DECISION NO: DEC-E/2012/142
PARTIES
RUSEK
(REPRESENTED BY MS. KATE KENNEDY BL
INSTRUCTED BY JC HOBAN & COMPANY - SOLICITORS)
V
GER LALLY & ASSOCIATES
(REPRESENTED BY LAVELLE COLEMAN - SOLICITORS).
File No: EE/2009/117
Date of issue: 24 October, 2012
Headnotes: Employment Equality Acts 1998- 2008 - sections 6 and 8 - gender - pregnancy- conditions of employment - dismissal- exceptional circumstances.
1. DISPUTE
This dispute involves claims by Ms. Wioleta Rusek that she was (i) discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of gender and marital status, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in relation to her conditions of employment and (ii) dismissed by the respondent in circumstances amounting to discrimination on grounds of gender and marital status, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The complainant states that she commenced employment with the respondent as a Childminder in April, 2006. She further states that shortly after she informed the respondent of her pregnancy in August, 2008 her hours of work were reduced and contends that this amounts to less favourable treatment of her on grounds of gender and marital status contrary to the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2008. She further contends that the termination of her employment by the respondent in January, 2009 constitutes discriminatory dismissal of her on grounds of gender and marital status contrary to the Acts. The respondent rejects the complainant's assertions in their entirety.
2.2 The complainant referred a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2008 to the Equality Tribunal on 17 February, 2009. In accordance with his powers under the Acts the Director delegated the complaints to Mr. Vivian Jackson, Equality Officer for investigation and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions under Part VII of the Acts. My investigation of the complaint commenced on 31 January, 2012, the date the complaint was delegated to me. A Hearing on the complaint took place on 8 March, 2012 at the outset of which Counsel for the complainant withdrew all allegations that she was treated unlawfully on grounds of marital status contrary to the Acts. A small number of points arose at the Hearing which required further clarification and gave rise to correspondence between the Equality Officer and the parties until late June, 2012.
3. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINANT'S CASE
3.1 The complainant states that she commenced employment with the respondent on 3 April, 2006. She adds that although her contract of employment states she was engaged as a Practice Administrator she was in fact performing duties related to childminding and housework - although she received additional payment for the latter duties which were predominately performed on Thursdays. The complainant states that she reported for duty on 25 August, 2008 as normal but that during the course of the day she felt unwell. She adds that she completed her normal working day but as a result of her symptoms (details supplied) she attended her doctor that evening. She states that her doctor advised her she was pregnant and certified her unfit for work for a few days. The complainant states that on leaving the doctor's surgery she texted the respondent advising her of her pregnancy adding that there was significant risk around her pregnancy. The complainant adds that texting was the usual form of communication between them. The complainant states that she received a text from the respondent a couple of hours later as follows - " Hi Wioleta, this is not good for me. You have to come in the morning but I am working at eight and will be back at 11:30. Talk to you then, Ger". The complainant states that she reported for duty the next morning - when she gave the respondent the doctor's note she had received the previous evening and remained at work until around 12:30pm, when the respondent returned. The complainant states that when the respondent returned she (the respondent) got irate and shouted at the complainant. She adds that the respondent asked her how she (the complainant) felt she would cope with her workload now that she was pregnant and that she (the respondent) suggested that it might be better if the complainant got another job.
3.2 The complainant states that she commenced sick leave that day and was again certified unfit for work by her doctor when this first certificate expired on 5 September, 2008. She states that she texted the respondent with this news on 5 September, 2008 and that shortly after she did so the respondent telephoned her. The complainant states that during this telephone conversation the respondent again suggested that the complainant should find another job in circumstances where her pregnancy was high risk or alternatively that she (the complainant) should consider taking a year off work altogether. The complainant states that she made no response to these comments. She adds that she sent her medical certificate - which certified her unfit for work until 30 September, 2008 - to the respondent by registered post the next day.
3.3 The complainant states that a few days later she received a letter from the respondent (dated 9 September, 2008) advising that (i) the respondent had hired a temporary childminder to cover the complainant's absence, (ii) that the day she was due back to work (1 October) was in the middle of a week it was not appropriate to return on that day as the respondent was working outside of Dublin that day and she (the respondent) needed to be present on the complainant's return to work to brief her on considerable changes to the respondent's children's schedules and (iii) in the circumstances she should resume duty on 6 October, 2008. In the course of the Hearing the complainant stated that in June, 2008 the respondent had invited her and her fiancé for dinner, in the course of which the respondent mentioned her daughter might be changing school the following September but made no reference to such a change impacting on the complainant's hours of employment.
3.4 The complainant states that on her return to work on 6 October, 2008 the respondent informed her that, effective immediately, her hours would be reduced from forty hours per week to twenty hours per week and that her attendance pattern would change significantly - in particular she was not required for any morning hours and commenced at 2pm. The complainant adds the respondent informed her that the requirements had reduced due to the changes of the children's school arrangements. She states that when the school hours of the respondent's daughter had changed previously her hours were not reduced. The complainant adds that although her hours were reduced by half she was still expected to perform the full range of duties she had previously done, despite the fact she was pregnant. The complainant states that she performed these duties until she went on certified sick leave on 13 December, 2008. She rejects the respondent's assertion that she agreed these changes to her working hours. It was submitted on her behalf that this behaviour amounts to less favourable treatment of the complainant on grounds of gender contrary to the Acts.
3.5 The complainant states that she subsequently approached the Social and Legal Advice Services of the Polish Chaplaincy in Ireland for assistance. She adds that this body wrote to the respondent on 26 November, 2008 seeking clarification of her terms of employment and an explanation of why her hours were reduced. The complainant states that the respondent's solicitor responded to this letter on 11 December, 2008 in which it alerted the complainant to the possibility that the complainant's role might become redundant. The complainant states that the situation became extremely stressful for her and she was placed on certified sick leave on 13 December, 2008. She adds that she subsequently received a text from the respondent asking that they meet on 17 December, 2008. The complainant states that at this meeting the respondent informed her she was being made redundant and that her employment would terminate in two weeks. She adds that during this meeting the respondent made reference on several occasions to the letter she had received from the Social and Legal Advice Services of the Polish Chaplaincy in Ireland. The complainant further states that the respondent was angry at receiving this letter and told the complainant that this was the reason for her redundancy.
3.6 The complainant states that she met with the respondent again on 20 December, 2008 to finalise the paperwork for termination of her employment. She states that the respondent refused to permit the complainant to take away the RP50 so as to check it and matters were not concluded until 12 January, 2009. She adds that the redundancy cheque she was given was not honoured by the bank concerned and this added to the distress she suffered at the time. The complainant rejects the assertion that her role was redundant and states that a couple of weeks after her employment terminated she observed a woman collecting the respondent's children from school.
3.7 Counsel for the complainant submits it is well established that (i) less favourable treatment of a woman on grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination on grounds of gender1 and (ii) the dismissal of a woman from the beginning of her pregnancy until the end of her maternity leave is prohibited unless there exceptional circumstances unconnected with her condition2. She further submits, notwithstanding the complainant's contention that her role was not redundant, that the financial position of the respondent at the time she made the decision to terminate the complainant's employment was not such that she had no option but to act as she did. Counsel argues that the respondent cannot therefore rely on Winston v Mason3 as the financial difficulties which the respondent experienced postdate the decision to dismiss the complainant. Finally, Counsel submits that the respondent cannot rely on her husband's financial circumstances at the time to support her argument that the financial position of the respondent warranted terminating the complainant's employment - as the complainant was not employed by him.
4. SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S CASE
4.1 The respondent rejects the complainant's assertions in their entirety and states that the actions she took were due to changes in requirements for the complainant's services and the business/financial circumstances of the respondent. The respondent accepts that the complainant commenced employment on 3 April, 2006 and that whilst her contract of employment states she was engaged as a Practice Administrator she was in fact performing duties related to childminding and housework. In the course of the Hearing the respondent stated that she had been advised to treat the complainant's employment in this fashion as it was the most tax efficient way for the enterprise. The respondent also accepted that the complainant worked a forty hour/five day week and that she received additional payment of €50 per week for performing housework one day a week.
4.2 The respondent states that from June, 2008 she noticed her clients were not engaging her as often as previously and her income came under pressure. She adds that her husband, who was employed in insurance broking, was also experiencing financial pressures. The respondent states that in addition, the bank would not to facilitate the business overdraft arrangement she previously enjoyed. She adds that she did not inform the complainant of these difficulties as she (the complainant) was getting married the following June. The respondent adds that despite the foregoing she continued to retain the complainant in employment. The respondent states that on 22 August, 2008 she received notification her daughter had secured a place in a particular school (details supplied). She adds that as a result of this there would be a lesser need for the complainant's services, although she never raised this matter with the complainant at that time. The respondent states that the complainant reported for duty on 25 August, 2008 as normal. She adds that she received a text message from the complainant around 8pm that evening informing the respondent that she (the complainant) had fell ill during the day, had gone to the doctor, was told she was pregnant and was certified unfit for work for a period. The respondent states that she had a meeting with a new client arranged for the following morning. Her husband was away and the children were still off school and she therefore had difficulties organising alternative childcare arrangements at such late notice. She states it was in this context that she sent the text which she did to the complainant asking that she (the complainant) attend for duty the next morning. The respondent states that the complainant reported for duty the next day but did not perform any duties - instead she rested on the couch watching television with the children until she (the respondent) returned home in the late morning.
4.3 The respondent rejects the complainant's assertion that she behaved irately towards her when she (the respondent) returned home that day. She adds that she was delighted for the complainant and told her so. She further states that the complainant gave her the sick note covering her absence until 5 September, 2008 - which certified her as unfit for work due to abdominal pain. In the course of the Hearing the respondent stated that during this conversation she made reference to the complainant's future plans and the possibility that she might return to Poland to have her baby. The respondent could not recall making any reference to her (the complainant) about finding alternative employment.
4.4 The respondent states that she received a text from the complainant on 5 September, 2008 informing her that she (the complainant) was unfit to resume work until 1 October, 2008. She adds that she subsequently received a medical certificate covering this period giving abdominal pain as the reason for the absence - adding that she was never informed that the complainant had a high risk pregnancy. The respondent further states that she wrote to the complainant on 9 September, 2008 advising, in general terms, of the maternity and sick leave regimes which operated in Ireland. The respondent adds that this letter also indicated there would be considerable changes to the complainant's role and that as she (the respondent) had a prior work engagement for 1 October, 2008 and as she had to be present to brief the complainant on this she (the complainant) should not resume work until 6 October, 2008 - the Monday after she was certified fit to resume work.
4.5 The respondent states that around mid-September, 2008 she decided, due to the changed circumstances as regards her childminding requirements - she now only required childminding from 2pm each day - and the worsening financial situation she and her husband found themselves in, that she had no option but to reduce the complainant's hours. She adds that she informed the complainant of these changes - and of the reasons for same - when she resumed duty on 6 October, 2008. The respondent states that the complainant accepted the new hours and displayed no dissatisfaction with them. The respondent states that in end November, 2008 her financial circumstances became more acute and she sought advice from her accountant. She states that around this time she received a letter on the complainant's behalf from the Social and Legal Advice Services of the Polish Chaplaincy in Ireland which she passed on to her solicitor for action. The respondent states that her solicitor responded to this correspondence by letter dated 11 December, 2008, in which the complainant was advised that there was a considerable risk to her position. The respondent states that having subsequently taken the relevant professional advices she decided she had no option but to make the complainant redundant. The respondent rejects the complainant's assertion that there was no redundancy stating that the position was never subsequently filled and she relies on family, friends and neighbours to provide support with pick-ups and drop-offs to school - and submits that the complainant may have seen one of these persons at the school.
4.6 The respondent states that the complainant went on sick leave on 13 December, 2008. She adds that she met with the complainant on 17 December, 2008 and informed her that she had no option but to make her (the complainant) redundant. The respondent states that she advised the complainant this situation arose because acute financial circumstances and changes in the children's schedules meant the necessity for her services had diminished. The respondent rejects the complainant's assertion that she was angry at the complainant obtaining advice and having her then representative write to the respondent seeking clarification on a number of issues. The respondent adds that the complainant took the RP50 form away with her and that she seemed to understand what was happening. She states that they met again on 20 December, 2008 but the complainant was not prepared to sign the necessary documentation to enable the respondent give her the redundancy cheque. The respondent states that the documentation was finally concluded in early January, 2009 and accepts that the redundancy cheque was declined by the respondent's bank when it was first presented - due to insufficient funds - but that it was paid when presented subsequently.
4.7 In summary, the respondent submits that the reduction in the complainant's hours from forty hours per week to twenty hours per week with effect from 6 October, 2008 were for reasons which were unconnected with the complainant's pregnancy. The respondent further submits that the financial situation she found herself in late 2008 was so serious that she had no alternative but to make the complainant redundant. This decision was premised on exceptional reasons unconnected with her pregnancy which were communicated to the complainant in writing and therefore rebuts any inference of discriminatory dismissal raised by the complainant. The respondent seeks to rely on the Determination of the Labour Court in Winston v Mason4 in this regard. Finally, the respondent argues that the precarious employment situation of her husband at the time - he was subsequently made redundant - is relevant to the decision she made as the complainant was employed as a childminder which enabled both the respondent and her husband to work and pool their respective incomes for family financial reasons.
5. CONCLUSIONS OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER
5.1 The issues for decision by me are whether or not (i) the respondent discriminated against the complainant on grounds of gender in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in relation to her conditions of employment when it reduced her hours in October, 2008 following the complainant notifying her she was pregnant and (ii) the respondent dismissed the complainant in circumstances amounting to discrimination on grounds of gender in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in December, 2008. In reaching my decision I have taken into consideration all of the submissions, both written and oral, submitted to the Tribunal as well as evidence advanced at the Hearing.
5.2 Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998- 2008 sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. It requires the complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts upon which she can rely in asserting that he was treated unlawfully contrary to the Acts. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised. If the complainant does not discharge the initial probative burden required her case cannot succeed.
5.3 I shall look at the discriminatory treatment element of the complainant's claim first. It is common case that the complainant commenced employment with the respondent in April, 2006 and that whilst her contract of employment indicates that she was employed as a Practice Administrator she was in fact performing duties related to childminding and housework for respondent. This contract of employment clearly indicates that the complainant's employer is Gerardine Lally, t/a Lally & Associates, a point that is of particular relevance and to which I shall return later in this Decision. It is also common case that the complainant was employed for forty hours per week from the outset of her employment until June, 2008 when she returned to Poland to get married. The complainant's absence between June, 2008 and 25 August, 2008 (when she resumed duty) was clearly approved by the respondent. The parties agree that on the evening of 25 August, 2008 the complainant texted the respondent - which was a general method of communication between them. The complainant furnished the Tribunal with the wording of this text - which was agreed by the respondent at the Hearing. This text states that the complainant is pregnant, that her pregnancy is at risk and that she is unable to attend work. The respondent states that (i) she had a meeting with a new client arranged for the following morning and (ii) her husband was away and the children were still off school and she therefore had difficulties organising alternative childcare arrangements at such late notice. She further states it was in this context that she sent the text which she did to the complainant asking that she (the complainant) attend for duty the next morning. The content and tone of this text (the wording of which was opened to the Tribunal and agreed by the parties) can be interpreted a number of ways. However, on balance I accept the respondent's explanation, although it must be said that the choice of words could have been better.
5.4 It is common case that (i) on 26 August, 2008 the complainant furnished the respondent with a medical note certifying her as unfit to work until 5 September, 2008 and (ii) that she was subsequently certified as unfit for duty until 30 September, 2008 - both absences attributed to lower abdominal pain. However, the respondent accepts that she was on notice of the complainant's pregnant condition from 26 August, 2008. The respondent states that she was experiencing financial pressures from the previous April but did not relate these to the complainant at the time, instead she struggled to retain the complainant in employment. However, within days of becoming aware of (i) the complainant's pregnancy and (ii) that she would be absent from work at least until 30 September, 2008, the respondent wrote to the complainant (on 9 September, 2008) (a) setting out certain statutory entitlements whilst pregnant (b) indicating that there would be considerable changes to the schedules of the respondent's children and (c) informing the complainant that it was not appropriate for the complainant to return to work at the end of her sick leave but instead to resume a few days later when it was convenient for the respondent. Whilst the respondent did not at the time specify what impact these considerable changes might have on the complainant's employment she did so on 6 October, 2008 when the complainant resumed duty after sick leave, advising that her weekly hours were to reduce by half. It is well established that pregnancy and matters connected therewith are issues which are uniquely female and therefore less favourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy/maternity constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of gender5. Moreover, it is well established that the entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave is a protected period6 within which the EU Equal Treatment Directive (Recast)7 and the Pregnant Worker's Directive8 apply. I have carefully considered all of the evidence adduced by the parties on this issue and I find that the complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of gender in respect of this aspect of her complaint.
5.5 Having found that the complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment. The respondent states that around mid-September, 2008 she decided, due to the changed circumstances as regards her childminding requirements - she now only required childminding from 2pm each day - and the worsening financial situation she and her husband found themselves in, that she had no option but to reduce the complainant's hours. She adds that she informed the complainant of these changes - and of the reasons for same - when she resumed duty on 6 October, 2008. The respondent states that the complainant accepted the new hours and displayed no dissatisfaction with them. On evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties I am satisfied that the respondent's immediate impression of the situation at the time is correct - the complainant expressed no dissatisfaction with the reduction in her hours, although her position on the issue subsequently changed. I am also satisfied that the respondent's childminding requirements altered as a consequence of changes to her children's school schedules - which resulted in her needing the complainant's services for a smaller number of hours each day. I am further satisfied that whilst the complainant was still expected to perform the full range of duties she had previously performed - as the primary nature of her role had not changed - she was not required to do so to the same extent that she had previously. In light of the foregoing I am satisfied that the respondent had discharged the probative burden required of her and find that the complainant was not discriminated against on grounds of gender in terms of her conditions of employment.
5.6 I shall now look at the second element of the complaint - that the complainant was dismissed during her pregnancy in circumstances amounting to discrimination on grounds of gender. As stated at paragraph 5.4 above the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) states that the entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave is a protected period within which the EU Equal Treatment Directive (Recast) and the Pregnant Worker's Directive apply. Article 10 of the Pregnant Worker's Directive prohibits, with certain limited exceptions, the dismissal of a pregnant employee during this protected period. In Danosa v LKB Lizings SIA9 the CJEU stated as follows - "During that [protected] period, Article 10 of Directive 92/85 does not provide for any exception to, or derogation from, the prohibition on dismissing pregnant workers, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition, provided that the employer gives substantiated grounds for the dismissal in writing.".
5.7 In a recent Determination10 the Labour Court carried out an analysis of several CJEU judgements on this matter. It concluded that "in every case in which pregnancy related dismissal is in issue, the factual combination of the dismissal and the woman's pregnancy must, in and of itself, place the onus of proving the absence of discrimination firmly on the respondent.". It went on to states that in doing so the respondent must present "cogent and credible evidence that the dismissal was in no sense whatsoever related to her pregnancy.". In the instant case the complainant had her employment terminated at a time when she was pregnant and the respondent was aware of her condition. Consequently, I finds that the complainant has established a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissal and the onus shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that the are exceptional factors unconnected with the complainant's condition which gave rise to the termination of her employment
5.8 It is the respondent's contention that (i) the complainant's position became redundant in December, 2008 and (ii) the respondent's financial circumstances became so serious that she could not afford to retain the complainant in employment and consequently she terminated her employment, having obtained the appropriate professional advice. In the course of the Hearing the respondent stated that of the two reasons submitted for terminating the complainant's employment, the serious financial situation she found herself in was the determining factor for her decision and I shall therefore examine this issue first. The respondent seeks to include her husband's employment situation as well as both of their personal financial circumstances - particularly in terms of the mortgage on the family home - as part of the reason for her actions. I am satisfied that the respondent is not entitled to rely on these factors as part of her defence. The respondent gave evidence at the Hearing that she engaged the complainant as an employee of the company because she had received professional advice that this was more tax efficient approach to adopt. In doing so the respondent undoubtedly benefitted from a tax liability perspective by including the complainant's salary as a business expense over the years of her employment. She cannot subsequently seek to resile from that position when it suits her. In addition, the personal debt of the respondent and her husband cannot be permitted as components of the exceptional reasons necessary in terms of the probative burden that requires to be discharged by the respondent in a business capacity, however significant and stressful those circumstances may be, as the complainant was clearly an employee of the respondent only.
5.9 The respondent submitted documentary evidence (prepared by her accountant) in respect of the financial position of the enterprise during the period 2007-2010. It is clear from this material that over this period the respondent's sales reduced by over 46%. However, it is the financial situation in 2008 that must be examined in terms of the respondent's defence. The material indicates that sales in 2008 were only 8% lower than 2007. Expenses were marginally higher in 2008 and the net profit fell by approximately 30% on 2007. This figure was however, sufficient to cover the salary of the complainant during 2008. The respondent submits that during 2008 she formed the view that her projected sales for 2009 and 2010 would drop significantly and that this was also a factor which influenced her decision to terminate the complainant's employment when she did. This significant drop in sales did not materialise in 2009 - sales reduced by 6% on 2008. Moreover, the complainant was due to go on maternity leave during that year - a period during which the respondent had no statutory or contractual obligation to pay the complainant. I am therefore of the view that the respondent acted with undue haste in reaching the decision which she did. Consequently, I am not satisfied that the financial circumstances of the respondent in late 2008 were such that would amount to exceptional circumstances in terms of the burden of proof the respondent was required to discharge.
5.10 I shall now examine the second issue - that the complainant's role became redundant. The complainant argues that no redundancy situation existed at the time as she saw a lady collecting the respondent's children from school about a month after she left the employment. Taken at its simplest form redundancy is described as a situation where an employee's position ceases to exist and s/he is not replaced. No evidence was adduced by the respondent which demonstrates that the requirements she had from early October, 2008, when she reduced the complainant's hours to twenty hours per week, had changed again by the following December. Indeed, the opposite is the case as her evidence was that she took up some of the slack herself and reverted back to family, friends and neighbours to provide support with pick-ups and drop-offs to school. I accept the respondent's evidence in this regard and I also accept that she did not replace the complainant with another employee. I further accept that this explains the scene which the complainant subsequently witnessed at the respondent's children's school. The respondent's representative wrote to the complainant's representative (at that time) on 11 December, 2008 setting out the situation and alerting the complainant to the possibility of redundancy. The reasons set out therein are consistent with the reasons the respondent has advanced in the course of my investigation. Having evaluated all of the evidence advanced by the parties on this point I am satisfied that a genuine redundancy situation existed at that time. It was clearly open to the respondent to make alternative arrangements for her childcare which best suited her needs and were more cost efficient - in some instances at no cost at all - and this is what she did. In summary the situation was that whilst the respondent's needs did not alter, the manner in which she addressed them did. In reaching this conclusion I note that the respondent discharged her statutory duties to the complainant in terms of the redundancy payments legislation, although the process was not a smooth one. In light of the foregoing I find that the respondent has discharged the probative burden required of her in respect of this element of the complaint - that the termination of the complainant's employment were due to circumstances unconnected with her pregnancy.
6. DECISION OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER.
I have completed my investigation of this complaint and make the following Decision in accordance with section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011. I find that -
(i) the respondent did not discriminate against the complainant on grounds of gender, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in respect of her conditions of employment,
(ii) the respondent did not dismiss the complainant in circumstances amounting to discrimination on grounds of gender in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2008 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts, and her complaint cannot therefore succeed.
_______________________________
Vivian Jackson
Equality Officer
24 October, 2012
1 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscrentrum voor Jong Volswassen Case C177/88
2 Brown v Rentokil Case C394/96 and Article 10 of EU Pregnant Worker's Directive
3 EED032
4 EED032
5 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen Case C177/88
6 Brown v Rentokil Case C394/96
7 EU Directive 2006/54/EC
8 EU Directive 92/85
9 Case C-232/09
10 Trailer Care Holdings Ltd v Deborah Healy EDA128