Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Teacher

A Government Department

Representatives

Conor E Byrne BL instructed by Michelle Loughnane Richard Grogan & Associates

Cathy Smith BL instructed by the Chief State Solicitor's Office

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994

CA-00029032-001

12/06/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00029032-002

12/06/2019

The complainant qualified as a primary teacher. After she qualified, she put her name on a supply list for substitute teachers.   She commenced working as a substitute teacher on 07 March 2003 and became a member of the pension scheme.   The pension scheme the complainant joined was the one applicable prior to 01 April 2004 (Old Scheme). The complainant gave birth to her first child on 09 September 2013. The complainant returned to work as a substitute teacher on 17 February 2014.   In 2018 she made an enquiry about her pension contributions. The respondent informed her she had made contributions into both the pre-01 April 2004 scheme (Old Scheme) and the Single Public Service Pension Scheme (Single Scheme) schemes. The complainant claims her contributions should always have been to the original pre-01 April 2004 scheme (Old Scheme). She claims that she was on maternity leave between 19 August 2013 and 15 February 2014 and this period should not have been treated as a break in her service resulting in her being placed in a less favourable pension scheme on her return from maternity leave. Her total pay for the year ending 31 December 2018 was €29,721.87. The complainant submitted her complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission on 12 June 2019.

The complainant has made two claims. The first, under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994 Sections 30 and 31 claiming she did not receive her entitlement to maternity leave and that she returned to work following maternity leave on less favourable terms and conditions, in particular her pension and these conditions are ongoing and continuing.   The second, under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 claiming she has been discriminated against, by reason of her gender and family status, by her employer classing her maternity leave as a break in service resulting in her being placed on a less favourable pension scheme.

The complainant commenced working as a substitute teacher in 2003. She joined the Old Pension Scheme. She worked at various schools substituting for other teachers. She gave birth to her first child on 09 September 2013 and she states that she was on maternity leave from 19 August 2013 to 15 February 2014. She returned to work on 17 February 2014. She gave birth to her second child in 2016.

On 16 April 2018 the complainant sent a query to the Pensions Unit of the respondent. She wished to know to which pension scheme she was making contributions. The respondent operates three pension schemes; the pre-01 April 2004 (Old Scheme), post-01 April 2004 (New Entrant) and the post 2013 Single Public Service Pension Scheme (Single Scheme). After a number of reminder emails the respondent replied on 08 November 2018.   The respondent informed the complainant that she had made contributions to both the Old Scheme and to the Single Scheme. The complainant was informed that the reason she was now contributing to the Single Scheme was because of her break in service in 2013/2014. That is the period she claims she was on maternity leave for the birth of her first child.

The complainant submits that there are considerable differences between the schemes. The Single Scheme being less favourable than the Old Scheme. She submits that the period from 19 August 2013 to 15 February 2014 was a period of maternity leave, protective leave and was not a break in service.

The complainant submits she was not permitted to return to her post on terms and conditions which were no less favourable to her in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the EU Directive 2006/54/EC and the Maternity Protection Act 1994.   The less favourable terms and conditions are ongoing and continuing.

The complainant further submits she was discriminated against by the respondent and continues to be discriminated against, by reason of her gender and family status in having her maternity leave classed as a break in service resulting in her being moved to a less favourable pension scheme.

It is submitted that the complainant has been treated less favourably than her male counterparts as well as her female counterparts who have not availed themselves of maternity leave.

Legal Submission

The complainant submits EU Directive 2006/54/EC at Article 15 and the Maternity Protection Act 1994 prohibits an employer from treating an employee on maternity leave less favourably on her return to work. The EU Directive has direct effect and is applicable to Irish employees. Sections 26 and 27 of the 1994 Act give an employee the right to return to the same or no less favourable job at the end of maternity leave.

The Employment Equality Act prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status.   Section 6 (2A) provides that discrimination on the gender ground shall be taken to occur where, on a ground related to her pregnancy or maternity leave, a woman employee is treated less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated. This reflects the approach of the European Court in Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (Case C 177/88) [1990] ECR I-3941.

The complainant did not receive a document which set out a gender equality clause or a non-discriminatory clause, but such clauses are taken to be included in the terms of her contract by Sections 21 and 30 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 (as amended).

The submission relied on O’Brien v Persian Properties T/A O’Callaghan Hotels DEC-E2012-010, Gardiner v Mercer Human Resource Consulting DEC-E2006-007, Jones v Norwich Union International Limited DEC-E2006-062, Campbell v Bank of Ireland Private Banking DEC-E2013-046 and Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda Case C-333/97. The complainant relied on Ntoko v Citibank [2004] 15 E.L.R. 116 to support the use of a hypothetical comparator.

It was submitted that the complainant had discharged the burden of proof pursuant to Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts and relied on the Labour Court decisions in Hallinan v Moy Valley Resources DEC-E2008-025 and Cork County Council v McCarthy EDA0821. In the Hallinan case the Labour Court set out that a complainant meeting the burden of proof must establish: -

         i.            That he or she is covered by the protected ground;

       ii.            Establish the specific treatment has allegedly taken place;

     iii.            That the treatment was less favourable than was or would be afforded to a person not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground.

The complainant is seeking to be placed back on the Old Scheme and is seeking compensation for the effects of discrimination. It is submitted that the decision in Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, CD Robinson-Steele Case C-131/04 should be considered in assessing compensation.

Further, it was submitted that the complainant was entitled to legal aid or in the alternative, in addition to an award of compensation, the costs incurred, by virtue of Case C-684/16 and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union and the Von Colson principles.

The complainant rejects any argument that the time period within which to bring these claims was within six months of her return to work from her first period of maternity leave. It is submitted the discrimination against the complainant is ongoing and continuing.   The complainant relies on the decisions in GP Trainer v Health Provider ADJ-00016102 and HSE v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331 to reject any argument the claims are brought out of time.

Preliminary Points

Complaints Statute Barred

The respondent submits that each claim is statute barred. The complainant maintains that in 2014 she was denied her rights under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994 by not being permitted to return to her post on terms and conditions which are no less favourable. The complainant also claimed that this treatment constituted discrimination under the Employment Equality Act. The respondent submits that any such complaints should have been brought within six months of the relevant date in 2014.

The respondent submits that the decision in HSE v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331 is particular to a claim under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and does not support a defence to a claim that the within complaints are statute barred. As the complainant submitted her complaints on 12 June 2019 the time period for consideration for both complaints can only be from 12 December 2018 to 12 June 2019. No breach of the Maternity Protection Act, 1994 and no act of discrimination contrary to the Employment Equality Act, has been pleaded within the appropriate time period.

Complainant Not an Employee

It is submitted that the complainant has never been the employee of the respondent. Where a complaint relates to conditions of employment, contrary to Section 8 of the Employment Equality Act, the complaint is one which can only be maintained in the context of an employer employee relationship. As there is no contract of employment between the complainant and the respondent there can be no discrimination contrary to Section 8 of the Act.

Similarly, the 1994 Act defines employer at Section 2 as “the person with whom the employee has entered into or for whom the employee works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment”. The respondent relies on the Supreme Court decision in Boyle v Hillside Park School and the Minister for Education and Skills [2018] IESC 52 in which case the Supreme Court clarified that this is no contract of employment between the Minister for Education and a teacher.

Section 8 of 1998 Act Excludes Pension Rights

The complaints here relate specifically to the complainant’s pension rights, which are expressly excluded under Section 8 of the Employment Equality Act. The respondent submits that the complaint is misconceived in law and requested the claim be dismissed in accordance with Section 77A of the Act. The complaint which has been made as to a breach of Section 8 of the Act is excluded from the ambit of that section and the respondent relies on the decision in Mongans v Clare County Council DEC S2008-039 where it was held that:- “A complaint is misconceived if it is incorrectly based in law example if the complaint did not relate in any way to the 9 discriminatory grounds under the Equal Status Acts. It would be misconceived.”

Complaint Misconceived

The respondent submits that where the jurisdictional and legal difficulties have been brought to the attention of the complainant and the Workplace Relations Commission any continuation of the complaint could be considered vexatious.

This submission is made on the basis that the complaint was initiated under the incorrect piece of legislation and it is submitted that it cannot succeed and, in that regard, following the dicta of Birmingham J in O’N v McD [2013] IEHC 135, this imposes a hardship on the respondent where it has to expend time, effort and money in defending a complaint in those circumstances.

The respondent submits that the complaint is both misconceived and vexatious within the meaning of Section 77A of the Act. The respondent requests that it be dismissed on these grounds.

Burden of Proof

The respondent submits that the complainant has not established facts from which the complaint of discrimination can be presumed to have occurred, where the claim which has been made is expressly excluded from that legislation.

The respondent submits the complainant has not met the burden of proof required under Section 85A(i) of the Act. The respondent relies on the Labour Court decision in Southern Health Board v Mitchell AEE/99/8 which established that a complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

Substantive Issue

Employment Equality Act

The respondent states that the complainant was employed on a casual daily basis by several different schools. The respondent presented a list of the dates and schools at which the complainant worked between January 2013 and November 2014. The complainant worked for a total of 62 days at 11 different schools in that period. The schools are referred to by letters A to K. The table shows that the complainant worked for 4 days, from 19 to 24 June 2013, at school K. Her next working day was at school J on 17 February 2014, where she worked for 1 day.  

The respondent does not know if the complainant was in receipt of maternity benefit in the period alleged to be maternity leave. The respondent does not accept that the complainant was on maternity leave, as defined in the 1994 Act, in the relevant period as she was not in employment in this period or in the immediate period prior to this. The complainant’s last working day, 24 June 2013, was substantially before the date she claims to have commenced her maternity leave.

The respondent submits that as the complainant was not in employment she was not on leave from employment, maternity or any other type of leave. In order for the period to be a period of leave it would need to be connected in some way to employment and it is not.

The definition of maternity leave in Section 8(1) of the Maternity Protection Acts, 1994-2004, is: -

Subject to this Part, a pregnant employee shall be entitled to leave, to be known (and referred to in this Act) as “maternity leave”, from her employment for a period (in this Part referred to as the minimum period of maternity leave) of not less than 26 consecutive weeks.

The respondent submits that this definition supports the submission that maternity leave is leave from employment. Further, it is only maternity leave, as defined by the Act, which is a protected period of leave. If the complainant had been on maternity leave her membership of her existing pension scheme would have been continued. It is submitted that as the complainant was not in employment as a teacher in August 2013 she was not on maternity leave from her employment.   Accordingly, the period, which the complainant describes as a period of maternity leave, is not in fact maternity leave within the meaning of the 1994 Act.

The Single Scheme applies to persons who start pensionable public service employment on or after 01 January 2013. The rules of the scheme apply to any public service employee in a pensionable post who commenced employment on or after 01 January 2013 or who resumes public service employment after that date following a break of more than 26 weeks, be they full-time, part-time, permanent or temporary.

The respondent submits that when the complainant’s employment as a substitute teacher terminated, in June 2013, that there followed a break in service. The respondent submits that the relevant period was not a protected period but a break in service simpliciter. The fact that the complainant was pregnant and gave birth in this period, does not and cannot change the employment status of the complainant or convert a break in service into a period of protective leave.

Maternity Protection Act

The respondent submits notwithstanding the complaint which has been made, no facts have been asserted which give rise to the refusal of maternity leave to the complainant by the respondent.

The respondent submits that at no time was the complainant employed by the respondent and at no time did the complainant apply for maternity leave from the respondent.

The respondent submits that the complaint under the 1994 Act has been articulated as a failure to permit the complainant to return to her employment on the same terms and conditions as prior to her maternity leave has no legal basis in fact or in law.   The complainant was not employed by the respondent, she was not on maternity leave within the meaning of the Act, and she did not return to the respondent’s employment after the period in question. The respondent submits there was no breach of the 1994 Act or the Directive, as claimed.

The respondent raised several preliminary points. The first matter I must consider is if I have jurisdiction to hear the dispute referred under the 1994 Act and the claim submitted under the 1998 Act.

The background is as follows. The complainant became a member of the pension scheme, the Old Scheme, when she first commenced employment as a substitute primary teacher in 2003. In 2018 the complainant made an enquiry about her pension to establish to which scheme she had contributed. The respondent informed her that she had contributed to both the Old Scheme and to the Single Scheme.

The complainant discovered that the change from the Old Scheme to the Single Scheme had occurred in 2014. The new Single Scheme was introduced on 01 January 2013. The complainant claims that she was on maternity leave between 19 August 2013 and 15 February 2014. She claims that maternity leave is a period of protective leave and she should have maintained all her terms and conditions, including a right to remain in the Old Scheme, during this period of protective leave.

The respondent denies that the complainant was their employee. Further, it states that the complainant, as a substitute teacher, worked at various schools for short periods. That her last day at work in 2013 was 24 June when she worked at school K.   The complainant returned to work on 17 February 2014, when she worked for one day at a different school, school J.   Between June 2013 and February 2014, for a period of approximately 34 weeks, the respondent submits the complainant was not employed as a substitute teacher. The respondent submits that this period was a break in service and not a period of protective leave. The respondent accepts that if the complainant was on protective leave then she would have remained a member of the Old Scheme.

Public service employees in pensionable posts commencing employment on or after 01 January 2013 or resuming employment after that date following a break in service of more than 26 weeks join the Single Scheme. It was accepted by the respondent that the terms of the Single Scheme are less favourable than the terms of the Old Scheme.

The complainant claims she has been discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of gender and family status by having her terms and conditions, specifically her membership of a pension scheme, changed because of availing herself of maternity leave.   Further, she claims the respondent denied her her rights under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994 as she did not receive her entitlement to maternity leave and had not permitted her to return from maternity leave on the same terms and conditions of employment.

The respondent submits that the two claims are statute barred and as such that deprives the Workplace Relations Commission of jurisdiction to hear the dispute and the complaint. Further, the respondent submits that the complainant has never been the employee of the respondent and as there is no contract of employment between the parties there can be no discrimination contrary to Section 8 of the Employment Equality Act or denial of entitlements under the Maternity Protection Act.

CA-00029032-001

The time limit for referring a dispute relating to the entitlement of an employee under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994 was amended by the Workplace Relations Act, 2015.   Section 41 (7) provides: -

(7) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a dispute referred to him or her under this section if—

(a) …

(b) …

(c) in the case of a dispute relating to the entitlement of an employee under the Act of 1994, it has been referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date on which the employer is informed—

(i) that the employee is pregnant, has recently given birth or is breastfeeding,

(ii) in the case of an employee who is the expectant father of a child, that the expectant mother of the child is pregnant, or

(iii) in the case of an employee who is the father of a child who has been born, that the child’s mother has died,

(d) …

(e) …

(f) …

(g) …

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section

applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the

period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such

expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the

complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.

The dispute under the 1994 Act referred by the complainant is that she did not receive her entitlement to maternity leave and that she returned to work on less favourable terms and conditions.   The complainant worked at school K from 19 to 24 June 2013. There was no explanation of the complainant’s status for the period from 25 June 2013 to 19 August 2013. The complainant did not present evidence of complying with the notice requirements of Sections 9 and 28 of the Act. The complainant claims she was on maternity leave from 19 August 2013 to 15 February 2014. The complainant next worked as a substitute teacher at school J on 17 February 2014.   The referral of this dispute was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 12 June 2019. I am satisfied that this dispute was referred outside of the time limit specified in Section 7 (c). Therefore, I find I do not have jurisdiction to hear this dispute.

CA-00029032-002

Section 77 (5) (a) of the Employment Equality Act provides; -

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace

Relations Commissionor Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified

in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly

The effect of this provision is that the complainant can only seek redress in respect of occurrences during the six-month period prior to the date on which the complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission. The complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 12 June 2019. The relevant six-month period is from 13 December 2018 to 12 June 2019.

The complainant alleges she was discriminated against by her employer, by reason of her gender and family status, in her employer classing her maternity leave as a break in service resulting in her being placed on a less favourable pension scheme.   The complainant claims to have taken maternity leave from 19 August 2013 to 15 February 2014. The complainant was placed into membership of the Single Scheme in 2014. Clearly the event complained about took place in 2014, outside the six-months prior to the date of the claim being submitted to the Workplace Relations Commission.

The complainant submits that the alleged discrimination is ongoing and continuing and that it is subsisting contravention. The complainant relies on the decision in GP Trainer v Health Provider ADJ-00016102 in relation to the claim of subsisting contravention. In relation to a continuing breach the complaint relies on the decision in HSE v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331.

The respondent submits that the claim relates to an alleged denial of rights in 2014. Therefore, any complaint should have been brought within six months of that date. Further, that the decision relied on in HSE v McDermott is one particular to the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.

The issue in GP Trainer v Health Provider concerned the requirement on an employer to provide a written statement of the main terms and conditions of employment to their employee. The Terms of Employment (Information) Act transposed Directive 91/533/EC. That Act was amended by the Workplace Relations Act, 2015. The adjudicator was required to interpret domestic law while ensuring that the Directive was given full effect. He relied on the Labour Court decision in Seclusion Properties Ltd v O’Donovan DWT14114 which held: - “It is clear that the obligation on domestic courts and tribunals to interpret national law in conformity with a Directive applies ‘as far as possible’. That is to say, it cannot serve as a basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem. As was pointed out by the CJEU in Dominguez v Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, a conforming interpretation can only be arrived at by taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the Directive in question is fully effective and that an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the Directive is achieved.” The adjudicator’s finding that the contravention of Section 3 of Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 was a subsisting contravention was in the context of interpreting domestic law to ensure the Directive in question was given full effect. I am satisfied that the decision in GP Trainer v Health Provider is not a defense to the claim the complaint is statute barred.

In HSE v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331 the court considered the time period for bringing claims under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991. The complainant claimed that there had been unlawful deductions from his pay between 01 January 2011 and 30 June 2011. Salary increases due from 01 June 2009 had not been paid. However, the claim submitted related to deductions made in 2011. Hogan J held; - “It is at this point that we can return to the construction of the relevant language of s. 6(4), namely, “within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates”. The first thing to note is that no special meaning has been ascribed to the word “contravention” by the 1991 Act, so that it must be given its ordinary, natural meaning.

13. We may next observe that the actual language of the sub-section is clear, because it is the words “contravention to which the complaint relates” which are critical. It may be accepted that every distinct and separate breach of the 1991 Act amounts to a “contravention” of that Act. If, for example, an employee is paid monthly and the employer makes unlawful deduction X in respect of salary for every month in a two year period it might be said in the abstract that there have been 24 separate “contraventions” of the 1991 Act during that period.

14. Yet the relevant statutory language takes us somewhat further, because the key question is the “date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.” In other words, time runs for the purposes of the Act not from the date of any particular contravention or even the date of the first contravention, but rather from the date of the contravention “to which the complaint relates.” As the EAT pointed out in its ruling on the matter, had the Oireachtas intended that time was to run from the date of the first contravention, it could easily have so provided.

15. For the purposes of this limitation period, everything turns, accordingly, on the manner in which the complaint is framed by the employee. If, for example, the employer has been unlawfully making deductions for a three-year period, then provided that the complaint which has been presented relates to a period of six months beginning “on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates”, the complaint will nonetheless be in time.”

Complaints under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 will be in time so long as the complaint presented relates to a period of six months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. Each new deduction would be a contravention of the Act and a complaint about that new contravention may be brought within six months of that contravention.

The complainant’s claim under the Employment Equality Act, 1998, is that she was discriminated against by her employer by reason of gender and family status in her employer classing her maternity leave as a break in service resulting in her being placed on a less favourable pension scheme. This claim arises from the complainant being placed on the Single Scheme in 2014. No act of discrimination contrary to the Employment Equality Act, 1998, between 13 December 2018 and 12 June 2019 has been pleaded or presented. I am satisfied that HSE v McDermott does not support the concept of a continuing breach but rather deals with repeated breaches of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 where each new breach gave rise to a fresh six-month period within which a complaint may be presented.

The Labour Court in HSE v Whelehan EDA0923 considered Section 77(5) of the Act in a case brought in 2007 in which the complainant claimed that certain documents created by the respondent during an investigation contained material which amounted to discrimination against him on the disability ground. The relevant documents had been created in 2001. The complainant became aware of the existence of these documents in 2007 and he lodged his complaint. He submitted that the Act must be construed in a common-sense way and that it would be absurd to hold that he should have made a claim before he became aware of the facts upon which the claim was based. The Labour Court found the claim was presented outside the time limit prescribed by Section 77 and stated: -

“In considering this question the Court has also had regard to s.5 of the Interpretation Act 2005, which provides: -

·       5.— (1) In construing a provision of any Act (other than a provision that relates to the imposition of a penal or other sanction)—

(a) that is obscure or ambiguous, or(b) that on a literal interpretation would be absurd or would fail to reflect the plain intention of—(i)in the case of an Act to which paragraph (a) of the definition of “Act” in section 2(1) relates, the Oireachtas, or(ii)in the case of an Act to which paragraph (b) of that definition relates, the parliament concerned,

·       the provision shall be given a construction that reflects the plain intention of the Oireachtas or parliament concerned, as the case may be, where that intention can be ascertained from the Act as a whole.

Section 77(5) is neither obscure nor ambiguous. Nor could it be regarded as producing an absurd result since its literal interpretation is in line with the generally applicable law relating to limitation periods. Had the Oireachtas intended to provide a discoverability test it could easily have made such a provision.”

The issue of discoverability was not pleaded in this case, but I note that the claim was submitted more than six months after the complainant was told, on 08 November 2018, that she had been placed in the Single Scheme in 2014.

The Labour Court in County Cork VEC v Hurley EDA1124 considered the issue of continuing discrimination and the application of Sections 77(5) and (6A). The Court determined that the two sections deal with different forms of continuing discrimination. Section 77(5) deals with separate acts of discrimination that were sufficiently connected so as to constitute a continuum of discrimination.   In order for a complainant to succeed in establishing a continuum of discrimination she would have to show that there were acts of discrimination, within the six months prior to the claim being submitted, which were sufficiently linked to the other earlier alleged acts of discrimination. The Court found that Section 77(6A) deals with a single act extending over a period of time provided the complaint is submitted within six months of the point at which the discrimination ended.

I have carefully considered the submissions and presentations in this case. The events that give rise to the complainant being placed on the Single Scheme occurred between 2013 and 2014. During questioning at the hearing, it was confirmed that information about pension contributions are noted on the payslip issued to substitute teachers. The complainant did not make an enquiry about her pension contributions until April 2018. She eventually received a reply on 08 November 2018. The claim for redress was received on 12 June 2019. The cognisable period is 13 December 2018 to 12 June 2019. The claim relates to being placed on the Single Scheme in 2014. I am satisfied the claim for redress received on 12 June 2019 was submitted outside the time limit prescribed by Section 77 of the Act.   Therefore, I find I do not have jurisdiction to hear this claim.

CA-00029032-001 – Complaint under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994

Having carefully considered all the evidence available to me I am satisfied that this dispute was referred outside of the time limit specified in Section 7 (c) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015. Therefore, I find I do not have jurisdiction to hear this dispute.

CA-00029032-002 – Complaint under the Employment Equality Act, 1998

Having carefully considered all the evidence available to me I am satisfied that the claim was submitted outside the time limit prescribed by Section 77 of the Act.   Therefore, I find I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.

Maternity Leave

Break in Service

Pension

Discrimination Gender / Family Status