EQUALITY OFFICER'S DECISION NO: DEC-E/2014/074
PARTIES
Ms. Beata Nowakowska
(Represented by Hoban Boino Solicitors – Kancelaria Pawna)
Vs
Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Ltd
And
Rottapharm Ltd
(Represented by IBEC)
FILE NO: EE/2011/665 and 666
Date of issue: 4 November 2014
1. Dispute
1.1. This dispute involves a claim by Ms. Beata Nowakowska that the Respondents, Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Limited (“Noel Recruitment”) and Rottapharm Limited (“Rottapharm”), discriminated against her on grounds of gender by reason of her pregnancy contrary to Section 6(2A) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 and contrary to Section 8(1)(b) of those Acts in relation to her conditions of employment.
1.2 It is also submitted that Rottapharm, as a provider of agency work, discriminated against Ms. Nowakowska (“the Complainant”) as an agency worker contrary to Section 8(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 as amended.
1.3 It is further submitted that the Respondents dismissed the Complainant because of her pregnancy and that the said dismissal constitutes discriminatory dismissal; that the Respondents breached Article 10 of the Pregnancy Directive (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) which prohibits the dismissal of pregnant workers from the beginning of their pregnancy until the end of their maternity leave, save in exceptional circumstances not connected with their condition; that the Complainant was dismissed during the course of her pregnancy and that the Respondents have failed to provide details of any exceptional circumstances or any objective justification for the dismissal.
2. Background
2.1 The Complainant referred a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 to the Equality Tribunal on the 13th September 2011 alleging that the Respondents had discriminated against her on grounds of gender and family status.
2.2 In accordance with his powers under section 75 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008, the Director, on 15th of January 2014, delegated the case to me, Gary Dixon, an Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director under Part VII of those Acts. This is the date on which I commenced my investigation. Written submissions were received from all parties. As required by Section 79(1) of the Acts and as part of my investigation, I proceeded to a Hearing on the 7th July 2014.
2.3 A Hearing had originally been scheduled for 25th March 2014 but was deferred following a request for adjournment received on 24th March from Rottapharm who subsequently provided medical evidence in relation to the unavailability of its witness. The Complainant accepted the Tribunal’s decision to defer the hearing notwithstanding the inconvenience caused in relation to a witness travelling from Poland. A new hearing date was subsequently scheduled for 7th July and the parties were notified by registered post.
2.4 At the commencement of the rescheduled Hearing on 7th July it was noted that Rottapharm was not in attendance. It emerged that this was due to a technical error by Rottapharm’s representative (IBEC) in recording the rescheduled Hearing date. IBEC was contacted and advised (by telephone) that the hearing would proceed as scheduled with the concession of a one hour deferral in the commencement time. The deferral facilitated IBEC’s attendance at the Hearing on behalf of Rottapharm. I consider that this was the fairest way to proceed considering the Hearing date had already been deferred at the request of Rottapharm at late notice to the inconvenience of the Complainant as outlined above.
2.5 Furthermore, in light of the fact that Rottapharm were not in a position to have a staff member present, in closing the Hearing I afforded them the opportunity to submit final arguments in writing within 2 weeks. Rottapharm availed of this opportunity and their comments were copied to the Complainant for response. Final correspondence in the matter took place on 21st July 2014.
3. Summary of Complainant’s case
3.1 The Complainant submits that she commenced employment at Rottapharm, through Noel Recruitment, in November 2009 as a general operative. While her training and working arrangements - such as shift rotation, conditions of employment, etc. - were managed by Rottapharm, she was paid by Noel Recruitment.
3.2 In December 2010 the Complainant discovered she was pregnant. In January 2011 she informed her manager at Rottapharm of her pregnancy and provided medical evidence. She also advised Noel Recruitment of her pregnancy by email.
3.3 Ms Nowakowska submits that in March 2011 she was asked by Rottapharm management to work a 3-cycle shift (which involved night shift work) but said she was not in a position to do so; she then provided a medical certificate advising that she should not undertake night shift work. The Complainant alleges that subsequently she was asked repeatedly (almost daily) to work a 3 cycle shift even though her manager was aware that she could not do so on the advice of her doctor. She also alleges that when she requested to be assigned to day shift work exclusively, her supervisor advised her that it would be discriminatory vis-à-vis employees working both day and night shifts to allow her to do so.
3.4 The Complainant submits that on Sunday 1st April 2011 Noel Recruitment contacted her by telephone and advised that she was no longer required by Rottapharm because of a downturn in its business. She disputes Rottapharm’s rationale for her dismissal which she contends was related to the fact that she was pregnant. Noel Recruitment did not succeed in securing another placement/assignment for her and in November she requested her P45.
Alleged Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
3.5 In addition to the issues outlined above which the Complainant submits constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination, she further submits that the close proximity of these events to the announcement of her pregnancy is a fact of sufficient consequence to discharge her burden of proof. Rabbitte v EEC Direct (DEC – E/2008/07) re dismissal on notification of pregnancy is cited in this regard. Further, the Complainant submits that the Labour Court in Determination No: EDA095 (Intrium Justitia v Kerrie McGarvey) has confirmed that the dismissal of a pregnant woman raises a prima facie case of discrimination on the ground of gender. Accordingly, the Complainant submits that the burden of proof thus shifts to the Respondents to establish that both the less favourable treatment and the dismissal were attributable to objective, non-discriminatory grounds.
The Pregnancy Directive (Council Directive 92/85/EEC)
3.6 The Complainant submits that the Respondents also breached Article 10 of the Pregnancy Directive which prohibits the dismissal of pregnant workers from the beginning of their pregnancy until the end of their maternity leave, save in exceptional circumstances not connected to their condition. She states she was dismissed during the course of her pregnancy and that the Respondents have failed to establish that there were exceptional circumstances which justified dismissal, thereby rendering the dismissal discriminatory - cases Webb v Emo Air Cargo, Brown v Rentokil Ltd. and Dekker v Stichting Vorm are cited in this regard.
Alleged Dismissal by Reason of Redundancy
3.7 The Complainant submits that even if there was a decline in business (as asserted by the Respondents), no clear and fair procedure was followed regarding the selection of employees for dismissal and, even though she was one of the most senior operatives at Rottapharm, she was “let go” before other agency workers with less service than her.
4. Summary of Respondents’ case(s)
4.1 Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Limited
4.1.1 Noel Recruitment states that the Complainant registered with them in November 2009 and was subsequently assigned to Rottapharm as a production operative on a temporary basis. She worked both day and night shifts in rotation.
4.1.2 On 31st January 2011 the Complainant informed them (Noel Recruitment) that she was pregnant and confirmed that she had also notified Rottapharm (the provider of agency work) of her pregnancy.
4.1.3 Noel Recruitment states that Rottapharm conducted a risk assessment in accordance with its policy for pregnant employees and concluded that there were no significant restrictions on the Complainant being able to do her job.
4.1.4 On 1st April 2011 Rottapharm notified Noel Recruitment that the Complainant would be finishing up that day and that she would be paid one week’s remuneration in lieu of notice. Noel Recruitment state that they were advised by Rottapharm that this was due to a downturn in business (resulting in a 12% reduction in production) and the phasing out of agency workers, one of whom was the Complainant.
4.1.5 Noel Recruitment confirmed that it had 3 staff placed with Rottapharm during 2011, one of whom was the Complainant; another became directly employed by Rottapharm in April 2011 while the third was retained by Rottapharm as an agency worker until March 2012.
4.1.6 Noel Recruitment states that it tried to source alternative employment for the Complainant following her tenure at Rottapharm but that they were unable to find a suitable position. On 18th November 2011 the Complainant requested her P45.
4.2 Rottapharm Limited
4.2.1 Rottapharm Limited is part of the Rottapharm Madaus Group headquartered in Milan. It established its Irish manufacturing facility in 1999 and employed approximately 140 people during 2012 at its facility at Mulhuddart, West Dublin.
4.2.2 Rottapharm submits that the Complainant was employed by Noel Recruitment and assigned to their manufacturing site as an agency worker in November 2009. She undertook Production Operator duties which included the set-up, operation and cleaning of equipment and processes in the assigned manufacturing area(s).
4.2.3 Rottapharm states that in early 2011 a significant downturn in forecast volumes dictated that there was a business based requirement to decrease resources in manufacturing via a combination of reduced agency resources, expiry of fixed-term contracts and voluntary redundancy. In light of this, Rottapharm submits that the Complainant ceased her assignment with the company in April 2011.
4.2.4 Rottapharm denies that it discriminated against the Complainant and submits that is has been well established practice of the Equality Tribunal and the Labour Court to require a Complainant to present, in the first instance, facts from which it can be inferred that s/he was treated less favourably than another person is, has or would be treated, on the basis of the discriminatory ground cited. In Teresa Mitchell v Southern Health Board (DEE11, 15.02.01) Rottapharm submits that the evidential burden which must be discharged by the Complainant before a prima facie case of discrimination can be said to have been established was outlined by the Labour Court as follows:
“The claimant must ‘establish facts’ from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely on seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if those primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment. Applied to the present case, this approach means that the appellant must first prove as fact one or more of the assertions on which her complaint of discrimination is based. A prima facie case of discrimination can only arise if the appellant succeeds in discharging that evidential burden.”
4.2.5 Rottapharm submits that it is only when the Complainant has discharged this burden to the satisfaction of the Equality Officer that the burden shifts to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised. Rottapharm strongly submits that the Complainant has failed to discharge this burden of proof and, consequently, that the claim cannot succeed. Rottapharm further submits that the Complainant has not proved any facts of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination; in fact, the allegations made by the Complainant pertaining to her dismissal are factually incorrect.
4.2.6 Rottapharm also submits that the reality of the situation that led to the Complainant’s (and other agency workers’) redundancy from the organisation was due to a significant downturn in business. Rottapharm states it was advised of significant changes to the forecast volumes in two of its key markets. The net effect for the company of these changes was a reduction of 43 million sachets in 2011 (equivalent to 12% of total sachet production). Rottapharm states that it advised Noel Recruitment of this situation stating that it had no alternative but to consider the use and “phasing out” (i.e. reducing the number) of agency workers on a “line by line” basis consistent with demand. The company submits that it commenced a programme of reduction of agency workers from January 2011 and that the Complainant was not the first nor the last agency worker to be phased out under this process; numbers of workers were reduced depending on the lines that staff were working on, their experience on the lines, and in line with volume adjustments and demand. Accordingly, Rottapharm submits that the Complainant was not dismissed, but rather she was one of a number of agency staff at the time whose services were discontinued.
4.2.7 It is Rottapharm’s position that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination which would allow the burden of proof to be shifted to the Respondent(s); the Complainant has also failed to establish any facts from which it may be presumed that she was treated unequally on the ground of gender.
4.2.8 Rottapharm further submits that should the Tribunal find that the Complainant has discharged the evidential burden required to raise a presumption of discrimination, then she has failed to prove that she has been treated less favourably than another person is, has or would be treated in a comparable situation on the ground specified in section 6(2)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 and, consequently, her claim must fail. Rottapharm asserts that an allegation of direct discrimination needs two elements in order to succeed – the first is less favourable treatment and second is the existence of gender grounds. It is submitted that the Complainant has provided no evidence of less favourable treatment nor has she identified any other employee she was treated less favourably than; therefore there is no evidence of discrimination. In addition, it is submitted that the Complainant has failed to establish the existence of gender grounds for any such treatment.
4.2.9 In summary, Rottapharm argues that the burden of proof rests with the Complainant to show that she was discriminated against on the ground of gender within the meaning of the Employment Equality Acts and that no evidence has been produced to support such a claim. Accordingly, Rottapharm considers that the claim is unfounded, frivolous, vexatious or misconceived within the meaning of section 77A(1) of those Acts and should be dismissed.
5. Conclusions of the Equality Officer
5.1 Under Section 2 (1) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2008 an agency worker is defined as follows:
“agency worker” means an employee whose contract of employment is as mentioned in paragraph (b) of the definition of such a contract in this subsection;
The Employment Equality Acts also apply to providers of agency work. This term is defined at Section 2(5) of the Act as follows: -
“A person who, under a contract with an employment agency, within the meaning of the Employment Agency Act, 1971, obtains the services of one or more agency workers but is not their employer for the purposes of this Act is in this Act referred to, in relation to the agency workers, as the “provider of agency work”.
5.2 It is accepted that Rottapharm procured the services of a number of agency workers, including the Complainant, pursuant to an agreement with Noel Recruitment and that, accordingly, Rottapharm is a provider of agency work for the purposes of the Act.
5.3 Section 8 of the Act contains the general prohibition of discrimination. Section 8(1) provides: -
In relation to—
(a) access to employment,
(b) conditions of employment,
(c) training or experience for or in relation to employment,
(d) promotion or re-grading, or
(e) classification of posts,
an employer shall not discriminate against an employee or prospective employee and a provider of agency work shall not discriminate against an agency worker.
5.4 The combined effect of these provisions is that both the first named respondent (Noel Recruitment) and the second named respondent (Rottapharm) can each be an impleaded party under the Act; the former as the Complainant’s employer and the latter as the provider of the agency work on which the Complainant was employed. It follows, therefore, that each or either of the named respondents may potentially be considered liable for any discrimination deemed to have arisen.
5.5. The essential issue for decision by me, therefore, is whether each or either of the named Respondents discriminated against the Complainant on grounds of her gender in terms of Section 6 and contrary to Section 8 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 in relation to her treatment during her pregnancy. While the Complainant’s original complaint included an allegation of discrimination on grounds of family status, no separate arguments were presented (or rebutted) in that regard. In reaching my decision I have taken account of all submissions, oral and written, made to me in the course of my investigation, including evidence presented at the Hearing.
5.6 Alleged Discrimination by Noel Recruitment
5.6.1 Noel Recruitment is an Irish recruitment agency which provides jobs in many sectors throughout the country. The Complainant registered with the agency in 2009 and was placed with Rottapharm. The Complainant had a contract of employment with Noel Recruitment and, accordingly, she was paid by that company while working at Rottapharm.
5.6.2 Noel Recruitment became aware that the Complainant was pregnant when she advised them so in January 2011. Subsequently - on 1st April 2011 - Noel Recruitment was notified by Rottapharm that the Complainant would be finishing up that day because of a downturn in business (resulting in a 12% reduction in production) and the phasing out of the use of agency workers, one of whom was the Complainant.
5.6.3 Noel Recruitment submitted evidence of their attempts to source alternative employment for the Complainant following her tenure at Rottapharm. However, they were unable to find another suitable position.
5.6.4 Noel Recruitment submits that it offered to pay the Complainant for 21 days Health & Safety leave after she had been “let go” by Rottapharm but, in order to have done so, they would have required a work safety assessment from Rottapharm. However, while Rottapharm confirmed that they had undertaken a risk assessment, they concluded that there were no significant restriction on the Complainant being able to do her job and reiterated that the reason she was laid-off was unrelated to pregnancy but due to the downturn in business.
5.6.5 While Noel Recruitment is technically the employer in this case, I am satisfied that it did not have any role or part in relation to the central point at issue, i.e. the decision to lay-off the Complainant in April 2011. I note that the Complainant has not taken issue with the position of Noel Recruitment to any significant degree in that regard.
5.7 Alleged Discrimination by Rottapharm
5.7.1 Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination. If she succeeds in doing so, then, and only then, is it for the Respondent(s) to prove the contrary. The Labour Court elaborated on the interpretation of section 85A in Melbury v Valpeters (EDA/0917) where it stated that section 85A: "places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule".
5.7.2 Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2008 provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where “a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2)…..” Section 6(2)(a) of the Acts define the discriminatory grounds of gender as follows – “as between any 2 persons, ............ (a) that one is a woman and the other is a man,..
5.7.3 Gender - Pregnancy and the special protected period
The entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave constitutes a special, protected period as outlined in the Court of Justice of the European Union Decisions in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd[1] Brown v Rentokil Ltd[2] and Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum[3]. The Labour Court in Trailer Care Holdings Ltd Vs Deborah Healy[4] referred to the fact that “the jurisprudential principle that discrimination on grounds of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex is now codified in Directive 2006/54/EC on the Principle of Equal Treatment of Men and Women (the Recast Directive). This Directive provides, at Article 2.2(c), that any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC constitutes unlawful discrimination for the purpose of that Directive”. Furthermore it refers specifically to Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum and the fact that “the Court of Justice of the European Union (formally the ECJ) has made it clear that since pregnancy is a uniquely female condition any adverse treatment of a woman on grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination on ground of her sex. Thus, the law of the European Union recognises the reality that to treat a woman less favourably because she is pregnant is to discriminate against her because she is a woman. That can never be justified. Issues such as disruption caused to an employer’s business or costs associated with accommodating a pregnant woman in employment are, as a matter of Union law, wholly irrelevant”[5]
5.7.4 Treatment during pregnancy
The Complainant has submitted that she was discriminated against by the Respondents on grounds of gender following the announcement of her pregnancy in relation to her conditions of employment in that she was essentially refused appropriate work during her pregnancy. At the Hearing the Complainant explained that after she advised her manager that she was pregnant she was moved briefly (only once) to lighter work. However, subsequently she was requested to work a 3 shift cycle that included a night shift. After she advised him that she was not in a position to undertake night shift work, she states that she was moved from one job to another almost daily.
5.7.5 The Complainant also asserts that there was no clear and fair procedure followed in relation to her selection for redundancy and that other agency workers with less service than her were retained after she was “let go”. In this regard she provided a list of names of other workers at Rottapharm whom she states had a shorter period of service and less experience than her but who were retained following her redundancy. At the Hearing it was established that two of the workers on the list were agency workers who had also been recruited through Noel Recruitment and that both were retained post her redundancy.
5.7.6 During the Hearing Rottapharm’s representative accepted that the Complainant had been moved because of her pregnancy. It was asserted that while this was done in an effort to facilitate her, it became unmanageable and unsustainable. As regards her selection for redundancy, Rottapharm argued that the phasing out of agency workers was due to a downturn in business and that all agency workers were eventually phased out on a line-by-line basis. However, at the Hearing Rottapharm did not dispute the assertion that the Complainant was the first of its agency workers to be “phased out” due to the downturn. The Rottapharm written submission appears to confirm this by stating that “following her redundancy the remaining workers were phased out”. However, subsequent to the Hearing Rottapharm submitted the following statement:
“The company commenced a programme of reduction of Agency Workers from January of that year. Beata was not the first agency worker to finish with us nor was she the last. We reduced our numbers from January depending on the lines staff were working on, their experience on lines, and in line with volume adjustments and demand.”
5.7.7 Therefore, while it has been asserted by Rottapharm that “Beata was not the first agency worker to finish…” no evidence, such as a schedule of names, etc., has been provided by the Respondents in that regard. As already mentioned, the Complainant provided a list of 12 names of agency workers whom, she submits, had less service than her but who were retained post her redundancy. The list includes 2 agency workers recruited via Noel Recruitment who confirmed that both were retained after Ms. Nowakowska was made redundant. The Complainant asserts that that one of these agency workers performed similar functions to her and was retained at Rottapharm until 16th March 2012.
5.7.8 I accept that there was a downturn in business which affected significant changes to forecast volumes resulting in a reduction of 43 million sachets and necessitated the phasing out of the use of agency workers. The evidence before me, however, does not show any objective rationale for the Complainant’s selection for redundancy prior to other less experienced agency workers. Therefore, it appears to me that the Complainant’s pregnancy must have been a consideration in Rottapharm’s decision to terminate her assignment at the company. The evidence indicates that agency workers with less service and less experience than the Complainant were retained post her redundancy. Further, even if I were to consider the fact that the Complainant could not work night shifts to be a reasonable defence for her early selection for redundancy - which I do not - Rottapharm has indicated that the downturn in business resulted in “shift patterns being altered with a move away from two cycle shifts to one cycle shift…”. Therefore, the fact that the Complainant could not work night shifts during her pregnancy would have become less of an issue during the downturn as the need for night shifts diminished.
5.7.9 In evaluating the evidence I must first decide whether the complainant has established a prima facie case pursuant to Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008. As mentioned above, the Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of “sufficient significance” before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn (see reference at 5.7.1 above to Melbury v Valpeters).
5.7.10 It is a fact that the Complainant was “let go” (or selected for redundancy) at a time when it was known that she was pregnant. It is well established EU and national law that such a “dismissal” on its face is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. As outlined at 5.7.3 above, a pregnant woman enjoys special protection during her pregnancy and maternity leave. I consider, therefore, that it is for Rottapharm to rebut this inference.
5.7.11 I have stated above that I accept that the phasing out of agency work by Rottapharm was objectively justified and that all of its agency workers were subsequently laid-off due to the downturn in business. Therefore, I also accept that the Complainant would have been laid off in due course regardless of whether or not she was pregnant. However, I must also be satisfied that the Complainant’s pregnancy was not in any way a consideration when the decision to terminate her employment at Rottapharm was taken.
5.7.12 Having had regard to all the facts presented in the matter, I consider that Rottapharm has not repudiated the inference of discrimination. In my view the selection process lacked transparent objectivity. No clear or fair procedure appears to have been followed regarding selection for dismissal as the Complainant was “let go” before other agency workers with less service than her.
5.7.13 It is unlawful to dismiss a pregnant person at any stage of her employment for any reason that is linked with her pregnancy. It is for the Respondent in all cases to prove that there are exceptional circumstances justifying any such dismissal. In my opinion such a burden has not been discharged. Accordingly I am satisfied that the Complainant was discriminated against on grounds of gender in relation to this matter, i.e. that her tenure at Rottapharm was ended prematurely due to her pregnancy.
5.7.14 No arguments were presented by the Complainant in relation to alleged discrimination on grounds of family status. Accordingly, as no prima facie case has been established pursuant to Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts in that regard I consider that the Complainant did not suffer such discrimination.
6. DECISION OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER
6.1 I have completed my investigation of this complaint and in accordance with section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 I hereby make the following decision:
6.2 I consider that the Complainant has established a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissal on the gender ground and that Rottapharm Limited has not rebutted this inference. Accordingly I find that -
(i) as a provider of agency work, Rottapharm Limited discriminated against the Complainant as an agency worker contrary to Section 8(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2008 as amended;
(ii) Rottapharm Limited also discriminated against the Complainant on grounds of gender by reason of her pregnancy contrary to Section 6(2A) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 and contrary to Section 8(1)(b) of those Acts in relation to her conditions of employment;
(iii) Rottapharm did not discriminate against the Complainant on grounds of family status contrary to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2008 as amended;
(iv) Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Limited did not discriminate against the Complainant on grounds of gender or family status contrary to the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2008 as amended.
6.3 In accord with the Acts, therefore, I order Rottapharm Limited to pay to the Complainant €20,000 in compensation for the effects of the unlawful discriminatory treatment. I consider that this award is appropriate in light of all of the issues in question in this case, including the fact that I have found that the phasing out of the use of agency work by Rottapharm was objectively justified and that all of its agency workers were subsequently laid-off due to the downturn in business.
____________________
Gary Dixon
Equality Officer
4 November, 2014
'Footnotes'
[1] [1994] ECR 1-3567
[2] [1998] ECR 1-04185
[3] [1990] ECR 1-3941
[4] EDA No 128
[5] [1990] ECR 1-3941