ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00009747
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | John Sherlock, Caroline Sherlock & 7 Minors | Father William Cummins |
Representatives | HeatherRosen | McMahon & Williams Solicitors |
Complaints:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012564-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012567-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012568-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012570-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012571-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012572-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012575-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012577-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00012583-001 | 20/11/2015 |
Date of Call Over and Adjudication Hearing: 9/11/18, 16/07/2019 and 22/7/2019
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Louise Boyle
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
Background:
The complainants’ detail they were discriminated against on 23rd May 2015 when attending or attempting to attend a first holy communion mass. It was detailed that they were discriminated against on the grounds of gender, race and their membership of the travelling community and that they were harassed.
Call over meetings and hearings took place on 9 November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019. Some preliminary issues were raised and parties were advised that to ensure effective and efficient administration of justice, that a decision would be issued with regards to the preliminary issue(s).
Submissions were substantial with copious volume of documentation and whilst I will not be referring to every one, I have taken them all into consideration.
This decision may be read in conjunction with ADJ-00009746, ADJ-00009750, ADJ-00009751, ADJ-00009752, ADJ-00009754, ADJ-00009755, ADJ-00009762. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012564-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012564-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012564-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012567-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. . |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012567-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012567-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012568-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012568-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012568-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012570-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012570-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012570-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012571-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012571-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012571-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012572-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012572-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012572-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012575-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012575-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012575-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012577-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012577-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012577-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies; In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms. I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case: CA-00012583-001
The respondent refuted the substantive allegations.
The respondent’s representative attended on 9th November 2019 and advised on 20 June 2019 that they would not attend the hearings scheduled for 16 July 2019 and 22 July 2019 “for a variety of reasons the most pressing being that no decision of the findings of the Preliminary Hearing has been decided”.
Preliminary issues raised included that the services provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. . |
Summary of Complainant’s Case: CA-00012583-001
In response to the preliminary issue that the service provided does not come under the legislation, the complainant, a minor, submitted that the Church is a provider of service as defined under Section 2(1) namely, “a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— (a) access to and the use of any place.
The complainant outlined that this is sufficient to include the Church and there is no need for further complication of matters by going further into the details that follow the words quoted above, because the variations that follow are just examples, written to expound upon the extensivenature of the category, by showing the wide stretch of examples that fall within it. There is no exclusion clause within the Act that allows for negative discrimination to occur. There is instead, in Section 6(5) which provides for what could be termed “neutral” discrimination, i.e. if for a religious purpose premises are reserved for a particular category of persons then exclusion of others is not discriminatory.
The complainant submitted that if it is ever contended that the dress-code drawn up and referred to on that day established a particular category of persons to be allowed entrance into the Church Service of Holy Communion in a way that is legitimate under the Law by Section 6(5), then it has to be pointed out that this categorisation was enforced in a discriminatory way since the mode of dress did not result in the barring of any woman or man of the wider community. Only Traveller women were excluded, and this even though the dress of others was exhibiting more elements that were deemed inadmissible by the said code than what was worn by the Traveller women who were barred, for example as regards length of dresses or skirts, or as regards neck-lines, etc. |
Findings and Conclusions: CA-00012583-001
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, call over meetings followed by hearings to deal with preliminary matters only, were held on 9th November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 26 July 2019. Parties were advised that a decision would issue with regard to the preliminary issue(s) raised. The respondent’s representative advised that they would not attend the hearings on 16 July 2019 and 26 July.
It was raised as a preliminary issue that the service provided by the Church was not a service within the meaning of the Act. The complainant submits that the service sought is one defined under Section 2 (1) and that it is not necessary to look any further into the examples of services covered under the Act.
Section 2(1) of the act sets out “unless the context otherwise requires— “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;
In McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR258, Finlay CJ detailed that “the courts have not got a function to add to or to leave from express statutory provisions so as to achieve the objectives which the Court may seem desirable”.
In Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] IR 211The Supreme Court pointed out: - “it is to be presumed that words are not used in a statute without a meaning and accordingly, effect must be given, if possible to all the words used for, as has been said, the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain”. I cannot, therefore, disregard that there are examples of services contained in the Act and must enquire further into those examples. In People v Farrell [1978] IR13,O’Higgins CJ stated: - “the application of ejusdem generis rule of construction (which) would indicate that the general terms ‘other convenience place’ (in that said case) ought to be construed in the same senses as the specifics” . I do not find that the service sought by the complainant can be constructed in the same sense as the examples given in the Act. I also note that in the case of O'Hanlon v Logue Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, [1906] 40 I.L.T.R 78; in which the late Ms M’Laughlin bequeathed monies to the Roman Catholic to be applied for the celebration of Masses and which on appeal the question arose as to whether a bequest for the offering of Masses created a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion. The Court held on appeal that worship, which in that case was a Mass, is “the essence of the gift to God” by those participating rather than for the edification of those present and not something available for the general public. While this is an old case, and was decided in a very different context, I believe that it remains relevant to, and persuasive for, the proposition that the celebration of a Mass is not a service to its participants.
There are other reasons as to why I am forced to the view that access to religious services or sacraments do not come within the ambit of the Act. If it were otherwise, it would be unlawful for Churches to refuse the Sacrament of Matrimony to persons who were divorced, or to provide that facility to persons of the same gender. Likewise, it would be unlawful to provide access to Holy Orders to exclusively men to the exclusion of women. There are also many examples of religious denominations that apply different rules to men and women in participation in worship or religious services. There seems to me to be no reason in law or in logic to differentiate between these type of religious services and a Holy Communion Mass. If the Oireachtas had intended to apply the principal of equal treatment, enshrined in the Act, to all of these situations, it would have said so in express terms.
I find therefore that the services sought by the complainant, namely access to a first holy communion mass is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Decision:
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.
CA-00012564-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012567-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012568-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012570-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012571-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012572-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012575-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012577-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. CA-00012583-001 I find that the services sought by the complainant is not a service as defined in the Act and I therefore, find the respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct. |
Dated: 12th August 2020
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Louise Boyle
Key Words:
Equal status, first holy communion mass, religion, gender, member of the travelling community, harassment |