ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00014175
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Roberto Alamazani | Martin Gibbons |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | Roberto Alamazani | A Landlord |
Complaints:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act 2000 | CA-00018367-001 | 08/04/2018 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act 2000 | CA-00018368-001 | 08/04/2018 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 16/11/2018
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Aideen Collard
Procedure:
The Complainant referred duplicate complaints under Section 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000 against the Respondent to the Workplace Relations Commission (hereinafter ‘WRC’) on 8th April 2018. He also submitted identical complaints against the Respondent’s wife as co-owner of the rental property subject to the alleged discrimination giving rise to these complaints (under ADJ-00014160) on the same date and all the complaints were heard together. Pursuant to Section 25 of the Equal Status Act 2000, the Director General referred these complaints to me for adjudication. I proceeded to hearing on 16th November 2018. Both Parties were in attendance and as both were unpresented, I outlined the requisite legal provisions in lay terms. As the complaints were referred outside of the statutory time-limit, I considered the Complainant’s application to extend time as a preliminary issue and prerequisite to my jurisdiction to deal with the substantive complaints.
Background:
The Complainant referred complaints of discrimination on the gender, age, race and housing assistance grounds against the Respondent, arising from his viewing of a studio for rent on 29th May 2017, contrary to Sections 3, 5 and 6 of the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015. He sent the notification to the Respondent on 25th July 2017 within the statutory two-month period and referred the aforesaid duplicate complaints to the WRC on 8th April 2018, over four months outside of the statutory six-month time limit. The Complainant seeks an extension of time on the basis that he had been unwell during that period. The Respondent wholly rejects the complaints herein and seeks to have them dismissed. In the event that the Complainant was granted an extension of time to pursue same, the Respondent and his wife were in a position to provide rebuttal evidence confirming that they let out properties to tenants of both genders, all ages, all races and/or in receipt of social welfare.
Preliminary Issue – Complainant’s Application for an Extension of Time
I must consider the Complainant’s application to extend time as a preliminary issue and prerequisite to my jurisdiction to deal with the substantive complaints. The alleged discrimination arose on 29th May 2017 and the Complainant referred these complaints to the WRC on 8th April 2018. Upon receipt of the aforesaid complaints, the WRC issued a letter dated 19th June 2018 notifying the Complainant that they were outside the statutory six-month statutory time limit, and affording him an opportunity to make a submission in support of an application to extend time to the Adjudicating Officer assigned. He made a submission in this respect on 28th June 2018 citing medical issues, accompanied with vouching documentation referring to GP visits and prescriptions for medication.
Section 21(6) of the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015 sets out the time limits within which a complaint must be referred to the WRC and makes provision for an extension of time for reasonable cause as follows: “(a) Subject to subsections (3)(a)(ii)and (7), a claim for redress in respect of prohibited conduct may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of the occurrence of the prohibited conduct to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence. (b) On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.”
These complaints were referred to the WRC on 8th April 2018. It is not in issue that the alleged discrimination arose on 29th May 2017 in relation to a viewing of the Respondent and his wife’s rental studio on that date. The well-established test as to what constitutes ‘reasonable cause’ for the purposes of an application for an extension of time is set out in the Labour Court decision in Cementation Skanska -v- A Worker DWT0425 & Department of Finance -v- Impact (2005) ELR 6:
“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time. The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons. Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time. Here the Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.”
Therefore, the onus lies with the Complainant to show that there are reasons which both explain and afford an excuse for the delay. I have considered the basis proffered by the Complainant for seeking an extension of time, which essentially relates to his assertion that he was too unwell to do so within the statutory six-month period from 29th May 2017 until 29th November 2017 and for some four months thereafter until the date of referral on 8th April 2018. In this respect, I note that the medical certificate/s furnished only certify him as being unfit for short periods of time and do not cover the full period. I also noted that as a matter of public record owing to the publication of names in relation to complaints under the Equal Status Acts and decisions on the WRC Website, that this Complainant has submitted numerous complaints to the WRC and/or attended at the WRC for hearings including before this Adjudication Officer during the period in question. When he was questioned regarding his interactions with the WRC during this period, he was unable to recall the nature of same and/or say when or why he had been able to attend at the WRC for other hearings.
Although the Complainant maintains that owing to illness he was unable to submit these complaints within the prescribed time limit, he was able to submit other complaints to the WRC and attend other adjudication hearings during the relevant period. Having regard to the totality of the evidence including the limited medical documentation submitted, I am not satisfied that there is a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay such that as a matter of probability, had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated these complaints in time. I therefore find that he has not shown reasonable cause for granting an extension of time to refer these complaints.
Decision:
Section 25(4) of the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to these complaints in accordance with the relevant provisions of that Act. For the aforesaid reasons, I determine that I do not have jurisdiction to investigate these complaints as they have been referred outside of the six-month statutory time limit and the Complainant has not shown reasonable cause for extending time up until the date of referral. Accordingly, these complaints are dismissed.