ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00008805
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | General Operative | Meat Processing Company |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 |
CA-00011570-001 | 25/05/2017 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 |
CA-00011570-002 | 25/05/2017 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 14/09/2017
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Procedure:
Following referral to me by the Director General, I inquired into these complaints of unfair dismissal pursuant to Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, and under Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 received by the Workplace Relations Commission (hereinafter ‘WRC’) on 25th of May 2017 and inquired into these complaints and gave the Parties an opportunity to be heard and to present any relevant evidence. The Complainant was represented by SIPTU. The Respondent was represented by Ms Siobhan McGowan of Purdy Fitzgerald Solicitors.All oral evidence, written submissions and supporting documentation presented by both Parties have been taken into consideration in relation to this decision.
Background:
The Respondent operates a meat processing plant. The Complainant is seeking compensation in respect of a claim of unfair dismissal and his entitlement to his statutory minimum notice. The Complainant was paid €9.399 per hour and worked 40 hours a week. He hasn’t secured a new employment and has been in receipt of Illness Benefit from the Department of Social Protection between 2/12/2016 and 15/04/2017 and from 12/08/2017 to date. The Complainant had the requisite twelve months’ service for the purposes of bringing a complaint of unfair dismissal which was brought within the six month statutory period. The fact of dismissal is not in dispute. The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as Operative for some 16 years from 21st November 2000 until he was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct as a consequence of an incident that had occurred on the 25th November 2016. The Respondent dismissed the Complainant by way of a letter of the 23rd January 2016. The sanction of dismissal was upheld and confirmed at the conclusion of the appeal hearing on the 24th August 2017. The Complainant has had a number of incidents in the past (in 2015 and 2016). He received a final written warning on 13th February 2015. The allegation substantiated in that case related to a) clocking in on the wrong clock machine b) entering production area without wearing the correct health & safety and food hygiene work wear c) clocking in a half hour before scheduled start time. The final written warning was active for a period of 12 months from the date it was applied. Following the 12 months period the Respondent removed the final written warning from the Complainant’s file. However, in the letter of 26th February 2016 the Respondent informed him that he “reverted to the previous stage of the disciplinary procedure i.e. written warning”. Following a random audit on 17th February 2016 it was found that the Complainant failed to clock out for his lunch break. As a result, following a disciplinary hearing on 25th February 2016 he was given a final written warning on the 26th February 2016. On 25th November 2016 the Complainant was accused of a) failure to wear hair net and beard snood correctly b) leaving wash room unlocked and unattended c) failure to complete correct documentation for knife control in the evenings. On 30th November he was requested in writing to attend an information meeting the following day. At the meeting the Complainant denied all allegations. Suspension from Duty letter was given to the Complainant at the meeting. The Complainant was invited in writing by letter dated 2nd December to an Investigation Meeting on 6th December 2016. The Investigation was conducted by JG, Office Manager. During the meeting the Complainant requested his Manager who was also one of the persons making allegations against him (JN) to attend, his request was declined. He also requested that the Investigator goes down to the area where the knife record sheets are kept to explain the way they are filled in. The Investigator refused. On 12th December Notification of the Intention to hold a Disciplinary Hearing on 16th December was sent to the Complainant. On 15th December (received on 16th December) a copy of the Investigation report was forwarded to the Complainant. The Complainant submitted medical certificate and was unable to attend the Hearing until 18th January 2017. Disciplinary hearing was conducted by CD, General Manager. During the hearing the Complainant denied the allegations. By letter dated 23rd January 2017, CD informed the Complainant that he was being dismissed with immediate effect. The Complainant did not appeal the decision within the 10 days’ timeframe set by the Respondent. SIPTU on his behalf appealed the decision on 8th of March 2017. An appeal hearing was held on 24th August 2017 and the decision to dismiss was upheld. |
CA- 00011570-001Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissal Act, 1977
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
Respondent vehemently rebuts the allegation of an unfair dismissal. Respondent submits that in April 2014 the Complainant was furnished with a verbal warning for his failure to wear safety equipment and essential protective clothing. In January 2015 the Complainant was furnished with a written warning on foot of removing company property off site without adequate consent. A month later the Complainant received a final written warning for clocking in irregularities and further failure to wear appropriate equipment in line with company policy. This said warning remained live on the Complainant’s file for a 12 month period. In late February 2016 the Complainant was again found deficient in his clocking in habits and failing to wear the correct protective equipment in breach of company policy. Following a further disciplinary investigation and hearing, he was furnished with a final written warning. At all stages in the previous disciplinary matters, the Complainant was informed of the allegation he faced, given the opportunity to bring representation and afforded the opportunity to appeal the decision reached following the disciplinary hearing. Another incident occurred on the 25th November 2016. The Complainant was alleged to have a) Failed to wear hair net and beard snood correctly b) Left the boning hall wash room unlocked c) Failed to complete correct documentation for knife control. Respondent noted that, despite the gravity of the allegations in stand-alone situation, the fact that the Complainant has received several previous warnings for similar failings showed a complete disregard for company safety standards and policy. In line with procedure, the Complainant was further formally notified of the allegations and invited to an investigation meeting with representation. On foot of it being found that the Complainant had a case to answer, he was further invited to a disciplinary hearing with the plant’s General Manager. Post this hearing the Complainant was informed that due to his gross misconduct and further, taking that he had a live final written warning on his file, that he was being dismissed. Respondent maintains that at all times it has followed its own disciplinary procedure and adhered with the rules of natural justice and fair procedures and furnished the Complainant with every possible opportunity to amend his errant behaviour and remain in employment. Unfortunately, the Complainant has continued to breach company policy. The sanction of dismissal is proportionate. This is further emphasized by the fact that the Complainant had a live final written warning on his file and had previously been sanctioned on several occasions for similar offences. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
SIPTU representative on behalf of the Complainant contends that there were a number of significant procedural deficiencies with the process conducted by the Respondent. He claims that the Suspension from Duty letter was prepared prior to the Information Meeting on the 1st December 2016 and handed to the Complainant at the meeting and therefore, the Respondent envisaged no other outcome of the meeting but disciplinary process. Similarly, an undated Investigation Report was completed on 14th or 15th December 2016. However, a letter informing the Complainant of the disciplinary hearing was issued on the 12th December 2016. Therefore, it is asserted that the Respondent pre-empted the outcome of the meeting and the investigation respectively. SIPTU representative questions also whether an adequate opportunity was given to the Complainant to cross-examine the witnesses in language he understood. He also points out that the correspondence from the Respondent to the Complainant was issued in English which is not his first language. The Complainant requested CCTV footage related to the events to be reviewed and that the Respondent reviews other knife control records to explain the way they are prepared but these requests were denied. In relation to the events of 25th November 2016 the Claimant disputes the Respondent’s version of the events. The Complainant’s representative submits that the Complainant was approached and challenged by the Manager about protective clothing after clocking in at around 10.45am but before he entered the wash room. Moreover, the Complainant maintains that at the relevant time he was not one of the wash room key holders and that his knife control record was in order. |
Findings and Conclusions:
In considering the Respondent’s decision to dismiss the Complainant, a number of factors or "tests" need to be considered. Firstly, it needs to be established whether or not there were sufficient grounds for the Respondent to initiate disciplinary action against the Complainant. Secondly, any investigation/disciplinary process applied must be in accordance with the requirements of fair procedure, due process and natural justice. Finally, consideration must be given to whether the sanction emanating from such a process falls within what might be considered a range of reasonable responses by the employer. Grounds to initiate disciplinary action I am satisfied, based on the evidence adduced that the Complainant a) was witnessed wearing his beard snood incorrectly, b) that the washroom door was left unlocked (although it seems that there is conflicting evidence in relation who was the key holder at the relevant time) and c) that the knife control sheet was not filled in correctly by the Complainant. Consequently, taking all the above into consideration, I am satisfied that the Respondent had sufficient grounds to initiate investigation process in relation to the allegations. Disciplinary process The second factor for consideration relates to the conducting of the disciplinary process. In relation to procedural fairness, I am guided by the requirement in S.I. No. 146/2000 - Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) which provides that the procedures for dealing with disciplinary must comply with the general principles of natural justice and fair procedures. The contractual and constitutional rights to fair procedures are also well established (In Re: Haughey [1971] IR 217). I note that the Complainant has been furnished with written Disciplinary Procedure translated into his native language. Point 14 of S.I. No. 146/2000 stipulates that “Warnings should be removed from an employee's record after a specified period and the employee advised accordingly”. The document provided by the Respondent correctly points out that “5. All warnings issued under this procedure shall have duration of twelve months from the date of issue.” It provides however for an unusual course of action whereby “At the twelve months an employee will revert back to the previous stage of the disciplinary procedure”. The document further clarifies the possible reversion from Final Written Warning and Suspension Stage to the Verbal Warning Stage at maximum (Stage 1) after 2 years. I do not believe that this was the intention behind point 14 of the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures. I would have some concerns that the notifications of the information and disciplinary meetings may not have been consistent with what one would consider as best practice in this regard. The evidence suggests that the Complainant was informed on 30th November 2016 of the Information Meeting that was due to take place on the next day. Similarly, letter requesting his presence at Investigation Meeting on 6th December was posted on 2nd December (Friday) and would be received, at best, on Monday 5th December. Despite the fact that I believe the Complainant was aware of the reason for the meeting, the short notice was less than ideal in terms of preparation. I note also that the letters of 12th December 2016 and 12th January 2017 in relation to the Disciplinary hearing arrangements stipulate that “These arrangements have been made in consultation with you and I would remind you that the hearing may proceed in your absence”. As there was telephone contact between the Parties made around the 12th of January I accept that preliminary decision re: hearing date of 18th January 2017 could have been reached. However, it is clear that the Complainant was not consulted in respect of the date of 16th December. I note that while the Respondent encouraged the Complainant to be accompanied at the interview and subsequent disciplinary hearing the Respondent also pointed out to him in the Suspension from Duty letter that “you are not to discuss any aspect of the investigation with anyone other than named in this letter”. The Complainant exercised his right to representation and was accompanied at the Investigation Meeting on 6th December 2016 by the Shop Steward. I would also have some concerns in relation to the matter of suspension. The case of The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland-v-James Reilly took a close look at suspending the employee on full pay in this case. The High Court recognised that suspending someone-even on full pay-is a very serious measure with potential reputational damage which may never be overcome, even if the employee is subsequently found to be not guilty of the allegations. It held that a suspension should only be imposed “after full consideration of the necessity for it pending a full investigation” of the issues. The Court identified four circumstances where it would be justified:
In the case before me the reason for the suspension given to the Complainant was not linked to any of the above or to the seriousness of the allegations but “because he is already on a final written warning”. Second difficulty I would have with the matter of suspension is that the Suspension from Duty letter was handed to the Complainant during the first, Information Meeting. It is therefore clear that the decision to suspend the Complainant was taken without the Complainant being afforded opportunity to defend himself. Similarly, it is worrying that the General Manager (GM) of the Respondent wrote to the Complainant to “formally advise you that you are required to attend a disciplinary hearing as detailed below…” on 12th December 2016, prior to the Investigation Report being concluded. This may suggest that, again, the Responded pre-empted the outcome of the investigation. Moreover, in the letter GM writes “A copy of the evidence the Authority will be presenting has been forwarded to you.” I note that the Respondent has sent by post copies of minutes of meetings and interviews to the Complainant shortly after they have taken place. However, the key piece of evidence, namely the Investigation Report was forwarded on the 15th December and was received by the Complainant on the day of the planned disciplinary hearing. I note that the Complainant submitted a medical certificate and was not in a position to attend the meeting. Nevertheless, I find the manner in which the above matter was handled concerning. I would also have some concerns in relation to the matter of the knife control records. It seems that each of the two employees, the Complainant and his work colleague MP had difficulty with the other’s method of populating the sheet. For that reason rather than completing one spreadsheet each of them had a separate one. The Respondent outlined at the hearing that the procedures in relation to record keeping is extremely important. Yet, it seems that there was an ongoing unaddressed issue between the two employees, which consequently led to one of them being disciplined. I note that the Respondent provided interpretation over the phone or in person where possible at the meetings with the Complainant. With the exception of the request not to discuss the matter included in the Suspension Letter the Complainant was provided with opportunities to respond to the allegations and make representation. The Complainant was given access to an appeal process. He didn’t exercise his right to appeal within the time frame outlined in the Dismissal Letter. Nevertheless, the Respondent accommodated his late request submitted some two months later. Based on the above, I am not satisfied that, despite the Respondent making some effort, the disciplinary process was conducted in accordance with the requirements of fair procedure, due process and natural justice. Proportionality of Sanction The final test for consideration relates to the proportionality of the sanction and whether or not it falls within the range of reasonable responses that might be expected in the circumstances. As to whether there were substantial grounds for the Complainant’s dismissal on the ground of gross misconduct, the applicable legal test is the “band of reasonable responses” test, as comprehensively set out by Mr Justice Noonan in the context of Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 in the High Court case of The Governor and the Company of Bank of Ireland -v- James Reilly (2015) IEHC 241. Of significance in my view is the reference by the Respondent to previous incidents “it is my decision that your actions constitute an act of gross misconduct due to the accumulation of previous misconduct”. The Respondent goes on “it is my decision to terminate your employment with immediate effect from the date of this letter under Section 3.2. Disciplinary procedure; Dismissal (Stage 4); If, following a period of suspension without pay or a final written warning an employee is guilty of further breaches, the employee will be dismissed; of the company handbook” I note that there were three allegations of misconduct against the Complainant: a) failure to wear hair net and beard snood correctly b) leaving wash room unlocked and unattended c) failure to complete correct documentation for knife control in the evenings. The Investigation Report concluded that the Complainant was in breach of company hygiene policy by not wearing his beard snood correctly and left the wash room unlocked and unattended. The Investigator did not conclude definitively whether or not the Complainant failed to complete knife control paperwork. The Respondent’s Disciplinary Procedures include a list (“not necessarily comprehensive”) of 19 examples of gross misconduct. None of the above breaches or breaches of a similar nature are included. I note that the Respondent’s Definition of Hygiene Policy states that the hygiene rules “must be observed”. However, neither of the documents indicates that breach of hygiene policy constitutes gross misconduct. The established jurisprudence in relation to dismissal law in this jurisdiction takes a very restricted view of what constitutes gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal. This is evidenced, for example, by the determination of the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Lennon v Bredin M160/1978 (reproduced at page 315 of Madden and Kerr Unfair Dismissal Cases and Commentary (IBEC, 1996)) wherein the Tribunal states: ‘Section 8 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 saves an employer from liability for minimum notice where the dismissal is for misconduct. We have always held that this exemption applies only to cases of very bad behaviour of such a kind that no reasonable employer could be expected to tolerate the continuance of the relationship for a minute longer; we believe the legislature had in mind such things as violent assault or larceny or behaviour in the same sort of serious category. If the legislature had intended to exempt an employer from giving notice in such cases where the behaviour fell short of being able to fairly be called by the dirty word ‘misconduct’ we have always felt that they would have said so by adding such words (after the word misconduct) as negligence, slovenly workmanship, bad timekeeping, etc. They did not do so.’
I find that the grounds for dismissal in the case before me considered in the context of the events of 25th November 2016, do not come within the category of ‘very bad behaviour of such a kind that no reasonable employer could be expected to tolerate the continuance of the relationship for a minute longer’, described above by the Tribunal.
In any event, the evidence before me was that the Respondent allowed the Complainant to continue working for some five days on and after 25th November 2016 before he was suspended.
It follows, from my discussion above that the Complainant’s failure to wear his beard snood correctly and leaving the washroom unattended and unlocked cannot reasonably be considered to amount to gross misconduct justifying the imposition of a sanction of dismissal. In this regard, therefore, I find that the sanction of summary dismissal imposed by the Respondent was disproportionate and unwarranted in all the circumstances.
Undue Weight Placed on Previous Incidents Involving the Complainant
As stated previously, the Complainant had had a number of incidents in the past (in 2015 and 2016).
It is evident that the decision to dismiss the Complainant was informed to no small extent by those previous incidents. It is confirmed by the wording of the decision “it is my decision that your actions constitute an act of gross misconduct due to the accumulation of previous misconduct”.
I note that the Respondent relies on Charles Sukore v Carphone Warehouse Ltd UD604/2015 in support of the “accumulation of previous misconduct” matter. I reviewed the case and it is my opinion that it does not apply in the case before me. Moreover, in DHL Express (Ireland) Ltd v Michael Coughlan UDD1738 (decision of 28th July 2017) the Labour Court criticised the Claimant (DHL) for placing undue weight on previous incidents. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
In hearing this claim, it is not a matter for me to decide on the issue of guilt or innocence of the Complainant. The question for me as Adjudication Officer is whether, following a fair and transparent investigation and disciplinary process, the Respondent’s decision to dismiss was one that a reasonable employer might have made. (EAT – UD690/2012). For the aforesaid reasons, I find this complaint to be well-founded pursuant to Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and conclude that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent. Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 sets out the various forms of redress including reinstatement, re-engagement and financial compensation which may be awarded and relevant to the instant case where compensation only is sought, Section 7(1) (c) (i) of the Act provides: “…if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,…” Section 7(1)(ii) of the Act provides: “… if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances…” Section 7(2) sets out the factors which should be considered when determining the amount of compensation and of most relevance to this case is the measures adopted by the employee to mitigate his loss. The Complainant submitted four documents confirming that he applied for three jobs in total and inquired about one in March 2017.None of the jobs related to his work qualifications and experience with the Respondent. There were conflicting statements given at the hearing. Complainant’s representative stated that he has secured a new employment. However, the Complainant himself stated that he is in receipt of Illness Benefit from the Department of Social Protection since the date of dismissal and therefore unavailable for work. It was subsequently clarified that the Complainant has been in receipt of Illness Benefit between 2nd December 2016 and 15th April 2017 and form 12th August 2017 to date. Therefore I consider it just and equitable in all the circumstances to award the Complainant €751.92 (2 weeks salary at €9.399 per hour x 40 hours), subject to any lawful deductions, within 6 weeks of the date of this decision. |
CA-00011570-002Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant asserts that he did not receive his statutory entitlement under the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent submits that on foot of the fact that the Complainant was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct he is not entitled to his statutory minimum notice. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The evidence before me confirms that the Respondent dismissed the Complainant with immediate effect and did so without adhering to its obligations under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 which under Section 4.2 (e) requires eight weeks’ notice if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for fifteen years or more. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
In accordance with Section 4(2) d of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 I find that the Complainant was entitled to eight weeks’ notice as she has over 15 years’ service at the time of his dismissal. In accordance with Section 12(1) of the Act I direct that the Respondent pay the Complainant compensation of €3,007.68 amounting to eight week pay within 42 days of the date of this decision, subject to any lawful deductions. |
Dated: 01.11.2017
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Key Words:
Summary dismissal, minimum notice, gross misconduct |