PTD163

This matter came before the Court by way of an appeal brought on behalf of Mary McCormack (“the Complainant”) against the decision of a Rights Commissioner (now known as an Adjudication Officer). The Rights Commissioner held a hearing on 30 March 2015 in which he investigated a number of complaints under five separate Acts (Payment of Wages Act 1991; Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994; Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001; Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 and Unfair Dismissals Act 1977) none of which were upheld. The Rights Commissioner issued his findings in respect of each of the foregoing complaints in a conjoined decision dated 22 February 2016. The Complainant appealed against each of the Rights Commissioner’s findings (other than in respect of his recommendation under the Unfair Dismissals Act). Notice of the appeals was received by the Court on Monday, 4 April 2016.

The Law

Section 53(2) Workplace Relations Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”)

The Workplace Relations Act 2015 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Labour Court in respect of all statutory employment complaints where the relevant appeal is brought on or after 1 October 2015. Section 53(2) makes provision in this regard for the appeal of any decision or recommendation of a Rights Commissioner given after the aforementioned date even though the hearing of the matter may have taken place prior to that date.

Section 53(2) provides:

“(2) Where a decision or recommendation in relation to a complaint or dispute to which subsection (2) or (4) of section 8 applies was not made before the commencement of this Part, any decision or recommendation made by a rights commissioner in relation to the complaint or dispute after such commencement shall be appealable to the Labour Court under section 44 as if the decision were a decision of an adjudication officer under section 41.”

Section 44 of the 2015 Act

Subsections (2) to (4) of Section 44 of the 2015 Act are relevant to certain procedural issues that fall to be considered by the Court in respect of the timing of the within appeal. They provide:

“(2) An appeal under this section shall be initiated by the party concerned giving a notice in writing to the Labour Court containing such particulars as are determined by the Labour Court in accordance with rules under subsection (5) of section 20 of the Act of 1946 and stating that the party concerned is appealing the decision to which it relates.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), a notice under subsection (2) shall be given to the Labour Court not later than 42 days from the date of the decision concerned.

(4) The Labour Court may direct that a notice under subsection (2) may be given to it after the expiration of the period specified in subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the notice was not so given before such expiration due to the existence of exceptional circumstances.”

Section 18(h) Interpretation Act 2005

This provision deals with the interpretation of periods of time that are set down in legislation, as follows:

“(h) Periods of time. Where a period of time is expressed to begin on or be reckoned from a particular day, that day shall be deemed to be included in the period and, where a period of time is expressed to end on or be reckoned to a particular day, that day shall be deemed to be included in the period;”

The wording of section 18(h) of the Interpretation Act 2005 is comparable to that of section 11(h) of the Interpretation Act 1937 which section fell to be considered by the High Court in McGuinness v Armstrong Patents Limited [1980] 1 IR 289. In that case, McMahon J, held that in enacting section 11(h), the Oireachtas had opted for a different approach to that of the “well-settled rule of law in England” whereby “When a period of time prescribed by a statute is defined as a period ‘from’ a particular event … the day of the event is excluded in computing the period.” Later in the judgment, he remarked, “I would gladly adopt any construction of [section 11(h)] which would achieve uniformity in the laws of England and of Ireland in computing periods of time, but I do not see how the provision can be construed in that way.”

Discussion

Having regard to section 18(h) of the Interpretation Act 2005, the Court was notified of the within appeal 43 days from the date of the Rights Commissioner’s decision. The appeal was not, therefore, brought within the relevant statutory time limit as decreed by the Oireachtas in section 44(3) of the 2015 Act. This was not disputed at the hearing by the solicitor who appeared on the Complainant’s behalf.

When questioned by the Court, the Complainant’s solicitor informed the Court that there were no exceptional circumstances which prevented the lodging of the appeal within the statutory time limit and he would not, therefore, seek to make an application to the Court pursuant to section 44(4) to enlarge the time for bringing the appeal.

Conclusion

This matter was referred to the Court outside the statutory time limit, and as there are no exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of the time, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear it.

Signed on behalf of the Labour Court



Alan Haugh
JD______________________
30 May 2016Deputy Chairman



NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to John Deegan, Court Secretary.