Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Safeguarding Officer

A Care Provider

Representatives

Ms. Bairbre Ryan, B.L. instructed by Michael A O'Brien & Co. Solicitors

Arthur Cox

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994

CA-00020829-001

27/07/2018

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00020829-002

27/07/2018

The following is a summary of the Complainant’s case.

CA-00020829-001 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994

The Complainant was employed from December 2016 in a Deputy Coordinator role (“DHC”) with the Respondent.

The Complainant claims that following a verbal arrangement with the senior manager (“PIC”) in January 2017, she was promoted to the role of DHC and Designated Safeguarding Officer. She said that she did not get a written contract amending her role but continued in the role until her maternity leave commenced on 4 August 2017. She claims that during that time she was presented as the Designated Safeguarding Officer and point of contact in relation to any complaints. The Complainant said that during this time her photograph was displayed throughout the premises and resident houses as the Designated Safeguarding Officer.

The Complainant claims that two new senior management roles were advertised during her maternity leave; both were deputy head positions (deputy PIC’s), one of which included Safeguarding responsibilities. The Complainant claims that this was the role that she held prior to her taking her maternity leave. She said that she had no knowledge that the roles were advertised as she was away from the workplace on maternity leave at the time.

The Complainant said she was concerned that the role she held prior to her maternity leave would no longer be there and were effectively her role would be removed by the two deputy PIC roles. The Complainant expressed her concern to the Reginal Manager and said that she had held the role of DHC and Designated Safeguarding Officer prior to her taking her maternity leave. She said that her Regional Manager was unaware that the Complainant was the previous Designated Safeguarding Officer but assured her that she would have a role to return to after her maternity leave.

She also contacted the new PIC who had taken over while she was on maternity leave and sought clarification on her role. A meeting was held on 26 March 2018 where she was again assured that her role would be available to her on her return from maternity leave. However, when she did return to work following maternity leave, she did not hold any Safeguarding duties and her photographs as the contact person were no longer displayed as was prior to her maternity leave.

The Complainant also claims that she was not put forward for Safeguarding training, which was held in June 2018, despite other colleagues being put forward. The Complainant said that she no longer felt she had the level of support she had prior to taking her maternity leave in August 2017.

The Complainant also raised a complaint about another role that was created, where she said that she was only afforded one day’s notice before attending an interview, as the invitation for interview was sent to her work email address while she was out on maternity leave and had just returned to work.

The Complainant claims that the Respondent is in breach of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 and the Maternity Protection Act (Amendment) Act 2004 and in particular sections 26 and 27 of the Act relating to a general right to return to work on expiry of protective leave and her right to suitable alternative work in certain circumstances on return to work.

The Complainant said that she first submitted a complaint to the PIC about returning to less favourable terms in her employment on 21 March 2018 and prior to her return to work from maternity leave. She said that she had been made aware of changes within the staffing structure in her work place by a third party.

She said that she was ultimately forced to resign following several attempts to resolve matters upon realising that she would never return to the role she held prior to taking her maternity leave.

CA-00020829-002 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

The Complainant claims that her employer is in breach of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 -2015 and had discriminated against her on the grounds of gender and family status whilst on maternity leave and upon return from her maternity leave.

The Complainant said that during her maternity leave period (4 August 2017 – 9 April 2018) a full-time permanent position was advertised for a promoted role and with associated higher pay. She said that the role held the same job description and responsibilities as her role and despite having worked in that role, she was not notified nor given the opportunity to interview for the post, whilst she was out of the workplace on maternity leave. She said that she feels that it was unfavourable treatment whilst she was out of the workplace on maternity leave.

The Complainant said that despite various meetings and email correspondence exchanged from March to July 2018 between her and the Respondent, the matters remain unresolved.

The Complainant said that training relevant to the Safeguarding role was not offered to her on her return from maternity leave, despite training being held in June 2018, two months after her return to the workplace, and despite being offered to other employees in her workplace. The Complainant said that she has since applied to attend a session of this relevant training later in the year, at her own expense.

The following is a summary of the Respondent’s case.

The Respondent is part of a charitable trust working with people with intellectual disabilities.

The Respondent said that the Complainant commenced employment with it on 20 December 2016 as a DHC and her role evolved during the term and she took up the role of Designated Safeguarding Officer in addition to her other DHC duties. She went out on maternity leave from 4 August 2017 until 9 April 2018.

The Respondent said that HIQA carried out an inspection of it and certain findings were made. The Report stated that “the management structure was not robust or stable” and in response to these findings, the Respondent took action by identifying two new senior managers. They would work closely with the PIC and develop safeguarding plans and submit them to the Regional Manager. It said that these changes were all specified in the HIQA report, so it had no choice but to comply.

The Respondent said that during the Complainant’s maternity leave, the two full time permanent positions were advertised for two deputy PIC’s and one of the roles was to incorporate the role of safeguarding and complaints officer. The Respondent said that the deputy PIC role is a senior management role. The new roles advertised were two levels above the Complainant’s grade. The Respondent explained that the usual and normal progression within the organisation is that a staff member, such as the Complainant with a post as a DHC, would first progress to a “Coordinator grade” followed by a “deputy PIC grade” and then finally a “PIC”.

The Respondent said that given the nature of the work there are several positions that have safeguarding responsibilities and there were two Designated Safeguarding Officers from January 2017 to October 2017. The Respondent said that the Safeguarding function is prescribed in law and the PIC has overall legal responsibility for meeting the necessary safeguarding requirements, not the Complainant in her role, which is down the hierarchical structure.

The Respondent said that by email dated 21 March 2018 the Complainant wrote to the PIC raising a formal complaint about the deputy PIC roles while she was on maternity leave. The Complainant said that she had learned that two deputy PIC roles were advertised and one of them would include her safeguarding role. She claimed unfavourable treatment, particularly since the role attracted a €20 per hour remuneration as opposed to her €16 per hour. A meeting was arranged for 28 March 2018.

The Respondent wrote to the Complainant and said that it was willing to increase her pay to €17 per hour, however it would be requiring her to agree to a trial where she would demonstrate that she was able to combine the role of DHC and Designated Safeguarding Officer duties. The Respondent claims that the safeguarding role had changed substantially, since she was away, and was now substantially more robust following the audit by HIQA. The Respondent was adamant that the Complainant was first and foremost a DHC and her related duties was what she was contracted for. The Safeguarding role that she carried out prior to her maternity leave was additional to that role. The Respondent said that the Designated Safeguarding Officer’s role was now a more substantial role, and she would be given an opportunity to perform that role within this new organisational structure if she so wished.

The Respondent said that the PIC did circulate an advertisement to the Complainant in relation to a “Coordinator role”, the grade immediately senior to her grade, on 28 March 2018 which would be a promotional outlet to her within the current structure. The Respondent said that a meeting was organised to discuss the Complainant’s grievance, where the PIC confirmed that the Complainant’s role was not gone, that she was expected to return to her DHC role with safeguarding responsibilities as was before. The Respondent said that it explained that following the HIQA inspection it was required to strengthen the structure of the organisation and the Complainant would have a role to play with the safeguarding structure.  

The Respondent said that it was in the process of clarifying the role and had committed to doing so by 9 April 2018, when the Complainant wrote back to say that she was not happy with the conditions of employment and did not understand why her job was advertised as a full time position while she was on maternity leave without her being informed about it.

The Respondent said that the PIC replied that it was open to the Complainant to appeal the decision under the grievance procedures. However, she did not take up the option. A further email was sent by the PIC on 4 April 2018 and 11 April 2018 inviting the Complainant to communicate with her on the job description and conditions of employment, including an increase in pay and a reduction in her hours, as she had requested. The PIC said she was available to meet with the Complainant and her solicitor to discuss further.

The Respondent said that the Complainant returned to work on 9 April 2018 and chose to continue to work in her role as DHC, on the same rate of pay as prior to her going on maternity leave and she did not take up any safeguarding duties. The PIC said that the Complainant approached her and said that the new terms and conditions would need to be sorted out before she took up any safeguarding duties. The discussion between the Respondent and the Complainant’s solicitor continued throughout April and May 2018. However, the Complainant was not satisfied with the outcome.

The Respondent said that a meeting was held on 9 November 2018 with the Complainant and her solicitor. The Respondent said the Complainant said that she would take on the Designated Safeguarding duties if she received the same rate of pay (€20) as the deputy PIC. The Respondent said that it would review the rate of pay and come back to her within a week. A summary note of the meeting was sent by HR to the Complainant on 13 November 2018. She replied stating that she did not agree with the Respondent’s assessment of events; that she did not have a chance to return to the Designated Safeguarding role that she was doing before going out on maternity leave and was not informed that it was being advertised as a higher position nor given the opportunity to go for this position. She also claims that she had not stepped down from her safeguarding duties as was stated in the minutes.

The Respondent subsequently received a letter of resignation a few days later dated 12 November 2018.

The Legal Submissions

The Respondent highlighted the fact that the legal onus is on the Complainant to establish a prima facie case contrary to section 26 of the Maternity Protection Act and referred to the Labour Court’s decision in Southern Health Board v Mitchell [2001] DEE 011 on the extent of that burden.

The Respondent, in relation to the Complainant’s claim of discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status as regards to promotion, training and conditions of employment, stated that again the onus is on the Complainant to establish the facts of a prima facie case. The Respondent again cited Southern Health Board v Mitchell and the decisions in Minaguchi v. Wineport Lakeshore Restaurant Dec-E2002/20; Department of Defence v. Barrett EET081 and Graham Anthony & Co. Ltd v. Margetts [2003] EDA 038 as the relevant case law for consideration.

The Respondent argued that the Complainant was given numerous assurances from it over the course of a number of months that she would return to the same job with the same, if not better, terms and conditions.

The Respondent said that in light of the HIQA inspection report the Respondent was required to make structural changes to the organisation which included the introduction of more senior roles with senior management responsibility. The Respondent was working with the Complainant on her return to work to determine how that new structure would work and she chose not to engage in her safeguarding responsibilities while discussions were ongoing between the Respondent, the Complainant and her representative on improved terms and conditions. Accordingly, she was not offered training when it became available at that time as it was unsure if she was willing to return to those duties.

In relation to the Complainant’s return to work the Respondent said the Complainant was employed as a DHC and a Designated Safeguarding Officer prior to her maternity leave, when she returned to work, she was returning to the same role only that her solicitor was negotiating better terms and conditions. She was never refused that right of return to the same job. The Respondent maintains that the Complainant has not established facts to substantiate a claim that she was refused to return to her job and therefore has not established a prima facie case and the burden of proof does not shift to it to rebut.

In relation to the claim of less favourable treatment in regard to her conditions of employment the Respondent said that a meeting was held with the Complainant, and the minutes were presented in evidence and were signed by the Complainant dated 26 March 2018. The Respondent said that these demonstrate that the Complainant was returning to the same role she held prior to her maternity leave. It claims that subsequent correspondence exchanged between the parties also support that contention.

In relation to the claim of less favourable treatment in regard to training, the Respondent highlighted the fact that due to an ongoing grievance that the Complainant had with the Respondent on its decision to appoint two new deputy PIC’s she had informed it that she was standing down from her standing duties and accordingly she was not selected for training when is was being scheduled at that period in time. The Respondent said that training could be arranged at a later point.

In relation to the claim of less favourable treatment in regard to promotion the Respondent said that two senior management posts were deemed necessary following the HIQA inspection. These were two posts at a level two grades over the Complainant’s contracted position. These posts were advertised externally as an open competition and the Complainant was not in any way treated less favourability than any other employee because of gender or family status. Each and every employee was treated the same with respect to this competition. The Respondent noted that the two successful candidates were female, one of which has children. Accordingly, she has the same gender as both comparators and the same family status as one of her comparators in respect to this part of her claim.

CA-00020829-001 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994

The Relevant law

“26.—(1) Subject to this Part, on the expiry of a period during which an employee was absent from work while on protective leave, the employee shall be entitled to return to work—

(a) with the employer with whom she or he was working immediately before the start of that period or, where during the employee’s absence from work there was a change of ownership of the undertaking in which she or he was employed immediately before her or his absence, with the owner (in this Act referred to as “the successor”) of the undertaking at the expiry of the period of absence,

(b) in the job which the employee held immediately before the start of that period, and

(c) under the contract of employment under which the employee was employed immediately before the start of that period, or, where a change of ownership such as is referred to in paragraph (a) has occurred, under a contract of employment with the successor which is identical to the contract under which the employee was employed immediately before the start of that period, and (in either case) under terms or conditions —

(i) not less favourable than those that would have been applicable to the employee, and

(ii) that incorporate any improvement to the terms or conditions of employment to which the employee would have been entitled, if she or he had not been so absent from work.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b), where the job held by an employee immediately before the start of the period of her or his absence on protective leave was not the employee’s normal or usual job, the employee shall be entitled to return to work, either in her or his normal or usual job or in that job as soon as is practicable without contravention by the employee or the employer of any provision of a statute or instrument made under statute.

(3) In this section “job”, in relation to an employee, means the nature of the work which she or he is employed to do in accordance with her or his contract of employment and the capacity and place in which she or he is so employed.”

Having heard the evidence from both sides, I am satisfied that the Complainant, prior to taking her maternity leave on 4 August 2017, was contractually employed as a DHC. A copy of her contract was presented to me in evidence. I am satisfied that the Complainant accepted the offer to take on the additional duties as Designated Safeguarding Officer in January 2017 and her details were displayed in the Respondent’s facilities. None of this evidence was contested.

I note the Complainant claims that this Safeguarding Officer was a promotion from her existing role, and it was a verbal agreement with the PIC at the time.

I am satisfied that following a HIQA inspection the Respondent was informed that its structures were insufficiently robust. I have been presented in evidence with the action plan following that inspection, which includes the need for two new positions at senior management level and one shall have a remit for safeguarding, complaints and be the Designated Safeguarding Officer for the centre. These positions were just one level lower than the top PIC in the organisation. I also was informed that the senior PIC left while the Complainant was out on maternity leave and was replaced.

I have heard that the Complainant was informed via a work colleague of the changes to the structure of the organisation and she identified that her role had been “promoted” to a senior management role and that a new person was placed in this role, following an open competition, that she was not informed about or invited to partake in. I am satisfied that once she learned of these changes, she started to seek clarity from the Respondent about the restructuring, and her role. I note that discussions were held, and she said that the senior Regional Manager admitted to her that she was unaware that she held the position of Designated Safeguarding Officer prior to her maternity leave.

I have been gained substantial insight from the evidence presented and very clear exchanges of communications between the parties from 21 March 2018 onward. Where the Complainant, who not returned to work at the time, is claiming that her rights were compromised by the introduction of the new senior management roles and one of which is her job, which is on better terms and conditions to what she was contracted.

I note a meeting was arranged for 26 March 2018 and reassurance was forthcoming from the Respondent that the Complainant would return to the same role she held prior to her maternity leave, including to the role as Safeguarding officer. I note at that meeting the Complainant having been presented with the facts of the restructuring and how the designated safeguarding officer’s role had substantially changed and the fact that she would come back to her role, prior to her maternity leave. I note that she requested a wage increase and possibly an alteration to her working hours.

I note that following that the parties engaged in a negotiation. I note the Complainant was insisting on a wage increase in line with the pay structure of the Deputy PIC who, she deemed, took her role, and the Respondent, in response, was offering a modest pay rise but insisting on a probationary period of three months to determine whether the Complainant could manage her substantial role as both DHC and her new advanced role as Designated Safeguarding Officer, in possibly a shorter working week.

I note that the Complainant refused this offer and the Respondent invited the Complainant to consider grievance procedures. A draft contract was presented to the Complainant so that she could see the defined role and the terms and conditions as proposed. I note that the Respondent in the meantime had sanctioned the Complainant’s return to work on reduced hours as per her request to return to the role of DHC.

It is evident that the Complainant’s legal representative and the Respondent continued to negotiate the details of the proposed new contract. The discussion continued for some time and, in the interim, I note that the Complainant returned to work in the grade she held prior to her maternity leave but she did not carry out any Safeguarding Officer duties. The Complainant claims that she was not given any duties whereas the Respondent said she stood down from that role. I note that no solution could be reached on the “new” contract, and the Complainant resigned her position with the Respondent on 12 November 2018.

Conclusions

I am satisfied that the Complainant was due to return to work when she contacted the Respondent and raised a grievance that her role was effectively advertised and promoted and that she was not notified about this while she was on maternity leave. I note that that Respondent met with the Complainant and explained that the she was to return to her role, that there was a restructuring while she was on maternity leave on foot of a HIQA inspection and the positions advertised were   senior management roles and not her role. From this point, it is clear that the Complainant set out certain demands for her return to work and accordingly sought to return in more favourable terms and conditions akin to the senior management role. These negotiations became the centre piece prior to her return to work, on her return to work and long after she had returned to work.

Notwithstanding these negotiations, I note that the Complainant was a DHC grade. By her own evidence she had taken on the additional duties as a Safeguarding Officer, but she maintained as a DHC grade. I understand that the Safeguarding Officer role was not an onerous workload prior to her maternity leave. She claims that it was a promotion. However, I note the agreement was a verbal arrangement, which I find unusual. There was nothing committed to writing, no competition called to fill the promotion opportunity, no increase in her pay or improvement to her terms and conditions. Namely, all the usual circumstances that would normally align with a promotion opportunity.

It is not disputed that while she was on maternity leave, HIQA demanded a new senior management structure, two grades higher than the grade that the Complainant held. One of those posts was to include Safeguarding responsibilities with a new reporting system and structure. I have heard that the organisation would have a number of additional Designated Safeguarding Officers along with the deputy PIC who held overall responsibility for Safeguarding.

On the balance of probabilities, I find that the Complainant was a DHC and was not promoted beyond that grade when she held the role as a Designated Safeguarding Officer. I am satisfied that she was invited to return to that grade, and role on the same terms and conditions as is required by the Maternity Protection Act 1994. However, she felt aggrieved and she engaged in the negotiation of new terms and conditions in parallel to her return to work. I note that both parties were demanding different elements to be included in the new terms and conditions. There is nothing unusual in that.

I also find that the restructuring of the Respondent was on foot of a HIQA inspection and recommendations. I note that the Respondent is heavily regulated and clearly had to follow those recommendations. The two new roles introduced were senior management roles, and I am satisfied they were not simply the Complainant’s role upgraded or promoted. That, I deem, is just too simplified an explanation. I find nothing unusual in the Respondent’s actions in introducing, advertising and filling of these positions.

In relation to the evidence at to the Complainant’s duties on her return to work, the Complainant was of the view that she got no Safeguarding Officers duties to perform, whereas the Respondent said that she voluntarily stood down from those duties herself, while the negotiations were ongoing. I note that the Complainant’s email signature, on her return to work at this time, was very unusual. Her email signature had her name followed by Designated Safeguarding Officer, which had a line through it. As denoted here “Designated Safeguarding Officer”. In evidence, the Complainant said it was to make the point that she no longer held that role. I am satisfied that she would not have done this if she was still available to take on Designated Safeguarding Officer duties. I am satisfied that it would appear that this action was making a statement to her employer that she was no longer a Designated Safeguarding Officer while those negotiations were ongoing. Accordingly, I prefer the evidence from the Respondent that the Complainant stood down from her Safeguarding duties while the negotiations on a possible new contract where ongoing at the time.

I note that the Complainant’s own evidence is that she was told by both the Regional Manager and the PIC that she would return to her original role.

Accordingly, for the reasons outlined, I find that the Complainant was offered to return to her original role when she returned to work following her maternity leave. However, she instead sought to negotiate new, better terms and conditions. Therefore, the complaint brought under the Maternity Protection Act does not succeed. 

CA-00020829-002 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

The issue for decision here is whether or not the Complainant was subjected to discrimination by the Respondent on the grounds of her gender and family status in terms of the manner in which she was treated in her conditions of employment and not being provided with training in the safeguarding role.

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her. If she succeeds in doing so, then, and only then, is it for the Respondent to prove the contrary. The Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of "sufficient significance" before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent. In deciding on this complaint, therefore, I must first consider whether the existence of a prima facie case has been established by the Complainant. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the burden of proving there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment passes to the Respondent.

In the case of Melbury Developments v Arturs Valpetters [EDA0917] the Labour Court, whilst examining the circumstances in which the probative burden of proof operates stated that a Complainant "must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn …… the burden of establishing the primary facts lay fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule”.

Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where "a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2)”

The complaint under the gender and family status ground in the present case arises as the Complainant was on maternity leave at the period of time when the discriminatory treatment is alleged to have occurred. The Complainant claims that the advertisement of her position for promotion and not affording her the opportunity to apply for that position was discrimination. The Respondent said that the two positions advertised were for senior management roles and not her position, which was still available for her on her return following her maternity leave.

I note that decision in the European Court of Justice stated in Dekker -v- Stichting Vormingscrentrum voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) plus, ECR. 1) that unfavourable treatment as a result of or connected to pregnancy is direct discrimination on the grounds of gender. It later held in Brown v Rentokil (C-394/96 [1998] IRLR 445) that the entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave is a protected period during which both the EU Equal Treatment Directive and EU Pregnancy Directive prohibit dismissal on grounds of pregnancy and dismissal of a pregnant employee during that period can only occur in exceptional circumstances unrelated to pregnancy or maternity. Whilst these cases related to appointments and dismissals, the approach adopted in these cases has also been recognised as extending to the terms and conditions of employment by the European Court of Justice in the case of CNATVS -v- Evelyne Thibault (C-136/95 [1998]) where it was held:

"It must therefore be held that a woman who is accorded unfavourable treatment regarding her working conditions, in that she is deprived of the right to an annual assessment of her performance, and therefore, of the opportunity of qualifying for promotion as a result of absence on account of maternity leave, is discriminated against on the grounds of her pregnancy and her maternity leave. Such conduct constitutes discrimination based directly on grounds of sex within the meaning of the Directives."

I am satisfied that the two senior positions were advertised while the Complainant was on her maternity leave. I note that the positions were advertised externally and brought to the attention of eight employees internally, all of which were in a higher grade to the Complainant and had the required “essential attributes/qualifications”. In particular, the essential qualifications for the role and had the necessary 3 years work experience as specified in the advertisements. The Complainant did not have the essential qualifications for the role, nor the 3 years’ experience and accordingly, she was not informed of the advertisements two senior positions. I note for the records presented that these individuals were also female. I understand that the two successful candidates were female, and one has a number of children. Thus, the same family status as the Complainant.

In relation to the claim of discrimination regarding the failure by the Respondent to select the Complainant for safeguarding training, the Complainant has not identified a comparator that was selected for training. As I noted above, the Complainant returned to work in April 2018. The training that the Complainant is claiming she was not selected for was a specific training package provided by a third party. I note that she claims that she was not put forward for training whereas work colleagues were. I understand that the first availability for training was June 2018. This is clearly after her return to work, and outside of the period of pregnancy and maternity leave, the protected period during, which both the EU Equal Treatment Directive and EU Pregnancy Directive provide. Accordingly, it is for the Complainant to establish a prima facie case that the actions or inactions of the Respondent in relation to safeguarding training are by reason of discrimination due to one or both the protected grounds. Namely, gender and family status. That case has not been made out.

Accordingly, from the evidence adduced in these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminated on grounds of gender and family status in terms of Section 6(2) and contrary to Section 8 of those Acts.

CA-00020829-001 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994

The complaint pursuant to the Maternity Protection Act is not well founded.

CA-00020829-002 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

Based on all of the foregoing, I find, pursuant to Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case.  

Employment Equality Acts - Maternity Protection Act - gender and family status - failed to establish a prima facie case