Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Manager

A Restaurant

Representatives

Niamh McGowan BL instructed by Taylor & Buchalter Solicitors

Act

Complaints Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00019762-001

13/06/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00019762-002

13/06/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00019762-003

13/06/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00019762-004

13/06/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00019762-005

13/06/2018

The Complainant was employed in the Respondent’s restaurant as a bar manager on the 7th November 2016 and he was dismissed from his employment and the 19th of January 2018. He referred this complaint on the 13th June 2018. The Complainant is claiming that he was harassed in relation to his conditions of employment and dismissed on the sexual orientation ground contrary to the terms of the Employment Equality Acts. He's also claiming that the Respondent was in breach of the Organisation of Working Time Act in relation to his hours of work, breaks and daily rest periods. The Respondent denies the claims and submits that the Complainant was dismissed for reasons of redundancy.

The Complainant submits that he was directly discriminated as against by the Respondent on the sexual orientation ground contrary to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 as amended.

The Complainant outlined incidents where he says he was subjected to inappropriate comments from two Directors which referred to his sexual orientation. When the comments first started the Complainant was taken aback by the remarks made and he did not know how to respond. He submitted that there were times he laughed nervously at some of the comments as he did not want to appear weak in front of the Respondent's Directors.

It was submitted that the Respondent has characterise the exchanges as workplace banter/inappropriate chat between friends. While the Complainant and the Directors had a good working relationship they were not friends of the Complainant. The comments that were made related to either the Complainant’s sexual orientation or that of others and involved stereotypical characterisations of gay men. The frequency of the comments were such that they became almost normalized, but they continued to cause discomfort to the Complainant. 

The complaint gave evidence that Director A in particular frequently referred him and other gay men as “queers”. Director A called the Complainant’s attention to two men dining in the restaurant and he asked if he saw “those ‘pair of queers”. At a birthday party in the restaurant in October 2017 referred to two gentlemen as that “that pair of queers”. The Complainant and his husband dined in the restaurant in or about the 8th of December 2017 and when the Complainant's husband ordered a gin and tonic he said that Director A referred to the drink as a “queers drink” and asked, “would you like a scarf and umbrella to go with it”. The Complainant said that when he bought a red Mercedes car, Director A said that “it’s a lovely queer car” and “all you need now is a nice scarf and you’ll be a proper queer driving around”. On 23rd December the Complainant was having dinner with his husband and his young nephew when Director A approached the table and he asked, “did you see that other pair of queers, they’re there since 2pm drinking”. The Complainant went on to give evidence of other incidents where he was referred to as a “queer” and other derogatory comments which referred to his sexual orientation. He said that Director B made an offensive comment at a management meeting at which breakfast was served concerning the sausages the Complainant was eating. On the night of the Christmas party when the Complainant returned a scarf he had borrowed from Director B, he (Director B) made a comment “…I hope I don’t catch the gay off the scarf…”.

The Complainant said he never experienced these remarks in any other place he worked, and he was very taken aback at the conduct. He frequently told Director A to stop but he didn't and persisted in calling him “queer” almost every day. The Complainant said being called “queer” is very offensive and it is one of the most derogatory word directed against a gay person. He said that he received a WhatsApp message from Director A on the 24th June wishing him “Happy Pride Day ye Big Queer”.

In June 2017 the Complainant said he was fed up with the way he was been treated and he tendered his resignation to Mr A, but he did not say why he was resigning. He was persuaded to stay.

The offensive comments continued and in response to a Happy New Year message he sent to Director A he received a response message in the WhatsApp group calling him a “steamer”. This message was sent from Director A’s phone.

On the 19th of January 2018 he was called to a meeting and handed a letter and he was notified that he was being made redundant. He said that he offered to take a cut in salary or to do a different job, but he was not given an option and his employment ended. He believes he was dismissed because of his sexual orientation.

The Complainant accepts that the company has a grievance policy. He said he did not use the policy because it directed him to go to the Directors with any complaints. Because he was harassed by the Directors he was afraid that he would appear weak if he made a complaint through the process. He asked Director A almost every day to stop making offensive comments to him and he rejects the contention by the Respondent that the comments did not offend him. He said in evidence that calling him “queer” is one of the most offensive comments that can be made to him as a gay man.

The Complainant’s husband and two former members of staff gave evidence of hearing some of the comments made by both Director A and Director B.

The Respondent said that the Complainant was hired as a supervisor before the restaurant opened. He was involved in getting the business up and running. Shortly after it opened he was promoted to Bar Manager and received a pay increase. It was known to both Director A and Director B before they interviewed and hired the Complainant that he is gay. It was submitted that as in many workplaces, friendships develop amongst staff and as friends there was a certain amount of workplace banter/inappropriate chat between the management team, but it was in no way derogatory.

Director A said in evidence that he never used the name “queer” when he was in conversation with the Complainant. He accepted that on one occasion he sent a WhatsApp message to the Complainant wishing him happy Gay Pride and calling him a “big queer” with laughing emojis. He said it was meant as a joke. He said he never used the word to the Complainant in any other circumstances. He said that he had banter with the Complainant about his sexual orientation. He said that some of his best friends are gay and lesbian and he understands that the term “queer” is embraced by the LGBT community. He said that he was good friends with the staff including the Complainant and they often had a laugh. He said that the Complainant sent a happy New Year message to his phone while he was in the company of a number of staff and one of them took his phone and sent a response to the Complainant calling him a “steamer”. Mr B said that the Complainant could not have been offended as he took a screen shot and sent it to the WhatsApp staff group.

In January 2018, the Directors met to discuss the performance of the business. Following a review of all aspects of the business, it was clear that the wage costs were too high, and it was necessary to look at ways of reducing this cost. Staff costs as a percentage of the turnover should be no more than 30% to 35% but it was running at 45% as the business was overstaffed. There were 3 senior Managers, the Complainant and 2 Directors, and it was concluded that this area of the business was over resourced, and it was decided to make the Complainant redundant and that staff who left would not be replaced. Director A said that he organised a meeting with the Complainant on the 19th January 2018 and informed him that due to financial circumstances it was necessary to make his role redundant. He did not offer him any other role. He said that the Complainant’s selection for redundancy had nothing to do with his sexual orientation. He said that other measures were also put in place to reduce costs such as reducing opening hours.   The Complainant was the only member of staff made redundant but over a period of time staff numbers were reduced from 51 to 30 through non-replacement.

Director B denied that he made any remarks which were offensive to the Complainant. He said that the Complainant was always happy and when he informed him that he was thinking of leaving in June 2017, they persuaded him to stay as he was a good employee. He denied that he made any derogatory comment to the Complainant about his scarf on the night of the Christmas party. He also said that he did not make a derogatory comment about the sausages the Complainant was having for breakfast. He said that the Complainant never complained about being harassed. The company has an equal opportunities policy and the procedures are set out in the Handbook.

He said that the Complainant’s position was made redundant because the company was losing money and it had nothing to do with his sexual orientation. The Complainant was the only senior manager who could have been made redundant as he is a shareholder in the company together with Director A and 2 other Directors.

Director C said that he is not involved in the day to day management in the restaurant, but he has responsibility for the financial and legal end of the company. He said that he visited the restaurant every day as his office is nearby. He said the Complainant could have complained to him if he was being harassed. He spoke to the Complainant regularly and he was always very happy and he got on well with the staff.

Director C said that the Complainant’s position was made redundant because the business was losing money. The business was only operating since November 2016 and it is normal in such a new business to be overstaffed as it takes time to determine the right balance of staff. The ratio of wages to turnover should be in the region of 35% but it was running in excess of 45% and the business could not sustain this. The Directors had a number of meetings before Christmas, but it was decided to wait and see if the Christmas party market would create an upturn in business, but the restaurant did not get the bounce they were expecting. After Christmas the Directors decided that they had to implement measures to stop the losses. They examined all areas of the business and decided that the management of the business was top heavy and also, they had a higher level of wages. As the other 2 Managers are shareholders, the Complainant’s job was the only one which could be made redundant at management level.   It was also decided to implement other cost cutting measures such as reducing opening hours and not replacing staff who had left. He said that the Complainant’s sexual orientation had no bearing whatsoever on the decision to make his position redundant.

Three witness gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent and they all said that none of them witness any derogatory comments directed towards the Complainant.

The Law

Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts provide:

“discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would

be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in

subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’)”

Section 6(2) provides:

“As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of

those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

…….

(d) that they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as “the

sexual orientation ground”),

14A.—(1) For the purposes of this Act, where—

(a) an employee (in this section referred to as ‘the victim’) is harassed or sexually

harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as ‘the workplace’) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is—

(i) employed at that place or by the same employer,

(ii) the victim’s employer, or

…..

(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)—

(i) such harassment has occurred, and

(ii) either—

(I) the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or

(II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated,

the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim’s employer in relation to the victim’s conditions of employment.

(2) If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

……

(3) A person’s rejection of, or submission to, harassment or sexual harassment may not be used by an employer as a basis for a decision affecting that person.

……..

Section 14 A (7) provides:

(a)(i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and

…..

being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

(b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.”

The issues for decision by me are whether the Respondent (i) harassed the Complainant contrary to section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 as amended on the sexual orientation ground and (ii) dismissed in circumstances constituting discrimination and victimisation of him on the sexual orientation ground contrary to the Acts. In reaching my decision I have taken into consideration all the submissions, oral and written, made to me by the parties as well as the evidence given by the witnesses at the Hearing.

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts, sets out the burden of proof necessary in claims of discrimination. It provides "Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary."

 In the case of Melbury Developments and Valpeters (Det. No. EA AO917) the Labour Court stated in relation to Section 85 A as follows:

"Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.

It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, a prima facie case of discrimination, that is, facts from which it can be established that he was harassed and discriminated against on the sexual orientation ground in relation to his conditions of employment.  It is only when he has discharged this burden to the satisfaction of Adjudication Officer that the burden shifts to the Respondent to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination and harassment raised.

The Labour Court in the case of Nail Zone Ltd and A Worker Determination No. EDA1023, defined the law in relation to harassment as follows:

“The essential characteristics of harassment within this statutory meaning is that the conduct is (a) unwanted and (b) that it has either the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. This suggests a subjective test and if the impugned conduct had the effect referred to at paragraph (b) of the subsection, whether or not that effect was intended, and whether or not the conduct would have produced the same result in a person of greater fortitude than the Complainant, it constitutes harassment for the purpose of the Acts.”

The Complainant is complaining that he was harassed on the sexual orientation ground in relation to his conditions of employment. He stated that during the course of his employment he was constantly subjected to comments such as being referred to as ‘queer’ and reference was made to him about a gay couple dining in the restaurant as ‘a pair of queers’. He outlined a number of different occasions when Mr A made offensive comments and sent WhatsApp messages to him which referenced his sexual orientation. He also said that on two occasions Mr B made offensive comments to him. The Respondent rejects that there were any offensive comments made and any comments made were banter and the Complainant did not object.                                

I note that three witnesses gave evidence including the Complainant’s husband, and they all stated that they heard Mr. A using the word ‘queer’ to the Complainant and referring him to a gay couple and calling them ‘a pair of queers’.   I note that Mr. A accepted that he sent the Complainant a WhatsApp message saying, “saying happy gay pride you big queer” and he also accepted that a message was sent from his mobile phone by another employee calling the Complainant ‘steamer’.

Therefore, I am satisfied from the evidence that the Complainant has established that he was subjected to offensive comments and name calling during the course of his employment which violated his dignity at work. Likewise, I am satisfied that that the offensive name calling constitutes less favourable treatment of the Complainant on the sexual orientation ground as a person of a different sexual orientation would not have been called such offensive names. Applying the jurisprudence of the Labour Court in Nail Zone cited above, I find the treatment falls within the definition of harassment under section 14A of the Acts.  On the basis of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the Complainant has established a prima facie case of harassment contrary to section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts.

I have considered the evidence of the Respondent, but I am not satisfied that the Respondent has rebutted the prima facie case of sexual harassment established by the Complainant

I note that Section 14A(2)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 provides a statutory defence for the Respondent in cases of harassment and sexual harassment if the employer can establish that they took steps to prevent the harassment.

The Respondent evidence is that the Complainant did not make a formal complaint about the alleged harassment while he was in the employment. The Respondent said that the company has a grievance procedure and a policy for dealing with harassment and the Complainant did not utilise it to make a complaint. It was submitted that this was a new business and the Complaint was hired before it opened. The company handbook contains all the policy and procedures. The Complainant had responsibility for training new staff in relation to the handbook and he was well aware of the procedure for making a complaint. The Respondent said that the company’s policy in relation to the prevention of harassment is contained in the handbook.  The Complainant said that he did not make a written complaint to management as both Mr. A and Mr B were Directors and senior Managers and they were the people harassing him. He felt he could not complain to the other Director as he was not involved in the day to day running of the restaurant. He said that each time Mr. A made an offensive comment he asked him to stop. A witness for the Complainant said that she heard him telling Mr. A to stop after he made a comment about the car (‘queer’s car’) the Complainant had bought.

I am satisfied that the Complainant asked Mr A to desist from calling him offensive names. I note a WhatsApp message from the Complainant on the 31st December 2017 wishing Mr. A Happy new year elicited an offensive name calling reply from Mr A’s phone. While Mr. A said that he did not send the message, I note that as a Manager he took no disciplinary action against this employee nor did he put appropriate measures in place to ensure that the Complainant would not be subject to such offensive treatment in the future.  I cannot accept the Respondent’s contention that the language directed at the Complainant was banter. The test is subjective, and it is clear the Complainant did not receive the comments as banter and asked Director A to cease making them on numerous occasions. I cannot comprehend how senior Managers in a workplace would consider it acceptable to call such offensive names or make such offensive comments to a gay man. I am satisfied that it is a breach of their trust and duty of care towards their employee to create and tolerate such a degrading and offensive work environment.  

I have examined the company handbook it contains a mission statement on Equality and outlines the 9 grounds of discrimination under the Equality Acts, but there is no policy or procedures in relation to the prevention of harassment or any procedures for making a complaint of harassment contained in it.

In my opinion the Grievance Procedure, which deals with issues from employees who are aggrieved, is not appropriate nor has it been designed to deal with serious allegations of harassment and sexual harassment.   I am not satisfied that the Respondent had any measures in place to prevent harassment in the workplace in line with the code of practice, S.I. No. 208 of 2012 Employment Equality Act 1998 (Code of Practice)(Harassment) Order 2012.

As the Respondent has no policy to prevent harassment in workplace and the Managers who harassed are Directors and shareholders in the company and in a position of power over the Complainant, the statutory defence under Section 14A(7)(2)(a) is not available to the Respondent. Therefore, I find that the Respondent has failed to rebut the prima facie case of harassment on the sexual orientation ground raised by the Complainant. On the basis of the foregoing, I find that the Complainant has established a prima facie case of harassment on the sexual orientation ground in relation to his conditions of employment which the Respondent has failed to rebut.

Discriminatory Dismissal/Victimisation

The Complainant claims that his dismissal was a discriminatory dismissal on the sexual orientation ground and victimisation was notified that he was being dismissed for reasons of redundancy on the 19th January 2018. He is claiming that he was dismissed for reasons connected with his sexual orientation as he was the only gay person working in the company. He said that he was the only person made redundant and none of the 3 members of staff who reported to him were made redundant.

The Respondent said that the Complainant was made redundant as the company was losing money and wage costs were much higher than they should be.   There were 3 senior managers including the Complainant. The other 2 Managers were Directors and shareholders in the company and it was decided to select the Complainant for redundancy and not to replace staff who left.   They also reduced opening hours.    

Section 74(2) of the Employment Equality Act provides:

“For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a Complainant,

(c) an employee having represented or otherwise supported a Complainant,

(d) the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

(e) an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

(f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

(g) an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs”.

I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a nexus between his sexual orientation and dismissal.

In relation to the Complainant’s complaint that his dismissal was victimisation contrary to Section 74, the Complainant must establish that his dismissal was a reaction to having made a complaint or taken action in any of the matters outline above from (a) to (g). I note that the Complainant had made no complaint of discrimination against the Respondent at the time he was made redundant nor had he taken any of the other actions specified above. I am satisfied therefore that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of victimisation. Having examined the evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant was dismissed because his position was made redundant.

I find that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant in relation to his conditions of employment and harassed him contrary to S. 8(1)(b) of the Acts in terms of Section 14A(7) of the Act.

I find that the Respondent did not dismiss the Complainant for discriminatory reasons on the sexual orientation ground in terms of Section 8(6)(c) or victimise him in terms of Section 74(2) of the Act.

Section 82-(1)(c) of the Act provides that I can make an order for the effects of the discrimination. The maximum award I can make under Section 82(4) is two years pay for discriminatory treatment. The Complainant was paid €39,000 per year. The EU Council Directives require sanctions for a breach of the principle of equal treatment to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

In accordance with Section 82 of the Act, I order the Respondent pay the Complainant €20,000 in compensation for the breach of his right to dignity at work and the distress caused to him by the harassment.

The total award is redress for the infringement of the Complainant’s statutory rights and, therefore, is not subject to income tax as per Section 192A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (as amended by Section 7 of the Finance Act 2004).

Pursuant to Section 82-(1)(c) I order the Respondent to draw up a Policy which provides for the prevention of harassment on the nine grounds of discrimination under the Employment Equality Acts. The Policy should take into account the provisions of S.I. No. 208 of 2012 Employment Equality Act 1998 (Code of Practice) (Harassment) Order 2012;

This Policy should be effectively communicated to all staff including senior management and training should be provided to ensure familiarity with its contents.

I order that the above actions should be completed no later than 4 months from the date of this decision.    

The Complainant said that he was required to work long hours finishing late and starting early next day. He and he frequently worked more than 15 hours in the day resulting in him not getting adequate daily rest periods. It was submitted that from the records submitted by the Respondent to the Complainant that there were 14 dates on which the Complainant did not receive a rest period of 11 hours.

It was submitted that the Complainant was responsible for rostering of all staff including himself and the 2 Directors. The Complainant requested that he work as many hours as possible as he had recently married and bought a house.

11.—" An employee shall be entitled to a rest period of not less than 11 consecutive hours in each period of 24 hours during which he or she works for his or her employer.”

Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act provides for a 6-month time limit from the date of the contravention for referring a case the Director General. The Complainant referred this complaint on the 13th June 2018. Therefore, the cognisable period for the purposes of this complaint is the 14th December 2017 to the 13the June 2018.

I have examined the clock report provided by the Complainant’s representative from the 14th December 2017 until the 19th January 2018 and I note that the Complainant failed to clock in for a number of days in each of these weeks. On the days the Complainant clocked in, the records do not show that there was a failure to provide daily rest periods contrary to Section 11. The clock in/out system in place recorded the hours worked and there was an obligation on the Complainant to use it to record the hours he worked. In the circumstances, I find that the complaint is not well founded.

I find that the complaint is not well founded.

The Complainant said that he regularly did not receive breaks and when he was on his breaks he was regularly interrupted.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant rostered himself for breaks. They said that they have a clocking system in place for recording attendance and breaks. It was not enforced for break periods for the Complainant as he was a member of management and paid for breaks.

In accordance with Section 12 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, (1) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without allowing him or her a break of at least 15 minutes; (2) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 6 hours without allowing him or her a break of at least 30 minutes; such a break may include the break referred to in subsection (1).

As stated above, the cognisable period for the purposes of this complaint is the 14th December 2017 to the 13the June 2018.

The Respondent accepted that there are no records of the Complainant’s breaks as he was not required to use the clock system to record his breaks. Section 25 of the Act requires an employer to keep records and Section (25)(4) provides that where an employer fails to keep records the onus of proving compliance with the Act lies with the employer.

In the absence of records, I find that the complaint is well founded.

I find that the complaint is well founded. I award the Complainant compensation in the amount of €400 for the breach of Section 12 of the Act.

The Complainant said that he frequently worked more than 48 hours per week. He accepted that he did not clock in and out every day, but he said that even if he did that all his hours would not be recorded a did the work rosters from home.

The Respondent denied that the Complainant worked more than 48 hours per week. The Complainant was responsible for the rostering which included rostering himself and wanted to work as many hours as possible. The clocking system in place recorded the hours worked but the Complainant frequently did not clock in. The Complainant trained other staff and was fully aware of the necessity to comply with the terms of the Organisation of Working Time Act.

Section 15 of the Act provides:

— (1)” An employer shall not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours, that is to say an average of 48 hours calculated over a period (hereafter in this section referred to as a “reference period”) that does not exceed—

(a) 4 months…”

As the Complainant frequently failed to clock in, the clock in record was of no assistance in calculating the hours the Complainant worked. The Respondent submitted a record of the number of hours the Complainant was paid for during 2017. I have examined this record over the reference period of 4 months excluding holiday weeks and I have calculated he was paid for working an average of 47 hours over the reference period. In the circumstances, I find that the Respondent has not been in breach of Section 15. I find that this complaint is not well founded.

I find that this complaint pursuant to Section 15 of the Act is not well founded

Employment Equality Acts discrimination, harassment, dismissal, victimisation, sexual orientation ground, Organisation of Working Time Acts, Section 11 - rest periods, Section 12 – breaks, Section 15 – weekly hours.