DEC-E2016-078

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS

Decision - DEC–E2016-078

PARTIES

Dr. Kevin Brogan

(represented by The Irish Medical Organization)

-v-

The Health Service Executive

(represented by Ms. Niamh McGowan B.L. instructed by

Arthur Cox Solicitors)

File References: et-149630-ee-14

Date of Issue: 19th May, 2016

1. Dispute

1.1 This case concerns a complaint by the complainant that he was discriminated against by the respondent on the ground of age contrary to sections 6(2)(f) of the Employment Equality Acts in relation to his conditions of employment in terms of section 8 of those Acts. The complainant also claims that he was subjected to indirect discrimination on the ground of age contrary to section 31 of the Acts.

2. Background

2.1 The complainant referred a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts to the Director of the Equality Tribunal on 3rd October, 2014. In accordance with his powers under section 75 of the Employment Equality Acts, the Director General delegated the case on 10th November, 2015 to me, Enda Murphy, an Adjudication Officer/Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions under Part VII of the Employment Equality Acts. This is the date I commenced my investigation. A written submission was received from the complainant on 28th April, 2015 and from the respondent on 25th September, 2015. As required by section 79(1) of the Acts and as part of my investigation, I proceeded to hearing on 4th February, 2016. The final correspondence from the parties following the hearing was received on 5th April, 2016

2.2 This decision is issued by me following the establishment of the Workplace Relations Commission on 1 October 2015, as an Adjudication Officer who was an Equality Officer prior to 1 October 2015, in accordance with section 83(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

3. General Information relating to the Complaint

3.1 Traditionally the roles of medical doctors working in the area of public and community health services were those of Area Medical Officer (AMO) and Senior Area Medical Officer (SAMO). A review of public health services was commissioned by the then Minister for Health in 1998 leading to the publication of the Report of the Public Health Review Group (“Brennan Report”) in April 2002. This report recommended the separating out of community medical services from public health services and the introduction of a three tiered structure, within the area of community health, of a Principal Medical Officer to whom Senior Medical Officer’s (SMO’s) would report and AMO’s who would report to the SMO’s. Arising from the Brennan Report and other matters the Respondent and the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) under the auspices of the Labour Relations Commission concluded the Public Health Doctors’ Agreement in 2003 which provided inter alia that there would be no further recruitment of AMO’s. The 2003 Agreement made no changes to the qualification requirement albeit that the role of SAMO was to disappear and the new entry level post of SMO was to be created. Circular No. 23/2004 which was issued by the Minister for Health and Children on 13th May, 2004 sanctioned the implementation of the SMO role with immediate effect. The Circular set out the job description, qualifications and particulars of office for the position of SMO. The qualifications required a candidate to have a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Public Health but also provided for equivalent qualification examples which included an MSc in Community Health and a Masters in Community Child Health (UK).

4. Summary of Complainant’s Case on Substantive Issue

4.1 The complainant is a Community Health Doctor, employed at the grade of Area Medical Officer (AMO) by the HSE since 1997 within Community Medical Services in the South East. The complainant submits that among the terms of the Public Health Doctors’ Agreement in 2003, it was stipulated that there would be no further recruitment of AMO’s. Consequently, the future entry grade for younger doctors wishing to pursue careers in the Community Health Medicine Service would be at SMO level, at a higher salary level and status than the previous AMO entry grade. The complainant contends that the operation of this Agreement by the respondent has given rise to circumstances whereby experienced doctors, such as him, have found themselves in the anomalous position of being stranded below the basic grade of entry into their medical speciality.

4.2 The complainant submits that the crux of the present complaint is that by virtue of his age, he has suffered discrimination either directly or indirectly as a result of the operation of the 2003 Agreement by the respondent. The complainant submits that this discrimination manifests itself in his exclusion from the SMO grade by circumstances that were beyond his control. It is the complainant’s contention that had he been a younger doctor he would not have been shut out in this fashion. The complainant submits that this patent unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that he has been required to induct and train younger doctors who have entered the Community Health Medical Service since 2003. These younger doctors have entered at SMO level, by right, and have automatically enjoyed a salary level, and crucially, professional status above that enjoyed by the complainant. The complainant submits that his Senior Medical Officer colleagues consider him to operate at the level of SMO.

4.3 The complainant submits that the qualifications for appointment to the role of SMO which were set out in Circular No. 23/2004 in May, 2004 require that applicants should possess a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Health or an equivalent qualification. The complainant obtained a Masters in Child Health from UCD in 2007; however, he submits that he was not made aware until July, 2015 that this qualification was deemed by the respondent as an equivalent qualification for the purposes of eligibility to apply for appointment to the position of SMO. The complainant submits that at the material time in 2004 he had worked for the respondent for ten years and possessed Diplomas in Child Health and Obstetrics, and had completed General Practice training in Northern Ireland. The complainant submits that had the respondent wished, it could have appointed him to the position of SMO on the basis of experience and qualifications, the sum of which were vital in his role in Community Health. Instead, he was left behind at the grade of AMO, while younger colleagues entered the service at the grade of SMO.

4.4 In summary, the complainant claims that the decision to set the qualification of Masters in Public Health, or equivalent, as an essential qualification for the post of SMO in Community Health has served as a barrier in preventing doctors from applying for promotion. The complainant submits that his exclusion from even applying for a post for which he is very well qualified and, to all intents and purposes, performs through the imposition of an educational requirement that he did not possess at the time when it (i.e. the practice, criteria or provision) was put in place amounts to indirect discrimination on the grounds of age.

5. Summary of Respondent’s Case on Substantive Issue

5.1 The respondent submits that the complainant’s case is spurious and being brought solely for the purpose of pursuing an industrial relations agenda while avoiding engaging with the binding mechanisms set out in the public service agreements for the resolution of industrial relations issues. The respondent submits that the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) have pursued an agenda with it since 2005 to have all AMO’s upgraded to the position of SMO irrespective of their qualifications. The respondent submits that the present complaint is being brought with a view to exerting pressure on it to upgrade all remaining AMO’s to the position of SMO.

5.2 The respondent submits that with effect from 2003 the entry level for doctors wishing to pursue a career in the community health medical service would be SMO and that all candidates who meet the educational qualification criteria are eligible for promotion or appointment to the SMO posts as they arise, irrespective of age. The qualification requirement (over and above the requirement that a candidate be a medical practitioner with at least five years’ relevant post qualification experience and public health experience) since 2003 is a Masters/Diploma in Public Health or equivalent. The respondent submits that there was no agreement that experience would substitute for this post-graduate qualification particularly when post-graduate experience was already a prerequisite for qualification. The respondent submits that the complainant obtained a Masters in Child Health in 2007 and that this qualification is a recognised equivalent of the Masters in Public Health and has been confirmed as such.

5.3 The respondent submits that the complainant is eligible to apply for the position of SMO on the same basis as all other medical doctors with the appropriate qualifications and has been eligible to do so since 2007 at the latest when he obtained a Masters in Child Health. The respondent submits the fact that the complainant might have been unaware that he did in fact possess the required educational qualifications simply cannot ground a valid complaint of discrimination in circumstances where any such discrimination could only be considered hypothetical, as he did not in fact suffer any adverse treatment at the hands of the respondent (i.e. he never applied for any of the vacant SMO posts since 2005). The respondent submits that the complainant has not adduced any evidence to support his claim that he has been treated less favourably on the grounds of age based on the imposition and retention of educational qualification standards for the post of SMO vis-à-vis younger doctors. Specifically, it is submitted that the complainant cannot establish discriminatory treatment in circumstances where the alleged discriminatory provision did not affect him as he met (and meets) the eligibility criteria.

5.4 The respondent submits, without prejudice to the foregoing, that the educational qualification standards for the post of SMO are applied equally to all potential candidates irrespective of age or other status. The respondent submits that the imposition of the mandatory educational qualification in public health is to ensure a high level of quality and professionalism among the SMO grade; to ensure that only suitable applicants of high quality are attracted to the SMO grade and because the public health qualification is appropriate and would support the SMO in performing his/her duties. The educational qualification is long standing and reducing it or removing it would defeat the above objectives as well as creating an inequitable situation whereby existing officers would be required to hold this qualification but it would not be a requirement for future post holders.

5.5 In summary, the respondent denies that the complainant has been subjected to discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the grounds of age in terms of the imposition of the educational qualification standards for the post of SMO.

6. Summary of Respondent’s Case on Issues of Jurisdiction

Locus Standi

6.1 The respondent submits that the complainant does not have the locus standi to bring a complaint alleging discrimination when the alleged discriminatory act does not (and cannot) adversely affect him. The respondent submits that the complainant does, in fact, possess the requisite educational qualification to apply for promotion to the grade of SMO and has done so since the date upon which appointments commenced in 2004 or from 2007 onwards at the latest, by virtue of his attainment of his Masters in Child Health in that year. The respondent submits that the complainant’s claim is no more than a hypothetical claim under the Employment Equality Acts (i.e. if he did not meet the mandatory educational qualification requirement, would its retention constitute indirect age discrimination against him) which it is submitted should not, and cannot, be considered by the Tribunal.

Time Limits

6.2 The respondent submitted that the present complaint is out of time and does not comply with the required time limits for the referral of a complaint within the meaning of section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts. The respondent submits that the act which the complainant alleges indirectly discriminates against him on the ground of age was the imposition of the educational qualification standards for the position of SMO. The respondent submits that in circumstances where the 2003 Agreement and Circular 23/2004 were implemented more than ten years before these proceedings were instituted, that the claim is manifestly out of time and cannot proceed on the basis that the claim is statute barred.

6.3 The respondent submits that the complainant cannot point to any discriminatory act which affected him within the six (or twelve) months prior to the bringing of this claim (on 3rd October, 2014) such as would entitle him to pursue a claim based on a continuum of discrimination. The respondent submits that the complainant did not apply for promotion during the relevant period, and therefore, was not deemed ineligible or denied the opportunity for failing to comply with the educational qualification standards set. Despite competitions having been run for SMO posts during 2013, 2014 and 2015 the complainant did not put himself forward for consideration for the posts. The respondent submits that had he done so the complainant would have passed the vetting process because of his educational qualifications (i.e. on foot of having obtained a Masters in Child Health in 2007).

6.4 The respondent submits, to the extent that the complainant alleges that he does not need to point to an act of discrimination as having occurred within the six (or twelve) months prior to lodging his claim on the basis of an allegation that the educational qualification requirement imposed by the respondent constitutes a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle that remains in force, the respondent while denying that the educational qualification constitutes a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle refers to the decision of the Labour Court in County Cork –v- Hurley[1], where it was made clear that a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle must have a clear and adverse effect on the complainant. The respondent submits that in the instant case, the complainant cannot discharge this burden as he is in fact eligible to apply for vacant SMO posts and has been since 2007 at the latest.

6.5 The respondent also referred to the issue raised by the complainant in respect of his application for re-grading (or “regularisation”) under the terms of the Haddington Road Agreement (based on Circular 017/2013 dated 15th October, 2013). The respondent submits that the process of regularisation requires that a person has been in an appropriately approved acting up arrangement on a continuous basis for at least two years at 31st December, 2012 and that it continued thereafter. The respondent submits that the criteria set out in Circular 017/2013 are applied uniformly to all acting up individuals irrespective of age. The respondent submits that the complainant’s application for regularisation was rejected on 28th August, 2014 because he did not meet the criteria and this this decision was completely unrelated to his age or educational qualifications. The respondent submits that the complainant’s application and the subsequent refusal of this application (and the relevant dates of this application and refusal) are totally unrelated to the present complaint for the purposes of determining whether it complies with the requirements of section 77 of the Acts. The respondent submits that the process of regularisation is entirely separate from any competitions which are conducted for appointment to the position of SMO.

7. Summary of Complainant’s Case on Issues of Jurisdiction

Locus Standi

7.1 The complainant submits that he initially applied for promotion to the position of SMO in 2005 but the application was rejected by the respondent on the basis that he did not possess the requisite educational qualifications (i.e. a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Public Health or an equivalent qualification). The complainant submits that he was not made aware until July, 2015 that his qualification of a Masters in Child Health was deemed by the respondent as an equivalent qualification for the purposes of eligibility to apply for appointment to the position of SMO. As a result, the complainant claims that he has been precluded from applying for promotion to the grade of SMO on the basis of the educational qualification requirements.

Time limits

7.2 The complainant submits that he has been subjected to an ongoing continuum of discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the grounds of age as a result of the operation of the 2003 Agreement by the respondent on the basis that the requirement to have a qualification of a Masters in Public Health, or equivalent, as an essential qualification for the post of SMO has served as a barrier in preventing him from applying for promotion to that position. The complainant submits that the discriminatory treatment in the present case has been ongoing since 2005 when his application for promotion to the position of SMO was rejected on the basis that he did not possess the required educational qualification. The complainant claims that he was not aware until July, 2015 that his qualification of a Masters in Child Health was deemed by the respondent as an equivalent qualification for the purposes of eligibility to apply for appointment to the position of SMO.

7.3 The complainant submits that discrimination on the grounds of age can and should be conceived of as operating along a continuum as opposed to being manifested via a single instance. In this regard, the complainant submits that the continued refusal of the respondent to re-grade him to the grade of SMO during the period from 2005 amounts to an ongoing continuum of discrimination on the grounds of his age. The complainant submits that section 77(5) of the Acts allows a complaint on the date that the discrimination is alleged to have taken place or the “most recent occurrence” of the conduct in question.

7.4 The complainant submits that the discriminatory treatment in the present case has manifested itself through a number of ongoing acts during the period from the initial refusal of his application for promotion in 2005 through to the rejection by the respondent of his application for re-grading to the post of SMO (by way of “regularisation”) under the terms of the Public Stability Agreement (“the Haddington Road Agreement”) on 28th August, 2014. The complainant submits that this act constitutes the most recent occurrence of the discriminatory treatment and therefore that the present complaint, which was referred to the Director of the Equality Tribunal on 3rd October, 2014, complies with the required time limits under section 77(5) of the Acts.

8. Conclusions of the Equality Officer on Issues of Jurisdiction

8.1 The jurisdictional issues for decision by me are (i) whether or not the complainant has the locus standi to bring this claim and (ii) whether or not this complaint was referred to this Tribunal in accordance with the time limits prescribed at section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts. In reaching my decision I have taken into consideration all of the submissions, both written and oral, submitted to the Tribunal as well as evidence advanced at the Hearing.

8.2 In considering the first issue regarding whether or not the complainant has the locus standi to bring this claim, it is noted that there is a dispute between the parties as to whether or not the complainant’s educational qualification (i.e. a Masters in Child Health which he obtained in 2007) was considered to be an acceptable qualification for the purposes of meeting the eligibility requirements to apply for promotion to the position of SMO. The complainant has claimed that he was not made aware that this qualification was deemed acceptable by the respondent until July, 2015 and therefore, he had been under the apprehension since 2005 that he did not meet the educational requirements for promotion to the grade of SMO. I am of the view that both of the jurisdictional issues raised by the respondent are inextricably linked in the context of the present case. In the circumstances, I propose to firstly consider the issue of time limits as the former issue will be moot if the present complaint does not meet the requirements of section 77(5) of the Acts.

8.3 Section 77(5) of the Acts provides as follows: -

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director….may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (c) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6months there were substituted reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as specified in the direction…..”.

This subsection requires a complainant, in the first instance, to refer a complaint to this Tribunal within six months of the alleged act of unlawful treatment, or if the alleged treatment forms a series of individual connected acts, the most recent of those.

Section 77(6A) of the Acts provides as follows:-

For the purposes of this Section –

(a) Discrimination or victimisation occurs –

(i) If the act constituting it extends over a period, at the end of the period,

(ii) If it arises by virtue of a term in a contract, throughout the duration of the contract, and

(iii) If it arises by virtue of a provision which operates over a period, throughout the period.

This section pertains to a single act extending over a period of time and so treated as done at the end of that period, if an employer maintains and keeps in force a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle which has had a clear and adverse effect on the complainant.

8.4 In considering this issue, it is important to clarify at the outset, the precise nature of the claim of discrimination which is being alleged by the complainant in the present case. In the complainant’s written submissions to the Tribunal (received on 28th April, 2015), it was submitted that “the crux of this complaint is that Dr. Kevin Brogan, by virtue of his age, has suffered discrimination, directly or indirectly, as a result of the operation of the 2003 LRC Agreement. That discrimination manifested itself in Dr. Brogan being excluded from the Senior Medical Officer grade by circumstances that were beyond his control. It is the contention of Dr. Brogan, and the IMO, that had Dr. Brogan been a younger doctor, he would not have been shut out in this fashion”. The complainant’s representative clarified at the oral hearing that the present complaint relates to a claim of indirect discrimination on the grounds of age in terms of the manner in which a provision of the 2003 Agreement (i.e. the requirement to have a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Public Health or an equivalent qualification) has allegedly resulted in the complainant being excluded from progression to the grade of SMO. Therefore, in order for the complainant to establish that he has been subjected to indirect discrimination on the grounds of age contrary to Section 31 of the Acts he is required to demonstrate that the “apparently neutral provision” of having these educational qualifications as criteria for promotion/recruitment to SMO posts puts him (or persons in his age category) at a “particular disadvantage” compared with other persons of a different age i.e. younger doctors in the present case.

8.5 It was not in dispute between the parties that with effect from 2003 (arising from the Public Health Doctors’ Agreement) that the entry level for doctors pursuing a career in the community health medical service would be the SMO grade and that the qualifications for this post required candidates to have a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Public Health or an equivalent qualification. The 2003 Agreement also provided that there would be no further recruitment to the AMO grade (i.e. the complainant’s grade) and this had the effect that doctors serving in this grade were required to possess the aforementioned qualification in order to qualify for appointment to the SMO grade. The respondent gave evidence that competitions for the post of SMO were held initially in 2004 and from 2005 to 2009 until the implementation of the embargo on public sector recruitment and promotion and that there were subsequent competitions in 2013, 2014 and 2015. It was not in dispute that SMO vacancies are filled by way of open competition operated by the Public Appointments Service or by the respondent’s National Recruitment Service.

8.6 I am satisfied that the first act in any continuum of alleged discrimination for the purposes of determining whether the present complaint meets the time-limit requirements of section 77(5) of the Act occurred in January, 2005 when the complainant’s application for promotion to the position of SMO was rejected by the respondent. I note that in the case of County Cork VEC –v- Ann Hurley[2] the Labour Court has interpreted the provisions of sections 77(5) and 77(6A) of the Acts in the following manner: “Subsection (5) and subsection (6A) of s.77 deal with different forms of continuing discrimination or victimisation. Under subsection (6A), an act will be regarded as extending over a period, and so treated as done at the end of that period, if an employer maintains and keeps in force a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle which has had a clear and adverse effect on the complainant (Barclays Bank plc v Kapur IRLR 387). This subsection would apply where, for example, an employer maintains a discriminatory requirement for access to employment or promotion”.

8.7 Therefore, in the context of section 77(6A) of the Acts, the discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle which the complainant claims has had an adverse effect on him in the present case is the requirement for applicants for the post of SMO to possess a Masters in Public Health/Diploma in Public Health or an equivalent qualification. It was not in dispute that the only occasion upon which the complainant actually applied for promotion to the post of SMO was in 2005 and that he did not apply in subsequent competitions which were held during the years from 2005 to 2009 and 2013 to 2015.

8.8 In order for the complainant to be able to rely upon the provisions of section 77(6A) it would be necessary for him to demonstrate that the educational qualification requirements for promotion to SMO had adversely affected him during the six month period (or twelve month period on extension for reasonable cause) immediately prior to the referral of the present complaint on 3rd October, 2014. I am satisfied that this is clearly not the situation in the present case. In this regard, I note that there was a dispute between the parties as to whether or not the complainant was aware that the Masters in Child Health which he obtained in 2007 was deemed by the respondent as an acceptable qualification for the purpose of meeting the entry requirements for participation in these competitions. However, notwithstanding any confusion or ambiguity that may have existed between the parties on this issue, the fact remains that the complainant did not apply for promotion to the position of SMO since 2005. Accordingly, there has been no evidence presented to suggest that the complainant was precluded or denied access by the respondent from participating in any competitive process for promotion to the post of SMO since 2005 on the grounds of not having the required educational qualification. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the complainant could not have been adversely affected by the alleged discriminatory requirement during the six (or twelve month) period prior to the referral of the present complaint. Accordingly, I cannot accept that any of the acts complained of which occurred after the incident in 2005 can be regarded as part of a continuum for the purposes of section 77(6A) of the Acts.

8.9 In considering the issue of whether the matters complained about constitute ongoing discrimination or a continuum of discrimination within the meaning of section 77(5) of the Acts, I have again taken cognisance of the Labour Court’s interpretation of that provision of the Acts in the Hurley case where it held that: “Subsection (5) of s.77 deals with a situation in which there are a series of separate acts or omissions which, while not forming part of regime, rule, practice or principle, are sufficiently connected so as to constitute a continuum ….. It is clear for the passage just quoted that in order for acts or omissions outside the time limit to be taken into account there must have been acts or omissions of victimisation (or discrimination) within the time limit. There can be practical difficulties in applying that provision. There must be some reality in the claim that acts of victimisation actually occurred within the limitation period. Otherwise a complainant could revive a claim which had been extinguished by the time limit simply by raising an additional related claim, no matter how tenuous, within the time limit”.

8.10 The complainant has argued that the discriminatory treatment in the present case has operated along a continuum and that the ongoing refusal by the respondent to re-grade him to the grade of SMO represents ongoing discrimination. In this regard, the complainant has submitted that the first act of discrimination occurred in 2005 on the date of the refusal of his application for promotion to SMO and that there has been a continuum of discrimination culminating with the most recent occurrence of discrimination on 28th August, 2014 when his application for “regularisation” was refused by the respondent. I note that the complainant has relied upon a number of instances where there has been interaction between the IMO and the respondent in relation to the issue of re-grading existing AMO’s to the grade of SMO as examples of the ongoing discrimination during the interim period between the aforementioned first and latest acts of alleged discrimination. I am satisfied that there is absolutely no link between the alleged act of discrimination in 2005 and either the refusal by the respondent of the complainant’s application for regularisation in 2014 or the interaction which took place between the respondent and the IMO during the intervening period on the issue of re-grading existing AMO’s to the grade of SMO.

8.11 As I have already stated, the alleged discriminatory treatment in the present complaint relates to a claim of indirect discrimination on the grounds of age in terms of the imposition by the respondent of the mandatory educational requirements for appointment to the post of SMO. I note that the process of “regularisation” (pursuant to Circular 017/2013) facilitates the appointment of a person to a substantive post in circumstances where that person has been in an appropriately approved acting up arrangement on a continuous basis for at least two years at 31st December, 2012. I am satisfied that this is a totally unrelated and distinct process from the competitive process by which appointments are made to the post of SMO. I accept the respondent’s evidence that the refusal of the complainant’s application for regularisation was in no way connected to his age or the educational qualification criteria which the complainant alleges are indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of age in the present case. Furthermore, I am also satisfied that all of the events referred to by the complainant in terms of the interaction between the respondent and the IMO during the period from 2005 to January, 2015 relate exclusively to negotiations of an industrial relations nature which took place between these parties on the general issue of the re-grading of existing AMO’s to the grade of SMO.

8.12 Having regard to the foregoing, I cannot accept that any of the acts complained of which occurred after the incident in 2005 can be regarded as part of a continuum for the purposes of section 77(5) of the Acts. In the circumstances, I find that the present complaint fails to comply with the time limits prescribed in section 77(5) of the Acts. Accordingly, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to investigate the present complaint.

9. Decision

9.1 I find that the present complaint fails to comply with the time limits prescribed in section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to investigate the present complaint.

______________

Enda Murphy

Equality Officer/Adjudication Officer

19th May, 2016

[1] EDA1124

[2] EDA1124