Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Mark J. Savage

Councillor Daragh Butler

Representatives

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00022429-001

04/10/2018

The complainant submits that on 5 May 2018, the respondent approached him inside the main front entrance of Swords Castle as he was manifesting his religious beliefs as an Evangelical Christian by distributing pamphlets expressing his religiously held pro-life, anti-abortion beliefs to members of the public, at a public location where the Leinster branch of the Irish Pipe Band Association Championships was being held in advance of the impending abortion referendum.

The complainant contends that the respondent confronted him in a threatening manner, engaging in thuggish, intimidatory behaviour whilst invading his personal space. The complainant submits that this encounter occurred after he had read the contents of said pamphlet which included the Evangelical religiously motivated statement of exaltation “praise the good lord Jesus Christ”.

The complainant states that the respondent is a service provider under the Acts in that when the complainant was present at a public event, said event was hosted by Fingal County Council of which the respondent is an elected member. The complainant argues that the respondent in a capacity of maintaining his profile as (i) a member of a political party which provides a public service of purporting to represent the concerns of the electorate and (ii) in a capacity of being an elected member of said Council which provides a public service to citizens. The complainant uses the Leinster Pipe Band as a comparator, in that, no members of said Band were discriminated against.

The complainant asserts that the matter of the two month deadline for sending “ES 1 Notification” to the respondent is accounted for by reason that in the aftermath of the conduct by the respondent towards him, the complainant suffered severe mental anguish which is ongoing.

The respondent states that he is shocked to have this complaint levelled against him. He categorically rejects the claims of the complainant and submits that he was attending the said event as a private citizen. The respondent states that the within complaint is vexatious and misconceived and should be dismissed on that basis.

Section 21 (2) of the Acts provide as follows

“(2) Before seeking redress under this section, the complainant-

(a)    shall, within 2 months after the prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, or where more than one incident of prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, within 2 months after the last such occurrence, notify the respondent in writing of (i) the nature of the allegation, (ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act…”

With regard to the instant matter, the complainant alleges that the incident of discrimination took place on 5 May 2018, however the complainant only notified the respondent 4 months later on 4 September 2018. The complainant has argued reasonable cause in order to extend the time for notification to 4 months in accordance with section 21 (2) on the basis that he has suffered and continues to suffer ”mental and emotional distress and anxiety”. However, the complainant has not provided any supporting documentation to corroborate this statement. I am cognisant of the application by the Labour Court of the Cementation Skanska test (“reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay“) in the case of Hewlett Packard Ireland Ltd. v Zajaczkowski DWT 191. I am mindful of the fact that the complainant has taken cases previously to this forum and to the Circuit Courts and is entirely familiar with the statutory obligations under the Equal Status legislation. Having carefully considered the matter, I find that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the instant complaint as the complainant has not established reasonable cause to extend the notification period to four months. Accordingly, the complaint is out of time and therefore statute barred.

I find that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the instant complaint as the complaint is out of time and therefore is statute barred.

No jurisdiction, out of time