Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A solicitor

A legal practice.

Representatives

self

Susan Lennox BL

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00028802-002

31/05/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00029346-001

31/05/2019

The Complainant is a solicitor and was employed by the Respondent from 14/05/2018 until 12/09/2018.

Complaints under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 were received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 31st May 2019.

Preliminary Argument: Respondent.

Put forward by the Respondent.

It was submitted by the Respondent that both complaints are statute barred as they are brought outside the six-month statutory limits as imposed under section 7(3) of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and section 6(4) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.

The Complainant worked from 14th May 2018 until 12th September 2018, the cognizable period therefore is 13th September 2018 to 13th March 2019. The complaint was received by the WRC on 31st May 2019, some two and a half months outside the six month time limit.

The Respondent quoted Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT 0338 (28/10/2003) in which the Labour Court in considering whether “reasonable cause” exists, held it was for the Complainant to show that there were “reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay”.

In Alert One Security Ltd v Khan DWT 72 / 2015, time was extended where the Complainant was both ignorant of the law and was relying on advices of his employer. The Complainant, a solicitor can certainly not claim that she was ignorant of the law or reliant on the Respondent for her legal advice.

Abbot Vascular v Patrick Baggott EET121 05/11/2012 held the question the Adjudication Officershould ask is whether“a reasonable diligent person, having the same state of knowledge of the material facts as the complainant would have delayed in pursuing a claim for the reasons advanced by the complainant”

The grounds advanced by the Complainant for not having submitted her claim on time, neither explain or excuse the delay and therefore reasonable cause has not been shown to justify an extension of time.

The Complainant contends that she was unable to submit a claim to the Workplace Relations Commission due to the fact that the Respondent was in possession of her files and would not release them to her. This being the case it was impossible to quantify her claim made under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.

The Complainant made several attempts to secure these files from the Respondent and only managed this in February 11th, 2019 when she secured other employment.

The Complainant is a solicitor and should be well acquainted with legal deadlines etc.,

The Complainant could not be given the files referred to until she secured another position and gained a practising certificate. She commenced other employment on 11th February 2019, approximately one month before the end of the six month period.

In the case of Cementation Skanska Ltd v Tom Carroll DWT 0338.

The Labour Court provided its view of the standard that should be applied in applications for time extensions under the ground of “reasonable cause”

“It is noted that the standard required by this subsection is that of ‘reasonable cause’. This may be contrasted with the much higher standard of ‘exceptional circumstances preventing the making of the claim’ which is provided for in other employment related statutes. The Act gives no guidance as to the type of circumstances that can constitute reasonable cause and it would appear to be a matter of fact to be decided by the Rights Commissioner (and by extension the Court on appeal) in each individual case.

It is the Courts view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the complainant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons. Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time. Here the Court should consider if the Respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case”.

I have considered the points raised and find that no reasonable cause for the delay and failing to meet the deadline existed.

I have no jurisdiction to hear the complaint due to the failure to meet the deadline.

The complaints being submitted outside the statutory time limit are therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Adjudication Officer.

Time Limits, Reasonable Cause.