Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Sales Assistant

A Shop

Representatives

SIPTU

 Solicitors

Act

Complaint Reference Nos.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00011930-001

16/06/2017

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00011930-002

16/06/2017

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00011930-003

16/06/2017

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00011930-004

16/06/2017

The complainant said she made a genuine mistake on the sale of a bottle of alcoholic beer to a customer on Good Friday where she was subsequently unfairly summarily dismissed, without recourse to any fair procedures.

The respondent claims that this incident was one of many issues that it had with this employee. The complainant’s mistake could have had serious consequences for the business and following a fair hearing the complainant was dismissed for gross misconduct.

The following is a brief summary of the respondent’s evidence.

The respondent is the owners of a general store and has been in operation since May 2015. The respondent said that it had invested heavily in the business and acquired an off licence in the summer of 2016. It claims that it had eight employees working with it at the time.

The respondent said that the complainant was employed as a Sales Assistant since 5 November 2015 until her employment was terminated due to gross misconduct in 28 April 2017. The respondent said that the complainant worked approximately 21-22 hours per week and received all the necessary training for the position.

The respondent said that it had a number of issues with the complainant’s work during her time working there. It claims that she received a verbal warning on 14 February 2017 for not locking up the back door of the shop correctly and for leaving a large sum of money downstairs at the cash registers instead of locking it carefully away as was the procedure.

The respondent presented evidence of the training that was provided to staff for dealing with Alcohol and Tobacco sales. It states that the complainant was given that training and completed a questionnaire as proof of learning, which was signed by the complainant. The respondent said that it could have been in substantial trouble for the sale of alcohol on a prohibited day, including a possible temporary closure of the premises.

The respondent said that Good Friday fell on 14 April 2017 and the complainant was scheduled to work in the afternoon. The store had been cordoned off and signs had been erected to ensure that customers and staff were aware that alcoholic products were not for sale on the day. It transpired that the following day the manager, Ms. A, had noticed that a sale was made for an alcoholic beverage and having reviewed the CCTV was able to determine that the complainant was the sales assistant responsible for that sale. Ms. A reported the incident to one of the respondent’s Directors and after discussing the options she prepared the notice letter dated 21 April 2017 and gave it to the complainant on the shop floor that evening.

Ms. A held a meeting on 24 April 2017, with the complainant and her brother in attendance. Ms. A introduced herself and explained the purpose of the meeting, she said that she had a conversation with the two Directors before the meeting and it was agreed that if there was no good reason or valid excuse for the sale of the bottle of beer, that as this was a serious offence, the complainant’s contract would be terminated. The respondent said that the complainant maintained that she made a genuine mistake and accepted that she was the person who had sold the bottle of beer to the customer on the day in question.

The respondent said that the complainant had asked for a further meeting with the directors of the company and Ms. A said she would ask them but did not think it was going to happen. The respondent points to its employee handbook where it claims that it is entitled to summarily dismiss an employee for behaviour deemed as gross misconduct. The respondent highlighted a number of other issues of the complainant’s poor performance that Ms. A had recorded in relation to the complainant during her time working at the respondents. The respondent said that if the complainant was unhappy with its decision to dismiss her she could have appealed the decision but she chose not to.

The respondent also informed me of the situation after this meeting where An Garda Síochána were involved in getting the respondent’s keys back from the complainant.

The complainant said that she commenced employment on 5 November 2015 as a Sales Assistant working 24 hours per week. Her basic pay was on average €227 per week at approximately €9.25 per hour. Her employment was terminated on 24 April 2017.

The complainant said that on 21 April 2017 she was handed a letter by her manager, Ms. A, at the start of her shift at 3pm, when she asked what the letter was about, her manager told her to “read it and you will find out” as she walked out the door of the shop at the end of her shift. The complainant said she opened the letter to read that she was invited to a meeting on 24 April 2017 to discuss “some issues that have come to light recently which may result in disciplinary sanction in particular a matter of gross misconduct on Friday 14 April 2017”. The meeting was to be conducted by Ms. A and one of the directors of the business Ms. B. The complainant said that she continued to work the rest of that day and the following two days without any more information about the allegation. She said she had no idea what it was about.

On Monday 24 April 2017, the complainant was accompanied to the meeting by her brother. Ms. A chaired the meeting and explained that Ms. B was unable to attend. The complainant said that Ms. A outlined that the complainant had sold a bottle of alcoholic beer to a customer on Good Friday although the alcohol area had been cordoned off and there were signs erected to warn against the sale of alcohol on that day. The complainant said that she had no recollection of making such a sale, and asked Ms. A if she was sure that the complainant was responsible, to which Ms. A informed her that she had checked the CCTV and she was sure it was the complainant. The complainant said that if it was her it was a genuine mistake. She said that Ms. A told her that a mistake was not a valid excuse and she had no choice but to dismiss her on the spot.

The complainant said she asked how the customer got access to the bottle of beer and Ms. A told her that the CCTV showed that the customer had reached in over the red tape in the cordoned off section and took the bottle.

The complainant asked why the cash registers were not set up to prevent the sale of alcohol, like all the other times when the store was not permitted to sell alcohol, i.e. early in the morning and Ms. A said it was not possible to do it for Good Friday. The complainant said she asked Ms. A was it fair that she was being dismissed because she made a single mistake on “one sale item of the possible 1,000 or so sale transactions” that she processed on a 7-hour shift that day. The complainant requested to have another meeting with Ms. A and one of the Directors. Ms A said she would ask the Directors and come back to her with the meeting arrangements.

The complainant said that about one hour after the meeting Ms. A phoned her to say that she had discussed what was said at the meeting with the Directors and they said that the excuse was not good enough and that Ms. A confirmed that the dismissal was correct and proper and that the complainant would receive a letter in the post confirming same. The complainant said that she asked Ms. A if she could speak with the Directors, where Ms. A confirmed that they did not want to speak with her. She claims that Ms. A told her to bring in her work keys and uniform and hung up.

The complainant said that she waited for her letter of dismissal before she would bring back the uniform and keys. This caused some confusion and difficulty where the respondent involved An Garda Síochána, eventually the keys were returned and the complainant received her letter of termination of employment on 9 May 2017. The complainant said that this letter included a whole raft of new allegations that she had not seen or were ever raised with her before.

The complainant claims that there were no reasonable grounds for the dismissal. It was not fair that the respondent had not reminded staff not to sell alcohol on the day, that the effort to cordon off was obviously not sufficient to stop customers who wanted to access alcohol on the day to do so and the cash tills were not set up to prohibit the sale like it does on other times when alcohol is prohibited.

The complainant referred to the Labour Court decision in DHL Express (Ireland) Ltd v Coughlan [UDD1738] where it states that the established jurisprudence in relation to dismissal law takes a very restricted view of what constitutes gross misconduct and claims that has been evidenced in the EAT decision of Lennon v Bredin M160/1978 wherein the Tribunal states: ‘Section 8 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 saves an employer from liability for minimum notice where the dismissal is for misconduct. We have always held that this exemption applies only to cases of very bad behaviour of such a kind that no reasonable employer could be expected to tolerate the continuance of the relationship for a minute longer; we believe the legislature had in mind such things as violent assault or larceny or behaviour in the same sort of serious category. If the legislature had intended to exempt an employer from giving notice in such cases where the behaviour fell short of being able to fairly be called by the dirty word ‘misconduct’ we have always felt that they would have said so by adding such words (after the word misconduct) as negligence, slovenly workmanship, bad timekeeping, etc. They did not do so.’ [note the respondent’s emphasis]

The complainant said her situation does not fall into the category of case as referred to and underlined above and that the sanction of dismissal for selling a bottle of beer was totally disproportionate.

The complainant said that there were no procedures complied with, let alone fair and proper procedures that complied with the principle of natural justice, that none of the provisions set out in S.I. 146 of 2000 were complied with. The complainant said that the letter inviting the complainant to the meeting is lacking in the necessary specific details of the allegations against her and the possible outcomes were not provided. She said that there was no opportunity given to her right to representation. She was not given a copy of the disciplinary procedures; there was no full and through investigation to establish facts and determine if a disciplinary hearing was required. She claims that the meeting on 24 April was ‘a dismissal meeting’ and it breached all of the fundamentals principles of natural justice and fairness.

The complainant also states that she is entitled to a minimum notice of one week which she failed to get on dismissal.

CA-00011930-001 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

The Relevant Law

Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides:

“(1)   Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

…

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a) the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b) the conduct of the employee

(c) the redundancy of the employee, and

(d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

…

(6) In determining for the purposes of this Act, whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so—(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and (b) to the extent (if any) of   the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act.”

The material facts that there was a dismissal are not in dispute between the parties. The respondent contends that the complainant was dismissed on the grounds of gross misconduct. She was adjudged to have sold alcohol to a customer on Good Friday, that she did not have a good enough excuse for this and as it could have had substantial consequences for the respondent, it was deemed as an act of gross misconduct and her employment was terminated. The respondent maintains that it conducted a full and fair investigation, and following that, it felt that it had no choice but to dismiss the complainant. The complainant disputes that she knowingly sold a bottle of beer to a customer on the day in question. She argues that the investigation/disciplinary process was flawed and the decision was made in advance of the meeting on 24 April 2017. She claimed that the penalty of dismissal was totally disproportionate for her simple mistake.

The decision of whether a reasonable employer would have dismissed the employee in the same circumstances was explained by Noonan J. in the High Court case of Bank of Ireland –v- O’Reilly [2015] IEHC 241 where it was held that: “…the onus is on the employer to establish that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal and that it resulted wholly or mainly from one of the matters specified in s.6(4), which includes the conduct of the employee or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. Section 6(7) makes clear that the court may have regard to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct in relation to the dismissal. That is however not to say that the court or other relevant body may substitute its own judgment as to whether the dismissal was reasonable for that of the employer. The question rather is whether the decision to dismiss is within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer to the conduct concerned - see Royal Bank of Scotland v. Lindsay UKEAT/0506/09/DM.

I respectfully agree with the views expressed by Judge Linnane in Allied in Allied Irish Banks v. Purcell [2012] 23 ELR 189, where she commented (at p. 4):

“Reference is made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in British Leyland UK Ltd v. Swift [1981] IRLR 91 and the following statement of Lord Denning MR at page 93:

‘The correct test is: was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair. It must be remembered that in all these cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take a different view.”

It is clear that it is not for the EAT or this court to ask whether it would dismiss in the circumstances or substitute its view for the employers view but to ask was it reasonably open to the respondent to make the decision it made rather than necessarily the one the EAT or the court would have taken.”

I note the decision of the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Hennessy V Read & Write Shop Ltd UD192/1978   “In deciding whether or not the dismissal of the claimant was unfair we apply a test of reasonableness to: (i) the nature and extent of the enquiry carried out by the respondent prior to the decision to dismiss the claimant; and (ii) the conclusion arrived at by the respondent, that on the basis of the information resulting from such enquiry, the claimant should be dismissed.”

In O’Riordan v Great Southern Hotels, UD 1469/2003, I note the Tribunal set out the appropriate test for determining on claims relating to gross misconduct, stating “In cases of gross misconduct the function of the Tribunal is not to determine the innocence or guilt of the person accused of wrong doing. The test for the Tribunal in such cases is whether the respondent had a genuine belief based on reasonable grounds arising from a fair investigation that the employee was guilty of the alleged wrongdoing”.

Finally, in the EAT case David Mullane v Honeywell UD/1112008 it stated, “The Tribunal must decide whether the conclusion that the offending act had been perpetrated by the claimant was reasonable on the balance of probabilities and that dismissal was a proportionate response”.

I have also considered the limits of Section 6(7) (a) and (b) in this case on the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the Employer. It is not for me to assume the role of the decision maker in the disciplinary, that is performed by the respondent. It is for me to consider the facts under the overarching principle of reasonableness.

I understand that the sale of alcohol to a member of the public on Good Friday was a breach of the respondent’s licence and there could have been serious consequences for the respondent if reported and the respondent was prosecuted. It would appear from the evidence presented that the complainant has made a mistake and it is for the respondent to determine where this mistake constitutes an act of gross misconduct. I have to determine if the sale of one bottle of beer is of such a nature to constitute that it falls within the range of reasonable responses open to the respondent and that substantial grounds did exist to justify the complainant’s dismissal. The complainant said it was a simple mistake, whereas the respondent said that the mistake could have serious consequences on its business and others working there. The complainant claims that the respondent is responsible here, there was no staff notice as a reminder that it was Good Friday, the tills were not doctored to prevent sales and the efforts to cordon off was not sufficient. The respondent said everyone was trained in relation to dealing with alcohol sales. Customers and staff were on notice from the signs and physical barriers cordoning off the alcohol section that this was not a regular trading day. I am satisfied that the complainant should have been more vigilant. The sale of one bottle of beer appears minor in isolation however, the possibility of the consequences on the business, with the possible temporary closure should it have been reported and prosecuted are significant. Accordingly, I find that the actions of the respondent were within the range of reasonable responses open to it and that substantial grounds did exist to justify the complainant’s dismissal.

The next issue for me to consider is the proportionality of the sanction of summary dismissal for the act of gross misconduct. I note a leading authority in this regard is set out In DHL Express (Ireland) Ltd v Coughlan [UDD 1738], where the Labour Court held:

“The established jurisprudence in relation to dismissal law in this jurisdiction takes a very restricted view of what constitutes gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal. This is   evidenced, for example, by the determination of the Employment Appeals   Tribunal in Lennon v BredinM160/1978 (reproduced at page 315 of Madden and Kerr Unfair Dismissal Cases and Commentary (IBEC, 1996)) wherein the Tribunal states:

‘Section 8 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 saves an employer from liability for minimum notice where the dismissal is for misconduct. We have always held that this exemption applies only to cases of very bad behaviour of such a kind that no reasonable employer could be expected to tolerate the continuance of the relationship for a minute longer; we believe the legislature had in mind such things as violent assault or larceny or behaviour in the same sort of serious category. If the legislature had intended to exempt an employer from giving notice in such cases where the behaviour fell short of being able to fairly be called by the dirty word ‘misconduct’ we have always felt that they would have said so by adding such words (after the word misconduct) as negligence, slovenly workmanship, bad timekeeping, etc. They did not do so.’”

It is clear that the bad behaviour referred to above is of such a kind that no reasonable employer could or would be expected to reasonably tolerate the continuance of the employer/employee relationship for a minute longer. The situation described above is not in line with the situation in the case before me for consideration. The complainant was served with a letter to attend an investigatory/disciplinary meeting which was not scheduled for over two days into the future. In the meantime, the complainant continued to work in the store and perform her usual tasks. There is no indication that the employer was in such dire straits that it had to get rid of the complainant. It would appear that the respondent was happy for the complainant to perform her tasks until it was able to consider the matters at hand and determine the appropriate course of action. Therefore, I am satisfied that this is not the type of case that summary dismissal would be considered proportional for an act of gross misconduct.

The next issue which I must consider relates to the procedural fairness or otherwise of the complainant’s dismissal. The complainant contends that the procedures which were invoked by the respondent in terms of the manner in which the investigation and disciplinary procedures were conducted were flawed.

I note the respondent’s employee handbook which lays out the Disciplinary procedure in a clear manner. It sets out the purpose, scope and principles of the policy. I particularly note where it states that “At any disciplinary hearing employees will have the opportunity to hear the case against them, state their case and may be accompanied by a fellow employee.” I see that the types of disciplinary offences are listed (not an exhaustive list) and the disciplinary elements that can be expected throughout the process.

It is essential at this point that I do not lose sight of the commercial reality facing the respondent. The complainant’s actions could have put the respondent’s business in jeopardy. I accept that the respondent felt that it had to protect its business interest and it felt that it was making the correct decision. However, the respondent was also obliged to balance this right against the right of the employee and on her access to natural justice and fair procedures in the face of these serious allegations. It also had to take note of the serious consequence that a decision of summarily dismissal would have on her.

When assessing the procedural fairness of a dismissal it is important to note the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order, 2000 [S.I. No. 146/2000] which sets out the general principles that should apply in the operation of disciplinary procedures and the promotion of best practice in giving effect to these procedures. The Code states that the procedures applied must comply with the general principle of natural justice and fair procedures, which include that:

1.       the details of the allegations or complaints be put to the employee concerned;

2.       the employee concerned be given the opportunity to respond fully to any such allegations or complaints;

3.       the employee concerned is given the opportunity to avail of representation; and

4.       the employee concerned has the right to a fair and impartial determination of the issues being investigated, taking into account the allegations or complaints against him or her, the response of the employee concerned to them, any representations made by or on behalf of the employee concerned and any other relevant or appropriate evidence, factors or circumstances.

I also take note of the decision in Foley V Post Office (2000) CR1283 as stated by Mummery L.J. at p1295 “This case illustrates the dangers of encouraging an approach to unfair dismissal cases which leads an employment tribunal to substitute itself for the employer or to act as if it were conducting a rehearing of, or an oral appeal against, the merits of the employers’ decision to dismiss. The employer, not the Tribunal, is the proper person to conduct the investigation in the alleged misconduct. The function of the Tribunal is to decide whether that investigation is reasonable in the circumstances and whether the decision to dismiss, in light of the results of that investigation, is a reasonable response”.

The complainant did not dispute the facts of the case. Instead, she has argued around the lack of natural justice and a breach in terms of fair procedures in relation to how she was dealt with. In an effort to address the points one by one, I have separated them below,

·       The allegation was first brought to her attention by way of letter dated 21 April, 2017. A reference to “matter of gross mis-conduct on Friday 14th of April 2017” was set out but not expanded on. Also, the letter said that the “meeting is to discuss some issue/s that have come to light recently which may result in disciplinary sanction”. On the face of this letter it looks like a discussion is to be had with the possibility of disciplinary action further down the line. The severity of the actual situation and the ultimate sanction of a dismissal at this meeting have not been set out. I have found that the complainant was not appraised of exactly what she was meant to be accused of, nor has she been put on notice of the possible consequences facing her.

·       The complainant was not presented with copies of the company procedures in relation to Disciplinary procedure. There was no reference to any procedures in this regard.

·       The respondent then went on to hold an investigation. However, the complainant did not have sight of all the evidence - the CCTV evidence - which was the evidence that the respondent relied on to make its decision to dismiss her.

·       The complainant could not have been prepared for a meeting which served as the investigatory meeting, the disciplinary meeting and the meeting to deliver a summary dismissal. The whole process constituted a major omission which goes to the heart of unreasonableness. The respondent has a duty of care to the complainant and appears to have abdicated itself from that duty and went straight to a summary dismissal.

It is well recognised that the activation of a Disciplinary procedure is meant to be corrective rather than punitive and I note that the complainant had one formal warning on her record at the time of the incident. I have heard evidence from both sides and I am satisfied that once the complainant was deemed to have “no proper excuse” for the sale of the bottle of beer she was going to be dismissed, no other alternative was up for debate.

I note that Ms. A carried out the necessary actions on behalf of the respondent. However, it is clear that the decision makers were the two directors and although the complainant had asked to discuss her situation with them, they refused. The furore with the keys followed and this had a definite souring of relations from this point onward.

The complainant and respondent both gave evidence that the complainant was orally and summarily dismissed on the day of the meeting 21 April 2017. The letter, confirming the dismissal is dated 28 April 2017 and it is the evidence from the complainant that it was not actually received until 9 May 2017, sets out the reason(s) for dismissal. The meeting of 21 April 2017 addressed one issue of misconduct – the sale of alcohol on Good Friday. The letter of termination reads “this decision [of dismissal] was reached in consideration of a history of unresolved poor conduct despite proper disciplinary process culminating in an act of gross misconduct in the sale of alcohol on a Good Friday….”. The letter lists a serious of eight other different instances dating back to 5 November 2016, where the action taken against the complainant in seven of those occurrences was that the “manager spoke with employee ….” and it referenced the formal verbal warning dated 14 February 2017.

There appears to be confusion from the respondent’s side as to the precise reason why this list is contained in the letter for the dismissal. It was given as evidence that the main reason for the dismissal was the sale of alcohol on 14 April 2017, but then why are all the other instances forming part of the reasons for dismissal, that has not been adequately addressed. I am satisfied that not all the instances listed in the letter have been put to the complainant to address previously. I am satisfied that only the issue that led to a verbal warning was raised formally with her and she was given an opportunity to address. The list of all the instances paints a fairly impressive negative picture of the complainant’s working relationship with her employer, which I imagine gives the respondent comfort that its ultimate dismissal decision is correct. I am satisfied that all the other instances were not raised in the meeting of the 21 April 2017 and I doubt that they were ever raised formally with her at all. I deem that for these instances to be presented now as the preamble to the main reason for a summary dismissal lacks fairness.

I am satisfied that the respondent needed to examine and fully consider the complainant’s side of the story before deciding what it was going to do and that did not happen. It appears to me from the evidence adduced that the meeting of 21 April 2017 was established with only one purpose and that was to summarily dismiss the complainant. For the reasons outlined above, the respondent’s dismissal of the complainant was procedurally unfair.

The respondent points to the fact that the complainant failed to appeal the dismissal. I note that but it is clear that she sought an opportunity to speak with the Directors to plead her case but was refused access to that. I am satisfied that she had to wait two and half weeks for formal written confirmation of her dismissal. An Garda Síochána had been called by the respondent to get the keys and the relationship and trust between the complainant and the respondent had hit rock bottom. The damage had been done.

In respect of mitigation, the complainant submitted some documentary evidence of seeking other various roles for employment. She said she found alternative employment in December 2017.

I note the decision of the Employment Appeals Tribunal in the case Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd (UD858/1999) where it stated, “a claimant who finds himself out of work should employ a reasonable amount of time each weekday in seeking work. It is not enough to inform agencies that you are available for work nor merely to post an application to various companies seeking work. The time that a claimant finds on his hands is not his own, unless he chooses it to be, but rather to be profitably employed in seeking to mitigate his loss”. It is clear that there is a legal duty to mitigate financial loss by taking diligent steps to secure comparable alternative employment. I also note the decision in Burke v. Superior Express limited UD 1227/2014 where the EAT held that the standard required is a high one. Therefore, I must find that the complainant has made reasonable attempts but has not fully endeavoured to mitigate her loss.

The complainant was paid on average approximately €227 per week. On the basis of my findings above I declare the complaint is well founded. I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €7,000 (seven thousand euro) which is roughly equivalent to 31 weeks’ pay, which I determine to be just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. This award of compensation takes into account the complainant’s failure to fully mitigate his loss.

CA-00011930-002 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

In respect of the complaint made pursuant to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, I find that the complaint is well-founded. I find that the respondent has not demonstrated that the complainant is not entitled to statutory notice. The complainant was employed by the respondent for less than 2 years, and it follows that she is entitled to the statutory notice period of one week. Taking her weekly wage was on average at €227, I find that the appropriate redress is €227 (two hundred and twenty-seven euro).

CA-00011930-003 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

This case was withdrawn.

CA-00011930-004 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

This case was withdrawn.

CA-00011930-001 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.

I order the respondent to pay the complainant €7,000 (seven thousand euro) in compensation in respect of the financial loss associated with his dismissal.

CA-00011930-002 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 11 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 11 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under that Act.

I find that the complaint made pursuant to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act is well-founded and the respondent shall pay to the complainant redress of €227 (two hundred and twenty-seven euro)

Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015 - Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 – unfair procedures - compensation