EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS 1998-2012
Decision DEC - E2013-001
A Teacher
and
A Vocational Education Committee
(Represented by IBEC)
File reference: EE/2008/183
Date of issue: 28th January 2013
Keywords: Employment Equality Acts, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Disability imputed, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, Harassment, Victimisation.
1. Dispute
1.1 This dispute concerns a complaint by a teacher against a Vocational Education Committee. The complainant alleges that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation and disability, in relation to a failure to provide reasonable accommodation, in promotion/re-grading and conditions of employment contrary to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2012. He also claims harassment and victimisation.
1.2 The complainant referred his complaint under the Acts to the Director of the Equality Tribunal on 1st April 2008. In accordance with his powers under Section 75 of the Act, the Director delegated the case on the 30th June 2010 to me, James Kelly, an Equality Officer, for investigation, decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions under Part VII of the Act. This is the date I commenced my investigation. Submissions were received from both parties. As required by Section 79 (1) of the Acts a Hearing was held on the 9th November 2011 and a second Hearing was held on the 23rd February 2012. The final correspondence in the case was received on the 7th June 2012. In reaching my decision I have taken into account all of the submissions, written and oral, made by the parties.
2. Summary of the complainants' case
2.1 The complainant is a secondary school teacher and began his employment as a teacher with the respondent in September 1982. He has been employed at his current school since November 1988.
2.2 The complainant submits that the discrimination, harassment and victimisation arose following an incident that occurred in his classroom in February 2005 when a student questioned him about his sexuality in a Civic, Social and Political Education class and where the complainant replied that "I am a lesbian trapped in a man's body". He claims that his reply was to cause his students "to reflect on and problematise their homophobic attitudes." The complainant claims that his employer used this incident as grounds to refer him for psychiatric examination, and following this placed him on administrative leave/sick leave and has subsequently threatened to terminate his employment. The complainant claims that the respondent's actions were discriminatory under the Acts on the gender ground, sexual orientation ground and the grounds of disability, imputed to him contrary to Section 6(2)(g). He further claims that this was harassment and victimisation.
2.3 The complainant claims that he was directed/ordered to go on administrative leave and to attend a Consultant Psychiatrist for medical assessment, and he claims that he had no choice but to cooperate with such a direction from his employer. He claims that he was subsequently "psychiatrist mobbed" from that point onwards simply over a statement that he made in his class room to his students.
2.4 The complainant claims that he was victimised by the respondent on foot of a number of legal actions including employment related cases that he had taken against it dating as far back as 1990 and more recently in 2006. He cites the respondent's action of placing him on administrative leave, having him subsequently psychiatrically assessed and by failing to facilitate his return to the work place as the examples of the victimisation.
2.5 The complainant claims that a disability has been imputed on him by the respondent, following the assessment and report by Forensic Psychiatrist Dr. M. He claims that the respondent has failed to provide reasonable accommodation in assisting him with his return to work, now that he himself provided medical certification that he is fit to return to work.
2.6 The complainant claims that he disagreed with the medical assessment by Dr. M and in October 2007 attended his own Consultant Psychiatrist and Psychotherapist, Dr. C, who having assessed him, certified him fit to return to work dated the 3rd October 2007. He claims that he provided his employer with this certificate and sought a response about the necessary arrangements regarding his position with the respondent.
2.7 The complainant claims that instead of making provisions for his return to work, the respondent again consulted with Dr. M who raised concerns about Dr. C's certification and recommended that a further objective, well informed assessment was required of the complainant. The complainant claims that this is unacceptable on the basis that 13 months had passed from his last assessment with Dr. M.
2.8 In response to the respondent's claim that (a) the complaint is out of time and (b) notwithstanding that, as certain aspects of the claim, namely gender discrimination and victimisation, were not addressed in the complainant's submission to the Tribunal in support of the original complaint they are not properly before the Tribunal for consideration; the complainant claims that (a) this is a case of "on-going" discrimination all deriving from the respondent's decision to refer him for psychiatric assessment and its subsequent refusal to allow him back to work. In relation to (b), the complainant claims a similar set of circumstances arose in an Equality Tribunal decision O'Dwyer v An Post Dec E2006-012, where the Equality Officer found that she did have jurisdiction citing in her conclusions Long and Powers Supermarket & Others1 where Mr. Justice Johnson held that there is an obligation on the Equality Officer to examine all aspects of the claim whether or not they have been referred to in the original referral form.
3. Summary of the respondent's case
3.1 The respondent is a Vocational Education Committee (VEC) established under the Vocational Education Act, 1930 with responsibility for nine second level schools and in excess of 4400 students. The respondent disputes the claims alleged by the complainant.
3.2 As a preliminary point it claims that this case is out of time. It claims that the events that the complainant is referring to i.e. "the comments in a classroom" dates back to February 2005 whereas this claim was only sent to the Tribunal in March 2008, close on three years after the complainant was placed on administrative leave and attended his first psychiatric appointment. It also maintains that certain aspects of the complaint, although mentioned in the original complaint form, were not referred to or supported in the submissions sent to the Equality Tribunal and accordingly, these are not properly before the Equality Tribunal for consideration.
3.3 The respondent submits that it did request the complainant to take administrative leave and to attend an independent medical assessment with Dr. M, a Forensic Psychiatrist, as a consequence of a number of factors and events which were outlined to him in a letter dated 5th May 2005 and these as outlined in the letter include,
"Extent of [complainant's] leave, Nature of absences, [complainant's] correspondence stating he was 'stressed', [chief executive officers] concern for [complainant's] well being, Work-related stress was highlighted in [complainant's] [previous] High Court Action against the VEC, concerns around allegations and complaints made against [complainant] and brought to the attending of the CEO" (sic)
3.4 The respondent claims that it dealt with the complainant in a fair and consistent manner at all times. It claims that its actions were always in the best interest of the wellbeing of the complainant, its students and staff. It claims that the complainant willingly attended the appointment with Dr. M and a report was prepared and the complainant was given a copy. In essence the report outlined that the complainant "was suffering from a depressive illness which was moderate in severity ... the disorder would be exacerbated by [his] returning to work in his present condition. I doubt there will be any significant improvement in his depressive disorder without a period of intensive treatment with antidepressant medication. I have recommended to [complainant] that he return to his GP with a view to him commencing antidepressant medication or referring him to a specialist psychiatric service for treatment".
3.5 The respondent claims that the complainant had a second meeting with Dr. M in September 2006 which again confirmed the view that the complainant was medically unfit to return to work as a teacher. In his report Dr. M stated that "In my opinion, [complainant] could not be considered fit to return to work as a teacher with the VEC until such time as he has engaged in specialist psychiatric treatment and dealt with the issues outlined in this evaluation in a satisfactory manner." The respondent claims that on the basis of the independent assessment the complainant was placed on sick leave.
3.6 The respondent admitted that the complainant had taken legal actions against it in the past, which it claims he was entitled to do so. However, this was never held against him and it cited examples of instances where it assisted him. The respondent claims that it was in constant contact with the complainant throughout the entire process. The respondent also pointed to the significant records of written correspondence, copies of reports of meetings and recorded conversations that the complainant produced in his evidence, which highlights the ongoing contact between the parties.
3.7 The respondent claims that its letter of the 5th May 2005 sets out the cumulative reasons as to why it decided to send the complainant for independent assessment. It claims the medical report outlined that the complainant was unfit to return to work. This, it claims, was supported by a second report over a year later and it outlined the course of action required to address his condition. It claims that there was constant communications between the parties during this period, including letters of the 23rd April 2007 and 9th July 2007 offering support.
3.8 The respondent on receipt of the complainant's correspondence enclosing Dr. C's report certifying the complainant as medically fit to return to work, sought advice on how to proceed. A meeting was proposed to discuss the issue in early 2008, which was subsequently cancelled due to an illness to the person in the VEC dealing with the complainant. The respondent finally made arrangements for a different independent assessment with Prof. K which the respondent asked the complainant to attend and stated that any further meeting be postponed until both parties had in their possession Prof. K's "independent assessment of your current health and wellbeing". The respondent informed the complainant that they would pay for the expenses incurred for the assessment and would continue to pay him while he was on sick leave.
Conclusions of the Equality Officer
4.1 Section 6(1) of the Acts provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where on any of the discriminatory grounds mentioned in subsection (2) one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated. Section 85A of the Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. It requires the complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts upon which he can rely in asserting that he suffered discriminatory treatment. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised.
Jurisdictional Issues
4.2 Two jurisdictional issues have been raised by the respondent, which I must consider and decide upon prior to considering the substantive case.
4.3 First, I will deal with the respondent's claims that as the complainant's submission in support of his claim does not include any reference to gender discrimination and victimisation, therefore these aspects of the claim are not properly before the Tribunal. It is clear that the complainant listed the grounds on which discrimination was being claimed and made a reference to the description of the claim in the original EE.1 form furnished to the Tribunal. I note that the two disputed grounds were contained in the suite of issues as part of the complaint. I note the decision of the Equality Office in Dec E2006-012 O'Dwyer v An Post and the reference to Mr. Justice Johnson's claim that there is an obligation to examine the claim in its entirety. Accordingly, I am satisfied that these two elements are contained in the complaint before me for consideration.
4.4 In relation to the second jurisdictional issue the respondent raised an issue of whether or not this entire matter is properly before the Equality Tribunal on the basis of the time limits set out under Section 77(5)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts and has asked me to consider this as a preliminary matter in the investigation of the case.
4.5 Section 77(5)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 states that "Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence". [my emphasis added]
4.6 Section 77(5)(b) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 states that "On application by a complainant the Director or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly."
4.7 I am not aware of any application to the Director to extend the time limit as is provided in Section 77(5).
4.8 I note the decision in Healy -v- HSE West Area2, where the Equality Officer stated that "Section 77 (5) (a) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2007 states that the six-month time limit starts from the "date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimization to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence". The approach generally taken in this situation is set out in Cast v Croydon College3 which states that: "a further decision can constitute a separate act of discrimination even though it is made on the same facts as a previous decision, providing that there has been a further consideration to the matter and has not merely reiterated or referred back to the earlier decision."
4.9 I also note where the Equality Officer in Carroll -v- HJ Heinz Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd.4, said: "In considering the time limit issue, I am guided by the decision of the Labour Court in a recent case DET No. EDA0923 HSE v Tom Whelehan in relation to time limits. The Labour Court stated "A time limit of the type in issue is analogous to a limitation period for the bringing of actions in civil law. It is settled law that limitation periods run from the time a cause of action accrues and not from the date of knowledge of the material facts grounding the cause of action unless there is an express statutory provision to the contrary. In that regard the Supreme Court, in Hegarty v O'Loughran [1990] 1 IR, 148 rejected the view that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could reasonably discover its existence. The Court held that a cause of action accrues at the time when all the requisite elements of the action existed whether or not the plaintiff knew of their existence."
4.10 I note that the complainant in his submission to the Tribunal of the 16th October 2008 states that the respondent used his classroom statement -"I am a lesbian trapped in a man's body", of the 9th February 2005- to have him sent for psychiatric assessment and placed on administrative/sick leave. The complainant claims that the entire set of events relate back to that classroom statement. It is clear that the respondent's decision to place the complainant on administrative leave and to send him for psychiatric assessment was communicated to the complainant in its letter of the 5th May 2005.
4.11 I note the respondent's letter to the complainant of the 5th May 2005 where the Respondent's Chief Executive Officer wrote "...I informed you that I had given much thought to the whole situation and had taken advice and had come to the conclusion that taking all aspects of the situation, including your own welfare into account, the appropriate and responsible thing for me to do was to ask you to attend at the VEC's expense, an independent medical assessment" and later on he writes "I wish to reiterate and confirm my request that you refrain from attending school pending my receipt of the above mentioned report". Accordingly, I am satisfied that this letter sets, at the very latest, the date of the respondent's decision to place the complainant on administrative leave and have him sent for Psychiatrist assessment. It is clear that the complaint in relation to the respondent's actions to place the complainant on administrative leave and have him attend a Consultant Psychiatrist for assessment was lodged with the Director of the Equality Tribunal well outside of the prescribed period as set out under the Acts.
4.12 Therefore, I find that the complainant's claim, that the respondent discriminated against him in terms of its decision to have him psychiatrically assessed and to be placed on leave based on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, imputed disability and that this was an action of harassment and victimisation was referred to the Tribunal outside the time limits prescribed by Section 77(5) of the Acts, and that no application for an extension of the time limits has been made. Accordingly, I have no jurisdiction to consider these aspects of the case.
Substantive matter - Reasonable accommodation
4.13 The outstanding issue that remains to be addressed in this case relates to the ongoing aspects of the case, namely, the complainant's claim that he had been placed on administrative/sick leave due to the psychiatric reports which have indicated that he suffers from a depressive illness and is not considered medically fit to return to work as a teacher until such time as he has engaged in specialist treatment in a satisfactory manner. The complainant claims that the respondent has made no effort to take appropriate measures or make any reasonable accommodation to enable him to return to work, which he claims is a breach of Equality legislation.
4.14 Disability is defined in Section 2 of the Acts as meaning -
"(a) the total or partial absence of a person's bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person's body,
(b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness,
(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person's body,
(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction, or
(e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person's thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour,
and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person".
4.15 In this case the complainant has stated that he does not have a disability and that the respondent had imputed a disability on him. I have been presented with physiatrist's reports from Dr. M and note that they refer inter alia to the complainant's depression. It is a well established precedent of both this Tribunal and the Labour Court that clinical depression has been considered to fall within the definition of a disability within the Acts. In the circumstances, I find that the complainant does have a disability within the meaning of the Acts. Accordingly, I will now consider the complainant's case in relation to the ongoing situation of whether the respondent has failed to provide him with reasonable accommodation on his possible return to work.
4.16 Section 16 (1) of the Acts state,
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring any person to recruit or promote an individual to a position, to retain an individual in a position, or to provide training or experience to an individual in relation to a position, if the individual -
(a) will not undertake (or, as the case may be, continue to undertake) the duties attached to that position or will not accept (or, as the case may be, continue to accept) the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be performed, or
(b) is not (or, as the case may be, is no longer) fully competent and available to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, the duties attached to that position, having regard to the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be, performed."
However, Section 16(3)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts tempers that defence: "For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability is fully competent to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully competent and capable on reasonable accommodation (in this subsection referred to as "appropriate measures") being provided by the person's employer."
4.17 I note the decision of the Labour Court in A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker (EED037) (and upheld on appeal in the Circuit Court) set out an approach that an employer should consider in relation to an employee with a disability, ..."if it can be shown that the employer formed the bona fide belief that the complainant is not fully capable, within the meaning of the section, of performing the duties for which they are employed. However, before coming to that view the employer would normally be required to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee's capacity.
The nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer, should ensure that he or she in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee's condition and that the employee is given fair notice that the question of his or her dismissal for incapacity is being considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the employer's decision.
In practical terms this will normally require a two-stage enquiry, which looks firstly at the factual position concerning the employee's capability including the degree of impairment arising from the disability and its likely duration. This would involve looking at the medical evidence available to the employer either from the employee's doctors or obtained independently.
Secondly, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable Section 16(3) of the Act requires the employer to consider what if any special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable. The Section requires that the cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. Here, what constitutes nominal cost will depend on the size of the organisation and its financial resources.
Finally, such an enquiry could only be regarded as adequate if the employee concerned is allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level and is allowed to present relevant medical evidence and submissions."
4.18 In applying this approach it is clear that in situations where a person acquires a disability during the course of their employment the onus is most definitely with the employer to take the following steps;
1. to ensure it has fully established the factual position of impairment and the likely duration of this condition on the employee,
2. to establish what, if any, special treatment and/or features that maybe available to allow the employee to become fully capable, this will then be further considered with regard to nominal costs, and,
3. to keep the employee concerned fully aware of proceedings and allow for their participation at every level.
4.19 To further complement this approach, I have also taken cognisance of the decision of the Equality Tribunal in An Employee -v- A Company5, where the Equality Officers refers to a decision6 of Dunne J. in the Circuit Court on hearing the appeal of A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker (EED037) as mentioned above. The Equality Officer said in paragraph 4.11;
" I note that the complainant submitted that there was a failure to provide appropriate measures that would have enabled the complainant to return to the workplace. I note both parties refer to Humphreys v Westwood Fitness Club. In this case Dunne J. sets out a process lead approach to a person with a disability which essentially holds that:
- even if there is a strong possibility that the employee may in fact be incapable of doing the job, the obligation to provide appropriate measures comes first
- that an employer is thus obliged, when on notice of an employee's disability, to go in good faith through a process of checking objectively, with qualified expertise where needed, what is the actual medical situation, what are the necessary implications for work, and what can be mitigated by appropriate measures,
- and that an employer who has failed to go through that process will have breached the requirements of the Acts, even if the employer might reasonably have supposed, without checking further, that the disability is probably serious enough to render the employee not fully capable of undertaking their duties under section 16(1).
It was submitted by the complainant that the respondent failed to consider any alternatives to enable the complainant to return to his post. The complainant's representative referred to a letter from a named doctor that suggested that it a phased approach might be suitable. I note that the medical opinion sought by the respondent specifically states that: "no recommendations that could be made in relation to accommodations that it would be appropriate in managing [the complainant's] future risk within the workplace". I am satisfied that the respondent has completed a process-oriented approach when considering the complainant's return. (my emphasis added)
4.20 Accordingly, I must now look at the evidence and consider the case before me bearing in mind the approach set out in the authorities from the established case law. It is clear from the case law that the onus rests with the respondent to take a proactive approach in establishing the actual position of the complainant's disability and determining the implication on his return to work as a teacher in the school environment. I am mindful that the respondent placed the complainant on administrative/sick leave on the basis of Dr. M's psychiatrist reports. These reports set out the course of action required for the complainant before he could return to work, namely, seeking a course of treatment. However the report lacked clarity as to what recommendations it had for the complainant's possible return to work, if at all. The report is also silent on the duration of the complainant's condition.
4.21 I am satisfied that the parties were in constant contact with each other during the period. I am satisfied that the evidence above in paragraph 3.6 and 3.7 support this. In particular, I note where the respondent's evidence includes a letter sent to the complainant dated 23 April 2007 reporting on a meeting it held with him some days earlier. The letter states "based on [Dr. M's two reports that the complainant could not be considered fit to return to work until he engaged in specialist treatment] this expert medical evidence, on behalf of [the respondent] I wish to confirm that you will be placed on sick leave with effect from Tuesday, 8th May, 2007, [...] Please be assured in the context of engaging with treatment as recommended by [Dr. M] in relation to your fitness to work, [the respondent] will provide you with any such support as is deemed appropriate by the treating Physician to facilitate your recovery to optimal health". I also note another letter sent by the respondent on the 9th July 2007, which among other issues stated "I would like to enquire as to how this is progressing? Should you require any support as you engage in this process, please be assured that the [respondent] is more than willing to provide same and do not hesitate to contact me directly in this regard".
4.22 I note that the respondent was presented with the complainant's own medical opinion in October 2007 stating that he was fit to return to work. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the respondent had been presented with information which would suggest that the complainant may return to work, which was contrary to the existing medical evidence at that time. I am satisfied that the respondent sought advice as to what steps it should take on receipt of this information. As indicated above in Paragraph 4.18, and in order to complete the various stages required, I am satisfied that as the essence of the respondent's medical opinion report is at odds with that of the complainant's medical opinion, there is then a definite requirement on the respondent to seek further clarity. It is clear that there would be an obligation upon the respondent in such circumstances to fully establish the factual position and I acknowledge that it set about attempting to do this, albeit in somewhat of a laboured fashion. I note that it made arrangements for a meeting with the complainant which was cancelled due to an illness and then it chose to set up an appointment with a different independent specialist at the respondent's cost, to collect and establish the factual situation before the parties met to discuss the complainant's position with the respondent. However, I am satisfied that such arrangements are time restrained by availability. It is clear from the evidence and in meeting the personalities from both sides at the hearing that the relationship between the complainant and the respondent was extremely fraught and strained at the time. I am certain this did not facilitate smooth communication between the parties. Accordingly, I conclude that the respondent was attempting to establish the up to date factual information before it engaged in a discussion with the complainant about his possible return to work. In the circumstance I find that the respondent did not fail in its obligations to provide the complainant with reasonable accommodation within the meaning of Section 16 of the Acts.
Other Matters
4.23 At the first hearing the complainant claimed that the respondent's failure to provide access to a number of witnesses namely, the respondent's CEO and its medical representatives placed him at a disadvantage as he wanted to put questions to them. However, I note that neither party, including the complainant, called on medical experts to attend either day of the hearing. I am satisfied that the respondent ensured that its CEO was present for the second hearing date and the complainant was in a position to adduce evidence from him in a lengthy cross examination. I am satisfied that I was presented with all the relevant medical reports in evidence and these were the reports that the respondent made its decisions on. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the complainant and the respondent's CEO were the key witnesses in this case and were necessary to assist me with my investigation of this case. I am satisfied that both parties were given sufficient opportunity to present their cases.
4.24 The complainant claimed in the original EE1 form discrimination in relation to promotion/re-grading and conditions of employment. However, no evidence was adduced during the course of the investigation in relation to these aspects of the claim. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there is no case to consider in respect of promotion/re-grading and conditions of employment, other than what I have already dealt with in my decision.
4.25 The complainant in his submissions to the Tribunal has also raised a number of other issues which include inter alia the failure of the Equality Tribunal and the Labour Court to find in his favour in another case he has previously taken against the respondent prior to these proceedings; the integrity of the respondents medical practitioners that carried out psychiatrist assessments on him, where I note that he had taken a separate case of complaint to the Medical Council. All of these matters are outside of my jurisdiction in the investigation of this case under the Employment Equality Acts.
5. Decision
5.1 I have concluded my investigation of the above complaint and hereby make the following decision in accordance with Section 79(6) of the Acts. I find that,
(i) the claim that the complainant was discriminated, harassed and victimised by being placed on administrative leave/sick leave and referred for psychiatrist assessment was not lodged within the timeframe provided by Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts and therefore, I have no jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
(ii) the respondent did not discriminate against the complainant, on the disability ground pursuant to section 6(2)(h) of the Acts in relation to the provision of reasonable accommodation within the meaning of section 16 of the Acts.
_______________
James Kelly
Equality Officer
28th January 2013
1 High Court [1990]
2 DEC-E2011-080
3 Cast v Croydon College, Court of Appeal [1998] IRLR 318
4 DEC-E2011-114
5 An Employee -v- A Company - DEC-E2010-062
6 Humphreys -v- Westwood Fitness Club (2004) ELR 296