DEC-E2017-074

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS　

DECISION NO.: DEC-E2017-074　

PARTIES:　

MARJORIE METCALFE　

(Represented by Gilvarry & Associates Solicitors)　

- V -

DECARE OPERATIONS IRELAND LTD　

(Represented by Irish Business Employers Confederation)　　

File Reference: et-158504-ee-15　

Date of Issue:     26 September 2017

HEADNOTES:

Equality, age, disability, conditions of employment, reasonable accommodation, dismissal　

1.  Dispute　

1.1 This dispute involves a claim by Marjorie Metclafe (hereinafter referred to as ”the complainant”) that she was discriminated against by Decare Operations Ireland Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ” the respondent”), on the grounds of disability and age contrary to section 6 of the of the Employment Equality Acts (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Acts’) in terms of conditions of employment, discriminatory dismissal, failure to provide reasonable accommodation and victimisation　

2.  Background　

2.1 The complainant referred a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts to the Equality Tribunal on the 23 July 2015.  On 1 March 2017, in accordance with her powers under the Acts the Director General of the WRC delegated the complaint to me, Louise Boyle, an Adjudication Officer/ Equality Officer for investigation and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions under Part VII of the Acts.  Submissions were received from both parties and a hearing of the complaint took place on 10 March 2017.  Both parties attended the hearing.　

2.2  This decision is issued by me following the establishment of the Workplace Relations Commission on 1 October 2015, as an Adjudication Officer who was an Equality Officer prior to 1 October 2015, in accordance with section 83.3 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.　

2.3 The complainant began work on 10^th February 2003 as a Data Entry with her primary role that of data input of different claims into the company’s system.　

2.4 She resigned her position on 8^thApril 2005 but returned on 6^th July 2005 and has worked there up until 27^thMay 2015 when she was dismissed.  　

2.5 She was absent from work 26^thAugust 2013 owing to surgery and this was followed immediately with absence owing to a back issue which was later diagnosed as osteoarthritis through the Company Doctor’s medical report dated 1^st September 2014.  　

2.6 She was deemed unfit for work by the company doctor on 1^st September 2014 and never returned to work.  　

2.7 Her GP advised that she was suitable for part-time work 25^thSeptember 2014.　

2.8 The complainant’s employment was terminated on 27^th May 2015due to inter alia being “unfit for work” and she did not appeal this decision.　

2.9 She alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of age and disability in relation to conditions of employment and dismissal and failing to give reasonable accommodation in relation to her dismissal.  　

2.10 Her claim for victimisation was withdrawn.　

3.1 She applied later that year on 4^th October 2011, for part-time work and told her manager she was experiencing pains in her joints especially when sitting for a long period of time.　

3.2 She was advised that part-time was not available at that time “due to business necessity”. 　

3.3 She advised that she had pain between 2004-2011, for which she was prescribed anti-inflammatorys but at the end of 2011 it was getting worse and by mid-afternoons she had difficulties sitting.  　

3.4 She claims that prior to sick leave in August 2013, she was given limited training in relation to a new computer system which was introduced and she believed this was in relation to her age.　

3.5 It was also claimed that she was threatened with disciplinary action if she did not do overtime. 　

3.6 She claims that another employee with cancer was facilitated with part-time working but that she was not facilitated.　

3.7 On 26^th August 2013 the complainant went out sick owing to a pre-scheduled operation and stayed out sick owing to back pain and her GP wrote a letter on 7^th October 2013 detailing that the “necessary posture which she has to maintain at work is associated with back pain” and that “she feels it would be better if she could work fewer hours, perhaps three days a week”.p>

3.8 The complainant was advised on October 21^st 2013 that no part-time position was available and that should she be unable to return, the company would keep her under review.　

3.9 On 18^th August 2014 she was referred to the company doctor and advised that she was contracted to “work a ‘39’ hour week”. 　

3.10 On 1^st September 2014 she was seen by the Company Physician Dr H who diagnosed her as having extensive osteoarthritis, and being unfit for work and unlikely to be fit for work in the future.　

3.11 The company confirmed in their letter of 16^th September, following this report, that she was “contracted to work a ‘39’ hour week” per her contract.　

3.12 The complainant believed this repeated reference to a 39 hour week meant that the Respondent was not willing to consider reasonable accommodation.　

3.13 On 25^th September 2014 her GP wrote to the company advising that in his opinion she is very capable of working part-time.  He also advised that he was not an expert Occupational Physician and would be happy to refer this lady to an Occupational Health Physician for independent review.　

3.14 On 10^th October 2014 the complainant wrote to the company advising that she was not able to return to work full-time now or in the future and the only way she could return to work wason a part-time basis. 　

3.15 She was reviewed again by the company doctor on 23^rdDecember 2014 who advised no change in her condition and determined that she remained unfit for work.　

3.16 She expressed annoyance at how she had been treated by the company doctor at this appointment and that her husband had also attended and he was also surprised at what he felt was the company doctor’s failure to conduct a thorough medical examination.  She advised that he did not put down his briefcase as he talked to her and only told her to raise her arm.  She had written to the doctor expressing her annoyance but she did not receive a response.　

3.17 The complainant was scheduled for a further medical review by the company doctor on May 22^nd 2015.　

3.18 On 20^th February a solicitor for the complainant wrote advising she would not attend any further medical examination until such time as her issues regarding her part-time working requests were addressed.  This was confirmed by the complainant on 10^th March 2015 who requested that the scheduled appointment be cancelled as she would not attend and again on 22^st May 2015.　

3.0 She did not attend the appointment and was advised a few days later that her employment was terminated.  She did not appeal this decision as she felt there was no point.　

4 Summary of the respondent’s case　

4.1 The respondent denied that the complainant had been discriminated against in relation to age and/or disability.　

4.2 The respondent highlighted that the complainant had not applied for part-time working when it had been offered to employees in March 2011.　

4.3 When she did apply in October 2011 no medical condition was brought to their attention by a medical qualified person at that time and part-time working was no longer available owing to business needs.　

4.4 It was confirmed that another employee absent due to cancer was accommodated on a 3 day week but that this was back in 2004 and the complainant had an opportunity since then to apply for part-time working but did not.　

4.5 The complainant’s last application for part-time working was received onJuly 12^th 2013 but the complainant did not highlight any disability as being why she was requesting part-time working.　

4.6 The complainant commenced scheduled sick leave owing to an operation on 26^th August 2013 and following this was absent owing to problems with her back.  The respondent only became aware of the disability ‘osteoarthritis’ in September 2014 following the complainant’s first appointment with the company doctor.　

4.7 The respondent contacted the complainant to discuss the company doctor’s report but she advised she was out of the country and could not attend and this was rescheduled.  The respondent was not aware that she had a family bereavement.　

4.8 On 30^th September 2014 a meeting was held with the HR Manager and the complainant to discuss the company doctor’s report and albeit they were in receipt of her GP’s letter which mentioned part-time working, the respondent determined that it was necessary to get an up-to-date medical opinion. 　

4.9 While the respondent accepts that the complainant was the oldest employee they rejected that they brought in a younger lady to do the complainant’s role on a part-time basis while she was absent.  The complainant’s absence was having an adverse effect on the business and they had to make a business decision to hire somebody in a temporary full-time capacity to cover the complainant’s long-term absence.　

4.10 The respondent rejects that they dismissed the complainant’s concerns about her health.  They carried out a fitness to work assessment by the company doctor in September 2014, as a result of which she was deemed unfit for work.  A further review was carried out on 23^rd December 2014 where she again deemed unfit for work and a further appointment was scheduled for 22^nd May 2015 which the complainant refused to attend despite being advised that she should attend.　

4.11 At no time did the complainant’s GP issue sick certs detailing “unfit to work full time but fit to work part-time”.　

4.12 The complainant had an opportunity to appeal the decision of dismissal but did not appeal it.　

4.13 They denied that that the complainant was ever threatened with disciplinary action for refusing overtime and denied that she was excluded from training.　

4.14 They denied that she was discriminated because of age because she had been taken back shortly after she had left on a previous occasion in 2005. 　

4.15 Evidence from the company doctor was that that he would not deem the complainant suitable for part-time working and that he stood over his diagnosis that she was unfit for work.  He advised that he had been asked by the respondent regarding the complainant’s fitness or otherwise for a full-time role and that he had not assessed her suitability for part-time work.  He could not recall if he had seen the GP’s letter regarding her suitability for part-time working.  　

4.16 The respondent rejects that the complainant was treated unfairly or treated with inequity.  They did not refuse to accommodate her and were met with obstruction from her in her failure to attend their company doctor’s assessment.　

4.17 They accepted she had a disability but there were no roles available other than full-time working, it was clear from their company doctor report that she was unfit for her role at the time and they do not have part-time hours.  They may have accommodated people in the past but this was when part-time working was available. 　

4.18 The respondent rejects that the complainant was dismissed on a disability grounds.  The company were endeavouring to carry out a full review of her fitness to return to work and as she refused to attend any further reviews, they were left with no alternative but to terminate her employment.　

5.   Findings and Conclusions　

5.1 Section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Section 82 of the Act.  In reaching my decisions, I have taken into consideration all of the submissions, oral and written, made to me by the parties as well as the evidence given by the witnesses at the hearing.　

5.2 Section 6 (1) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 provides:　

“For the purposes of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur where, on any of the grounds in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as “the discriminatory grounds”) one person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would be treated. 

Section 6 (2) (a) – (i) of the Acts outlines that the Complainant must be treated less favourably on the grounds of gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation, civil status, religion, age disability, race or a member of the Traveller community for the case to succeed.　

5.3 Section 85A of the Employment Equality Act sets out the burden of proof that applies to complaints of discrimination. In the first instance, it requires the Complainant to establish facts upon which they can rely in asserting that they were discriminated against. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised. Addressing the issue of the burden of proof in EDA0917 [2010] 21 E.L.R, Arturs Valpeters v Melbury Developments Ltd, the Labour Court, whilst examining the circumstances in which the probative burden of proof operates, held as follows:-

"Section 85A of the Acts provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.”　

5.4 In Graham Anthony and Co Ltd v Mary Margetts, EDA 038, in an age discrimination case, the Labour Court remarked:　

“The mere fact that the Complainant falls within one of the discriminatory grounds laid down under the Act is not sufficient in itself to establish a claim of discrimination. The Complainant must adduce other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination occurred.　

5.5Discrimination – Age　

Section 2 of the Act sets out that discrimination on the basis of age means “that they are of different age”.  The complainant asserts that she is the oldest employee and that she was discriminated against owing to her age in relation to her conditions of employment and their decision to terminate her employment.  She cited that younger people with other health conditions were accommodated by the respondent.  The respondent met this element of the claim by confirming that while she might have been the oldest employee, that does not infer that she was discriminated against.  The two employees who were working part-time had been working part-time since 2008 and 2011, a time when part-time working was available; neither age, family or health reasons came into the company’s decision to grant this.  At the hearing and in submissions, the complainant did not press, to any significant degree, the assertion of discrimination on grounds of age.   Accordingly, I find that the complainant has not pointed to primary facts of such substance to raise a prima facie case of discrimination. The claim on the age ground in relation to conditions of employment and dismissal fails.　

5.6  Discrimination – Disability　

Section 2 of the Acts states:　

''disability'' means -- (a) the total or partial absence of a person's bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person's body,(b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness,(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person's body,(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction, or(e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person's thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour, and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person." 　

5.7The fact that the complainant had a disability, namely osteoarthritis, was not in dispute. 

Based on the totality of the evidence presented, therefore, I am satisfied that the complainant is a person with a disability within the meaning of section 2 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2015. 　

5.8 Having established that the complainant had a disability, Section 85A of the Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. When investigating a complaint, my role includes undertaking an examination of any conflicts of fact in the evidence presented by the Parties to arrive at reasoned findings of fact within the meaning of the Act.　

5.9 With regards to the provision of reasonable accommodation, section 16(1) of the Acts provides:　

(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring any person to recruit or promote an individual to a position, to retain an individual in a position, or to provide training or experience to an individual in relation to a position, if the individual—　

(a) will not undertake (or, as the case may be, continue to undertake) the duties attached to that position or will not accept (or, as the case may be, continue to accept) the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be, performed, or　

(b) is not (or, as the case may be, is no longer) fully competent and available to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, the duties attached to that position, having regard to the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be, performed.　

Section 16(1) must be read in conjunction with Section 16(3) where a person with a disability is regarded as fully competent and fully capable of undertaking duties if ‘reasonable accommodation’ is the only difference between s(he) being able to do the job and not being able to do the job:  Section 16(3) of the Act provides: -　

(a) For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability is fully competent to undertake and fully capable of undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully competent and capable on reasonable accommodation (in this subsection referred to as “appropriate measures”) being provided by the person's employer.　

(b) The employer shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person who has a disability—　·

(i) to have access to employment,　

(ii) to participate or advance in employment, or　

(iii) to undergo training,　

unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.　

(c) In determining whether the measures would impose such a burden account shall be taken, in particular, of—·

(i) the financial and other costs entailed,　

(ii) the scale and financial resources of the employer's business, and　

(iii) the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance.　

5.10 The application of this Section was extensively considered by the Court in Humphrey’s v Westwood Fitness Club [2004] ELR 296.  That decision was subsequently appealed and was upheld in a decision handed down by Judge Dunne (as she then was) on 13^th February 2004.  In its decision this Court held that while the respondent can claim a defence of discrimination on the grounds of disability if they believed the claimant not fully capable to perform their duties, however:　

“…before coming to that view the employer would normally be required to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee's capacity.  The nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer should ensure that he or she is in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee's condition.  In practical terms this will normally require a two-stage enquiry, which looks firstly at the factual position concerning the employee's capability including the degree of impairment arising from the disability and its likely duration. This would involve looking at the medical evidence available to the employer either from the employee's doctors or obtained independently.　

5.11Secondly, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable, S.16(3) of the Act requires the employer to consider what if any special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable. The section requires that the cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. Here, what constitutes nominal cost will depend on the size of the organisation and its financial resources.  Finally, such an enquiry could only be regarded as adequate if the employee concerned is allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level and is allowed to present relevant medical evidence and submissions.”　

5.12 The respondent details that the complainant was not deemed fit for work and unlikely to be so in the future, such that the provision of reasonable accommodation could not apply.  While the correspondence from the complainant’s GP in Oct 2013 expresses the desire of her patient i.e. the complainant (and is not, as such, a medical opinion of the GP), the letter from GP dated 25^th September 2014 (following the company’s doctor report that she was unfit for work), is clearly the doctor’s medical opinion: “I am of the opinion that she is very capable of working part-time”.  The respondent did not acknowledge this and made no reference to it, thereafter, but instead referred the complainant back to the Company Doctor in December 2014 and again in May 2015.  It is extraordinary that there was no mention of the GPs letter, nor any referral to any independent medical physician, if they felt it was in conflict with their own doctor’s medical opinion. Neither the complainant’s GP nor the company doctor claimed to be occupational physicians but I find it very unusual that the respondent failed to consider the evidence from the “employee's doctors or obtained (evidence) independently”.  I also have a difficulty accepting the position put forward by the respondent that because the GP did not enter the wording on the sick certs that the complainant was also fit for part-time work, she was therefore ‘completely unfit’.  If there was any question over the letter from the GP dated 25^th September, the respondent should have sought clarification on same.  Indeed I am struck by the evidence of the Company Doctor who detailed that he was requested only to assess the complainant’s suitability for full-time work and not for anything less.  　

5.13 It was repeatedly stated by the respondent that the complainant had failed to apply for part-time working when part-time working was available, and they no longer had part-time working available.  However, while a desire by an employee to work part-time is not as such a statutory right, the courts have clearly outlined the statutory duty on an employer to make reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee as follows (A Worker (complainant) v An Employer (appellant/respondent/ [2005] 16 ELR 159)::　

“The provision of special treatment or facilities is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end…This can involve affording the person with a disability more favourable treatment than would be accorded to an employee without a disability. Thus it may be necessary to consider such matters as adjusting the person's attendance hours or to allow them to work partially from home. The duty to provide special treatment may also involve relieving a disabled employee of the requirement to undertake certain tasks which others doing similar work are expected to perform. The scope of the duty is determined by what is reasonable, which includes consideration of the costs involved. This is an objective test which must have regard to all the circumstances of the particular case (see British Gas Services Ltd v McCaull [2001] I.R.L.R. 60).　

5.14 The duty placed on an employer by s.16(3) includes, by implication, a requirement to make a proper and adequate assessment of the situation before decisions are taken which may be to the detriment of a disabled employee. In Marie Daly v Nano Nagle School[2015] IEHC 785, the High Court recently affirmed Section 16 of the Act in its interpretation of the scope of the obligation placed by Section 16 of the Act on an employer to consider what reasonable accommodation can be made for an employee with a disability within the meaning of the Act.　

5.15 The duty to provide reasonable accommodation must be ascribed a broad ambit. The ultimate test is that of reasonableness and proportionality. That involves putting a number of considerations into the balance including the practicability of what may be required, the costs involved, the disruption that may be caused to the service that the employer provides and the consequences for the disabled person of not providing the accommodation required, as held in HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Ring v Dansk Almennyttigt Boligselskab; HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S(C-337/11). If, however, the employer fails to properly understand the scope of its duty or fails to adequately consider all of the options that may be available, they will have failed in their statutory duty toward the disabled person.　

5.16 In this instant case I find no evidence of the respondent having looked to provide reasonable accommodation. It would appear that the respondent has failed to properly understand the scope of its duty and failed to consider all of the options that might have been available such as affording theperson with a disability more favourable treatment than would be accorded to an employee without a disability. I find that the Respondent failed to discharge its obligation under Section 16 of the Act, as it failed to fully consider whether or not reasonable accommodation could be made for the Complainant’s disability. It would appear that the Respondent simply did not consider the possible options that may have been available. It also cannot be ignored that perhaps had it done so the Respondent might legitimately have concluded that the Complainant could not be accommodated.　

5.17 Therefore, having assessed the written and oral evidence and submissions before me, I find that the Complainant has made out a prima facie case that the Respondent did discriminate against the complainant on grounds of disability, in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2015 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in relation to her conditions of employment as she remained out of sick leave and in relation to the provision of reasonable accommodation within the meaning of section 16 of the Acts and the Respondent has failed to rebut same. She requested a modification of her working conditions namely with regards reduced hours as per her medical doctors report and while the company’s doctor advised otherwise, his evidence was that he was only asked to explore her ability to work fulltime.  Such exclusion by the respondent amounts to discriminatory acts on the grounds of the complainant’s disability.　

5.18Discrimination – Disability: Dismissal 　

Next I will look at whether the complainant was dismissed on the grounds of her disability.  Employment Equality Legislation prohibits dismissal on any of the protected grounds and dismissal is described in Section 2 of the Act. The Labour Court case of A Worker (MrO, No 2) V An Employer,[2005] ELR 132 outlines the circumstances of a Discriminatory Dismissal on disability grounds.　

5.19 The complainant was not available to attend a meeting regarding the company doctor’s report as she was attending a nephew’s funeral in the UK.  While the respondent’s frustration is understandable that the complainant was not advising when she would be back in the country for a meeting, there appears to bea notable shift in the tone of the respondent’s correspondence dated, 16th September 2014, where they advise that if she does not attend a meeting they “will have to draw (their) own conclusion from the medical evidence of the report”.  Further on this letter references “you are contracted to work a ‘39’ hour week per your contract”.  This reference to her contractual requirement to work a ‘39’ hour week is repeated in numerous correspondence, and to such an extent that might suggest an outcome of – either ‘work full-time or not at all’.　

5.20 When the complainant’s GP submits a report dated 25^th September 2014 detailing that the complainant was fit to work part-time, the respondent refers her to the company doctor again in December and in May 2015.  When the complainant states that she will not attend the next meeting with the company doctor until her request for part-time working because of her disability is discussed, and with her representative also involved; the respondent’s response is that they would strongly advise her “not refuse her appointment”.  I find it extraordinary that there was no suggestion of inviting the complainant into a meeting to discuss her concerns, nor do they advise what the consequences might be should she fail to attend i.e. that they will terminate her employment.  The complainant does not attend the medical appointment on 22^nd May 2017 and on 27^th May she is advised that her employment is terminated owing to being “unfit for work for the foreseeable future”. Based on the totality of the evidence, the respondent is terminating her employing owing to inter alia her disability.  While it should be noted that I am surprised that the complainant did not avail of the right of appeal prior to involving external agents in her case, however, Section 8 of the act sets out the clear obligations of the employer in that:　

(4) A person who is an employer shall not, in relation to employees or employment—　

( a) have rules or instructions which would result in discrimination against an employee or class of employees in relation to any of the matters specified in paragraphs (b) to (e) of subsection (1), or　

( b) otherwise apply or operate a practice which results or would be likely to result in any such discrimination.　

5.21 I find that the respondent operated a practice of exclusion from employment when the company acted on and interpreted the company doctor report as a legitimate basis to terminate her employment and while there was no obligation on the employer to provide a reduction in hours to the complainant; there was no serious consideration of her as an individual employee of long standing in terms of the examination of appropriate measures or potential alternatives to assist her return to work .  As stated previously, to use one medical report commissioned by the respondent and ignore another from the complainant’s GP, did not meet the proportionality test clearly set out in Section 16 of the Act.  It goes to the core of the case that a higher weighting was placed by the respondent on the company doctor report over the GP report and there were insufficient attempts made to work at whether the complainant could return to work and if so, in what capacity.  The respondent recommended that she attend the company doctor but did not advise what it would mean if she did not.  No discussions took place and a decision was made to terminate the complainant’s employment, which I have determined, based on all the evidence, was on the basis of her disability.　

6 Findings and Conclusions　

6.1 I have completed my investigation of this complaint and in accordance with section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2015 I issue the following decision :　

6.2 I find that pursuant to Section 79(6) of the Act, the Respondent did not discriminate against the complainant on the grounds on age in relation to conditions of employment and dismissal.　

6.3 I find that pursuant to Section 6(2)(g) and Section 8(4) and Section 16 the respondent did discriminate against the Complainant on grounds of disability in relation to conditions of employment, reasonable accommodation and the dismissal of the employee.  　

6.4 In accordance with section 82 of the Act, I order that the respondent pay the complainant €18,000 in compensation.  This is redress for the infringement of the complainant’s statutory rights and, therefore, not subject to income tax as per Section 192A of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 (as amended).　

6.5 I order the respondent to immediately raise the awareness of reasonable accommodation amongst the Management and staff at the respondent business within 6 weeks from the date of this decision.