The Equality Tribunal
Equal Status Acts 2000 to 2011
Decision Number
DEC-S2012-003
Parties
A Complainant
V
A School
(Represented by Mr. Brian Foley B.L. on the instructions of Mason Hayes & Curran)
Case ref: ES/2010/0101
Issued: 16 January 2011
DECISION NUMBER DEC-S2012-003 CASE REFERENCE ES/2010/0101
Keywords:
Equal Status Acts 2000 to 2004 - Discrimination - Gender - Civil Status - Provision of Goods and Services - Prima Facie Case
1. Delegation under the Equal Status Acts 2000 to 2011
1.1. A complainant referred a claim to the Director of the Equality Tribunal under the Equal Status Acts on 26 October 2010. The respondent was notified of this complaint in accordance with the Acts on 26 June 2010. In accordance with his powers under section 75 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, the Director then delegated the case to me, Tara Coogan, an Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director under part III of the Equal Status Acts on 29 July 2011. An oral hearing, as part of the investigation was held in Dublin on 17 November 11. The parties have been anonymised to protect the identities of the children who attend or used to attend the respondent school.
2. Dispute
2.1. The dispute concerns a complaint of unlawful discrimination on the gender and/or civil status ground(s). The complainant submitted that a named national school ("the respondent") discriminated against him by, inter alia, not replying to his queries, allowed his child to be removed from the school contrary to the school's own policy, and by allowing his child to be enrolled in circumstances where his details were omitted from an enrolment form. Further issues concerning policy were also raised.
3. Case for the complainant
3.1. The complainant is a separated, non-custodial father of two children. He claims that the respondent has engaged in acts on-going discrimination against him throughout the entire duration of his children's attendance at the respondent school. The complainant maintains that this less favourable treatment has occurred on the grounds of his gender and civil (marital) status.
3.2. The complainant became aware that his daughter had been absent from school for a number of days in April 2010. As a legal guardian of his children, he believes that he ought to have the right to know more about these absences. While the complainant is not a custodian of his children, he maintains that his rights and responsibilities in relation to the welfare of his children have not been altered. Therefore, he ought to been informed of such matters. The complainant wrote to the respondent requesting copies of his children's attendance records for the entire duration of their stay in the school and for any notes that the children's mother may have submitted in relation to these. As the complainant did not receive a reply within two and a half weeks, the complainant sought assistance of a named solicitor. The complainant was subsequently advised that the respondent had sought advice in relation to data protection legislation and would revert in due course but maintains that the respondent ought to have replied to his letter informing him of this before he engaged a solicitor. The complainant's solicitor wrote to the respondent on 19 May 2010 and having received no response rang the respondent on 27 May 2010. The respondent refused to engage with the complainant's solicitor over the phone and advised the solicitor that he ought to contact the respondent's solicitor. However, having done so, the respondent refused to inform the solicitor who their legal representative was. The complainant submitted that this refusal to provide this information to a person acting on his behalf amounted to discrimination against him. While the complainant received a response from the respondent's solicitors eventually he was not provided with the requested notes. This, the complainant stated, was a further act of discrimination.
3.3. On 25 April 2008 the complainant's children were taken from the school by an unauthorised person contrary to the school's own policy relating to custody/separation policy. The complainant maintains that this breach of the school's own policy is an act of discrimination because, on an earlier occasion, when the complainant had attempted to take out his own daughter in a similar fashion he had been prevented from doing so. The complainant also submitted that the policy of having to have a written note from a separated parent is discriminatory as non separated parents merely have to inform the respondent if there is a change of arrangements.
3.4 The complainant, at the material time, was due to collect his daughter from her home shortly before 3 pm with the aim of making their way to the school to collect his son at 3 pm. On 25 April, 2008 at approximately 11.46 am the complainant received a text message from his wife requesting that the complainant pick up their daughter from school at 2 pm. The complainant replied that due to the short notice he would be unable to do so. He received no further texts from his wife. At approximately 14.18 the complainant sent a text message to his wife enquiring whether he should pick up his daughter from the school or from the house. As he received no reply, he texted his wife indicating that he presumed that he would be picking up his daughter from the school. He received no reply from his wife. However, when he arrived at the school he was informed that his daughter had been picked up somebody. The complainant became concerned and enquired who this person was and where his children were. The respondent refused to answer these questions and the complainant submitted that this was an act of discrimination as a non-separated parent would have been provided such information on their request. The complainant suffered much anxiety and distress as a result of this and it was only when one of his son's friends told him that his son had been picked up by the complainant's wife's partner that he was able to relax. The complainant who had imagined the worst possible outcome for the past 10 minutes - that his children had been abducted - stated that he would not have had to endure such fear if the respondent had simply told him what had happened.
3.5. The complainant denied that he behaved in a threatening manner at this time or that it was this incident that was the reason why the respondent had a security system installed shortly afterwards. The complainant stated that he was not approached by the Garda Siochana in relation to this matter (because if he had been approached he would have had at least had an opportunity to state his case) and that the respondent had not provided any evidence to this investigation to substantiate this claim. The complainant categorically denies that he assaulted or threatened the respondent principal despite his acknowledgement that such a reaction - in the circumstances where he believed his children had been abducted - would have been normal. He also pointed out that there is no mention of this alleged incident in the Board of Management meetings.
3.6. On 3 June 2008, the complainant met with his son's teacher about the fact that the complainant's wife was collecting him early from school on days when the complainant was supposed to pick him up. He told the teacher that he did not consent to his son being removed from the school early. The teacher replied that she could not stop the complainant's wife from picking up her son early. When the complainant asked if he could pick up his son early, the teacher replied that he could not. When the complainant queried why, the teacher replied that the complainant's wife was the primary carer. The complainant, who pointed out that there is no such distinction in law, stated that his opinion should be given the same weight as an equal guardian of his son. The complainant submitted that this distinction was an act of discrimination as any other non- separated parent would be allowed to pick up their child from the school. While the complainant noted that the respondent's reply in relation to this matter indicated that the teacher understood the meeting to be about the complainant's son's educational progress and not about custody and access arrangements, the complainant refutes this and stated that the meeting was about guardianship issues. The complainant also denied that his approach at this meeting was aggressive and that pointed out that the matter was not referred to Gardai.
3.7. The complainant submitted that the respondent's claim that "it is common place to refer to the parent with whom the children primarily reside as being the "Primary Carer" is not placed on any legislative provision and that therefore it cannot be accepted that such use of language is common place or that it only relates to separated parents. The complainant maintains that the use of primary carer in situations such as this allows for a school to make up its own rules and to ignore the law. The use of this word affected his rights as guardian as it prevented the complainant from picking up his son early.
3.8. The complainant maintains that the school allowed this practice to have his son been picked up early to continue. This would not have happened if a non-separated parent had given a similar instruction. The complainant stated that on 13 June 2008 when he went to collect his son the son's classmates told him that he had gone home early.
3.9. A further claim relating to an incident - relating to another request for documents - on 27 January 2010 was withdrawn at the hearing.
3.10. The complainant also indicated that the school has a practice of accepting parental consent from only one parent in relation to certain activities. The complainant pointed out that the practice of sending such forms to the home in the children's school bags creates a possibility where the mother of a child may consent to certain activities without the knowledge of the father. The complainant submitted that these forms indirectly discriminate against men as their right to act on behalf of their children can be undermined by the return of the signed without their knowledge. The complainant submitted that such forms should require the consent of both legal guardians. The complainant also submitted that the respondent's claim that such a practice would be impractical is unacceptable in circumstances where such an approach is required by law and the constitutional rights of parents. The complainant submitted that his child did participate in activities relating to religious matters without his consent. The complainant who was not seeing his child at the time had presumed that such activities would take place the next year. He acknowledged that he would not have objected to these activities but he would have preferred to have been given a choice.
3.10. The complainant submitted that the respondent's policy that states that: "in the absence of a custody arrangement, both parents will be treated as equal partners in terms of parenting rights and responsibilities" is indirect discrimination as it discriminates against men who generally are the parent who no longer retain custody following separation. The complainant submitted that the policy should state: "regardless of custody arrangements, both parents (if legal guardians) will be treated as equal partners in terms of parenting rights and responsibilities".
3.11. The complainant submitted that a previous decision issued by this Tribunal - relating to another matter that he had with this school - erred as equality officers do not have full understanding of guardianship. He stated that but for his Barrister missing the appeal window he would have appealed this decision. The complainant also stated that despite having lost his case in that incident, he believes that the system that he finds more acceptable now in place is a result of his efforts. He submitted that this new system undermines the respondent's submission that: "it is not possible to treat separated parents in an identical manner to married or non-separated parents". While he now accepts that this clause is followed by the statement that states: "This does not affect the guardianship rights of parents under the Guardianship of the Infants Act, 1964" the complainant, who credits himself with having this clause included, maintains that the school is not in a position to judge whether or not its own policy affects parental rights, given that they do not fully understand or appreciate such fundamental rights.
3.12. The complainant refuted the respondent's claim that it cannot be expected to treat separated parents in the same manner as it treats non-separated parents. He claims that it is a matter for the parents of the child to sort their difficulties out and if they fail to do so, they ought to seek a direction from the relevant court to sort such matters out. The complainant points out that section11 of the 1964 Act applies to all parents, not just separated parents.
3.13. The complainant further submitted that the respondent policy of accepting his daughter's enrolment form without the complainant's address and contact details - contrary to the custody/separation policy - discriminated against him as a man because he believes that the enrolment sheet would not have been accepted without the contact details of the mother. The complainant states that the fact that the enrolment occurred on foot of a court order is irrelevant and that the school ought to have treated him in the same manner as any other parent. By failing to do so, the respondent undermined his role as a guardian of the children and attempted to misrepresent the fact that the complainant is not involved in his daughter's life. The complainant pointed out that as a result of this omission, had there been an emergency, the respondent would not have been able to contact him.
3.14. In conclusion, the complainant submitted that a family does not cease to be a family merely because of a separation. The respondent by its actions and policies continues to promote a misconception that a family can be imposed upon and regulated by external forces merely because the parents do not reside together or agree at all times on some issues.
4. Case for the respondent
4.1. The respondent is a national school that has provided primary education to two of the complainant's children. One of the children is still a pupil in the respondent school.
4.2. This is the second complaint of unlawful discrimination that the complainant has brought against the respondent. The Tribunal had previously found the school's policy in relation to individual parent-teacher meetings to be compliant with the Acts.
4.3. The respondent refuted that it discriminated against the complainant on the gender and/or civil status ground in circumstances where the complainant requested information about his children's attendance. The respondent was performing its proper functions by informing the complainant about his daughter's absences on 24 April 2010. On foot of receiving this information, the complainant, for his own reasons, chose not to accept the information contained in the letter, or otherwise chose to probe the matter further by requesting "notes received from [the children's mother] for any of their absences." The respondent could not forward such notes to the complainant as this would have resulted in a breach of the Data Protection Acts, 1988 to 2003. Furthermore, it was submitted that records in relation to children's attendance were, in fact, forwarded to the solicitor's acting for the complainant on 3 June 2010.
4.4. The respondent does not accept that the response of the school to the complainant's letter dated 3 April 2010 amounted to an act of discrimination. While the respondent accepts that the principal refused to divulge information to a person claiming to be the complainant's solicitor over the phone, it was as an act of caution not of discrimination. It was pointed out that the respondent felt and continues to feel quite threatened by the complainant. The respondent is of the view that a genuine caller claiming to be representing the complainant would know the name of respondent's legal representative bearing in mind the number of complaints the complainant has made about the respondent. It was submitted that the approach taken by the respondent in relation to the phone call was a prudent course of action.
4.5. The respondent does not accept that the fact that a person collected his daughter without a proper note on 25 April 2008 amounts to discrimination in circumstances where the complainant argues that a similar breach was not allowed in relation to him. The respondent does not accept that such facts give rise to a legitimate comparator situation whereby the complainant claims that a non-separated father would not have required a note. The respondent submitted the following facts in relation to this incident. The complainant's wife rang the respondent to inform them that she had arranged a named individual to collect her children from the school at 2 pm. In the course of the phone call she also indicated that would send a note of authorisation with the person collecting the children and that she would inform the complainant of this arrangement. On the basis of this phone call the child was released into the care of the named individual, despite him not having a note. (It was subsequently received from the complainant's wife.) The respondent submitted that as substantive permission was communicated to the school by the person with custody until 3 pm the respondent had no option but to comply with the court order.
4.6. The existence of this court order is the reason why the complainant had been asked to confirm in writing that he had full authority from the person with custody to collect his children earlier than 3 pm. The complainant has refused to do so. It is accepted that a non-separated person would not be asked to submit such a note in similar circumstances, but it is disputed that this amounts to discrimination, as in such circumstances there would be no such court order in place. The existence of the requirement to have a written note is to protect both separated parents where a dispute may arise subsequently in relation to the collection of a child from the school. Further, it is submitted that a school, if aware of a court order, must comply with an order. The respondent relied on section 14(1)(a).
4.7. The respondent submitted that the complainant relied on select sections of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 and ignores the reality that the said Act also provides for an extensive regime whereby questions of custody and access may be regulated. The court has a wide ranging jurisdiction to make directions in relation to the custody and care of a child and any such directions, if made and communicated to the respondent in an appropriate fashion, would prevail over the wishes of a parent in relation to a child.
4.8. The respondent submitted that the facts of this case do not demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. The respondent submitted Cahill and Minister for Education and Science as an authority that different treatment is not synonymous with less favourable treatment. The respondent's primary objective is to provide an appropriate education to the complainant's children. The respondent has shown a commitment to involving both the complainant and his wife in the education of their children. The respondent denied that it has discriminated against the complainant on either of the grounds claim or indeed in any manner.
4.9. The respondent respectfully submits that the complaint is both frivolous and vexatious and requested that the Tribunal consider exercising its jurisdiction under section 22 of the Acts.
5. Conclusion of the equality officer
5.1. Section 38A (1) of the Equal Status Acts 2000 to 2004 sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. It requires the complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts upon which he can rely in asserting that he suffered discriminatory treatment. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination.
5.2. Briefly, 'Guardianship' in accordance with the 1964 Act refers to a formal right to make important decisions in respect of a child, including the right to request directions from a court in relation to the welfare of a child (even where that guardian in question does not have custody). The father and mother of a marital child are automatically joint guardians. 'Custody' involves the physical day-to-day control of the child and 'access' relates to the right to spend time with the child. I ought to be clear that both 'custody' and 'access' are matters that can be altered by court orders. In a case where a marriage/civil partnership/co-habitation is ongoing such matters are largely moot. However, they become very important in cases of marital breakdown. The provision of a judicial separation and divorce in Ireland by statute in 1989 and 1996 respectively was an attempt to deal with the breakdown of marriage and the proper provision of marital children. While the complainant is correct in asserting that his role as a guardian of his children has not and cannot, except in exceptional circumstances, be altered, it is not a matter for this Tribunal to determine whether his rights as a guardian have been violated by the respondent. The Acts do not recognise 'guardianship' as a protected ground and as such this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider such matters. The Equality Tribunal has limited jurisdiction to investigate this complainant under the Equal Status Acts. Therefore, this decision will only consider whether the complainant as a separated person and/or a man was treated less favourably than a woman and/or a woman with the same civil status or a woman with a different civil status was, is or would be treated in similar circumstances.
5.3. The complainant submitted that the respondent has not submitted a copy of a court order to the investigation. I have accepted, and am entitled to accept, the oral evidence in relation to this order and note that both parties were in agreement to the fact that custody, at the material time, was granted to the complainant's wife until 3 pm. It ought to be clear that to omit such an order from this investigation would fly in face of common sense.
5.4. In relation to the first issue about absenteeism and accompanying notes submitted by the children's mother. I find that the complainant received attendance records within a reasonable timeframe. I note that the complainant accepted that his solicitor had not repeated his request to the respondent in the manner in which the complainant had instructed his solicitor to request them. This is not a matter for this Tribunal or for the respondent. Nevertheless, the complainant submitted that the failure or omission to respondent to respond to his query constitutes less favourable treatment as a married man would not have been similarly treated. I have found no evidence to support such an assertion. The complainant has not provided any facts from which I could infer that a married non-separated father who had made such a request (concerning notes submitted by his wife, without explicit consent from said wife) would have been treated any differently in the circumstances.
5.5. In relation to the complaint of a refusal to engage with the complainant's representative on the phone, I note that the fact that the respondent would not name their legal representative to the caller is not under dispute. While I consider such conduct to be slightly grudging, in the circumstances of this case, I accept that the respondent acts rather cautiously when dealing with the complainant. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the reason why the information was not given orally over the phone to the caller was entirely or significantly because the complainant is a man and/or separated. I also find the complainant is very aware of the name of the legal firm representing the respondent and do not find that this refusal resulted in the complainant experiencing any actual difficulty. Such a refusal to engage with the complainant and/or his agents - while unnecessary - cannot be construed as discrimination within the meaning of these Acts. I accept that the reason for this terse treatment is because the complainant is viewed as litigious by the respondent.
5.6. The issue of the use of the term 'primary carer'. The complainant took issue with such term being used in the context of what he viewed as a discussion about guardianship as he does not view the term to have legal meaning. The use of such a term, in my view, does not constitute less favourable treatment in accordance with section 3(1)(a) of the Acts. I find that the term is often used in everyday conversation to denote the person who provides for the majority of the day-to-day control of a dependant child after a separation and I understand it to have meant, in the context the complainant is referring to, the fact that the teacher was aware of a court order that awarded custody to the children's mother until 3 pm and the implications this order has on the respondent. A teacher has no jurisdiction to decide matters pertaining to guardianship and I do not accept that by making such a statement the teacher was treating the complainant less favourably because of his gender and/or civil status. Nor is it fair to suggest that the teacher was using legally incorrect language. The comments relate and are appropriate to the complainant's circumstances as a separated parent. I also note that the complainant stated that as he had expressed his views about the children being removed from school early the respondent ought to have followed his instructions. It ought to be clear that equality in decision making requires joint input and it is not a matter for the respondent to decide which guardian is more equal in such circumstances. The decision in relation to this matter has been made by a court and the respondent cannot, unless explicit permission is provided by the complainant's wife or a further direction is given by the court, refuse to allow the complainant's wife to remove her children from the school in breach of such order.
5.7. While I appreciate that the complainant firmly believes that the respondent ought to treat the complainant and his wife as equal guardians in all circumstances, and that this means that the respondent adhere to his opinion on the matter, it is clear that the respondent cannot ignore an existing court order. I absolutely agree with the complainant's argument that - in an ideal world - it is a matter for the parents/legal guardians of a child to jointly decide such matters. However, in circumstances where such parents/legal guardians cannot agree to matters pertaining to their children's welfare, then such matters must be decided upon by a court. I note that the complainant recognises this is in his submission. What appears to be the issue here is that the complainant believes that the respondent is attempting to decide matters for him. I have found no evidence of this.
5.8. In relation to the issue of a third party having picked up the complainant's children without a written consent form. While I acknowledge the complainant's discomfort in discovering that his children had been picked up from the school by a third party, I find that in the circumstances he was, or ought to have reasonably been, on notice of the fact that his wife required the children to be picked up before the normal time. It is extremely regrettable that the complainant did not receive clear notification confirming this matter from his wife. Having been informed that the children had been collected earlier, I find that the logical next step for the complainant would have been to contact his wife/the home of the children. While the respondent could not tell him who had collected the child, they were able to say that his wife had authorised such a collection. This ought to have been satisfactory. I do not accept that the complainant was entitled to take his frustration on the respondent principal and I do not accept that the use of phrases such as "for fuck sake" is appropriate in front of primary school children. In relation to the claim that this incident was one of less favourable treatment I have been provided with no facts from which I can infer that a woman or a non-separated person would be have been treated more favourably in similar circumstances. That is, I have been provided no facts from which I can infer that a woman or a non-separated partner who, finding themselves in the same circumstances as the complainant, would have been given the name of the person who collected the child on the say-so of the parent with custody at the material time.
5.9. I am satisfied that is there is a legitimate reason why the respondent has a requirement to have written notice in circumstances where there is a custody arrangement or separation agreement in place. I find that, in accordance with section 14(1)(a), where a court order requires certain action, that the taking of such action is not discrimination within the meaning of these Acts. Furthermore, the complainant, when stating that it is discriminatory for the school to require a written note confirming altered arrangements from separated parents when it does not require such written instructions from non-separated parents, is not comparing two similar circumstances. The disputed policy relates to custody/separation policy and is therefore not applicable to parents who have no custody or separation agreements in place. The policy clearly applies only to such parents and/or any other persons named in such order. It ought to be clear that it is highly inappropriate for any person included in such order to request that the respondent or any third party collude with them to breach same.
5.10. I note that the complainant took issue with the respondent's phrase "it is not possible to treat separated parents in the same manner as it treats non-separated parents". I find that it is more correct to state the word 'always' in that sentence. There is no reason why the respondent would not treat separated parents the same as parents who are married or in an on-going relationship provided that such parents are willing to be so treated. I find that the objective of equality cannot be served by pretending that different things are the same. It is clear that ongoing matrimonial difficulties naturally complicate such matters. It ought to be noted that it is the very existence of these Acts that ensures that service providers must recognise the different realities that people with different civil status have and accordingly, that in certain circumstances same treatment could result in less favourable treatment. In any case, in the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the reason why the complainant is not treated in the same manner as a non-separated parent is because a non-separated person would not have a court order in place restricting custody and access.
5.11. The complainant submitted that he believed that he had been discriminated against when his daughter's enrolment form had been accepted without his details on it. He claimed indirect discrimination claiming that such a form would not have been accepted without the mother's signature. He provided no evidence to support such a claim and while I accept that the school would not have accepted an enrolment form without the details of at least one legal guardian, I cannot accept mere assertion about the gender or civil status of the parent required to sign a form. Furthermore, I note that the complainant claimed that this acceptance could have resulted in less favourable treatment because had there been an emergency the respondent would not have known how to contact him. Having examined the facts of this incident I note that the complainant admitted that he had received a blank enrolment form from the respondent but that he had not filled it in as he believed that he ought to fill in the same form as his spouse (after she had filled in her details). He maintained that the respondent ought to have forwarded his wife's completed form for him to fill in and that this practice of having two separate forms is discriminatory. The complainant submitted that the reason for this rationale was that a married/non-separated couple would have filled in their forms jointly. I accept that married/non-separated couples would fill in such forms jointly and while the complainant favours such an approach the facts of this case support an inference that his wife does not. I am satisfied that the complainant was clearly given an opportunity to provide his details but he chose not to do so because the manner in which he could submit these details was not acceptable to him. While I acknowledge that the complainant does not agree with the approach that the respondent took in relation to the enrolment form, I cannot accept his bona fides in relation to his alleged concern about being contactable in a case of an emergency. He, by his own admission, chose not to give his details to the respondent. I also note that the complainant's elder child had been attending the school and thus contact details would have been known by the respondent. It is clear that there was no less favourable treatment by the respondent.
5.12. The complainant maintains that despite the fact that he is a separated, non-custodial father of his children the respondent ought to ignore such a reality and treat the two parents as they would treat a couple who did not have such a fractured relationship. It is clear that the complainant is the father and guardian of these two children and that as a result he has certain rights and responsibilities in relation to them. This does not mean that he is correct in arguing that all individuals, regardless of gender and civil status, must be treated the same. The Equal Status Acts recognise the difference between the comparators provided for in each protected ground. Different treatment does not necessarily equate to less favourable treatment as the very purpose of these Acts is to recognise the inherent difference in various grounds. For example, in relation to the complainant's first issue about absenteeism and accompanying notes submitted by the children's mother. It is clear that the complainant became aware of this issue because the respondent notified the complainant of the matter. It did so by letter sent to the complainant. As no evidence was provided to the contrary I assume that a similar letter was sent to the complainant's wife. Thus, the notification itself exemplifies the need for different treatment. I find that it most likely that the complainant would not have received the information had the respondent treated the complainant and his wife in the same manner that it treats non-separated parents.
5.13. In a related matter the complainant referred to a situation where information sent to his child's classmates' parents had not been sent to him. The respondent had acknowledged this omission and had apologised to the complainant about it. The complainant had accepted this apology and acknowledged that nothing flowed from this omission. Also, the complainant submitted that he did not approve of the practice whereby he would receive a consent form about an extra curricular activity that was on offer for his child via the postal service as he submitted that this could mean that he may not receive proper notice and his child may have participated in activity that he did not approve of. The complainant was not able to give any actual examples where such an incident had actually taken place. Instead, he pointed out that the respondent had acted on his instructions in relation to some activity and complained about the fact that the child had been informed that he could not participate as his father had forbidden it. It is not a matter for this Tribunal to dictate respondent's policy responses in relation to such matters. I find that in the circumstances the complainant's wishes have been treated in the same manner as any parent's wishes would be, regardless of gender and/or civil status, in similar circumstances. I find that is entirely appropriate to explain to a child why they are not able to do something that their classmates are doing. In circumstances where there is joint decision making, I find that the child would be told that her/his parents had vetoed such activity. Where this joint decision making does not exist, I see no reason why the child should not be appropriately advised.
5.14. The complainant submitted that a family does not cease to exist when there is a separation. I have found no evidence to suggest that the respondent promotes a contrary view. The respondent is merely attempting to acknowledge and accommodate the diverse family situations that exist and I find that the respondent is taking extra steps to ensure this recognition where appropriate. The regulation that the complainant is referring to originates from the courts.
5.15. Finally, I note that the complainant submitted that all men who have relationships with women - regardless of civil status - are kept in the dark and lied to about matters concerning their children. The complainant maintains that most parents do not discuss matters concerning their children's education and that most important decisions are made by the mother alone. He submitted that many men do not know their rights. I accept that this is the complainant's opinion but do not accept that such statements have any basis in fact or are of any relevance in relation to his claim before this Tribunal.
6. Decision
6.1. In accordance with section 25(4) I conclude my investigation and issue the following decision:
6.2. The complainant has not established a prima facie case of less favourable treatment on the gender and/or civil status ground(s).
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Tara Coogan
Equality Officer
16 January 2012