Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A General Manager

A Rental Company

Representatives

Lars Asmussen B.L., instructed by Sean Ormonde & Co. Solicitors

Peninsula Group Limited

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00017160-001

30/01/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00017160-002

30/01/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00018313-001

05/04/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00018313-002

05/04/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00018313-003

05/04/2018

The Complainant claims that she commenced employment with the Respondent as an Office and Accounts Manager on 25 March 1995, she worked in a number of different roles in the Respondent, including up to the position of senior manager.

She claims that she was treated unfairly and less favourably on the gender, family status and disability grounds following her return to work from maternity leave in September 2017. She claims that she was effectively demoted from her role and that tasks and responsibilities were removed from her. She claims harassment and victimisation and constructive discriminatory dismissal.

CA-00017160-001 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant claims that she started with the Respondent in 1990 and got a contract of employment in March 1995 for her role as Office/Accounts Manager. She said that her role has changed substantially since, and she was promoted to General Manager in 2016, where she was delegated the various tasks and responsibilities for that role. She claims that she was never notified of the changes to her terms and conditions in writing.

CA-00017160-002 and CA-00017160-003 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

The Complainant commenced her employment on 25 March 1995 as an Office and Accounts Manager and was furnished with a contract of employment. She was subsequently promoted to the position of General Manger and received a gross salary of €70,000 and the use of a work car and work mobile phone. The Complainant claims that she performed very well and was never the subject of any disciplinary or performance related complaints. She oversaw significant growth and success in the Respondent’s commercial performance at that time.

The Complainant attended a meeting with Mr. A, Managing Director and owner of the Respondent, in and around June 2016 and informed him that she was pregnant, although it was her fourth pregnancy she was aware that there was no formal maternity leave procedure in place, her due date was 2 January 2017 and she decided to take a period of two weeks leave prior to her due date. In December 2016 she informed the then Financial Controller that she would be taking her full entitlement to statutory maternity leave both paid and unpaid. The Complainant gave birth on 28 December 2016. The Complainant said she maintained regular contact and sought regular updates regarding business matters, including meeting Mr. A on ongoing projects. The Complainant said that she told the Financial Controller that she would be back full time on 4 September 2017, when her other children returned to school. The Financial Controller left the Respondent on 26 May 2017 and on hearing that, the Complainant contacted Mr. A and asked if he needed any help to which she felt that Mr. A’s tone and behaviour was rather dismissive and belittling of her.

On 22 May she received a text message from Mr. A enquiring as to when she was returning to work, which read, “return to work 1 August as due” which she felt was to antagonise and intimidate her as she was in no doubt that Mr. A was aware of her plans. She said that she was unable to respond to the text as she was so anxious and distressed but later replied that she had health issues and would not be returning until 4 September 2017. She got no reply. The Complainant claims that this demonstrates that she was subjected to a discriminatory and harassing type of treatment. The relationship between her and Mr. A was deteriorating from there on. She claims that she visited her GP, who was very concerned for her. Around that time the Complainant was diagnosed with an autoimmune disease, where her system would break down and she would come out in a rash. She said that she mentioned that she was dealing with a health issue to Mr. A in a text.

In and around late July/early August 2017 the Complainant contacted Mr. A and offered to work one day if needed where she was told that Ms. B had been recruited and there was no need, he said “we are grand, we are fine”. Again, she felt the tone and demeanour of Mr. A to be dismissive and emotionless and felt that the recruitment of Ms. B was to threaten her that she was now subsequent to requirements, she felt she was going to be side-lined by the recruitment of Ms. B.

In July 2017, the Complainant said that she got a call from Ms. C, from HR, and Mr. A’s daughter in relation to annual leave pay and she said that there were “big changes” and the Complainant should return to work before she could avail of annual leave pay. The Complainant challenged that position as she felt it was incorrect. Ms. C remained steadfast and told her to contact Mr. A, she said she tried but her calls failed to connect. The Complainant said she felt isolated and mistrusted.

The Complainant returned to work on Monday 4 September 2017, where she was asked to meet with Mr. A, who informed her that “there was big changes around here” and Ms. B will have a role to “oversee everyone’s work”. The Complainant was shocked that on her first day back to work she was ambushed and effectively told that her role would be diminishing, and she would be de facto demoted, which she claims amounts to discriminatory treatment.

She said that an issue was raised with her about a job that had occurred, prior to her leaving on maternity leave, where the Respondent incurred a cost, that it claims it should not have incurred. She said she was not responsible for the cost incurred.

She claims that on the Tuesday she was carrying out a task where Mr. A loudly passed a comment that a “f… waste of time” and “finish the f… month ends”, where she felt embarrassed and upset and believed that this was motivated by her maternity leave and constitutes discrimination and harassment. She said that she sought progress on the months ends task and started on another task. Again Mr. A challenged her choice of task in an angry and dismissive tone which she said was utter contempt towards her.

The Complainant was advised on Tuesday 5 September that the NCT certificate on her work car was due for renewal and that the appointment was set for early morning on Saturday 9 September. The Complainant said that this was highly unusual to have arranged the appointment for such a date and time and would significantly discommode her due to family commitments.

On Wednesday 6 September the Complainant said Mr. A was again rude and aggressive over a task that he assigned to her and where a client was given wrong information from Mr. A, where he said, “I’ll f... sort it out myself” and hung up the phone abruptly on her. The Complainant said that she felt that she was walking on egg shells. She said later that day Mr. A told her in front of everyone to get back to her own desk, this made her feel intimidated, demeaned, devalued, embarrassed and upset.

On Thursday 7 September, a meeting was held with a client over the possibility of new business, however, Mr. A did not invite the Complainant to the meeting and she would have normally attended such types of meeting in the past. She said that she felt isolated and demeaned. She also claims that she had another interaction with Mr. A where he used aggressive language towards her.

On Friday 8 September the Complainant claims that she raised a query about specific details about a process in relation to a tender document on a computer that Mr. A was completing and where he said, “I’ll f... do it myself” and when she asked was she not to do it, he said “I don’t care what you do; Do whatever you like.” The Complainant said that she felt that she was not wanted and not welcome back in the workplace.

The Complainant maintains that the shocking treatment she was subjected to on her return to work was motivated by the fact that she availed of her statutory right to additional maternity leave and was de facto demoted and forced out of her job. She claims that this amounts to discrimination and harassment.

On 12 September 2017 the Complainant commenced a period of medically certified unpaid sick leave due to work related stress. She said that the Respondent failed to engage with her during this time to determine the cause of this stress or to help alleviate it. The Complainant said that she remained on sick leave until her resignation. On 29 September 2017 the Complainant wrote to the Respondent advising that the company car needed to be taxed. She got no reply.

On 31 October 2017 the Complainant wrote to Mr. A setting out a number of grievances regarding the manner in which she was treated since her return to work from maternity leave. Namely, that she felt that he had taken issue with her maternity arrangements, which were previously agreed; Mr. A’s tone and attitude on her return; suggesting that she had not kept an interest in the business while she was out on maternity leave; she makes reference that while she was away Mr. A said that it transpired that she was not doing her job properly; she said that she had not returned to the same job, demoted and replaced by a new general manger which was humiliating. She said that she was constantly criticised. She said that she wanted those matters addressed and resolved before she could return to work.

On 15 November 2017 Ms. B wrote to the Complainant outlining the arrangements for a grievance hearing on 20 November, a copy of the LRC Code of Practice for Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure was attached. The Complainant said that she was shocked that Ms. B would chair the meeting as she is the person who had effectively replaced her. The Complainant wrote back on the 16 November to Ms. B and outlined her concerns that she was investigating the grievance. She also raised a concern about how her correspondence was shared with others within the organisation. However, she confirmed that she would attend unrepresented. The Complainant said the meeting was held in a public bar and not in a private room which was upsetting and distressing. The Complainant set out all her grievances in particular citing the various issues she had with Mr. A. The following day she wrote to Ms. B requesting the minutes of the meeting, to which she received a typed version and not the handwritten notes. She again raised concerns about the integrity of process. She finally received the handwritten notes but raised issues with the grievance process and said that she was unhappy.

Around the same time the Complainant was advised by the Respondent that her car required a “health check” and arrangements were put in place to collect it and a replacement car was provided which was a far lesser model and she felt that this was to penalise her for making her complaint and was akin to victimisation.

The Complainant said that she received the outcome of the investigation by way of email from Ms. B on 15 December 2017 which stated that “after full investigation there is insufficient evidence to support your allegation. In this regard the allegation has not been substantiated”. The Complainant said that her initial fear had come to pass that as she expected Ms. B’s investigation failed to meet the fundamental standards of the LRC Code of Practice for Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure. There was a lack of transparency or clarity. The Complainant felt that the decision and procedure adopted were flawed and this was an attempt to “whitewash” the fact that she was discriminated against. All of which dented her trust and confidence in the Respondent and its processes. By email dated the 20 December the Complainant wrote to Ms. B and outlined her disappointment with the decision and events. She also restated her concerns that Ms. B was the person entrusted in carrying out the investigation. Ms. B wrote back on the 21 December outlining her methodology, included the minutes of her meeting with Mr. A and invited an appeal to an independent person.

The Complainant claims that on reviewing the notes on Ms. B’s meeting with Mr. A she was shocked to see a significant number of defects in the process adopted by Ms. B towards Mr. A including a different note taker, someone from within the Respondent, that the interview was “sanitised and generalised” and no depth in the questioning or in Mr. A’s replies. The Complainant said that by email dated 22 December 2017 she put that to Ms. B. She also asked why allegation in relation to his text messages to her were not put to him. Ms. B replied and mentioned that she was in the process of looking to appoint a third party to hear the appeal. The Complainant said that she engaged the services of a solicitor who wrote to the Respondent on 9 January 2018 outlining her issues with the Respondent and then followed an exchange of emails between the parties. The parties were attempting to get their own resolution when the Complainant noted that her work phone had been cut off, which she believes to be an act of victimisation for lodging her complaints both internally and with the Workplace Relations Commission on 30 January 2018.

The Complainant claims that her Solicitor sought details about the appeal, when her company car would be returned to her and when her phone would be reconnected. She said the Respondent in reply suggested that her request for her car and phone were unreasonable and she was building a constructive dismissal case. She said that all of this was having a damaging effect on her remaining trust and confidence in the Respondent. She said that by letter dated 16 February 2018 she resigned from her role with immediate effect. The Complainant said that by letter dated 19 February and again on the 26 February, Mr. A wrote to the Complainant’s Solicitor seeking to persuade her to change her mind and to return to work. She said that it was too late at that stage.

Legal arguments

Comparators

The Complainant said that she was directly discriminated on the gender and family ground essentially as a result of her pregnancy and maternity leave and a comparator is not required accordingly. In relation to the disability ground, she claims that any of her work colleagues not with the same disability as her, would be appropriate comparator. In relation to victimisation, harassment, failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation and constructive discriminatorily dismissing her she is not required to identify a comparator.

Discrimination

The Complainant cites Scholarbus Case C -79/99 in relation to the criterion for direct discrimination and the need for her to establish a prima facie case as set out in Dublin Corporation v. Gibney’s EE5/1986 before the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent as outlined in Ntoko v Citibank [2004] ELR 116. The Complainant cites A Technology Company v A Worker EDA0714 on the need for the establishment of objective facts that infer discrimination.

Pregnancy Discrimination on the grounds of Gender and Family status

The Complainant cited the leading authorities in relation to pregnancy discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status, including from the ECJ in Dekker C177/88 [1990] EU ECJ R177/88 regarding pregnancy discrimination being regarded as direct discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Treatment Directive 2002/73/EC where no comparator is required. She claims that the Directive is prescriptive in relation to her return to work “A woman on maternity leave shall be entitled, after the end of her period of maternity leave, to return to her job or to an equivalent post on terms and conditions which are no less favourable to her …” and that this has been enshrined in the Maternity Protection Acts. The Complainant claims that any departure from this is deemed as direct discrimination and she cites Campbell v. Bank of Ireland DEC2013-046 and Byrne v. Minister for Defence 2017 IEHC 453 in support of her case to establish a prima facie case and the burden of proof mush shift to the Respondent to prove the contrary.

Disability

The Complainant argued that she suffered from work related stress which manifested in her suffering from Lichen Planus, a skin rash. The Complainant cited Mr O v. A Named Company DEC- E2003-052 from the Equality Tribunal that work-related stress could amount to a disability and in A Government Department v. A Worker EDA094 when that condition manifests in a minimal level of symptoms to be classed as a disability. It claims that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant’s disability at all times and cites the decision in An Employee (Mr O) v. An Employer (NO. 2) [2005] ELR 132 where the Labour Court found that the employee was not treated sympathetically on a return to work and upheld a claim to constructive dismissal even though the employee failed to invoke the grievance procedures. It claims that a prima facie case of discrimination on the grounds of disability arose accordingly.

Harassment

The Complainant claims that in accordance with Section 14A(7) of the Acts she is clear that the Respondent violated her dignity and created an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive environment in which to work. She notes that there was purpose and effect in Mr. A conduct towards her. She references Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi [2011] IRLR 897 and Odion v. Techniform (Waterford) Ltd DEC-E2007018 and A Worker v An Engineering Company DEC-E2008-38 in support of her claim and she claims that there was a sustained verbal harassment regarding her pregnancy and having availed of her maternity leave.

Victimisation

The Complainant claims that in accordance with Section 74 of the Acts she believes that she was victimised. She said that she raised an internal grievance regarding discriminatory treatment on her return to work after she returned from maternity leave. She said the Respondent failed to investigate this or address the internal complainant adequately or at all and victimised her by removing her company car and replacing it with a lesser model which was faulty and cutting her company phone.

Constructive Discriminatory dismissal

The Complainant cites An Employer v. A Worker (Mr O)(No. 2) [EED0410] in relation to the contract test and reasonable test in constructive dismissal are also relevant for constructive discriminatory dismissal. She claims that she was constructively discriminatory dismissed falling her return to work from her disability. She said that in the cited case the Labour Court found that a senior ranked member of the Respondent failed to treat the Complainant in a sympathetic manner and instead set out to make life difficult on her return, which she claims is similar to her situation here. She also referred to Fergal Reilly v. UPS CSTC Ireland Ltd DEC-E 2013 -77 and Allen v. Independent Newspapers [2002] ELR132. The Complainant said that she brought a number of matters to the attention of her employers and had reasonably lost faith in the manner in which they had been dealt with and she was left with little choice other than to resign her employment and this, she claims amounts to constructive discriminatory dismissal.

CA-00017160-001 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

No submission

CA-00017160-002 and CA-00017160-003 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

The Respondent’s written submission is as follows. As noted above the Respondent did not attend the second day of the hearing to present witnesses to corroborate these written statements.

The Respondent are a specialist equipment rental company in Ireland supplying local authorities and Irish Industry. The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on the 25 March 1995. On 30 January she lodged a complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 and the Employment Equality Acts.

On 9 March 2018 the Claimant’s contract of employment was terminated by way of resignation. On 4 April 2018, the Complainant lodged a further complaint under the Employment Equality Acts, the Payment of Wages Act and the Organisation of Working Time Act.

Factual Background

For the relevant period of this claim, the Complainant’s title was that of “General Manager”. She was the most senior member of staff of the Respondent. Within her role she presided over the significant growth within the business and at all times completed her duties to a high standard. During this time the managing director of the Respondent, Mr A, enjoyed a positive and collaborative working relationship with the Complainant.

In 2016, the Complainant and her sister (who also works for the Respondent) approached Mr A and informed him that they were pregnant. Mr A congratulated both parties and wished them the best. Following the same, the Complainant commenced her maternity leave in December 2016.It should be noted that this was the Complainant’s fourth period of maternity leave in the course of her employment.

Prior to commencing this leave, the Complainant did not communicate to management that she wished to take an extended maternity leave. On 13 February 2017, the Complainant contacted Mr A by text asking that they meet for lunch. In the course of this conversation the Complainant advised that she was experiencing issues with her company vehicle and the parties agreed that the same would be repaired.

On 5 May 2017, the financial controller for the Respondent resigned her employment and Mr A assumed the role of financial controller on an interim basis. The Respondent is one of a group of companies within a group of companies. In the course of 2018, Mr A found that he required further support in relation to these enterprises. In light of the same, he employed Ms B as the “Group General Manager” from the 2 October 2017.

It is noted that Ms B’s contract of employment states that she is employed by the “Respondent Group of companies” whereas the Complainant ’s contract is with the Respondent directly. It was anticipated that Ms B would focus her energies on the Group of companies and that she would have no involvement with the Respondent or the Complainant’s employment.

On 22 May Mr A was completing the summer rosters for staff members and sent the Complainant a text message asking when she would return. By response, the Complainant advised that she was back on 4 September. At this point Mr A was unaware that the Complainant had intended to take additional maternity leave and as such requested that the Complainant check her dates in this regard. By response the Complainant advised that the financial controller had contacted her in relation to the same and that the Complainant intended to take the remainder as unpaid leave. As set out above, the financial controller had left the company previous to this and had not informed Mr A of this conversation.

As the Complainant was a senior member of staff and given that the financial controller had recently left the company, Mr A enquired as to whether the Complainant needed to take this extra time. This was due a requirement to have her return as soon as possible but also because he was on good, friendly terms with the Complainant, who duly returned to work on Monday 4 September 2017. On the Complainant’s first day back to work she set about re-introducing herself in the working environment and they did not interact much on that date. The Respondent denies stating that Ms B was appointed “in order to oversee everyone’s work” on this date. The Respondent denies speaking with the Complainant in the manner ascribed to him in subsequent correspondence on this date or any other date.

During the Complainant’s maternity leave, an issue arose whereby a banking group continued to take payments in relation to a lease that had expired. On 11 September, after the Complainant had a period of time to re-introduce herself to the working environment, Mr A queried the position in relation to the lease set out above. It should be noted that the Complainant faced no disciplinary sanction or censure in relation to the same. At this point Mr A simply wished to enquire as to how this situation arose. The Respondent denies that this conversation represented excessive criticism of the Complainant on her return to work, including the statement that “this will not work out” in the course of this meeting. Indeed, the Complainant always fulfilled her duties professionally and responsibly and he wanted to retain her in employment for as long as possible as she had vast industry knowledge which he considered to be “irreplaceable”. In the course of this meeting Mr. A informed the Complainant of an allegation of adverse treatment by a colleague who was on long term sick leave, where the Complainant reacted angrily and construed the same as being a personal attack against her.

The weekly staff meeting was arranged for that afternoon and tasks normally assigned to the Complainant were completed by other persons. This was due to the fact that it was the Complainant’s first week back in employment and a natural transition period would occur prior to her taking back all of her previous duties. The Complainant interjected in this meeting pointing out that some of these errors were made during her maternity leave which she intended to address.

The following day, the Complainant emailed Mr A advising that she wished to attend her GP. No further information was provided on this text message. Thereafter the Complainant commenced a period of certified sick-leave.

On 31 October the Complainant sent an email to Mr A setting out an extensive grievance in relation to her alleged mistreatment since her return to work. Given that the Complainant was the most senior person within the Respondent, the complaint directly implicated Mr A and the employee with the HR function within the Respondent was Mr A’s daughter, Ms B was nominated to hear the Complainant’s grievance. It should be noted the Ms B had not commenced employment with the Group of companies at this point and had no personal knowledge of the Complainant or Mr A’s interactions. It should also be noted that Ms B was not personally implicated in the Complainant’s grievance, rather Mr B’s rationale in creating the role she was soon to occupy was being brought into question.

By correspondence dated 15 November, Ms B set out the Complainant’s concerns and suggested a meeting in the company offices, mediation was offered should the Complainant wish to engage with the same. By response, the Complainant raised some concerns in relation to the appointment of Ms B but advised that she was happy to continue with the process. In the course of this communication the Complainant requested that the matter be taken off-site. Following the same, Mr A was invited to an investigation meeting in relation to these issues on 21 November. On 15 December 2017, Ms B confirmed that the Complainant’s grievance was not upheld. Specifically, Ms B found that as matters between the parties essentially involved a conflict of direct evidence the same could not be substantiated. This correspondence also allowed for an appeal within five days, should the Complainant elect to engage with the same.

Five days later, on 20 December 2017, the Complainant advised that she was “disappointed” by the outcome of this investigation and stated that she “wished to take Christmas to consider [her] position”. By response, Ms B stated that notwithstanding the Claimant’s misgivings she was “keen to resolve your underlying concerns”. On 9 January 2018, the Complainant’s solicitor corresponded with the Respondent alleging certain procedural issues in relation to the process thus far and requesting that the matter be appealed.

Following the same, the parties engaged in the process of arranging a mediation conference in an effort to resolve the issues. These communications cumulated with a mediation conference being arranged for 7 February 2018. Unfortunately, this mediation conference failed to resolve the issues between the parties. Following the unsuccessful conclusion of the same, the Claimant’s solicitor corresponded alleging that the removal of the Complainant’s vehicle and the disconnection of her company phone constituted victimisation.

In relation to the company vehicle, this was scheduled for routine maintenance during the Complainant’s sick leave. During this period the Complainant was provided with a replacement vehicle. As with all replacement vehicles the Respondent could not ensure that the this would be of the same make and model as the Complainant’s. On 22 January, the Complainant’s solicitor advised that the replacement car was “giving her a bit of trouble” and requested that the Respondent enquire into this. On the same date, a member of the Respondent’s staff queried the exact issue with the vehicle and requested that it be delivered to the Respondent for repairs if necessary.

On 30 January the Complainant’ solicitor advised that the vehicle was located at the Complainant’s mother-in-law’s and requested that it be collected.

Shortly thereafter, it was established the Complainant’s vehicle had in fact been involved in an accident and it noted the vehicle was not roadworthy. On 31 January Ms B corresponded with the Complainant requesting details of the accident and queried as to why it was not reported at the relevant time. It should be noted that the Respondent’s insurers would not allow the Complainant to be transferred to another vehicle in circumstances whereby she was involved in an accident with her current vehicle without first receiving a driver’s completed incident report form. Details of the incident were finally reported to the Respondent by the Claimant’s solicitor’s correspondence of the 14 February 2018, two days prior to her resignation.

Six days later, on the 14 February 2018 the Claimant’s solicitor requested specifics of the appeal process by 16 February.

On 16 February, the Complainant’s solicitor advised that she intended to resign with immediate effect. The next working day, 19 February, the Respondent advised that they had engaged the services of an independent third party to chair the Complainant’s appeal. On the 23 February 2018, the Complainant’s solicitor again corresponded advising that the Complainant consulted with her practitioner who confirmed that it was “not in the best interests of her health that she return to work or engage further with you”.

On the 26th February, Mr A personally wrote to the Complainant’s solicitors advising that,

“…I have worked with [Complainant] for 22 years and have always had a good working relationship with. In that respect I sincerely wish to encourage [her] to return to work within the group Naturally in any working relationship there can be ebbs and flows in a busy working environment but after 22 years I have to believe that [her] grievances can be resolved and that we can continue our own direct working longstanding working relationship between [her] and the company, with mutual trust and confidence.”

On 7 March, the Complainant’s solicitor confirmed that the Complainant wished to resign her employment. On 8 March, Mr A again requested that the Complainant engage with the third-party appeal and seek to resolve their differences. Finally, on 15 March 2018, the Respondent accepted the Complainant’s resignation.

Legal Submission

It is well settled that Section 85(A) of the Employment Equality Acts, as amended, specifies that the burden of proof rests with the claimant at first instance:

“Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

The Labour Court clarified the burden of proof in “Mitchell -v- Southern Health Board [2001] 12 E.L.R. 201 and it is submitted that the Complainant has not satisfied the requirements of Section 85A in the present case. The Complainant has alleged that she was severely discriminated against on her return from maternity leave. On receipt of these allegations the Respondent undertook a lengthy process of investigating these complaints.

On foot of these investigations, it was found that the incidents did not occur “on the balance of probabilities”.

In this regard it is noted that the Complainant did not provide, or indicate, any evidence other than her own statement in support of these allegations. When asked to indicate any such evidence (in terms of witnesses, CCTV etc.), the Complainant simply stated that these are in the possession of the Respondent.

As set out above Mr A (being the primary person the complaints relate to) strongly denied the Complainant’s allegations. The Complainant was an integral part of the growth of the company and was considered to be all but irreplaceable during the relevant time. Her absence and ultimate resignation from the company caused enormous operational difficulties. It is noted that in seeking to resolve the dispute between the parties Mr A sought to investigate the matter internally, arranged mediation and arranged for a specialist third party to hear the appeal of the Complainant’s grievance. The Complainant resigned just prior to the third-party appeal.

It is submitted that if the Complainant wished to prove the factual basis to which her complaint relates, it is incumbent on her to fully exhaust the Respondent’s internal procedures for investigating such allegations. A great deal of the Complainant application to the Commission relates to an allegation that the person instructed to hear the grievance in the first instance was not an appropriate person to do so. In this regard, the Respondent will rely on the High Court decision of Mooney -v- An Post [1998] 9 ELR 238.

In the present instance, the Respondent arranged for an internal investigation followed by a proposed external appeal. In the circumstances it is submitted that the Respondent did all that could be reasonably required in relation to the investigation of the Complainant’s grievance.

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the Complainant cannot prove the factual background to her allegation of discrimination, and as a consequence, her application under the Employment Equality Acts should fail.

CA-00017160-001 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

I note the claim by the Complainant that she was the General Manager of the Respondent and therefore a senior member of the management team. I have seen the substantial list of tasks and responsibilities that she has set out in her submissions and although she may not have received the written terms and conditions, I note, with interest, that her role is a lead role, if not ‘the’ lead role in many of the Human Resources functions for the Respondent. I am somewhat surprised and would have expected that the Complainant, who holds such a role of importance and authority could and should have demanded or prepared the necessary document to reflect her new terms and conditions on her promotion, to essentially the pinnacle of the Respondent’s hierarchy, if it was significantly important to her.

I am satisfied that the contract of employment provided by the Respondent to the Complainant on 25 March 1995 can properly be regarded as forming a written statement of her terms of employment as required by Section 3 of the Act. As indicated by the Complainant she has subsequently been promoted to the role as General Manager and her salary has been increased to reflect that. She has provided me with a clear and succinct list of her duties and responsibilities, which leaves me in no doubt that she is fully aware of her position within the Respondent. I note the failure by the Respondent to comply with Section of the Acts on the changing of the role on her promotion, albeit, I am fully satisfied that she knew her new terms and conditions. However, I am of the view that in this case that is merely of a minor technical contravention in this instance. I hold the view that there is no real practical impact of this breach on the Complainant during her employment with the Respondent.

I note the decision in Patrick Hall v Irish Water Determination TED161, where the Labour Court gave extensive consideration to the approach which should properly be adopted in cases where some technical contravention of the Act occurred which had no practical consequences for the Complainant. Section 7(1)(d) of the Act provides, in effect, that an Adjudication Officer may order an employer to pay a Complainant compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. The purpose of compensation is to provide redress to an aggrieved party for some loss, damage, inconvenience or expense incurred by that party in consequence of some wrongful act or omission by another. On the facts of the instant case, I am satisfied that the Complainant herein suffered no adverse consequences of any materiality in consequences of those contraventions upon which her claim to compensation is grounded. I am obligated to consider if such an award is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. In its decision in Irish Water the Labour Court held that where mere technical breaches of Section 3 of the 1994 Act occur, “the dictates of fairness or equity could not justify an award of compensation”. I follow that reasoning in my approach to this claim.

Accordingly, I deem that the amount of compensation which is just and equitable in all the circumstances of this complaint is €100.

CA-00017160-002 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

At the outset I note that Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her. If she succeeds in doing so, then, and only then, is it for the Respondent to prove the contrary. The Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of “sufficient significance” before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent. In deciding on this complaint, therefore, I must first consider whether the existence of a prima facie case has been established by the Complainant. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the burden of proving there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment passes to the Respondent.

Discrimination and Discriminatory Dismissal

The Relevant Law

Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where “a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) ...”. Section 6(2)(a) of the Acts defines the discriminatory ground where one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”), 6(2)(c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”) and 6(2)(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other is not, or is a person with a different disability, (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”). The Complainant has cited that any of her work colleagues are the suitable comparators here.

Accordingly, I am going to assess the Complainant’s case in relation to gender, family status, disability and discriminatory dismissal. It is important at this juncture to note that it is for the Complainant to adduce evidence to establish that she was treated less favourably due to the characteristics of the said grounds than her work colleagues as her comparators.

Gender and Family status

I have noted with interest that the Complainant had more than a strong suspicion that there were changes to the organisation that she had left to that of the one she was about to return to. The Complainant had said repeatedly in her evidence of a feeling there was a change in attitude towards her prior to her returning back. However, I am not satisfied from the evidence adduced that I have been presented with any concrete facts that demonstrate that to be the case. The interactions referred to, on the face of it, appear matter of fact at worst, more often cordial and lacking the intense discriminative nature as suggested. The Complainant’s claim the she was treated less favourably was because she was availing of her maternity leave does not bear out, particularly when she said she made attempts to offer her employer help and she was told that “we are grand, we are fine” in reply. Different cases cannot be made from the same set of facts, either the Complainant was or was not pressurised to return to work from her maternity leave. That pressure and ill feeling is not reflected in the evidence adduced.

I do note from the Complainant’s evidence that on her return to work things had changed and she felt she has been effectively demoted. I have heard that her role appears to be compromised in how she is treated, spoken to and her lack of involvement in the level of tasks she held heretofore. I am satisfied that the picture she paints is not one of General Manager, and more of general operative. Her role has diminished and how she is spoken to is blunt and unacceptable manner in this work environment. Much of her frustration is directed at Mr. A and her evidence would support that she should report into him but there appears to be a lack of general courtesy towards her on her return.

The Complainant’s evidence is that her role changed, I note she returned on a Monday and worked through one week to Friday and subsequently was out of the work environment until she resigned. One week is a very short period for someone to assess what has changed in their role. I would suggest that it would be hard to have to make a determination whether some duties were still within the Complainant’s remit in that short time. However, I acknowledge that the Complainant is best placed to give evidence on that and I have no evidence on the contrary. I accept her evidence that her role had changed, and her tasks and responsibilities were reduced from her pre-maternity status.

The Complainant has cited above some of the leading authorities in relation to pregnancy discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status, including from the ECJ in Dekker C177/88 [1990] EU ECJ R177/88 regarding pregnancy discrimination being regarded as direct discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Treatment Directive 2002/73/EC where she rightly notes that no comparator is required. She correctly summaries that “A woman on maternity leave shall be entitled, after the end of her period of maternity leave, to return to her job or to an equivalent post on terms and conditions which are no less favourable to her …”. The Complainant’s claim that departure from this is deemed as direct discrimination and she cites Campbell v. Bank of Ireland DEC2013-046 and Byrne v. Minister for Defence 2017 IEHC 453 in support of her case to establish a prima facie case and the burden of proof mush shift to the Respondent to prove the contrary. The Respondent by its failure to attend the second day of hearings and give its evidence has failed to rebut this.

In this regard I take note of the Labour Court decision in A Technology Company v A Worker EDA0714 in adopting the approach considered by the UK Court of Appeal in Wong v Igen Ltd & Others [2005] IRLR 258 stated that "if the protected factor or characteristic is more than a “trivial influence" in the impugned decision, a claim of discrimination will have been made out".  In the circumstances, I find that the Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of gender and family status in relation to her conditions of employment in respect of the treatment of her by the Respondent following her return to work.  In the same Decision the Labour Court also considered the standard of evidence which should be expected from a Respondent seeking to rebut an inference of discrimination. It adopted the reasoning of the Employment Appeals Tribunal for Great Britain in Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite [2003] I.R.L.R. 322 (Gibson LJ) and held that since the facts necessary to prove a non-discriminatory explanation would usually be in the possession of the Respondent, the Court should normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden. Applying that test to the present case, I find that the Respondent offered no cogent evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination raised. 

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant was subjected to discriminatory treatment on the grounds of gender and family status in relation to her conditions of employment. I find in the Complainant’s favour under this part of her claim.

Disability

I note that the Complainant claims that she suffered from work related stress which manifests in her suffering from Lichen Planus, a skin rash, prior to her return to work in September 2017. The Complainant cited Mr O v. A Named Company DEC- E2003-052 from the Equality Tribunal that work-related stress could amount to a disability and in A Government Department v. A Worker EDA094 when that condition manifest in a minimal level of symptoms to be classed as a disability. The Complainant cites the decision in An Employee (Mr O) v. An Employer (NO. 2) [2005] ELR 132 where the Labour Court found that the employee was not treated sympathetically on a return to work and upheld a claim to constructive dismissal even though the employee failed to invoke the grievance procedures. It claims that a prima facie case of discrimination on the grounds of disability arise accordingly.

I note that the definition of disability under the Employment Equality Acts is quite broad, it has been constructed accordingly and has been interpreted likewise in an extremely broad way heretofore in this jurisdiction. As noted above in Mr O v A Named Company DEC-E2003-052 it was held that work related stress may amount to a disability. I also note that in A Government Department v. A Worker EDA094, the de minimis rule applies and the condition must manifest in a minimal level of symptoms to be classified as a disability.

I have noted from the evidence adduced that the Complainant was in contact with the Respondent, in particular Mr. A, in advance of her return to work in September 2017. I note that she informed him that she had “health issues” at the time and “will not be returning to work until the 4th September”. The Complainant has outlined to me that her symptoms where ongoing and in particular in May 2017 and that they related to stress. The Complainant has suggested that the stress was “work related stress” and that her condition manifests as a skin condition and rash. It appears to me from the evidence that the Complainant’s evidence in relation to her disability and the Respondent’s discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodation started and ended with this brief interaction on the matter with Mr. A.

I am satisfied that the Complainant claims that it was “work related stress”, however she was not in work at the time, notwithstanding that she had been in contact with the then Financial Controller and Mr. A. I note that there is no further formal or informal discussion about her “health issues” with the Respondent. The Complainant actually takes issue with that very same point in her submissions as a negative aimed at Mr. A.

I have not been presented with medical evidence to support her claim of Lichen Planus. I note that there is a lack of evidence to support that such a disclosure or indeed a request for reasonable accommodation because of a disability was ever made to the Respondent. Therefore, I have to question whether the Complainant ever disclosed to the Respondent that she had a disability or that she required reasonable accommodation because of this disability. I find that such a fundamental step is essential in support of a claim to discrimination on the disability grounds and the Respondent’s failure to provide reasonable accommodation accordingly.

I should at this point state for completeness that based on my findings above it is therefore not necessary for me to determine whether the disability claimed actually comes within the definition of a disability or not under the Acts.

It is on that basis that I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facia case of discrimination on the grounds of disability and her claim to reasonable accommodation.

Constructive Discriminatory Dismissal

On the question of a possible constructive dismissal, the test to be applied is set out in Section 2(1) of the Employment Equality Acts. The question for me to determine is if it was reasonable for the Complainant to leave her employment?

The Relevant Law

Section 2(1) of the Acts defines a dismissal as including:

“The termination of a contract of employment by the employee (whether prior notice of termination was or was not given to the employer) in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled to terminate the contract without giving such notice, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee to do so….” .

I note that this definition is practically the same as that contained at section 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and the authorities on its application in cases under that Act are relevant in the case before me. It provides two tests, either and/or both may be invoked by an employee. The first test is generally referred to as the “contract test” where the employee argues entitlement to terminate the contract. The second test, the “reasonableness test”, applies where the employee asserts that in the circumstances it was reasonable for him or her to terminate the contract without notice.

The person making a complaint of discrimination is obliged by virtue of Section 85A of the Acts to establish facts upon which she can rely in asserting that she suffered discriminatory treatment. It is only when these facts have been accepted as sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination that the onus moves to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination.

I note in Melbury Peters V Arturs Valpeters, EDA 0917. The Labour Court stated that

“The mere fact that the complainant falls within one of the protected grounds is not sufficient to establish a claim of discrimination. The complainant must establish other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination occurred”

I note that in An Employer -v- A Worker (Mr. O No. 2) [EED0410] the Labour Court addressed the issue of constructive dismissal under employment equality legislation. I noted that the definition was practically the same as the definition of "dismissal" contained in the Unfair Dismissals Acts and held that the tests for constructive dismissal developed under that legislation, as noted above, were applicable tests under the Employment Equality legislation.

The contract test was described by Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRLR 332 as follows:

“If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself discharged from any further performance”.

I am satisfied this describes a situation in which an employer commits a repudiatory breach of contract. In such circumstances, the employee is entitled to accept the repudiation and consider herself dismissed. However, not every breach of contract will give rise to repudiation. It must be a breach of an essential term which goes to the root of the contract. This is a stringent test which is often difficult to invoke successfully.

I take note in the Supreme Court in Berber -v- Dunnes Stores [2009] E.L.R. 61: in considering the ‘reasonableness test’ it stated,

“The conduct of the employer complained of must be unreasonable and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.”

Both of these definitions firmly place the burden of proof on the employee to show that the resignation was justified in all the circumstances.

In considering this issue, I note that the investigation in relation to the Complainant’s grievances concluded and the decision was sent by email on 15 December 2017. The Complainant was out of work at the time. I note that she raised again her initial fear that Ms. B should not have been the investigator. I should note here that she raised concerns about Ms. B, but she did not raise objections to Ms. B and she went along with the process freely. I am satisfied that had she done so it would be necessary to pick someone else to conduct the investigation. I note that the Complainant was not happy with the investigation decision and in retrospect the investigation itself. However, she was then offered by Ms. B to appeal her decision to an “external investigator” if she so wished. I note that there was a parallel mediation/discussion process ongoing in and around that time, but this was separate to the possibility to appeal of the grievance decision received. She failed to appeal the decision and therefore has not fully exhausted the options open to her.

I note that the Complainant resigned in February 2018.

Having evaluated all the evidence, I have come to the conclusion on the balance of probabilities that the Complainant's resignation in February 2018, had more to do with her frustration in not being able to get a resolution in the parallel mediation/discussion than with any alleged breach of trust and confidence in the Respondent’s appeal process. I cannot find that the conduct of the Respondent amounted to a repudiatory breach of the Complainant’s employment contract nor was it so unreasonable as to justify her resignation. Consequently, the circumstances in which the Complainant’s employment came to an end could not properly be classified as a dismissal within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, therefore I find that the claim of constructive dismissal is not well-founded.

CA-00017160-003 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

Victimisation

The Relevant Law

Victimisation is defined by Section 74(2) of the Act as follows: - For the purposes of this Part, victimisation occurs where the dismissal or other penalisation of the complaint was solely or mainly occasioned by the Complainant having, in good faith—

(a) sought redress under this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act for discrimination or for a failure to comply with an equal remuneration term or an equality clause (or a similar term or clause under any such repealed enactment),

(b) opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment,

(c) given evidence in any criminal or other proceedings under this Act or any such repealed enactment, or

(d) given notice of an intention to do anything within paragraphs (a) to (c).

In Determination EDA1017, Department of Defence v Barrett, this Court held that in order to make out a claim of victimisation under the Act it must be established that: -

a. The Complainant had taken action of a type referred to at Section 74(2) of the Acts (a protected act),

b. The Complainant was subjected to adverse treatment by the Respondent, and,

c. The adverse treatment was in reaction to the protected action having been taken by the Complainant.

In the case of the Public Appointments Service -v- Kevin Roddy [EDA1019]  the Labour Court held that: “To  be encompassed within the ambit of section 74(2)(b) “proceedings” must come  within the definition as defined by Section 2 under Interpretations where “proceedings” means—(a)  proceedings before the person, body or court dealing with a request or reference under this Act by or on behalf of a person, and (b) any subsequent proceedings, including proceedings on appeal, arising from the request or reference, but does not include proceedings for an offence under this Act”

Under the Acts the Complainant must prove that the catalyst alleged for the adverse treatment complained of came within the ambit of one of the protected acts referred to at Section 74(2) of the Acts.

Therefore, in order to maintain a claim of victimisation within the meaning of the Employment Equality Acts it is necessary that the Complainant demonstrates the connection between her actions in relation to defending her entitlements under the Acts and the adverse treatment complained of.

The Complainant has suggested that there were a number of incidents that she believes demonstrates that she was subjected to victimisation. I have carefully considered all the evidence and it is clear to me that she engaged her Solicitor to write to the Respondent indicating a possible claim under the Employment Equality Acts, (the protected act). She claims that the victimisation she was subjected to related to the Respondent’s failure to investigate or address her grievance; removing her car from her and replacing it with a lesser model and cutting her company phone.

I note the date of the Complainant’s Solicitor’s letter was 9 January 2018 which postdates the investigation of her grievance, which I deem was still ongoing at the time as there was an opportunity to appeal the findings to an external person. I note the work car was already exchanged at that point and there was ongoing communication about it and the replacement car. The only incident that could be considered victimisation under the Acts was the cutting of the work mobile phone. The Complainant gave a comprehensive insight of the difficulty that this caused her, in particular, since it was only phone and contact number for those minding and schooling her children. She said that she had the mobile phone number for a number of years.

Section 74(2) of the Acts is quite specific, and I am satisfied that her interactions as of 9 January 2018 left the Respondent in no doubt the type of complaint it was facing up to. I also have considered the jurisprudence in this area and in DEC—E2002-017 A Complainant v A Department Store said that victimisation must be considered “very seriously”. In the leading Court of Justice in C-185/97 said that victimisation should be “construed as widely and liberally as can fairly be done … so as to encompass all forms of detriment inflicted on a worker … having committed a protected act”. I am satisfied that removing her work mobile phone from her without prior notice was a detriment. It caused her stress and anxiety as she was not contactable as a mother of young children. The Complainant has raised an inference of victimisation under the Act and the Respondent has not rebutted it. Accordingly, based on the evidence before me for consideration I find in favour of the Complainant on this aspect of her claim.  

Harassment

In relation to the claim of harassment. I note the publication from authors Bolger, Bruton, Kimber in their book Employment Equality Law 1st Ed. 2012 - Chapter 12 - Sexual Harassment and Harassment. Section 4. - Sexual Harassment and Harassment in Irish Law 12-36 where is states that, “It is important to remember that the scope of harassment on a protected ground is an act which subjects a person to unwanted conduct on any of the protected discriminatory grounds, for example, sexual harassment, religious harassment or racial harassment. The Employment Equality Acts do not apply to a generalised bullying or harassment which has no link to the discriminatory grounds.”

And in addition, this was made clear in the Employment Equality Act 1998 (Code of Practice) (Harassment) Order 2012 (S.I. No. 208 of 2012) which came into force on May 31, 2012.

Therefore, it is clear Section 14A(7)(i) of the Act defines “harassment” as any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds and being conduct which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. Such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

The claim for harassment appears to stem from the interactions with Mr. A prior to returning to work and on the Complainant’s return to work in September 2018. I have already noted above I have heard the evidence from the Complainant in relation to the interactions prior to returning to work and I have not considered that she has established an inference of unfair treatment, harassment or victimisation from these interactions. Notwithstanding, I note the evidence in relation to the work atmosphere on the Complainant’s return to work. She describes that as, “intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive”. She has given examples of what was said and how she was treated. I accept her evidence in this regard as trustworthy. However, from application of the law the Complainant must establish a prima facie case of harassment on the basis that there was unwanted conduct on any of the protected discriminatory grounds, namely on this occasion, the gender, family status and/or disability ground. I am satisfied that no evidence has been presented to substantiate that she was subjected to harassment based on any of the protected discriminatory grounds, as required under the Acts.

I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case in relation to her claim of harassment.

CA-00017160-001 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

I find that the case is well founded. The amount of compensation which is just and equitable in this case is €100.

CA-00017160-002 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

I hereby make the following decision in accordance with Section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 -2015. I find that:　

(i)                  the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of direct discrimination on grounds of disability in terms of Section 6(2) and contrary to Section 8 of those Acts. Accordingly, her complaint fails.

(ii)                the Complainant has established a prima facie case of direct discrimination on grounds Pregnancy Discrimination on the grounds of Gender and Family status in terms of Section 6(2) and contrary to Section 8 of those Acts. Accordingly, her complaint here is well founded.

(iii)               the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case on the gender, family status or disability grounds pursuant to sections 6(2) of the Acts, in respect of discriminatory dismissal contrary to Section 8(6) of the Acts.

In accordance with Section 82 of the Acts, I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant the sum of €53,000 [fifty-three thousand Euro] by way of compensation for the distress suffered as a result of the discrimination. In making my decision I have also had regard to Article 17 of the Framework Directive that the sanction should be “effective, dissuasive and proportionate” and as such this award equates to approx. nine month’s gross pay for the Complainant. This figure relates to compensation for the effects of the discriminatory treatment and does not include any element relating to remuneration.

CA-00017160-003 Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

I hereby make the following decision in accordance with Section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 -2015. I find that:　

(i)                  the Complainant has established a prima facie case of victimisation in terms of Section 74(2) of the Acts. Accordingly, her complaint here is well founded.

(ii)                the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of Harassment contrary to Section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts. Accordingly, her complaint her fails.　

In accordance with Section 82 of the Acts, I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant the sum of €8,000 (eight thousand Euro) by way of compensation for the distress suffered as a result of the victimisation. In making my decision I have also had regard to Article 17 of the Framework Directive that the sanction should be “effective, dissuasive and proportionate”. This figure relates to compensation for the effects of the discriminatory treatment and does not include any element relating to remuneration.

Employment Equality Acts – gender - family status - disability - terms of employment (Information) Act - discriminatory treatment – compensation