1. DISPUTE
This dispute involves a claim by Mr. M. that he was (i) discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of religion, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in respect of his conditions of employment and (ii) subsequently victimised in terms of section 74(2) of the Acts for having referred his original complaint to the Equality Tribunal. The complainant requested anonymity in this Decision and the respondent had no objection to same. Given the sensitive nature of aspects of this case I have decided to accede to the request.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The complainant is a Roman Catholic priest and is employed as a Chaplain at an institution under the aegis of the respondent. He alleges that the respondent treated him less favourably than other personnel employed by it in respect of certain of his conditions of employment and that this treatment constitutes discrimination of him on grounds of religion contrary to the Acts. He further contends that the respondent penalised him in circumstances amounting to victimisation under the Acts for having referred his original complaint. The complainant also referred a claim of equal pay under the Acts but withdrew this element of his complaint on 14 June, 2005.
2.2 The respondent denies all of the complainant's assertions and notwithstanding this submits that his claim of victimisation was referred to the Equality Tribunal outside of the six month timelimit prescribed at section 77(5) of the Acts. It contends therefore that the Equality Officer does not have the jurisdiction to investigate this element of the complaint.
2.3 The complainant referred his original complaint under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 to the Equality Tribunal on 20 January, 2004 and his complaint of victimisation under the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 on 22 February, 2005. In accordance with her powers under the Acts the Director delegated the complaint to Mr. Vivian Jackson, Equality Officer, on 23 March, 2005 for investigation and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions under Part VII of the Acts. Written submissions were received from both parties and a hearing of the complaint took place on 28 April, 2005, 4 July, 2005 and 13 December, 2005. A number of issues arose at the final hearing which required further clarification and gave rise to correspondence between the Tribunal and the parties until end January, 2006.
3. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINANT'S CASE
3.1 The complainant is a Roman Catholic priest and is employed as a Chaplain in an institution under the aegis of the respondent since September, 1998. He contends that the respondent has treated him less favourably on grounds of religion to other personnel employed by it in respect of certain aspects of his conditions of employment - namely (i) the application of the Scheme of Compensation for Personal Injuries Criminally inflicted on Staff employed for a specific role (hereafter for convenience referred to as the Compensation Scheme); (ii) the circumstances surrounding his appointment and removal from the post of Chaplain with the respondent and (iii) access to promotional outlets. The complainant submits that section 6(2)(e) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004, should be read in conjunction with the definition of religious belief at section 2(1) of those Acts so as to result in the most expansive definition of religious belief for the purposes of the legislation. Whilst accepting that other employees of the respondent are Roman Catholic, the complainant submits that as a result of being a priest, in particular having followed a long period of study to secure a specific qualification to become a priest, he has a different religious background to other Roman Catholics who are not priests. He further submits that this distinction is permitted applying the interpretative approach outlined above.
3.2 The complainant contends that under legislation dating back to 1877 and the 1947 Rules Governing the type of institution in which he works, he is a member of the particular category of employees who are covered by the Compensation Scheme. He adds that he operates in the same working environment as colleagues covered by the Scheme on a daily basis and is exposed to the same dangers and hazards as them. He contends that he is excluded from the Scheme because of his Chaplaincy and therefore he is being treated less favourably on grounds of his religious background. The complainant contends that the manner in which his appointment and removal from his position as Chaplain is conducted discriminates against him on grounds of religion. He states that whilst he is appointed by the relevant Minister, his appointment is contingent upon a personal nomination from his Bishop and this nomination can be withdrawn at any stage. He states that this process, which allows an outside body or person to suggest the appointment/removal of an employee with the respondent does not apply to other personnel employed by it. It is restricted to Chaplains and he submits that the process is discriminatory on grounds of religion. The final element of the complainant's discriminatory treatment claim concerns the manner in which the position of Head Chaplain is filled by the respondent. The complainant considers this to be a promotional outlet for him and states that the respondent allows an outside body (the Episcopal Conference) to nominate a person whom it believes to be suitable for the post, the relevant Minister acts on this and appoints the nominee. The complainant states that the post is not advertised and no selection process occurs. He contends that no other promotional post within the respondent is filled on this basis and argues that the respondent, by accepting the nomination, effectively allows an outside body to dictate the appointment and that this method of appointment constitutes discrimination of him on grounds of religion.
3.3 The complainant states that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the respondent convened a meeting on 10 March, 2004 which was attended by the CEO and Mr. X - a senior official in the respondent organisation, along with Fr. A (who subsequently became Head Chaplain) and two other Chaplains. He adds that in the course of this meeting a number of issues personal to him were discussed, including the fact that he had referred a claim to the Equality Tribunal. The complainant states it was agreed at this meeting that Fr. A would meet with a bishop the following weekend and that his (the complainant's) situation was communicated to the bishop. The complainant further contends that copies of personal documentation, including his referral form to the Equality Tribunal were released to Fr. A (in a letter dated 12 March, 2004) by the respondent's CEO. The complainant contends that these documents were subsequently given to his bishop and as a consequence, the bishop wrote to the CEO on 19 April, 2004 advising him that the complainant would be removed from his Chaplaincy and re-assigned to diocesan duties from July, 2005. He adds that at a meeting on 27 April, 2004 Fr. A informed thirteen of his fellow Chaplains of, inter alia, his claim with the Equality Tribunal. The complainant asserts that as a result of this a letter issued to his bishop that day, which was signed by all fourteen attendees at the meeting, dissociating themselves from his (the complainant's) actions and urging him (the bishop) to "immediately take the necessary steps before the situation deteriorates any further". The complainant states that he was summoned to a meeting with his bishop on 14 May, 2004 in the course of which he asserts the letter of 27 April, 2004 was read to him, he was informed that it was inappropriate to register complaints against the respondent with statutory agencies and if he persisted in doing so, action would be taken against him. The complainant states that prior to this he had a good working relationship with his fellow Chaplains and the bishop but since then he has had minimal contact with his colleagues and his relationship with the Bishop was strained.
3.4 The complainant states that he was refused a copy of the Chaplains' letter and issued a request under the Freedom of Information Acts. He adds that he was eventually furnished with a copy of the letter by his bishop on 18 August, 2004 along with a letter informing him that he would be re-assigned to diocesan duties in July, 2005. He adds that he subsequently wrote to his colleagues (via e-mail and ordinary post) on a number of occasions seeking to discuss the contents of the letter of 27 April, 2004 with them but received no reply. He states that he received a telephone call from Fr. A around 19 September, 2004 in which he contends Fr. A discussed the letter and the reasons why it was sent with him and undertook to contact him on his (Fr. A's) return from Lourdes. The complainant adds that no further communication occurred. The complainant states that a number of Chaplaincy Meetings took place and he was either not informed of them or no agenda was furnished so he declined to attend. The complainant states that he remained ostracised from his colleagues and during this period he sought clarification from the respondent as to his security of tenure and other issues which were of concern to him. He eventually sought the intervention of his local representative and by way of Parliamentary Question in mid-February, 2005 the relevant Minister stated that he intended to act in accordance with the contents of the bishop's letter to the respondent on 19 April, 2004. The complainant was eventually re-assigned to diocesan duties on 1 September, 2005.
3.5 The complainant submits that the above alleged treatment constitutes victimisation of him contrary to the Acts. He further submits that the source of this victimisation is the meeting of 10 March, 2004 referred to at paragraph 3.3 above and that it was ongoing up to and including his re-assignment to diocesan duties in September, 2005. He therefore rejects the respondent's argument that his victimisation claim is out of time. The complainant argues that the respondent is liable for the actions of Fr. A as he was furnished the documentation in the course of his employment. He further submits that comments made to both himself and Fr. A by the CEO of the respondent - the former in late October/early November, 2003 and the latter in the course of the meeting of 10 March, 2004- clearly demonstrate the disposition of the respondent toward him (the complainant) and support his assertions that he was penalised contrary to the Acts.
4. SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S CASE
4.1 The respondent rejects the complainant's assertions that it discriminated against him on grounds of religion. In the first instance it rejects the complainant's submission that he has a different religious background to any other Roman Catholic because he is a priest. The respondent, whilst accepting that the Acts define "religious belief" as including "religious background or outlook" submits that the phase means having a particular religious outlook or point of view which is shared by a particular group and not as differentiating within a group. As regards the specific elements of the complainant's allegations of discrimination, the respondent accepts that the post of Chaplain is considered an office under the 1877 Act and states that doctors (medical officers) are also appointed under that legislation. Both of these categories of employees are excluded from the compensation scheme referred to by the complainant. The respondent states that there are Roman Catholics, Muslims and members of the Church of Ireland amongst these personnel. It adds that the compensation scheme was negotiated in the mid-1980's with the trades union who had recognition for the category of employee covered by it, which excludes Chaplains and medical officers. The respondent submits that the complainant's religion has therefore no bearing on his exclusion from the scheme.
4.2 The respondent states that the complainant's appointment to the position of Chaplain is contingent upon his nomination by his bishop - this has been the established practice for many years - and it has been the practice of the Minister to act on that nomination. The respondent states that equally, it has been the Minister's practice to accede to a bishop's decision to effectively withdraw a nomination and redeploy a priest to other duties. It adds that the Church authorities have full discretion in this regard -the respondent has no power to alter the nomination. The same nomination process applies to Chaplains of other religious denominations and lay Chaplains. The respondent submits therefore that the process does not discriminate on grounds of religion. The respondent does not accept that the post of Head Chaplain is a promotional post for the complainant. It states that it has never been the practice to advertise the post of Head Chaplain, or indeed any other Chaplaincy appointment. The respondent states that in the context of provision and development of Chaplaincy services generally, the CEO wrote to the Episcopal Conference in December, 2002 asking it to give consideration to the appointment of a National Head Chaplain. The Conference replied in January, 2003 advising that it had nominated Fr. A for the position and the respondent merely acted on the nomination in due course. The respondent states that the process applied equally to all Roman Catholic Chaplains, including the complainant and could not therefore constitute less favourable treatment of him on the ground of religion.
4.3 The respondent argues that the complainant's victimisation claim was not referred to the Equality Tribunal within the six month timelimit prescribed at section 77(5) of the Acts. Notwithstanding this argument, the respondent rejects the complainant's assertion that it victimised him contrary to the Acts. It states that the complainant's appointment to the position of Chaplain is contingent upon his nomination by his bishop - this has been the established practice for many years - and it has been the practice of the Minister to act on that nomination. The respondent states that equally, it has been the Minister's practice to accede to a bishop's decision to effectively withdraw a nomination and redeploy a priest to other duties. It states that the complainant's bishop wrote to the CEO on 19 April, 2004 advising that the complainant would be re-assigned other duties in the diocese in July, 2005 and that the respondent merely complied with that decision. It submits that this does not constitute victimisation of the complainant.
4.4 The respondent accepts that the meeting of 10 March, 2004 took place and that a letter issued to Fr. A a couple of days later enclosing various documents - documents which it felt he was entitled to have in his capacity as Head Chaplain and in the context of ongoing discussions at that time in relation to the employment of Chaplains generally within the respondent organisation. It adds that the subsequent issues detailed by the complainant concern his dealings with his bishop, Fr. A and his fellow Chaplains. The respondent states that it was not aware (at that time) of the contents of the letter of 27 April, 2004 from the Chaplains to the bishop and the letter was not sent on its behalf. It adds that the Chaplains were not acting in their capacity as employees and the respondent cannot be held liable for their actions. In light of the foregoing the respondent argues that its actions do not constitute victimisation of the complainant contrary to the Acts.
5. CONCLUSIONS OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER
5.1 The issues for decision by me are whether or not the respondent (i) discriminated against the complainant on grounds of religion, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in respect of certain of his conditions of employment and (ii) victimised him in terms of section 74(2) of the Acts for having referred his complaint to the Equality Tribunal. In addition, I must decide whether or not the complainant's claim of victimisation was referred to this Tribunal within the timeframe prescribed at section 77(5) of the Acts and consequently whether or not I have jurisdiction to investigate that element of the claim. In reaching my decision I have taken into account all of the submissions, both oral and written, made by the parties.
5.2 I propose to deal with the complainant's allegations of discrimination in the first instance. The first point to be examined here is what is meant by "religious belief" for the purposes of the Acts. The complainant argues that section 6(2)(e) of the Acts must be read in conjunction with the definition of "religious belief" at section 2 of those Acts and I concur with him. In my view such an interpretation prevents a person from being treated less favourably than another person where that person has a religious background or outlook and the other person either has a different religious background or outlook or has none at all. However, I do not accept that it permits a distinction to be drawn between people who profess the same religious background or outlook because one is an ordained minister/priest and the other is not. If one was to follow the complainant's argument a person could arguably claim a different religious belief to another person on the basis that s/he was more devout in practicing his/her religion. If such an interpretation was permitted on the ground of religion under the Acts it is arguable that it would also apply to the other discriminatory grounds. Such a proposition is not sustainable as it could lead to absurd arguments that a person who has three children under eighteen years of age has a greater degree of protection on grounds of "family status" to a person who only has one child. Similarly, is a person with a severe mental or physical disability to be afforded a different degree of protection to someone with a relatively minor visual impairment? I cannot accept that the legislature intended such a distinction to be drawn between persons protected by the legislation and I am satisfied that discrimination on grounds of religion can only occur where a person is treated less favourably to another because s/he has a different religious belief to that person, or has none at all and I have applied such an interpretation to the relevant areas of this decision.
5.3 Both this Tribunal and the Labour Court have consistently applied an approach in respect of the burden of proof in non-gender claims of discrimination which requires that the complainant must, in the first instance, establish facts from which it can be inferred that he suffered discriminatory treatment. It is only when the complainant has established those facts to the satisfaction of the Equality Officer and s/he regards them as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised and I propose to adopt that approach in the instant case.
5.4 I note that the compensation scheme referred to by the complainant in the first element of his treatment claim originated through discussions with a trades union some twenty years ago and applied only to staff for which the union had recognition. I further note that this recognition did not include Chaplains, regardless of their religious belief and consequently all Chaplains are excluded from the scheme. Other personnel employed by the respondent (medical officers), who number around twenty, are also excluded. I am satisfied therefore that the complainant's religious belief was not a factor in denying him access to the scheme and he has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in respect of this element of his claim. In the interests of clarity I would point out that authority for deciding if an applicant under the scheme is in fact covered by the scheme does not rest with this Tribunal and the scheme sets out the appropriate authority in that regard. As regards access to the post of Head Chaplain I note that the person appointed to the post (Fr. A) is a Roman Catholic priest and consequently any difference in treatment between him and the complainant cannot be on grounds of religion. I accept the complainant's assertion that the appointment is effectively determined by an organisation which is completely external to the respondent. However, I also accept the respondent's argument that the post of Head Chaplain is atypical and does not conform to standard public service recruitment practices. I am of the view that the nomination process is far from ideal. However, I cannot conclude that it is discriminatory on grounds of religion and it appears to me that issues around the nomination process might be better addressed through other avenues. Finally, my comments in respect of the post of Head Chaplain apply equally to the process of appointment as a Chaplain. I find therefore that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in respect of both remaining elements of his claim of discriminatory treatment on grounds of religion.
5.5 I propose to deal with the complainant's allegation of victimisation and the respondent's arguments that the claim was referred out of time together as they are inextricably linked. It is the complainant's assertion that the disclosure of personal information about him by the respondent to Fr. A was directly responsible for the decision (in April, 2004) by his bishop to remove him as a Chaplain - which eventually took place on 1 September, 2005 - and the deterioration of his relationship with his fellow Chaplains and bishop over that period. It is also his assertion that this constitutes victimisation of him contrary to the Acts. The complainant referred his claim of victimisation on 22 February, 2005 at which time the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 were in operation. Section 77(5) of those Acts provides that " a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence". Section 77(6)(A) of the Acts provide that the date of discrimination or victimisation occurs "if the act constituting it extends over a period, at the end of the period.". For reasons I will set out later I find that the treatment of the complainant constitutes unlawful victimisation of him in terms of section 74(2) of the Acts. I am satisfied that this victimisation of him commenced in March, 2004 and was in effect on the day he referred his complaint - 22 February, 2005. I therefore find that his complaint is within time and I have jurisdiction to investigate it.
5.6 It is agreed by the parties that appointment to the position of Chaplain with the respondent is contingent upon the appointee receiving a nomination from his bishop. I note this process has operated for many years and that it has been the respondent's and the relevant Minister's practice to merely appoint the nominee. I accept the respondent's comment that if the bishop withdrew a nomination the Minister would again merely act on this - which he did in the complainant's case. I also accept that it is within the gift of the bishop to exercise his nomination in whatever way and in support of whomever he wishes. That been said, the exercise of that discretion cannot legitimise the actions of the respondent, if those actions are unlawful under the employment equality legislation. In the course of the hearing officials from the respondent stated that (i) there was never any indication from the complainant's bishop that he (the bishop) was contemplating withdrawing the complainant's nomination as Chaplain prior to his letter to the CEO on 19 April, 2004 and (ii) to their knowledge a nomination had never been withdrawn previously. It was also accepted that the respondent did not have occasion to raise any matter of a disciplinary nature with the complainant during his time as Chaplain.
5.7 The meeting on 10 March, 2004 was convened at the request of the respondent's CEO. I note at that time there were discussions ongoing between the church authorities, the respondent and the Department of Finance regarding the terms and conditions of employment of Chaplains generally. Whilst evidence was given at the hearing that the meeting was arranged to brief the negotiating team on developments in these discussions, I note that the respondent in setting the meeting sought an open agenda. The meeting was attended by the respondent CEO, (Mr. X) another senior official of the respondent, Fr. A (who was leader of the Negotiating Group) and two of his colleagues. It was established at the hearing that that in the course of this meeting the respondent CEO made reference, inter alia, to the fact that the complainant had referred a claim to this Tribunal and that his local representative had raised the issue of his employment with the respondent in the Dáil. Fr. A was unable to confirm whether or not this Tribunal was mentioned but recalled that the CEO stated he had concerns about the complainant taking the "legal route". Evidence was given by Mr. X that he was instructed by the respondent CEO to copy documents, which he believed to cover the complainant's referral form to this Tribunal, to Fr. A and these were enclosed with a letter to Fr. A dated 12 March, 2004, which was signed by the CEO. This evidence was corroborated by Fr. A who added that he did not request the documentation - the CEO suggested he should have it. Evidence was given by Mr. X that he believed Fr. A was meeting with a bishop the following weekend and it was his (Mr. X's) understanding that these matters would be raised with the bishop. Fr. A confirmed that he met with the bishop the following weekend and apprised him of developments in a number of areas raised at the meeting, including those in respect of the complainant. He added he did so because he understood that the respondent wanted the bishop to know what was happening in the Chaplaincy. He also confirmed at the hearing that he forwarded all of the documentation received from the respondent on 12 March to the bishop within days of receiving them, at the bishop's request.
5.8 The respondent states that any documents copied to Fr. A were released to him because it felt he was entitled to have them in his capacity as Head Chaplain and Leader of the Negotiating Team. It adds that the subsequent issues detailed by the complainant concern his dealings with his bishop, Fr. A and his fellow Chaplains and submits that any subsequent actions by those individuals cannot constitute victimisation of the complainant contrary to the Act. I cannot accept such a proposition. It is accepted by the respondent that Fr. A is its employee. It is also accepted by the respondent that whilst Fr. A was not the complainant's Line Manager in the normal understood sense, he was the Head Chaplain and the conduit between the respondent, the Chaplains and the Church authorities and it was in this capacity that the material was released to him. I am satisfied therefore that section 15 of the Acts places liability for his (Fr. A's) actions with the respondent, whether or not they were done with its knowledge or approval, unless it can show that it took reasonably practicable steps to prevent him from doing those acts. The respondent should have been aware of the practices as regards confidentiality surrounding claims before this Tribunal and indeed the statutory requirement that investigations are held in private, given the fact it was in receipt of the complainant's original claim. Yet it released confidential material to Fr. A, who by his own admission was not au fait with the operations of employment dispute machinery, without cautioning him that access to the documentation should be restricted and in the clear knowledge that he intended to discuss the matter with a person totally outside the respondent's control. In addition, I note the comment of one of the respondent's officials in the course of the hearing that he had concerns about copying the material to Fr. A but he was instructed to do so. Consequently, I find that the respondent cannot avail of the defence available at section 15 of the Acts
5.9 In the course of the hearing Fr. A confirmed that he alone decided to disclose the fact the complainant had referred claims under employment legislation, along with the comments expressed by the respondent CEO (on 10 March, 2004) about the "legal route" and the implications for same to the negotiations concerning the future of Chaplains in the respondent organisation, to the AGM of the Chaplains on 27 April, 2004. Fr. A also stated that the Chaplains present were concerned about the approach adopted by the complainant and decided to dissociate themselves from his actions and write to the bishop informing him of their views. I note that this letter post-dated the bishop's letter to the CEO in which he advised that the complainant would be re-assigned to diocesan duties in July, 2005 and I am satisfied that the Chaplains' letter did not therefore influence that decision, although it clearly prompted the bishop to admonish the complainant at the meeting on 14 May, 2004. In addition, disclosure of the information by Fr. A clearly portrayed the complainant in a bad light with his fellow Chaplains. The respondent rejects the complainant's assertion that he was subsequently ostracised by his colleagues and I believe that to be the case to some extent as he made informed decisions not to attend certain meetings and functions. However, I consider it perfectly understandable that the complainant might keep contact, particularly social contact, with his colleagues to a minimum, following the letter of 27 April, 2004 and the subsequent blanket silence from them to his communications seeking to discuss that letter with them.
5.10 In light of my finding at paragraph 5.5 above that the treatment of the complainant was continuous and was in existence after the coming into operation of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004, it follows that the definition of victimisation contained in those Acts is applicable. Section 74(2) of those Acts define victimisation as follows:
"...dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his...employer as a reaction to-
(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,
(b) any proceedings by a complainant, ........"
In the course of the hearing an official from the respondent (Mr. Y) confirmed that certain comments were made by the respondent CEO to the complainant in late 2003, although he felt they were made in a jocular fashion. However, jocular or not, I believe they indicate a disposition by the respondent towards the complainant - at this time the complainant had exercised rights under other pieces of employment protection legislation. Evidence furnished by Fr. A and Mr. X in the course of the hearing re-affirm my views as regards the respondent's opinion of the complainant. Having examined all of the evidence I am satisfied, on balance that the respondent's decision to release the information it did to Fr. A without any restriction whatever was a factor which contributed significantly to the decision made by the complainant's bishop to withdraw his nomination and remove the complainant from his Chaplaincy.
5.11 Evidence was given by the respondent that there was never any indication from the complainant's bishop that he (the bishop) was contemplating withdrawing the complainant's nomination as Chaplain prior to his letter to the CEO on 19 April, 2004 and (ii) to their knowledge a nomination had never been withdrawn previously. Whilst the nomination can be withdrawn at any time, I note that only five weeks had elapsed between the release of the information by the respondent to Fr. A and the complainant's bishop informing the respondent CEO by letter that he had decided to re-assign the complainant to diocesan duties. I cannot accept that the timing of these events is coincidental and find, on balance, that this treatment constitutes adverse treatment of the complainant and that he was victimised by the respondent in terms of section 74(2) of the Acts. In the interests of clarity I am satisfied that this adverse treatment continued until 1 September, 2005, the date on which the re-assignment took effect as during the intervening period the complainant lived with the threat and uncertainty of where his future lay.
6. DECISION
6.1 I find that -
(i) the complainant's claim of victimisation was referred within the timelimit prescribed at section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 and I therefore have jurisdiction to investigate that claim,
(ii) the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of religion and his claim must fail,
(iii) the respondent victimised the complainant in terms of section 74(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004 when it released information
concerning him at a meeting on 10 March, 2004
6.2 In accessing the redress which might be ordered in this case I note that Equality Officers have tended to put complainants in the position they would have been in had the unlawful treatment not occurred. However, I am mindful of the fact that the respondent has little, if any, authority over the bishop's nomination process. In the circumstances I consider compensation to be the most appropriate form of redress and I therefore order, in accordance with section 82 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2004, that the respondent pay the complainant €40,000 for the effects of the victimisation. This award does not include any element in respect of remuneration.
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Vivian Jackson
Equality Officer
13 April, 2006