1922 and was furnished for Catholic worship in 1943. The Head Chaplain
to the Defence Forces was responsible for the religious aspects of the administration of
the church and up until the time of the closure of the church for major renovations in
1983 the Department of Defence employed a sacristan/caretaker for the church. Insofar
as the respondent can ascertain it is believed that the Angelus was sounded by the
sacristan/caretaker up until 1983 and thereafter the bell has been run by an electric timer
since 1989. The Chapel has never been officially deconsecrated but it has not been used
for active religious services since its closure for renovation.
Summary of the Respondent's Case
It was submitted that the complainant fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the
State's position and obligations under the Constitution with regard to religion and
referred to Article 44.1 and Article 44.2.1. It was accepted that the OPW provides a
service to the public, or part of the public, within the meaning of the Act, by making the
Chapel Royal available for visitation by members of the public at certain times. That
"service" is provided in an entirely non-discriminatory way and does not make differences in the treatment of any persons on the religion ground. It is not accepted that the ringing of the Angelus bell amounts on its own to the provision of a service. It was also submitted that while it is not the purpose of the respondent in the ordinary course to provide facilities for a religious purpose many of its buildings in fact do have a religious purpose or have distinct religious connotations, and the exemption in Section 5(2)(e) is wide enough to be availed of by the respondent particularly when the Constitutional
provisions are considered.
Conclusions of the Equality Officer
At the outset, I must first consider whether the existence of a prima facie case has been
established by the complainant. There are three key elements which need to be
established to show that a prima facie case exists. These are:
(a) Applicability of the discriminatory ground (in this case the Religion ground).
(b) Evidence of specific treatment of the complainant by the respondent.
(c) Evidence that the treatment received by the complainants was less favourable.
If and when those elements are established, the complainant has established a prima facie
case and the burden of proof shifts, meaning that the difference in treatment is assumed to
be discriminatory on the relevant ground. In such cases the claimant does not need to
prove that there is a link between the difference and the membership of the ground, instead the respondent has to prove that there is not.
It is not clear whether the complainant's beliefs fall into the humanist orthodoxy. Nor is
it clear that humanism can be counted as a religion. Therefore, since the practice complained of has Catholic associations, it appears appropriate to consider this claim in
terms of less favourable treatment where "one [person] has a [Catholic] religious belief
and the other has not". This satisfies (a) above. In respect of (b) it is clear that the respondent is responsible for the ringing of the bell and the complainant claims that he hears the bell. In respect of (c) above the following issues are relevant. The respondent in this case is a service provider responsible for, among other things the maintenance and preservation of buildings in public ownership, including many which form part of our national architectural and historic heritage. It is reasonable for it to maintain traditions associated with such buildings. The building in question in the instant case is the Chapel Royal in Dublin Castle. The Chapel was latterly used for Catholic worship and the ringing of the Angelus bells in the present day by the respondent appears to be the performance of a minor tradition that has religious associations. It appears to be part of the overall
maintenance of the building and its traditions. The State is not obliged to adopt a secularist approach. On the contrary, the constitution requires it to "respect and honour religion". In the Quinn's Supermarket case, the Supreme Court held that when the Constitution states at article 44.3 that "the State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status", this must be considered in harmony with article 44.2.1, which provides that "Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen". I do not have jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, but in considering whether an organ of the State is acting correctly I am entitled to have regard to their constitutional obligations. The complainant's main difficulty was not with the Angelus bell being rung, but with who was ringing it. His argument was vehemently for the separation of Church and State. In this regard, the Equal Status Act, 2000 relates to services which may be discriminatory. It does not provide for services which are perceived to be discriminatory only when offered by a particular service provider. The complainant is arguing that public bodies, as emanations of the State, must adopt a strictly secular approach. This would preclude the respondent from being involved in any traditions connected with the buildings in its charge where those traditions had even remote religious associations. This could be perceived as directly contrary to its constitutional obligation to honour religion. This obligation must be understood as requiring the State to respect and honour a diversity of religious viewpoints. The complainant has not shown that the respondent treats some religious traditions less favourably than others in this context. Nor has he shown that the ringing of the Angelus bell represents anything other than a minimal intervention, if any, into his own lack of religious belief. As such, consideration of this claim under Section 22 of the Equal Status Act, relating to the dismissal of claims that are considered to be in bad faith, frivolous, vexatious or relating to a trivial matter, might have been appropriate in this case. This is particularly the case since others with a noncatholic though tolerant religious belief would not have similar difficulties and in addition, the central difficulty for the complainant is not one of discrimination but the more political desire to separate Church and State. However, in my opinion, consideration in a published decision of the issues involved in this case may prove to be of use.
I am not satisfied that one can decide a service is discriminatory on the basis of who is
providing the service, in terms of the Equal Status Act, 2000. That position in itself may,
in some circumstances, be discriminatory. Neither am I satisfied that the complainant has
established that in ringing the Angelus bell the respondent discriminates against him. I
find that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Decision DEC-S2004-015
I find that the complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent, the Office of
Public Works and accordingly this decision is in favour of the respondent.
Bernadette Treanor
Equality Officer
30 January 2004