Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Chemical Engineer

A Social Media Company

Representatives

Mason Hayes and Curran Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00029800-001

22/07/2019

At the opening of the hearing the complainant outlined the background to her complaint.

On April 30th 2019, arising from comments that she posted on Facebook, the complainant’s access to her Facebook account was disabled.

On July 18th 2019, a recruiter from the respondent company contacted the complainant, having seen her profile on LinkedIn. The recruiter provided details of a vacancy for a role that may have been suitable for the complainant, sending her a link to the job description. The complainant logged on to the respondent’s recruitment site but she had difficulty submitting her details and uploading her CV.

On July 22nd, the complainant submitted this complaint to the WRC, alleging that she has been discriminated against on the civil status ground. On her complaint form, she said that because she hadn’t got a live Facebook account, she was prevented from being considered as a candidate for a job.

On July 24th, the recruiter sent the complainant an email with a request to her to schedule a call to discuss the job. They had a phone conversation on August 1st at 10.00am. The following day, the complainant sent the recruiter an email describing her annoyance and disappointment because her Facebook account was disabled. A few days later, on August 8th, the recruiter replied and said that the closure of the account was outside her area. She asked the complainant if she wanted to withdraw her application for the job. The complainant replied to say that she was still interested. Within a few minutes, the recruiter replied to ask the complainant to suggest a few timeslots for a telephone interview with the hiring manager. She asked the complainant to treat the fact that her Facebook account was disabled as a separate matter. On August 16th however, the recruiter wrote to the complainant to say that she had decided not to proceed with the recruitment process.

The complainant’s opinion is that the reason she was not considered for a job with the respondent is related to the reason that her Facebook account was disabled. It is her view that the recruiters had access to her Facebook account and posts about her relationship with a work colleague.   She claims that she was excluded from progressing with her application because of the information that may have been available to the respondent regarding that relationship.

Section 6(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 is intended to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of a person’s civil status. In accordance with this legislation, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee or a prospective employee based on them being single, married, separated, divorced, widowed or in a civil partnership or no longer in a civil partnership.

The complainant submitted this complaint on July 22nd 2019, when she had difficulty applying for a job on the respondent’s careers website. On her complaint form she said,

“I am now not being treated fairly or equally to the other job applicants as my Facebook account was banned for some unknown reason.”

At that point, on July 22nd, the complainant’s job application was still live, and it was not until August 16th that she was informed by the recruiter that they would not proceed. Since her job application was rejected, it is the complainant’s view that she has been discriminated against due to the ambiguity regarding her status as a Facebook account holder who has been blocked, and her status as a job applicant.   She is concerned about the possibility that the respondent can access information about her from her Facebook account. She complained about the failure of the respondent to reassure her that there is a barrier between the information on her blocked Facebook account and the recruiters.

At the outset of the hearing, I explained to the complainant that it seemed to me that her complaint does not come within the definition of civil status as it is set out at section 2 of the Employment Equality Act. I am also concerned that, when she submitted this complaint, she was still being considered for a job.

I have now considered this matter, and having listened to the complainant’s evidence, I have come to the conclusion that this complaint of discrimination on the civil status ground is misconceived.

The complainant did not submit a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 and I have found that the complaint she submitted was misconceived. On this basis, her complaint cannot succeed.

Civil status not established