ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Decision Reference: ADJ-00001306
Complaint(s)/Dispute(s) for Resolution: An Ambulance Driver v An Employer.
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00001765-001 | 06/01/2016 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969 | CA-00001765-002 | 06/01/2016 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00003405-001 | 06/01/2016 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: : 31/5/2016, 07/12/2016
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Peter Healy
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41(4) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
Complainant’s Submission and Presentation:
The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on the 4th October 2004 and was based in a Location A as a trainee emergency medical technician. His daughter was born in 2010 and suffers from Downs Syndrome, accompanying cardiac medical conditions and further other medical complications arising from her Down Syndrome. She requires regular care and attendance at medical appointments concerned with these conditions and feeding difficulties.
The Complainant applied for a transfer in January 2011 following the birth of his daughter. The Complainant submits that on compassionate grounds he was moved to location B closer to his home effective from the 1st February 2014. At no stage was the Complainant’s contract of employment amended and he had been on a rostered basis of engagement. The complainant submits that there are significant differences between a rostered and unrostered paramedic. A rostered paramedic works at the stage station and on a regular rostered basis. By contrast a paramedic on an unrostered basis is engaged on various and varying rosters and can be moved from station to station with 24 hours notice. Significantly there is no fixed roster for unrostered positions.
By letter dated the 18th July 2011 Complainant raised a number of formal grievances about the failure on the part of the Respondent to provide him with a rostered position given his inability to comply with an unrostered position by virtue of his family status, being a carer for his daughter with a disability.
The complainant raised the issue with his Union on the 7th June 2011 (Unite) and the Union submitted a level 1 grievance on the 18th July 2011.
The complainant submits that proper procedure was not carried out by the Respondent in the grievance procedure which states that the grievance should be heard within 7 days of receipt. The complainant submits that he submitted his grievance on the 18th July 2011 and it was not heard until the 18th August 2011. Stage one of the grievance procedure was not upheld, as a junior officer could not over rule a more senior officer.
The complainant submitted a stage two grievance on the 12th September 2011 and this grievance was not heard until the 5th April 2012. There was a delay of six months in his grievance being heard and in accordance with the Handbook it should have been heard within seven days. On the 14th March 2012, the complainant received a letter from the Respondent confirming that his grievance had been upheld. Again this letter should have been received within seven days. The complainant submits that in the written result of the stage two grievances that the respondent has stated:
“There is merit in your claim for reasonable accommodation on grounds for (sic) family status therefore your grievance is upheld. The Local Managers are currently looking at different options within the former North East area that will give you the stability in a rostered line that you require on compassionate grounds and they will be in touch in due course”.
The complainant submits that by letter dated the 7th August 2012, the respondent informed the Complainant that he would be placed on a rostered position effective from that day.
The complainant submits that from November 2011 to August 2012 he was forced to take a period of carer’s leave to care for his daughter by virtue of the failure on the part of the Respondent to provide him with a rostered position. This was a period of unpaid leave and he incurred significant losses in terms of loss of salary for this period.
As of 2012 the Complainant had expected his seniority from Location A, being next in line for a rostered line, to transfer but this had not transpired. He was appointed on a roster where he did days in one location and nights in another which was significantly difficult for him having regard to his caring responsibilities for his daughter. The complainant submits that, it was against this backdrop that a level two grievance was lodged by him and upheld in part. When the Complainant returned to his work on the 3rd September 2012 he was not placed on a rostered line and in fact was covering sick leave. He was furnished with a temporary rostered position in September 2012 and was thereafter moved to three different rostered lines which he submits were not sufficiently stable. As a result of the inability on the part of the Respondent to provide the Complainant with his entitlement as per his grievance to a rostered line, the Complainant submits that he was again forced to take a period of carer’s leave from September 2013 to September 2014 due to the needs of his daughter with a disability and caring needs. Again he incurred significant losses in terms of loss of salary.
The complainant submits that during the period of the carer’s leave he sought confirmation from the Respondent that it would implement the grievance of March 2012 as upheld but no adequate response was forthcoming. In September 2012 when the Complainant returned from carer’s leave he was placed on a rostered shift but this was temporary in nature. The Complainant became aware in October 2014 that a position on a rostered vacant line was becoming available in Area B for one year and he was placed on this line. This was of significant benefit to the Complainant in terms of being able to care for his daughter on the basis of this roster being stable for one year. During this one year period of stability, the Complainant met with a number of representatives of the Respondent seeking clarification that his grievance finding would be upheld and implemented on a permanent basis as was his entitlement. The Complainant submits that he was caused significant stress by the failure on the part of the Respondent to respond to his emails. In September 2015 the Complainant was informed of a position becoming vacant, a rostered position, but was informed it would be advertised through the national transfer policy. The Respondent has previously offered positions to employees on a rostered basis in the absence of advertising through the national transfer policy. The complainant submits that there is no reason why this position could not have been offered to the Complainant and thereafter the Complainant engaged in significant correspondence seeking to have the upcoming vacancy furnished to him as per the grievance outcome as outlined above.
By letter dated the 10th November 2015 the Complainant outlined the difficulties he had experienced in having his grievance outcome upheld and the failure on the part of the Respondent to put him on a permanent rostered position. He also confirmed that he had suffered stress as a result of that uncertainty and had attended the Respondents occupational health nurse. He also stated that he was on a period of sick leave at this time and had been admitted to hospital. This letter very clearly and cogently set out the reasons why the Complainant required the implementation of the upholding of his grievance of March 2012. In spite of this letter by email dated the 12th November 2015 the Complainant was informed that he had been provided with stability in Area B and he was a non-rostered staff member. The complainant submits that the view of, Employee Relations Department of the Respondent, was that the Respondent had complied in full with the stage 2 decision of August 2012.
The complainant submits that this is manifestly not the case in circumstances where the letter of March 2012 very clearly upheld the entitlement of the Complainant to be accommodated with a rostered position.
The Complainant has also lodged grievances up to stage 3 arising from the failure on the part of the Respondent to recognise his losses for the purposes of his forced carer’s leave in circumstances where the Respondent failed to provide him with adequate rosters to allow him to care for his daughter. Both the grievances relating to the failure on the part of the Respondent to provide him with reasonable accommodation and recognise any of his loss of earnings have been exhausted to stage 3 and the Complainant is therefore left with no option but to come before the Workplace Relations Commission.
It is submitted that the Respondent has discriminated against the Complainant on grounds of his family status and/or the failure on the part of the Respondent to provide the Complainant with a rostered position constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of the Complainant’s family status in circumstances where he is unable to comply with the unrostered nature of the position he holds by virtue of the requirements of looking after his disabled daughter. It is clear that the definition of family status within section 2 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 pertains to a parent of a person who is over the age of 18 or a person with a disability who requires the need for “care and support on a continuing, regular or frequent basis”. In addition section 2 and family status arises in relation to children aged under 18. It is submitted that the Complainant’s daughter meets both of these definitions.
The complainant submits that it is manifestly the case that a person in a position such as the Complainant is not in a position to meet the requirements of change to rosters given the caring needs for his daughter and the manifestation of her disability and various conditions attached thereto. The failure on the part of the Respondent not to adhere to its grievance outcome at stage 2 in March 2012 and failing to provide the Complainant with a permanent rostered position at Location B constitutes discrimination on grounds of family status.
In relation to the indirect discrimination, the complainant submits that it is clearly established in cases such as Inoue v. NBK Designs Limited[1] that indirect discrimination can arise by virtue of well established propositions such as in that case difficulties carers for children face with working certain hours due to the care giving nature of their responsibilities towards children. In this regard the unrostered position which provides for lack of certainty and potential movement from station to station is clearly a direct discrimination on grounds of family status and on the basis of the Complainant being the primary care giver for his daughter and the manifestation of her disabilities.
It is also submitted that the Complainant has been victimised by the Respondent in failing to implement the decision of the grievance outcome of March 2015. As recently as November 2015 the Complainant has continued to be discriminated and victimised by the Respondent by the position of the Respondent that it has conformed to its decision of the stage 2 grievance procedure. That is manifestly not the case in circumstances where the Complainant has been forced to take one further period of carer’s period of carer’s leave in 2014 by reason of the inability to provide him with permanent rostered hours. At present the Complainant has suffered significant loss of earnings by virtue of the two periods of carer’s leave he has been forced to take by reason of the refusal on the part of the Respondent to adhere to the contractual entitlements on the part of the Complainant and not be placed on unrostered periods or rostered periods of no length of permanency.
The Complainant submits that he has suffered significant health issues as a result of the discrimination and victimisation by the Respondent and has attended with the occupational health department of the Respondent between August and September 2015. The Complainant submits that in October 2015 the Respondent refused to allow the Complainant to attend at its occupational health doctor which was a further act of victimisation on its part. The Complainant eventually was sent for a health assessment by the occupational doctor following his absence from work due to occupational stress effective from October 2015. The occupational health nurse advisor reported by letter dated the 3rd March 2016 that once the Complainant’s issues with the failure on the part of the Respondent to provide him with a rostered line at the Drogheda ambulance base were addressed it is expected that his significant health difficulties would then improve. At present the Complainant suffers from acute anxiety, occupational stress and attended hospital with suspected heart attack.
It is submitted that the Respondent has breached sections 6, 8 and 74 of the Employment Equality Acts by virtue of the discrimination and/or indirect discrimination on grounds of family status and victimisation the Complainant has been subjected to. The last date of discrimination was ongoing and/or November 2015 when the Complainant was informed that his grievances outcome had been fulfilled in full which is manifestly not the case. The Complainant is currently on a period of certified unfitness to work and has not as yet been furnished with a permanent rostered position.
The Complainant seeks an Order that he is entitled to take up a rostered permanent position at ambulance station close to his home together with compensation to reflect the loss of earnings for the periods of carer’s leave and damages for the effects of discrimination pursuant to section 83 of the Acts to include damages for the effect on his health the discrimination has caused to him.
The Complainant also asserts that he should be placed in the position of the vacant rostered line position in Drogheda as has become available and as he is entitled to. There is simply no reason why the Respondent has sought to advertise this through the national transfer policy.
The complainant submits that he received a Specified Purpose Contract-Fixed Term Temporary Contract from my employer in October 2004 employing me for the purpose of a Trainee Emergency Medical Technician but that he did not receive a Contract of Employment from his employer for his employment as a permanent Emergency Medical Technician.
The Complainant asserts that the respondent directly discriminates against him on the family status ground and the disability ground in failing to give him a stable roster when it has decided that he should be given a stable roster because of his responsibility for his daughter who is disabled. The respondent asserts that the Complainant has now been provided with stability in that he is allocated a roster for a period of 16 weeks and prior to the ending of that rotation he is informed of the next rotate The Complainant does not accept that he is thereby provided with stability or that this arrangement satisfies the respondent’s determination of his grievance.
Family Status
The Complainant asserts that he has suffered less favourable treatment on the family status ground, i.e. because he has responsibility for a child under 18 years. Furthermore, since the claimant’s child is disabled, the claimant’s family status will persist beyond his daughter’s eighteenth birthday.
Disability
The Complainant asserts that he has suffered less favourable treatment on the disability ground because he has responsibility for a disabled child. Case C– 303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law concerned the question whether Directive 2000/78 prohibits discrimination on less favourable treatment of an employee based on the disability of his or her child. Ms Coleman worked as a legal secretary with Attridge Law, a law firm, from 2001. In 2002 she gave birth to a son who suffered from apnoea attacks and congenital layngomalacia and bronchomalacia. Her son’s condition required specialised and particular care. She was his primary carer. In 2005, Ms Coleman accepted voluntary redundancy from Attridge Law. She subsequently lodged a claim of constructive dismissal. She alleged that she had been treated less favourably than other employees because she was the primary carer of a disabled child. She claimed that that treatment caused her to stop working for her former employer.
Respondent’s Submission and Presentation:
The respondent entirely rejects that the Complainant was the victim of discrimination. The respondent points out that his contract of employment which states the precise location he must work in and the “You may be required to work in any service area within the vicinity as the need arises.’
While the respondent is a national organisation the service for each region is run locally. In or around 2011 the two regions relevant to the complainant were amalgamated.
The respondent submits that was clear that when the Complainant commenced his employment that he was not provided with set hours rather had to work a roster as directed by his Manager.
The respondent submits that a transfer was arranged for the Complainant and he commenced working in Area B at the end of January, 2011 and the Complainant initially worked the roster assigned for a period of 50 weeks. The respondent submits that this provided him with a stable rostered working arrangement. This was not, however, his substantive post. The Complainant availed of carer’s leave from 1st December, 2011 to 31st August, 2012.The respondent rejects the assertion that the Complainant was ‘forced’ to do so and the inference to the effect that it was the respondent that ‘forced’ the Complainant to take carer’s leave. The Complainant made no complaint whatever in advance of, during or after taking carer’s leave to the effect he was ‘forced into taking such leave’ by the Respondent.
The Complainant lodged a grievance in relation to his desire to be appointed to a rostered position. This resulted in his grievance being upheld and by letter dated 14th March 2012 the Complainant was informed he would be provided with ‘stability’ in a rostered line. The Respondent submits that the Complainant was not, contrary to his submission, assured of a ‘rostered position’. The Respondent submits that, this is not what the letter of the 14th March 2012 provided and this is not discriminatory of the Complainant whether on family status or on grounds of a disability.
By letter dated 7th August the respondent confirmed the Complainant would return to ‘a position … on the Operational Roster’. When he returned from carer’s leave he was provided with a position on the Location B Operational Roster. The Complainant was provided a ‘line’ in an Area C.
Following the Complainants return from carer’s leave he was subsequently provided with another rostered position covering for a colleague who was absent on a period of leave. The Complainant occupied this ‘line’ until he commenced leave on grounds of ill health on 27th May, 2013. The Complainant remained absent from work on grounds of ill health until 15th August, 2013 and then availed of annual leave commencing 19th August, 2013 to 25th August, 2013. The Complainant subsequently availed of carer’s leave from 26th August, 2013 to 4th September, 2014. On the Claimant’s return to work on 9th September, 2014 he covered for the same colleague again. The Complainant was transferred to accommodate his request. He was informed he would be provided with stability in terms of his rostered hours. The respondent provided this stability to the Claimant. The Complainant made no complaint about these matters between September 2012 and late 2015. He was provided with stability in his rostered hours. When the Complainant reignited this matter in late 2015, it was directed to the Employee Relations Department who responded in clear terms to the Complainant outlining the fact that the stage 2 grievance up held by the Respondent‘ did not give you any guarantee that you would be appointed to any vacant line ahead of persons senior to you’
In summary the position of the Respondent is that it has fully complied with its assurances to the Claimant. Any alleged infringement of any purported agreement between the parties is, with respect, not properly a matter for the WRC and rather is a matter which may amount to a breach of agreement/contract/expectation/representation case. The agreement contended for by the Complainant(which is not accepted by the respondent) was recorded in writing by the respondent on the 14th March 2012. The Complainant had a period of 6 months to challenge any alleged breach of this agreement if he believed it infringed his rights pursuant to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts (as amended). No such challenge was maintained by the Complainant and prima facie his claim is out of time.
The respondent submits that strictly without prejudice to the foregoing, this is not a case of alleged continuing or ongoing discrimination. The alleged incident at issue here is the alleged breach of the terms of the letter of the 14th March 2012. This is something the Complainant was aware of as early as March 2012 and in any event as of his return from carer’s leave September, 2014. The Complainant did not take any action to address his concerns in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Equality Act. Without prejudice to all of the foregoing, his claim cannot proceed on the family status ground.
Furthermore, and in any event, there is no discrimination of the Complainant in the instant case on grounds of his family status. The Complainant has acknowledged he was provided with accommodation by the Respondent. His transfer to a base closer to his home was facilitated. He got to move location and he assigned to duties, under an identical contract of employment (as is his legal entitlement) closer to his home. The Complainant is attempting, through the vehicle of these proceedings to argue for a more favourable contract of employment to that which he was originally assigned. He wants to be appointed to a ‘rostered’ contract of employment. This is a different substantive post. Appointments of this nature are only made in line with the National Transfer Policy. The Complainant in seeking to be appointed to a new contract is seeking significantly ‘more’ favourable treatment under the employment equality acts without any legal basis whatever for doing do.
VICTIMISATION ALLEGATION
The respondent submits that The Complainant has not been the victim of victimisation. Such a claim as not been referred to this Tribunal. The Complainant states he has been victimised by the Respondent’s position that it has confirmed to its decision at stage 2 of the grievance procedure. This is entirely incorrect and is rejected. The Claimant’s decision to take carer’s leave is a personal one
Decision:
Section 41(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
In relation to the Complaints under the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969 I find that insufficient evidence has been advanced in relation to these claims and they must fail.
Issues for Decision:
Disability” is defined in Section 2 of the Acts as meaning –
(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person’s body,
and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person”.
It is clear that the complainant’s daughter is suffering from a disability as defined under the Acts and this is not contested.
In evaluating the evidence before me, I must first consider whether the complainant has established a prima facie case pursuant to Section 85A of the Act. The Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of ‘sufficient significance’ before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.
In this case, the complainants allege that the respondent indirectly discriminated against him on the family status ground in relation to his of employment. I must consider whether the respondent indirectly discriminated against the complainant on the family status ground in terms of section 6(2) (c) of the Employment Equality Act within the meaning of section 22 and 31 the Act and in contravention of section 8 of the Act. In making my Decision in this case, I have taken into account all of the evidence, both written and oral, submitted to me by the parties.
Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts, provides that:
"Discrimination shall be taken to occur where, on any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as "the discriminatory grounds"), one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated."
Section 6(2) provides that as between any two persons, the discriminatory grounds are, inter alia:
(b (c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as "the family status ground"),
Indirect discrimination
Parts III and IV of the Employment Equality Act 1998, deal, inter alia, with indirect discrimination. For the purposes of the Act, a comparison may be made between two persons who differ in relation to their, family status. Section 31 of the Act prohibits indirect discrimination in relation to the other grounds and provides that where a provision relating to employment applies to all employees or prospective employees (or a particular class of employees or prospective employees) and operates to the disadvantage of one person compared to another and in practice can be complied with by a substantially smaller proportion of employees or prospective employees of a particular category relative to persons of a different marital status, family status, disability, age etc. and cannot be justified as being reasonable in all the circumstances, it shall be regarded as indirect discrimination contrary to section 8 of the Act on whichever of the grounds is relevant.
Section 31 of the Acts provide that the provisions of section 22 shall apply in relation to indirect discrimination on all of the non gender grounds. Section 22(1) which deals with indirect discrimination on the gender ground provides:
(a) Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision puts persons of a particular gender [marital status, family status etc.] at a particular disadvantage in respect of any matter other than remuneration compared with other employees of their employer.
(b) Where paragraph (a) applies, the employer shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as discriminating against each of the persons referred to ..... unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary."
Establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
In the Labour Court case of NBK Designs Ltd v. Marie Inoue , the Court considered in that case that the disadvantage alleged arose "not from the person's gender per se, but from the combination of their gender, family status and/or their marital status."
In that case, the Labour Court stated "the complainant was unable to work full-time, not because she was a woman per se, but because she is the mother of a school going child and the primary carer of that child.". In addition to the combined impact of gender and family status on being able to work full time, the Court recognised that marital status may also be an issue.
In the instant case the competence of the complainant has never been raised by the respondent. I find that the only issue is the complainant’s inability to comply with rota requirements laid down by the respondent. I find that this inability was entirely due to his need to care for his daughter’s disability. The Complainant has responsibility for his daughter who is disabled; she has Down syndrome; she requires care 24/7 and he and his partner are her primary carers. The Complainant requires a stable work roster in order to care for his daughter. Failure of the respondent to provide advance notice of his working hours has placed the complainant in a position where he must choose between meeting the rota requirements of his employer or caring for his daughter. He was forced to choose the latter on a number of occasions. I find that the requirement to meet the rota requirements of his job placed the complainant (as a primary carer for a child with a disability) at the most extreme disadvantage and therefor a case of prima facie indirect discrimination on the family status ground is established.
Justification for the practice
In this case, I must consider whether the continuation of the complainants existing roster is justified by a legitimate aim. I find that the Respondent has available to a large workforce and other working patterns which would have relieved the complainant of his disadvantage. It is clear that the Respondent reached this same conclusion some years ago. Having heard extensive evidence from both parties, it is very clear where the correspondence of March 2012 and 7th August very clearly upheld an entitlement of the Complainant to be accommodated with a rostered position.
Having heard direct evidence from the relevant representatives for the respondent it is clear that their current position is that they can in no circumstances make a rostered position available to the complaint as “the service comes first”. It is clear that having reneged on their original commitment of 2012 that the respondent has no intention of engaging with the complainant to assess how they assist him in meeting the needs of his disabled daughter. The Respondent has had many opportunities that arose naturally under the development of their organisation to provide the complainant with a stable rostered position over the last number of years but has not done so for a number of internal administrative reasons arising from their structural reorganisation.
The facts of this case are very straightforward. The respondent through its own grievance procedures made a commitment to provide the complainant with arrangements in order for him to care for his daughter. I have no doubt having heard the facts of this case that the Respondent simply failed to follow through on this commitment due to a reorganisation, although their motivations are irrelevant regarding my decision. Rather than engage with the complainant has simply fobbed him off in the most unacceptable manner and has directly interfered with the complainant’s ability to care for his daughter.
Victimisation
As the respondent has provided no evidence to explain it’s compete change of position I must conclude that their actions were motivated by victimisation. Specifically, the actions of the respondent are motivated entirely by their desire to distance themselves from the findings of their own grievance procedure and ignore the complainant’s position. While medical evidence presented cannot attribute the complainant’s serious health issues entirely to the absence of a rostered position it is obvious that the complainant has suffered greatly simply in regard to being prevented from caring for his disabled child. At the time of writing this decision the complainant’s daughter is now six years old.
At the hearing of this complaint, it was the position of the respondent that they were unaware that there was anything wrong with the respondent. Arguments made by the complainant that the respondent has been discriminating against him on the basis of his alleged disability were not included in the original complaint and are therefore outside of my jurisdiction. However given the extremely serious, medically certified, condition of the complaint, I am extremely concerned by the Respondents statement at the hearing of this complaint that they were unaware of his serious medical issues.
I find that, at the time the hearing of this complaint that the respondent is continuing to discriminate against the complainant going as far back as their actions in March 2012.
Had the respondent made its current position clear to the complaint from the outset, the complainant could have made other arrangements to care for his daughter; this includes the option of resignation by the complainant which the respondent has indicated that it sees as an acceptable outcome. Instead the respondent has repeatedly given the complaint false hope over a number of years.
Decision:
I have concluded my investigation. Based on all of the foregoing, I find, pursuant to Section 79(6) of the Act, that the respondent has indirectly discriminated against the complainant on the ground of family status. In addition, the respondent has victimised the complainant in terms of Section 74 of the Acts.
Therefore, I find for the complainant.
(a) I hereby order, that the respondent pay the complainant the sum of €52,000 in compensation for the effects of the discrimination. This figure represents compensation for infringement of his rights under employment equality legislation in relation to discrimination and does not include any element relating to remuneration and is therefore not taxable.
(b) I hereby order, that the respondent provide the complainant with a stable rostered position that will allow the complainant to care for his daughter.
Dated: 26th April 2017