EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS 1998-2015
DEC – E2016-131
A Sales Representative
versus
A Books Wholesaler
(represented by Tom Muirhead, Solicitor, Moorepay compliance)
File reference: EE/2013/652
Date of issue: 20th September 2016
Keywords: Employment Equality Acts, Disability, Depression, Discriminatory Dismissal, Failure to provide reasonable accommodation
Dispute
1.1 The case concerns a claim by a Sales Representative against a Books Wholesale company. His claim is that he was discriminatorily dismissed on the grounds of disability in terms of 6(2)(g) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2011 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Acts’]. He also claims that the respondent failed to provide appropriate measures that would allow him to continue to be employed by them. It is the policy of the Equality Tribunal (now Workplace Relations Commission) to anonymise decisions in the case of disability unless specifically requested by the complainant otherwise.
1.2 The complainant referred a complaint under the Acts to the Director of the Equality Tribunal on 16th December 2013. On 13th October 2015 in accordance with his powers under Section 75 of the Acts, the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission delegated the case to me, Orlaith Mannion, an Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director General under Part VII of the Acts. On this date, my investigation commenced. Submissions were received from both parties and a joint hearing was held on 5th February 2016 as required by Section 79(1) of the Acts. Correspondence continued after the hearing.
1.3 This decision is issued by me following the establishment of the Workplace Relations Commission on 1st October 2015, as an Adjudication Officer who was an Equality Officer prior to 1st October 2015, in accordance with section 83(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.
Summary of the complainant’s case
2.1 The complainant had previously worked as a Sales Representative with the main (wholesale & otherwise) bookseller in Ireland for 30 years until December 2012. His salary there before being part of a group redundancy was €80,000. He commenced employment with the respondent as a Regional Account Manager on 2nd April 2013. His salary was £30,000 (sterling) per annum and a car allowance of £5000 plus mileage. He was also provided with a company mobile phone and laptop.
2.2 The complainant took sick leave on 13th May 2013 for one week i.e. he returned to work on 20th May 2013. He provided a medical certificate stating that he was suffering from stress. On Monday 13th May 2013 he attended hospital but the Consultant did not think that he was so unwell that he should be admitted. Instead he prescribed Zyban (Bupropion) to the complainant– an anti-depressant. He sent a text to Ms G (his line manager) to say that he was feeling unwell and had attended hospital. She rang him to see how he was and he said he would be back at work on Monday. The following day Ms S (the Personnel Manager) phoned the complainant to discuss his absence from work. The complainant explained that he was distressed as his wife had recently been diagnosed with cancer (he had also mentioned his wife’s diagnosis at the interview for the position) and he was processing being made redundant from his previous employer of 30 years. The complainant submits that she specifically asked what medication that he was on. He thought it was a strange question for an employer to ask. However, he replied Zyban. Ms S asked him to email her with the medication that he was on for their records. The complainant believes this to be intrusive but he felt obliged to do so. The complainant submits that by the respondent’s own actions they were on notice that he was going through a depressive episode from 17th May 2013.
2.3 The complainant completed a sickness self-certification form on 20th May 2013. No occupational health assessment was conducted by the respondent.
2.4 The complainant worked for the next few weeks without incident. He took no more sick leave. In June 2013 the complainant went on holidays within Ireland. On 11th June he misplaced his laptop. He carried out an extensive search for it. On 18th June he informed the respondent that he lost it. He also reported it missing to the local Garda station the following day. The complainant submits that it is the first time that he lost a phone or laptop (personal or otherwise) in his life. He also points out that the laptop required a password to access any company data.
2.5 That day 19th June Mr E (Sales Director) rang the complainant to state that he wanted to discuss concerns that he had. It was not identified to the complainant at any stage that the call was a disciplinary hearing or that the issue with the laptop was so serious as to lead to disciplinary action or the loss of his employment.
2.6 The complainant phoned Mr E. He was quite surprised that Ms S was also present on the call as he thought it was to discuss sales targets. It was only at that point that he was asked if wanted anybody to accompany him during the call. He was not at home so there was nobody there that could sit in with him. Nor was he aware that his position was in jeopardy.
2.7 The complainant submits that the call completely ambushed him. Mr E outlined his concerns and gave the complainant a very limited opportunity to respond. At the end of the conversation, Mr E terminated the complainant’s employment. That day a letter was sent from the respondent stating they were terminating his employment due to him ‘proving unsuccessful within the probationary period’. The letter informed the complainant that he had five working days from receipt of the letter to appeal the decision. The complainant was not provided with the notes of the telephone conversation.
2.8 The complainant appealed it and he was informed that the appeal haring had been arranged for 17th July 2013. The complainant asked that it take place after 19th July as his wife had cancer treatment up until then and in fairness the respondent agreed. By mutual consent, it was agreed that it would be done over Skype.
2.9 The hearing was due to be done over Skype with Mr M (Buying Director) on 14th August 2013. However Mr M was ill so it had to be postponed. In an email to Mr M the complainant said ‘I also want to make you aware that following my conversation with [Personnel Manager] enquiring how I was when I was out sick from 13th to the 17th May that the company’s attitude towards me changed on learning that I was suffering from stress.’ At no stage in the process did the respondent take any steps to obtain the factors of the complainant’s disability and the effect it may have had on him.
2.10 On 27th August Mr M wrote to complainant stating his appeal was unsuccessful.
2.11 The complainant submits that there was a complete lack of fair procedures in effecting his termination of employment. He submits that is supposed misconduct was a sham reason to cloak the real impetus of the termination of employment which was the respondent was becoming aware that the complainant had a depressive illness. He points out that he was dismissed a month after they became aware that he had a disability.
2.12 In direct evidence, the complainant stated that he had previously been diagnosed with reactive depression e.g. after his father died in 1998 and when his mother was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 2003. He never required hospitalisation. He has attended counselling in the past which he has found very helpful. He submits that his condition has never adversely affected his working life.
2.13 The complainant maintains that while he was initially devastated by his dismissal, he was determined not to allow it to knock him completely. He enrolled in a Springboard food technology course and as a result of that, he is working as a business development manager in that sector. He submits that Sales is his calling and he is delighted to be back working in it again.
2.14 He was not notified of any problems or improvement required in his performance or duties prior to the disciplinary phone call on 20th June. That the complainant had no previous issues with performance or conduct, according to himself), highlights that the respondent has no real or genuine basis to terminate his employment. He argues they simply used the losing a one-off case of genuine misplacement of a laptop, which can happen anybody, as a false reason for the dismissal. The complainant cites Mr O v A Named Company[1] and Rattigan v Connacht God Co-operative Society[2] where the complainant was also on probation when he was dismissed after the respondent became aware that had a depressive episode. Also cited was a Government Department v A Worker[3] where the Labour Court recognised depressive illness as a disability within the meaning of the Acts. The complainant also referred to Ms B v A Newsagents and Deli[4] where the Equality Officer states “Disability must be looked at ‘in the round’. It cannot be reduced to a game of bingo where a complainant’s doctor labels a condition on the medical certificate in a certain way and the disability provisions [of the Acts] automatically apply and s(he) calls it something else and disability provisions do not apply.”
2.15 The complainant also cites a case under the Industrial Relations Acts where the Labour Court held that ‘the dismissal of the employee was unfair. The employer’s decision not to adhere to either its own disciplinary procedures or be bound by the provision of the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary procedures (SI No 146 of 2000) because he was on probation was misconceived’[5].
2.16 The complainant respondent made no attempt to follow the test in A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker[6] as regards whether they could reasonably accommodate the complainant.
Summary of the respondent’s case
3.1 The respondent is the largest wholesaler of books in Europe.
3.2 The complainant approached the respondent in March 2013. At that time the respondent did not employ anyone in Ireland. That territory was covered by the UK-based Sales team. However, impressed by the complainant’s long experience in the wholesale book trade (as well as his network of contacts), Mr E (Sales Director) interviewed him and offered him a position. Mr E stated in direct evidence that the complainant did not declare his disability at the interview. Mr E admits that the complainant did say that his wife had been diagnosed with cancer but that it would not affect his work. The respondent does not conduct pre-employment medicals.
3.3 On 2nd and 3rd April 2013 the complainant came to the respondent’s Head Office in the UK and received full induction training. He spent some time on the road with a regional manager. The complainant received an email containing the respondent’s employee handbook. However, the email with the handbook attached was never opened by the complainant. The complainant never signed his contract of employment.
3.4 The complainant’s line manager was Ms G. He was required to send a visit schedule to her at the start of the week and a sales report at the end of the week. Ms G gave direct evidence to say that she was not happy with the limited information that he had provided in his schedules. He would merely give the towns that he intended calling to rather than the names of the specific shops. The respondent submits that at no time did the complainant complete a sales report in the format they requested. This was despite that having been discussed at induction and a further face-to-face meeting on 22nd/23rd April as well as by email. The respondent also states that the complainant had great difficulty with the expense forms and despite much assistance from Ms G he never mastered these.
3.5 The complainant apparently went off sick on Monday 13th May 2013. The respondent’s handbook clearly sets out the absence reporting procedure. It is standard for most organisations i.e. the complainant should have contacted his line manager on the morning that he was not reporting for work. Ms G tried to contact him and it was only on 16th May 2013 that she received a text saying that he was ill.
3.6 The following day Ms S (the personnel Manager) phoned the complainant to conducts a welfare conversation. He confirmed that he was suffering from stress and anxiety but the issues were not related to working for the respondent and that he would be returning to work on Monday 20th May 2013. It is correct that Ms S asked the complainant about the medication that he had bee prescribed. The respondent submits that she did this as part of the ongoing duty of care that all employers have to their staff. The complainant used his car in the course of his work and he received a car allowance for that. In direct evidence she states that she merely wanted to establish that the medication would not affect his driving. She stated that in the UK employers are no longer allowed to ask employees to fill out disability questionnaires so this is a good way of finding out whether an employee has a disability. She said it is very useful in the warehouse, for example, to know whether somebody has epilepsy.
3.7 The complainant did text his line manager to say that he would be back at work on Monday. However, as per company procedures he should have telephoned his Line Manager on Monday morning.
3.8 Matters came to a head on or about 17th June 2013. The complainant reported to the respondent that he had lost the company laptop that he had been provided with. The complainant did not report the loss promptly. The respondent submits that it contained sensitive commercial information. The value of it was £509 (plus VAT) sterling.
3.9 Mr E decided this was the final straw. The respondent submitted a letter dated 17th June inviting the complainant to a call to discuss concerns. However, the respondent submits it sent it by ordinary post. According to the notes provided by the respondent of the phone conversation the reasons for the dismissal were that the complainant had not signed his contract, his late reporting of the loss of the laptop, his failure to notify the respondent that he was not taking sick leave, his failure to email Ms S with the name of the medication that he was taking, not replying to emails and voicemails from Ms G, that his voicemail message has not been changed to say that he is back at work after holidays and the quality and tardiness of his sales reports as well as not contacting the Regional Account Manager who previously covered Ireland. The note records that the complainant started crying during the phone conversation and that he said he was depressed.
3.10 The respondent submits that no reasonable employer would have concluded from the available evidence than the complainant was disabled. The respondent submits that the reason they did not conduct a return-to-work meeting with the complainant as per procedures as Ms S had a welfare conversation with him on 17th May. The respondent argues that it was entitled to terminate the employment of the complainant if the required standards of performance are not met. They submit that he was not treated any differently than an other employee if s(he) was not meeting their standards.
3.11 The respondent submits that the performance issues predated the complainant’s sick leave. The complainant did not request reasonable accomodation. He was offered and received an appeal.
Conclusions of the Equality Officer
4.1. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where on any of the discriminatory grounds mentioned in subsection (2) one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated. The discriminatory ground in this case is disability. Therefore, the issue for me to decide is whether the complainant was discriminatorily dismissed and whether the respondent failed to provide reasonable accommodation in order to enable him to continue to work with the respondent. In reaching my decision, I have taken into account all of the submissions, written and oral, made by the parties.
4.2 In evaluating the evidence before me, I must first consider whether the complainant has established a prima facie case pursuant to Section 85A of the Act. The Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of ‘sufficient significance’ before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.
4.3 Before I consider the law as it applies, I must make a few findings of facts as there was significant disagreement between the parties over the evidence. First of all the complainant would be the first to admit that attention to detail was not his strong point. The respondent submitted the complainant’s CV as evidence. He had merely applied for the position using an old CV with handwritten updates. The respondent took him on anyway. He clearly was a good salesperson to have reached a salary of €80,000 with his previous employer. The complainant gave evidence that his previous employer placed a lot of trust in him and was less concerned about paperwork than the respondent. The complainant argued that he increased sales for the respondent in his short time working there. The respondent did not refute this. Despite the employer’s focus on performance issues as the reason for the termination of the complainant’s employment, there was no complaint from a customer nor was there any evidence of his core functions (i.e. generating sales) not performed. That said, the complainant should have made a greater effort to adjust to the culture of his new employer. The fact he was the only employee based in Ireland he should have understood the need of the company to know his whereabouts during the working day and their requirement for fulsome sales reports.
4.4 Regarding the complainant’s week of sick leave, of course he should have notified the respondent on the first day. However, his reactive depression had recurred. He felt so unwell that he asked to be admitted to the psychiatric unit of his local hospital. While the treating Consultant Psychiatrist did not think that he needed to be admitted, in these circumstances it is easy to see how the complainant forgot to notify his employer. It bears repeating that his wife was receiving treatment for cancer so notifying her husband’s employer was not be foremost on her mind either. As a new employee, I would not have been surprised had the complainant lied or minimised his condition (especially when there is such a stigma about mental ill-health) but the complainant told the Personnel Manager the full truth that his stress and anxiety were symptoms of his reactive depression. From then on, I accept the complainant’s contention that he was branded by the respondent as a problematic employee.
4.5 I am also troubled by the Personnel Manager’s request to know exactly what medication that the complainant was taking. To me, this request is an invasion of his privacy. I do not accept her excuse that she wanted to check that whatever drug he was on would not affect him driving as part of his work. To follow this justification to its logical conclusion, if from her internet research Bupropionwas contra-indicated with driving a vehicle, what would she have done? Forbid the complainant from using his own car to drive to appointments? Contact the psychiatrist in a different jurisdiction and inform him that he had got his prescription wrong? However, in this case her request for what he had been prescribed assists the complainant. The respondent cannot deny that it was on notice that the complainant was being treated for depression once he informed her of this.
4.6 I accept the respondent’s evidence that they did not actually receive his doctor’s certificate and the written confirmation of his medication until after he was dismissed. The complainant gave evidence that it was sitting in his drafts folder in email and he merely forgot to send it. However, it is clear from the documentary and direct evidence from both parties that the respondent was orally informed of the complainant’s reactive depression and the medication he had been prescribed on May 17th.
4.7 As an example of how the attitude changed once he informed the respondent of his diagnosis, his line manager made a drama about him not working in 3rd June (Irish bank holiday). The complainant pointed out that a skeleton staff would only be working in bookshops on a bank holiday and a Sales Rep is the last person that they would want to see. He pointed out that he had worked the previous Monday (27th May) which was a bank holiday in the UK and no comment had been made about that at the time even though it was included in his sales report.
4.8 Regarding the loss of the laptop, it should not have happened. Apart from the monetary value, it did contain commercial data. However, a sense of perspective must be maintained. It did not contain classified information. The respondent did not go to the expense of encrypting the data although the laptop was password-protected. The complainant was on holidays when he realised that he mislaid it. It is understandable that he waited to check whether it was in his own home or the holiday home before reporting it as lost. The respondent freely admits that this was the final straw. I cannot escape the conclusion that had the complainant not declared his psychiatric illness a month earlier, he would have been given a second chance.
4.9 The respondent submits that it sent a letter by ordinary post on 17th June inviting the complainant to a disciplinary meeting on 20th June. However, the complainant gave evidence that he never received it. All other correspondence was by email and phone. It does not align with the other evidence given by the respondent e.g. the following day the following day the Personnel Manager emailed the Sales Director and the complainant’s manager stating ‘Let me know if you want me to write to him with regard to the HR issues’. This is surprising if she had written to him the previous day. No response from either of the recipients was submitted to me. The following day (19th June) the Sales Director sent the complainant an email ‘I would like you to telephone me in the office at 3:00pm tomorrow which is 20th June as I would like to have formal discussions with you with regard to concerns I have’. Again if it existed why did he not refer to Ms S’s letter? I am satisfied that the supposed letter was never sent and was retrospectively drafted to ‘fix’ the file to make it appear that fair procedures were applied. Falsifying evidence does not assist the respondent’s case.
4.10 The respondent drove a coach and horses through fair procedures. The complainant was not warned that his job was in jeopardy, he was not provided with the notes of the meeting, he was not offered an opportunity for somebody to accompany him nor was he given an adequate opportunity to give his side of the story. Fair procedures must apply to dismissals occurring in probation also. Regarding the issues brought up apart from what is discussed in Paragraphs 4.3 to 4.8, the complainant gave evidence that once corrected on naming the bookshops rather than just the towns which contained the shops, he endeavoured to fill the forms out as requested. He admits that he wanted to get his contract checked out by a solicitor and that is why he had not signed it. However, he was not reminded of this by the respondent. The complainant agrees he struggled with the expense forms as they were in sterling. He points out that the respondent’s administration was not perfect either as he never received a payslip which is a breach of the Payment of Wages Act 1991. Regarding the other Sales Rep. that he was to contact, Ireland was previously this person’s territory. Therefore he was hostile to the complainant’s efforts at contact. Therefore apart from the failing to inform of the sick leave on time and the loss of the laptop, they were relatively minor issues. A written warning would have been a more reasonable response by the respondent especially when they were on notice of his disability within the meaning of the Acts. Instead the complainant was dismissed by phone and a letter issued that day reiterating the position. This falls short of even the respondent’s procedures in its handbook (page 8 of the respondent’s employment handbook). While the appeal was more considered it occurred two months after the complainant left employment so it was highly unlikely that they were going to take him back at that stage. Therefore, it was little more than a tickbox exercise.
The Law
4.11 I am satisfied that depression is a disability within the meaning of Section 4 of the Acts:
‘‘disability’’ means—
(a) the total or partial absence of a person’s bodily or mental
functions, including the absence of a part of a person’s
body,
(b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to
cause, chronic disease or illness,
(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of
a person’s body,
(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning
differently from a person without the condition or
malfunction, or
(e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person’s
thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or
judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour,
and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or
which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in
the future or which is imputed to a person;
As well as the determination cited by the complainant, the Labour Court acknowledged depression as a disability in Stobart (Ireland) Ltd v Richard Beashal.[7]
4.11 I have already stated that the respondent was on notice that the complainant had a psychiatric illness month before the respondent dismissed him. While the respondent stated that his sick leave played no part in the complainant’s dismissal, the evidence does not support that. While the complainant did not get off to a good start in his employment with the respondent, I am satisfied that he would not have been dismissed immediately after losing a company laptop if had given less information about why he took sick leave. While it may not have been the only reason, I am satisfied that his disability was a significant contributory factor in his dismissal. In this I am guided by the Labour Court in A Government Department and An Employee: “The requirement to establish that there was no discrimination whatsoever means that the Court must be alert to the possibility that a person with a disability may suffer discrimination not because they are disabled per se, but because they are perceived, because of their disability, to be less capable or less dependable than a person without a disability. The court must always be alert to the possibility of unconscious or inadvertent discrimination and mere denials of a discriminatory motive, in the absence of independent corroboration, must be approached with caution (see Nevins, Murphy, Flood v Portroe Stevedores[2005] 16 ELR 282).”[8] Therefore I am satisfied that the complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination on the grounds of disability and the respondent has failed to rebut it.
Reasonable accommodation
4.13 An employer is not obliged to retain an employee who is not fully competent and capable of doing the job s(he) is required to do. Regarding this Section 16 (1) of the Acts states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring any person to recruit or promote an individual to a position or retain an individual in a position, or to provide training or experience to an individual in relation to a position, if the individual ….
(b) is not (or as the case may be, is no longer) fully competent and available to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking the duties attached to that position having regard to the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be, performed.
However, Section 16(1) must be read in conjunction with Section 16(3) where a person with a disability is regarded as fully competent and fully capable of undertaking duties if ‘reasonable accommodation’ is the only difference between s(he) being able to do the job and not being able to do the job:
(3) (a) For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability
is fully competent to undertake, and fully capable of
undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully
competent and capable on reasonable accommodation
(in this subsection referred to as ‘‘appropriate
measures’’) being provided by the person’s employer.
(b) The employer shall take appropriate measures, where
needed in a particular case, to enable a person who has
a disability—
(i) to have access to employment,
(ii) to participate or advance in employment, or
(iii) to undergo training,
unless the measures would impose a disproportionate
burden on the employer.
(c) In determining whether the measures would impose such
a burden account shall be taken, in particular, of—
(i) the financial and other costs entailed,
(ii) the scale and financial resources of the employer’s
business, and
(iii) the possibility of obtaining public funding or other
assistance.
4.14 The complainant cites the case of A Health Club and A Worker. It is worthwhile to quote the relevant paragraphs:
This Section, on which the respondent relies, can provide a complete defence to a claim of discrimination on the disability ground if it can be shown that the employer formed the bona fide belief that the complainant is not fully capable, within the meaning of the section, of performing the duties for which they are employed. However, before coming to that view the employer would normally be required to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee's capacity.
The nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer, should ensure that he or she in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee's condition and that the employee is given fair notice that the question of his or her dismissal for incapacity is being considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the employer's decision.
In practical terms this will normally require a two-stage enquiry, which looks firstly at the factual position concerning the employee’s capability including the degree of impairment arising from the disability and its likely duration. This would involve looking at the medical evidence available to the employer either from the employee's doctors or obtained independently.
Secondly, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable Section 16(3) of the Act requires the employer to consider what if any special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable. The Section requires that the cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. Here, what constitutes nominal cost will depend on the size of the organisation and its financial resources.
Finally, such an enquiry could only be regarded as adequate if the employee concerned is allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level and is allowed to present relevant medical evidence and submissions. [my emphasis]
4.15 While the respondent did not use the phrase dismissal for incapacity, in reality that is what is was. The respondent did not inform the complainant that his dismissal was being considered, it did not seek a report from his own doctor nor send him to an Occupational Health Specialist even though they were aware that he had a psychiatric illness. No consideration whatsoever was made as to accommodations could be provided – for example, his probation could have been extended. The provisions in these Acts are not dissimilar to the UK Equality Act 2010 as they emanate from the same EU Directives. If the respondent had followed the provisions of the UK Act, they would have been able to defend this case better. I am satisfied that the respondent failed to provide appropriate measures that would enable the complainant to remain in their employ.
4.16 In considering redress, I must be cognisant of a number of factors. The complainant was not the perfect employee which may or may not be connected to his disability. However, a month after declaring he suffered from depression, he was dismissed for a relatively minor misdemeanour. Limited adherence to fair procedures applied. There is a particular stigma about psychiatric conditions in the workplace and regrettably the complainant was punished by the respondent for revealing the true nature of his condition.
Decision
5.1 I have concluded my investigation of this complaint. Based on all of the foregoing, I find, pursuant to Section 79(6) of the Act, that
(i) the respondent has discriminatorily dismissed the complainant on the ground of disability
(ii) the respondent hasfailed to provide appropriate measures that would allow the complainant to continue to be employed by them
Therefore, I find for the complainant.
5.2 In accordance with Section 82 of the Act, I order the respondent:
pay the complainant €18,000 (the approximate equivalent of six months of salary) in compensation for breaches of the Employment Equality Acts. The award is redress for the infringement of the complainant’s statutory rights and, therefore, not subject to income tax as per Section 192A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (as amended by Section 7 of the Finance Act 2004).
_______________
Orlaith Mannion
Adjudication Officer/Equality Officer
Footnotes
[1] Equality Tribunal Decision DEC-E2003-052
[2] Equality Tribunal Decision DEC-2008-026
[3] Labour Court EDA084
[4] Equality Tribunal Decision DEC-2013-149
[5] Labour Court Recommendation AD115
[6] Labour Court Determination No. EED037
[7] Labour Court Determination No. EDA1411
[8] Labour Court Determination No: EDA062