Equality Officer’s Decision No: DEC-P/2014/001
Parties
Mac Namara and Seven Named Complainants
(Represented by the ESB Retired Staff Association)
-v-
Electricity Supply Board
(Represented by Arthur Cox- Solicitors)
File No: PEN/2012/11-18
Date of issue: 18 July, 2014
Headnotes: Pension Acts 1990- 2012 – sections 66, 70 and 81E –equal pension treatment – age - frivolous, vexatious and misconceived
1. DISPUTE
This dispute involves claims by eight named complainants (see Appendix A) that they were discriminated against by the Electricity Supply Board (“the respondent”) on grounds of age, in terms of section 66(2) of the Pensions Acts 1990-2012 and contrary to section 70 of those Acts in relation to the application of the Government Pension Levy (“the pension levy”) to the benefits they receive as retired members of the ESB Defined Benefit Pension Scheme (“the Scheme”).
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The complainants are all retired employees of the respondent and are in receipt of pension benefits from the ESB Defined Benefit Pension Scheme as a consequence of that employment. The complainants state that the Government introduced the pension levy as part of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011and submit that as a consequence of the manner in which this levy was applied to the Scheme, they were discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of age contrary to the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. The respondent rejects this assertion and notwithstanding this submits that the claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived pursuant to section 81E (as amended) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012.
2.2 The complainants referred individual claims to the Equality Tribunal on 13 December, 2012. In accordance with his powers under section 75 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 the Director delegated the complaints to the undersigned - Vivian Jackson, Equality Officer, for investigation, decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director under Part VII of the Acts as they apply to the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. My investigation of the claims commenced on 5 March, 2014 - the date they were delegated to me. On delegation of the claims to me I noted the respondent had argued that the claims were frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)). The respondent submitted that this issue should be addressed in the first instance before any investigation of the substantive aspects of the claims should proceed. Having carefully considered the arguments advanced I decided to proceed along the lines submitted by the respondent and a Hearing to deal with that matter and any other matter connected thereto took place on 16 May, 2014. A small number of matters arose at the Hearing which required further clarification and gave rise to correspondence between the parties and the Equality Officer. This process concluded in late May, 2014.
3. SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT’S CASE
3.1 The respondent submits that the complainants’ claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)). The respondent advances this argument under three separate strands – (a) that the claims are time barred, (b) that it is a stranger to the claims and that they should properly lie against the Trustees of the Scheme of which the complainants are members and (c) that the claims do not relate to a rule of the Scheme.
3.2 The respondent states that section 81E(5) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 require claims, in the first instance, to be referred to the Tribunal within six months of the date of termination of the relevant employment. It adds that this period can be extended to a maximum period of twelve months under section 81E(6) of the Acts. The respondent notes that all of the complainants ceased employment with the respondent before the period(s) provided in either of these subsections – ranging from 1 year and 9.5 months to 16 years and 1.5 months (see Appendix A). It submits therefore that the claims are unsustainable as a matter of law and should be dismissed pursuant to section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 (as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012). In this regard the respondent seeks to rely on the Tribunal’s Decision in Giblin v Bank of Ireland Asset Management Ltd[1] and the Determination of the Labour Court in Hassan v HSE Addiction Services[2].
3.3 The respondent notes that the pension levy was introduced by the Government under The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011 which amended the Stamp Duties Consolidation Act, 1999 by inserting a new section 125B in this latter statute. The respondent further notes that this new section 125B (at subsection 12) places an obligation on “a chargeable person” (which the respondent submits in the case of pension schemes is typically the Trustees) to pay the appropriate pension levy (“duty”) to the Revenue Commissioners in accordance with the provisions of the Acts and specifically permits that the benefits (current or future) to any member of the Scheme may be adjusted as necessary to discharge this statutory obligation. The respondent submits that compliance with this statutory obligation is a matter for the Trustees of the Scheme (as a “chargeable person”) and that it has no role in the matter. In this regard it adds that it is clear it has no role or legal obligation to discharge the pension levy or to make a contribution to its discharge and submits that the failure of the respondent to make any such contribution cannot amount to discrimination of the complainants. It rejects the complainants’ assertion that the Scheme is a “Balance of Cost Scheme” and submits in any event, that any issue connected with the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 is not a matter for determination by this Tribunal and the complainants remedy in respect of any dispute in that regard rests elsewhere.
3.4 The respondent states that section 81E(4) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 defines “the respondent” for the purposes of the Acts as follows:
“(a) the person who is alleged to have discriminated against the complainant in breach of the principle of equal pension treatment,
(b) the person who is responsible for admitting persons to a scheme,
(c) the person who is alleged to be responsible for the victimisation and includes the trustees of an occupational benefit scheme.”
The respondent submits that it does not fall into any of the above categories and notwithstanding this, that the nature of the complainants’ claims (as detailed by the submissions and other documentation filed with the Tribunal and as accepted by the complainants at the Hearing) relates to the principle of equal pension treatment pursuant to paragraph (a) above. The respondent states that the decision on how the pension levy was to be applied was one taken by the Trustees alone and that such a situation was accepted by the complainants at page 8 of their submission where its states “the decision to recover the cost of the pension levy exclusively from ESB pensioners is a discriminatory act on the part of the Trustees of the Scheme....” and by virtue of the contents of their letter to the Equality Tribunal on 17 July, 2013 where it states “the complainants are satisfied that the Trustees of the ESB Superannuation Fund, as respondents in this case, discriminated on an age basis in having the entire pension levy of €18m payable by pensioners.”. The respondent submits that it is a separate legal entity to the Trustees and as such no legitimate claim can be maintained against it for a decision made by the Trustees.
3.5 Finally on this element of the respondent’s arguments, it states that the Scheme is governed by statute and it is currently regulated by the Electricity Supply Board (Superannuation) Order, 2014[3]. The respondent adds that this regulates the relationship and responsibilities it has in terms of the Scheme. It draws the Tribunal’s attention in particular to section 22 of the Regulations which, inter alia, requires it to appoint the Actuary to the Scheme and outlines what obligations it has in terms of consultation, when the Actuary reports there is, or is likely to be, a deficit on the Scheme – and states that these provisions were identical to the provisions which operated previously. The respondent accepts that certain of its employees operate as Trustees to the Scheme but submits that in performing that role they are discharging separate and distinct fiduciary duties and must comply with the responsibilities and requirements of those roles as imposed by other provisions of the pension’s legislation. It further accepts that it provides administrative support to the Trustees but argues that this is not sufficient to create a link which would render it a respondent to the proceedings in terms of section 81E(4)(a) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. In conclusion, the respondent submits that in all of the circumstances it is a stranger to the claims and is not a proper respondent in these proceedings.
3.6 The respondent states that section 70 of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 provides as follows: - “... the principle of equal pension treatment is that there shall be no discrimination on any of the discriminatory grounds (including, subject to section 68(2), indirect discrimination) in respect of any rule of a scheme”. It further notes that section 68 of the Acts defines indirect discrimination in terms of the rules of a scheme. The respondent submits therefore, in light of the foregoing, that a claim in terms of the principle of equal pension treatment must relate to a “rule of a scheme”. The respondent further submits that it is evident from the complainants’ claims that their dispute relates not to a rule of the Scheme, but to how the Trustees of that Scheme complied with State policy in terms of the pension levy and as such the matter is not justiciable under the pension’s legislation and is misconceived in law.
3.7 The respondent submits, for all or any of the above reasons, that the claims are frivolous, vexatious and/or misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 (as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)) and urges the Tribunal to exercise its power under that provision in the first instance.
4. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINANTS’ CASE
4.1 The complainants reject the respondent’s contention that their claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)) The complainants are all retired employees of the respondent and are in receipt of pension benefits from the ESB Defined Benefit Pension Scheme as a consequence of that employment. The complainants state that membership of the Scheme was a compulsory requirement under their conditions of their employment with the respondent and that contributions to the Scheme were made by both the respondent and staff on a ratio of 2:1. The complainants further state that previous funding shortfalls in the Scheme were generally addressed by increased funding by both the respondent and employees. They submit that the respondent has therefore an obligation to contribute all, if not a significant element, of the cost of pension levy. In this regard they refer to a quote by Mr. PJ Moriarty, a former ESB Chief Executive and Chairman in 1984, wherein he commented that “the spirit in which the Superannuation Fund has operated since its foundation has been that the ESB is the Guarantor of last resort against any financial difficulty”. The complainants submit that this amounts to custom and practice which requires the respondent to make some contribution. Moreover, they refer to Table 20 of the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 and submit that this statute renders the Scheme a “Balance of Cost Scheme” and as such places responsibility solely on the respondent for any deficits that may arise in the Scheme’s funds.
4.2 The complainants state that the Trustees wrote to the respondent seeking financial assistance towards payment of the pension levy and the respondent refused to do so. They add that in those circumstances the Trustees were faced with funding the cost of the pension levy from other avenues and ultimately they decided to reduce retired members’ benefits by 0.6% to discharge the pension levy costs. The complainants state that this decision to reduce the retired members’ benefits amount to discrimination of them on grounds of age in terms of section 66(2)(f) and contrary to section 70 of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. They add that this decision was communicated to them in writing by an undated letter from the Chairperson of the Trustees sometime in November, 2012. A copy of this letter was furnished to the Tribunal. The complainants compare the actions of the Trustees in the instant case, by effectively passing the cost of discharging the pension levy on retired members, to those of other Schemes where the cost was absorbed by the Scheme itself.
4.3 The complainants advance the following points by way of argument that the ESB is a correct respondent in these proceedings:
- All Trustees of the Scheme have to be appointed by the respondent Board.
- The Chairman of the Trustees has traditionally been an ex- Group Director of Finance of the respondent.
- The Actuary of the Scheme is appointed by the respondent Board.
- The Secretary to the Scheme is appointed by the Board and is generally a member of the respondent staff.
- The respondent provides administrative assistance to the Scheme.
The complainants submit that for the above reasons, and the arguments advanced in the preceding two paragraphs, the respondent is a correct respondent to the proceedings in terms of section 81E(4)(a) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 and they reject the contention that it is a stranger to the claims.
4.4 The complainants submit that the timelimits prescribed at section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 are irrelevant in the instant case. In support of this assertion they state the pension levy was only introduced under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011and therefore it could not have been contemplated by the pension’s legislation. They add that the decision to fund the levy by reducing their benefits from the Scheme was only communicated to them in November, 2012 and they referred their claims to the Tribunal about a month later, which is well within the timelimits prescribed. The complainants are unable to point to any rule of the Scheme which they claim amounts to discrimination on grounds of age in terms of the principle of equal pension treatment.
4.5 In conclusion, the complainants reject the respondent’s assertion that the claims are frivolous, vexatious or misconceived in terms of the Acts. In this regard they rely on the ordinary and common meaning of these words arguing that their claims could not be considered as “not having any serious purpose or value” , “annoyed, frustrated or worried” and “failing to understand correctly” – the standard dictionary meaning (respectively) of frivolous, vexatious and misconceived.
5. CONCLUSIONS OF EQUALITY OFFICER
5.1 The issue for decision by me is whether or not the complainants’ claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)). In reaching my decision I have taken into consideration all of the submissions, both written and oral, submitted to the Tribunal as well as evidence advanced at the Hearing.
5.2 Section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 provides as follows: -
(1) The Director may dismiss a claim at any stage if of the opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.”.
This provision is applied to Section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Acts, 2004). In Farley v Ireland & Others[4] the Supreme Court stated as follows –
“So far as the legality of the matter is concerned frivolous and vexatious are legal terms, they are not pejorative in any sense….It is merely a question of saying that so far as the plaintiff is concerned if he has no reasonable chance of succeeding then the law says that it is frivolous to bring the case. Similarly, it is a hardship on the defendant to have to take steps to defend which cannot succeed and the law calls this vexatious.”.
These principles were subsequently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Fay v Tegral Pipes Ltd & Others[5]. A claim is misconceived if it is incorrectly based in law[6]. This concept overlaps to some extent with “frivolous” in the sense that the latter has been interpreted primarily as “unsustainable” by the Superior Courts in this jurisdiction. In light of the foregoing it is clear that when deciding whether or not to dismiss a claim as frivolous, vexatious or misconceived in terms of Section 77A of the Acts (as it applies to the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012) I must be satisfied that the complainants have no reasonable chance of succeeding in their claims.
5.3 The respondent advances the argument that the claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived pursuant to section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 under three separate strands – (a) that the claims are time barred, (b) that the respondent is a stranger to the claims and that they should properly lie against the Trustees of the Scheme of which the complainants are members and (c) the claims do not relate to a rule of the Scheme. I shall look at the time limit issues in the first instance. Section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 provides, in the first instance, that a complainant must refer a complaint to the Tribunal within “six months from the date of termination of the relevant employment”. The section further provides that this period can be extended to a maximum of twelve months for “reasonable cause”. Appendix A to this Decision sets out the periods for each of the complainants between termination of their (respective) employment with the respondent and the date of referral of the claims. This period ranges from 1 year and 9.5 months to 16 years and 1.5 months and these details were accepted by each of the complainants during the course of the Hearing.
5.4 The complainants argue that that the timelimits are irrelevant in the instant case as the pension levy was only introduced under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011and therefore it could not have been contemplated by the pension’s legislation. In addition, they state that the decision to fund the levy by reducing their benefits from the Scheme was only communicated to them in November, 2012 and they referred their claims to the Tribunal about a month later, which is well within the timelimits prescribed. The essence of this latter argument is that the alleged act of discrimination took place in November, 2012 and that they referred their claims within a month of that act. This seeks to apply the timelimits prescribed at section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 to the instant case and to ignore the timelimits prescribed in the pension legislation for claims under those statutes. The complainants offered no authority for such a proposition. I am of the view that it is not permissible for the Tribunal to adopt such an approach. The timelimits prescribed at section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 are clear and unambiguous and must be applied notwithstanding the fact that the pension levy came into operation after they came into force. These timelimits require a claim to be referred to the Tribunal at the maximum, within twelve months of the date of termination of a complainant’s employment. In the case of each of the eight complainants this maximum timelimit was not complied with. I therefore find that the complainants have no prospect of succeeding in their claims and I dismiss them as frivolous and vexatious in accordance with section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)).
5.5 Whilst my conclusions in the preceding paragraph dispenses with the matter I have decided, in the interest of completeness, to address the other two strands of argument advanced on behalf of the respondent. The second such strand is that “it is a stranger to the claims”. In this regard it argues that it does not comport to any of the definitions of respondent provided at section 81E(4) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. It adds that the decision as to how the cost of the pension levy on the Scheme would be met was one made by the Trustees of the Scheme pursuant to statutory powers and obligations conferred on them by the Stamp Duties Consolidation Act, 1999 - as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011. The respondent submits it is clear from the complainants’ submission and other documentation filed by them in the course of the Hearing that they accept this to be the case. The respondent accepts that the Trustees approached it for financial assistance in meeting the cost of the pension levy and that it refused the request – stating that it was perfectly entitled to do so. In this regard it rejects the complainants’ assertion that the Scheme is a “Balance of Cost Scheme” and submits in any event, that any issue connected with the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 is not a matter for determination by this Tribunal and the complainants remedy in respect of any dispute in that regard rests elsewhere.
5.6 The respondent states that the Scheme is governed by statute and it is currently regulated by the Electricity Supply Board (Superannuation) Order, 2014[7]. It further states that this regulates the relationship and responsibilities it has in terms of the Scheme, that any role certain of its employees has as Trustees to the Scheme are separate and distinct fiduciary duties which must comply with the responsibilities and requirements of those roles as imposed by other provisions of the pension’s legislation and that any administrative assistance it provides the Scheme is not sufficient to create a link which would render it a respondent to the proceedings in terms of section 81E(4)(a) of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012.
5.7 The complainants state that membership of the Scheme was a compulsory requirement under their conditions of their employment with the respondent; that contributions to the Scheme were made by both the respondent and staff on a ratio of 2:1. The complainants further state that previous funding shortfalls in the Scheme were generally addressed by increased funding by both the respondent and employees and consequently they submit that the respondent has an obligation to contribute all, if not a significant element, of the cost of pension levy. In this regard they refer to a quote by Mr. PJ Moriarty, a former ESB Chief Executive and Chairman in 1984, wherein he commented that “the spirit in which the Superannuation Fund has operated since its foundation has been that the ESB is the Guarantor of last resort against any financial difficulty” and submit that this amounts to custom and practice which requires the respondent to make some contribution. Moreover, they refer to Table 20 of the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 and submit that this statute renders the Scheme a “Balance of Cost Scheme” and as such places responsibility solely on the respondent for any deficits that may arise in the Scheme’s funds. They state that the Trustees wrote to the respondent seeking financial assistance towards payment of the pension levy and it refused to do so and that as a consequence of this refusal the Trustees were faced with funding the cost of the pension levy from other avenues and ultimately they decided to reduce retired members’ benefits by 0.6% to discharge the pension levy costs. In the course of the Hearing the complainants advised that this decision was communicated to them in writing by an undated letter from the Chairperson of the Trustees sometime in November, 2012 and furnished a copy of this letter to the Tribunal. Finally, the complainants further states that (i) all Trustees of the Scheme have to be appointed by the respondent Board , (ii) the Chairman of the Trustees has traditionally been an ex- Group Director of Finance of the respondent, (iii) the Actuary of the Scheme is appointed by the respondent Board, (iv) the Secretary to the Scheme is appointed by the Board and is generally a member of the respondent staff and (v) the respondent provides administrative assistance to the Scheme and these are further indications that the ESB is a correct respondent in these proceedingsand they reject the contention that it is a stranger to the claims.
5.8 It is clear to me that on previous occasions when the Scheme ran into difficulties the issues were resolved through operation of the internal industrial relations machinery, with the assistance of the State dispute relations machinery, if necessary. It is common case that on the most recent occasion when the Scheme ran into financial difficulty – how it would meet the cost of paying the pension levy to the Revenue Commissioners – the respondent decided that it would not make any contribution to meeting this cost. Whilst such a decision might be contrary to custom and practice in the organisation or not apply to any provision of the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, such matters are not issues which can be determined by this Tribunal and any remedy which the complainants may have in this regard lies elsewhere. The fact remains that when faced with the respondent’s refusal to contribute towards the cost of the pension levy the Trustees had to make a decision as to how to fund that charge in order to meet the statutory obligations imposed on it to discharge an appropriate payment to the Revenue Commissioners as a “chargeable person” in terms of the Stamp Duties Consolidation Act, 1999 - as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2011. It is clear to me, and indeed I note the complainants accept this fact, that it was the Trustees who made the decision to apply the reduction to the complainants’ benefits from the Scheme to fund the cost of the levy. This situation is confirmed in writing by the Trustee Chairperson in his undated letter to one of the complainants sometime in November, 2012, a copy of which was furnished to me at the Hearing. The remaining seven complainants confirmed that they had each received a similar letter. Section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 defines respondent for the purposes of the legislation as follows:
“(a) the person who is alleged to have discriminated against the complainant in breach of the principle of equal pension treatment.
The complainants assert that the decision to reduce their benefits from the Scheme in order to meet the cost of the pension levy amounts to discrimination of them contrary to the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. This decision was made by the Trustees alone. Consequently, I find that the within proceedings are taken against the incorrect respondent and that the claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)). I am satisfied that any relationship between the respondent and the Scheme governed by the relevant SI[8], the pensions legislation, or otherwise administrative in nature, does not alter this position.
5.9 The final element of the respondent’s arguments is that the claims do not relate to a rule of the Scheme. In this regard it states that section 70 of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 provides as follows: - “... the principle of equal pension treatment is that there shall be no discrimination on any of the discriminatory grounds (including, subject to section 68(2), indirect discrimination) in respect of any rule of a scheme”. The respondent adds that that section 68 of the Acts also defines indirect discrimination in terms of the rules of a scheme. The respondent submits therefore, in light of the foregoing, that a claim in terms of the principle of equal pension treatment must relate to a “rule of a scheme”. The respondent further submits that it is evident from the complainants’ claims that their dispute relates not to a rule of the Scheme, but to how the Trustees of that Scheme complied with State policy in terms of the pension levy and as such the matter is not justiciable under the pension’s legislation and is misconceived in law. The complainants offered little by way of response in this matter and were unable to point to any rule of the Scheme which was breached in a discriminatory fashion in terms of their claims. Having carefully considered this matter I am satisfied that the respondent’s interpretation of the situation is correct – i.e. that the claims refer to the manner in which the Trustees complied with their statutory obligation to pay the pension levy to the Exchequer and in doing so reduced the pension benefits paid to the complainants under the Scheme. I am further satisfied that in reaching that decision the Trustees were not applying or operating any “rule” of the Scheme in terms of the definition of that word at section 65 of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012. In the circumstances I find that the claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 ( as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)).
6. DECISION OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER
I have completed my investigation of these claims and make the following Decision in accordance with section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011 (as applied to section 81H of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012). I find that the complainants’ claims are frivolous, vexatious and misconceived in terms of section 77A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2011, (as applied to section 81E of the Pensions Acts, 1990-2012 by section 81J of those Acts (as amended by section 66 of the Equality Act, 2004)) and I dismiss all eight claims on that basis in accordance with powers conferred on me under that provision.
_______________________________________
Vivian Jackson
Equality Officer
18 July, 2014
APPENDIX A
Details of the eight complainants
| Name | Date of Termination of Employment | Time elapsed between termination of employment and date of referral of complaint |
| Michael Mac Namara | 3/10/2002 | 10 years, 2 months |
| Carl O’Sullivan | 31/10/2003 | 9 years, 1.5 months |
| Patrick Philpott | 30/7/1997 | 15 years, 4.5 months |
| Ann McCafferty | 2/10/2005 | 7 years, 2 months |
| John Nugent | 26/2/2011 | 1 year, 9.5 months |
| Tony Collins | 31/7/2004 | 8 years, 4 months |
| Christy Keogh | 30/10/1996 | 16 years, 1.5 months |
| Brian Glover | 14/1/1999 | 13 years, 11 months |