Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Lorry Driver

A Waste Management Company

Representatives

The Complainant attended in person and was not legally represented

Ms. Cathy McGrady B.L. on the instructions of Farrell McElwee Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00031029-001

19/09/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00031029-002

19/09/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00031029-003

19/09/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00031029-004

19/09/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

CA-00031029-005

19/09/2019

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Lorry Driver from February, 1994 until 20 February, 2019 when his employment was terminated. The Complainant claims that he was constructively dismissed from his employment as a result of being subjected to bullying and harassment by the Yard Manager. The Complainant claims that his constructive dismissal amounts to an unfair dismissal contrary to the Unfair Dismissals Acts.

The Worker claims that he was subjected to bullying and harassment in the workplace during his period of employment with the Employer and has sought to have these matters investigated in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969.

The Complainant also claims that the Respondent has contravened the provisions of Section 3 and 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 in relation to his employment.

The Respondent disputes the claim of constructive dismissal under the Unfair Dismissals Acts and contends that the Complainant resigned from his employment of his own volition. The Respondent disputes that it has contravened the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 in relation to the Complainant’s employment.

The Employer also disputes that the Worker was subjected to bullying and harassment during his period of employment and contends that he failed to invoke any grievance under the internal procedures in relation to the alleged behaviour.

CA-00031029-001– Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant contends that he did not receive a written contract of employment from the Respondent during his period of employment. The Complainant claims that the Respondent has contravened the provisions of Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 in relation to his employment.

CA-00031029-002 – Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant stated that he was absent from work for a period of time in 2016 after suffering a heart attack. The Complainant stated that he was required to drive a smaller lorry following his return to work after this sick absence and he contends that this amounted to a change in his terms and conditions of employment. The Complainant claims that the Respondent has contravened the provisions of Section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 by failing to notify him in writing of this change to his terms and conditions of employment.

CA-00031029-004 – Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

The Complainant stated that he had experienced a medical condition affecting his bowels for approx. three years prior to the termination of his employment. The Complainant stated that he had requested the Respondent on several occasions during this period to install suitable toilet and sanitary facilities within the workplace to accommodate his medical condition. The Complainant stated that the existing toilet and sanitary facilities on site were not suitable and the Respondent failed to accede to his repeated requests to install suitable facilities.

The Complainant stated that he was present in the Respondent’s yard on 20 February, 2019 when he was approached by the Yard Manager, Mr. A, who was enquiring as to the whereabouts of another worker. The Complainant stated that he responded to Mr. A by saying that the other worker was “over there where the new toilets are supposed to be built”. The Complainant stated that Mr. A “turned on him” and launched a tirade of abusive language calling him “a big f…king man”, “a f…king pr..k and a c..t” and “to go a see my f..king employer who pays my wages”. The Complainant stated that he was shocked by the nature of the treatment to which he was subjected by Mr. A and felt that he had no other option but to leave his employment.

The Complainant stated that he left his employment immediately following the incident involving Mr. A and did not receive any subsequent contact from the Respondent. The Complainant stated that there wasn’t any point in contacting the owner of the business about this matter prior to his resignation as he considered the owner would have taken the side of Mr. A in relation to the matter. The Complainant contends that he was constructively dismissed from his employment as a result of the bullying and harassment to which he had been subjected to by Mr. A.

CA-00031029-005 – Dispute under the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

The Worker contends that he was subjected to bullying and harassment by his Employer during his period of employment. The Worker stated that he was subjected to abusive behaviour by the Yard Manager, Mr. A, during an incident on 20 February, 2020 which ultimately led to his resignation.

The Worker contends that this bullying and harassment occurred in response to his attempts to persuade the Employer to install proper toilet and sanitary facilities in the workplace to accommodate his medical condition.

CA-00031029-001 – Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Respondent submits that the WRC does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 on the basis that the Complainant has failed to refer the complaints to the Director General within the six-month time limit provided for in Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Respondent also submits that the Complainant has failed to establish that his failure to refer the complaints within the required time limit was due to reasonable cause, and therefore, he cannot avail of an extension to the time limit under the provisions of Section 41(8) of the Act.

The Respondent submits, without prejudice to the issue of jurisdiction concerning time limits, that it has not contravened the provisions of Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 in relation to the Complainant’s employment.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was issued with a written contract of employment in 1994 following his commencement of employment. The Respondent contends that the Complainant was issued with an updated contract of employment in 2017 which included references to the company’s grievance procedures and other internal policies. However, the Complainant failed to sign this contract and return a copy to the Office Administrator.

CA-00031029-002 – Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Respondent submits, without prejudice to the issue of jurisdiction concerning time limits, that it has not contravened the provisions of Section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 in relation to the Complainant’s employment.

The Respondent disputes the Complainant’s contention that his terms and conditions were changed following his return to work after sick absence in 2016. The Respondent accepts that the Complainant was asked to drive a smaller lorry following his return to work. However, the Respondent contends that this measure was discussed with the Complainant and was put in place to accommodate his medical condition after he had suffered a heart attack. The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s role with the company was that of a lorry driver and the request to drive a smaller vehicle did not alter his terms and conditions of employment.

CA-00031029-004 – Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

The Respondent submits that the WRC does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts on the basis that the Complainant has failed to refer the complaint to the Director General within the six-month time limit provided for in Section 8(2)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. The Respondent also submits that the Complainant has failed to establish that his failure to refer the complaint within the required time limit was due to reasonable cause, and therefore, he cannot avail of an extension to the time limit under the provisions of Section 8(2)(b) of the Act.

The Respondent submits, without prejudice to the issue of jurisdiction concerning time limits, that the Complainant was not unfairly dismissed and that he left his employment of his own volition. The Respondent submits that it was not made aware at any stage of the Complainant’s alleged bowel condition and was never presented with any medical evidence thereof. The Respondent submits that the Complainant is entirely disingenuous in his description of the toilet facilities and contends that there were always adequate toilet facilities available to him within the workplace. The Respondent submits that one of the toilets at the back of the canteen was occasionally left in a terrible state by some employees, which resulted in blocking. However, approx. 20 yards away from the station, there was a brand new portacabin with toilet and hand wash facilities. There was also a toilet at the garage approx. 300 metres away.

Evidence of Mr. A, Yard Manager

Mr. A, Yard Manager, stated that he drove into the Respondent’s yard on 20 February, 2020 and pulled up beside the canteen in order to ascertain the whereabouts of another employee. Mr. A stated that he asked the Complainant if he had seen the other employee and the Complainant responded that he “was out sh.ting in the field”. Mr. A stated that he responded to the Complainant by saying that “you’re a big man when you have a crowd around”. Mr. A stated that the Complainant started using expletives towards him and that he informed the Complainant to go and talk to the owner of the company. Mr. A stated that he drove out of the yard and he denies having used abusive or derogatory language towards the Complainant. Mr. A stated that he returned to the yard about half an hour later and was informed by another employee that the Complainant had left the yard stating that he was going home and “f..k Mr. A”.

The Respondent also adduced evidence from two other employees (Mr. B and Mr. C) who stated that they had witnessed the incident between Mr. A and the Complainant outside of the canteen on 20 February, 2020. Mr. B and Mr. C both stated that they did not hear Mr. A using foul or abusive language towards the Complainant during the course of their interaction on this occasion.

CA-00031029-005 – Dispute under the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

The Employer disputes the Worker’s claim of bullying and harassment in the workplace. The Employer submits that the Complainant was provided with a copy of the internal grievance procedures during his period of employment. The Employer submits that the Worker failed to invoke the internal grievance procedures in relation to the alleged bullying and harassment prior to his resignation.

Jurisdictional Issue – Name of Respondent

The first issue that I must decide relates to the jurisdictional issue raised by the Respondent as to whether or not the Complainant has pursued the incorrect entity as the Respondent in these proceedings.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant has referred the complaint against the trading name of the business (XXX YYY ZZZ) and contends that the correct identity of his employer was XXX YYY Limited. The Respondent submits that the Complainant has therefore pursued the incorrect Respondent and is now statute barred in her claim.

The Complainant submits that he was not aware of the correct name of the legal entity that employed him and that the trading name of the business (XXX YYY ZZZ) was included on all documentation and correspondence which he received from the Respondent. The Complainant contends that his employer was fully aware of this complaint at all material times and he sought leave to amend the name of the Respondent to that of the correct legal entity which had employed him.

Therefore, the question I must decide is whether or not it is legally permissible for me to accede to the Complainant’s application to substitute the correct respondent in this case. In considering this issue, I have taken cognisance of the Labour Court case of Auto Depot Limited -v- Vasile Mateiu UDD1954. In this case the Complainant, Mr. Mateui, made an application in the course of proceedings before the Labour Court under the Unfair Dismissals Act to amend the name of the Respondent from “Auto Depot Tyres Ltd” to “Auto Depot Ltd”. The Court allowed the request for the amendment and in doing so held that: “Accordingly, the Court considers the erroneous inclusion of ‘Auto Depot Tyres Ltd’ on the WRC complaint form to be no more than a technical error. The Court is fully satisfied that the Respondent’s name can simply be amended on the paperwork to reflect its correct legal title, that of ‘Auto Depot Ltd’”.

The Labour Court, in this case, provided an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence and relevant authorities on this subject and set out a number of factors which it took into consideration in arriving at its decision on this matter. In particular, I have taken cognisance of the following paragraphs from the decision: “Having regard to the foregoing and relying in particular on the High Court decision in Capital Food Emporium, the Court is fully satisfied that the correct employer has been pursued by the Complainant. The Court is further fully satisfied that the respondent party that appeared before the Court was the Complainant’s employer. That party was fully aware of the Complainant’s complaints to the WRC from July 2017. He knew precisely from whom the complaints were and to what the complaints referred. The respondent party has had a full opportunity to be heard and to answer those complaints. The Court is therefore equally satisfied that the employer will suffer no prejudice or injustice by its decision on this preliminary matter.

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is also conscious of the High Court Judgment in O’Higgins -v- University College Dublin & Another (2013) 21 MCA wherein Mr Justice Hogan held: “Even if the wrong party was, in fact, so named, no prejudice whatever was caused by reason of that error (if, indeed, error it be) …. In these circumstances, for this Court to hold that the appeal was rendered void by reason of such a technical error would amount to a grossly disproportionate response and deprive the appellant of the substance of her constitutional right of access to the courts.”

Declining jurisdiction in these circumstances would certainly amount to a “grossly disproportionate response” as envisaged in O’Higgins.

The Court is further satisfied that this approach is in line with the generally accepted principle that statutory tribunals, such as this Court, should operate with the minimum degree of procedural formality consistent with the requirements of natural justice. On that point the decision of the Supreme Court in Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1990] I.L.R.M 293 is relevant. Here Walsh J stated, albeit obiter, as follows: - “This present case indicates a degree of formality, and even rigidity, which is somewhat surprising. It is a rather ironic turn in history that this Tribunal which was intended to save people from the ordinary courts would themselves fall into rigidity comparable to that of the common law before it was modified by equity.”

I am satisfied that the general principles enunciated by the Labour Court in the Auto Depot Limited case can also be applied in the circumstance of the instant case. In considering this matter, I have taken the following factors into consideration:

·         The Complainant has named the trading name of his employer as the Respondent in these proceedings as opposed to the actual name of the limited company that employed him. The Courts have held in a number of cases, that statutory adjudicative bodies should not adopt a more stringent procedural approach than that adopted in ordinary litigation. Consequently, since a party can initiate proceedings in the High Court using a business name, it would be inconsistent with the informal and accessible nature of the procedures set out under the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 to hold that proceedings cannot be similarly initiated under those Acts.  

·         I am satisfied that the Complainant’s employer was fully on notice and accepted these proceedings from the outset. The notification of these complaints was sent by the WRC to the Managing Director of the company that employed the Complainant at its registered address on 24 September, 2019. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Complainant’s employer was fully informed as to the precise nature of the complaint from the outset of these proceedings.

·         The parties were notified on 13 December, 2019 of a hearing date before an Adjudication Officer on 21 January, 2020. I note that up to the date of the actual hearing, no issue regarding the issue concerning the incorrect Respondent was notified by the Complainant’s employer to either the Complainant or the WRC.

·         The correct employer appeared at the hearing with its legal representatives on 21 January, 2020 and was fully prepared to defend the complaints which had been initiated by the Complainant. I am satisfied that the Complainant’s employer was not prejudiced in any way in terms of its ability to defend the instant proceedings as a result of the mis-statement of the name of the Respondent on the initiating form for these complaints.

Having regard to the foregoing, I am satisfied that the correct employer has been pursued in relation to these complaints and that the mis-statement by the Complainant of his employer’s name on the Complaint Referral Form constitutes a technical error. Moreover, I am satisfied that the Complainant’s employer was fully aware of the existence and details of the instant complaints from 24 September, 2019. I take the view that if I were to decline jurisdiction in the pertaining circumstances that it would clearly amount to a “grossly disproportionate response” as envisaged by the High Court in the case of O’Higgins -v- University College Dublin & Another (2013) 21 MCA. In the circumstances, I find that the Respondent’s name can be amended to reflect its correct legal title.

CA-00031029-001 and CA-00031029-002 – Complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

Jurisdictional Issue – Time Limits

The Respondent raised a preliminary issue that the Complainant’s complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 were referred to the Workplace Relations Commission outside of the time limits prescribed in Section 41(5) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Complainant did not dispute that the instant complaint was not referred within the prescribed time limits and made an application for an extension of the relevant time limits in accordance with the provisions of Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

The Complainant has put forward a number of reasons to explain the delay in referring the instant complaint to the WRC, namely that he was suffering from stress arising from the termination of his employment, his wife was ill at the material time in question and that he was unaware of the statutory time limits governing the referral of complaints.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant has failed to establish that his failure to refer the complaints to the WRC within the prescribed time limits was due to reasonable cause. The Respondent submits that the Complainant has failed to submit any medical evidence to confirm how either his, or his wife’s medical conditions, impacted on his ability to refer the instant complaints to the WRC within the statutory time limits. In this regard, the Respondent submits that the Complainant was in a position to commence alternative employment in March, 2019 and that this fact is not consistent with the reasons propounded by him for the delay in referring the instant complaints to the WRC.

I am satisfied that the instant complaint was referred to the WRC outside of the statutory time limits. The Complainant’s employment was terminated on 20 February, 2019. I am satisfied that if there was a contravention of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, that that date is the last date when such a contravention took place. As the Complainant’s complaint was not referred to the WRC until 19 September, 2019, it was therefore clearly outside of the six month time limit but within the period of twelve months. I will therefore proceed to examine the Complainant’s application for an extension of the time limit.

Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, provides: -

“(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that enunciated by the Labour Court in the case of Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT0338. The Labour Court set out the test in the following terms: -

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The Complainant has put forward a number of reasons to explain the delay in support of his application for an extension of time. They relate, in the main, to a claim that he was medically unfit to attend to his affairs during the material period in question and that he was not aware of the statutory time limits for the referral of complaints. I am satisfied that the Complainant has failed to adduce any cogent evidence concerning the issue of how his medical condition impacted on his capacity to refer a claim within the time limit.

It is a matter for the Complainant to establish that there is reasonable cause for the delay. It is well settled that an application for an extension of time must both explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. Having considered the submissions of both parties, I am satisfied that the Complainant has failed to satisfactorily explain the delay in referring the complaints under the Act. I am satisfied that I have not been presented with any reasons from which I could reasonably conclude that the Complainant was impaired due to a medical condition in referring these complaints within the statutory time limits. Furthermore, while I accept that the Complainant may not have been aware of the statutory time limit, it is well settled that ignorance of one’s legal rights and responsibilities cannot be accepted as an excuse.

Having regard to foregoing, I find that the Complainant has neither explained the delay in referring the instant complaints nor has he put forward a justifiable basis upon which an extension of time could be granted in this case. Therefore, I find that the Complainant has failed to comply with the relevant time limits provided for in Section 41(5) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into these complaints.

CA-00031029-04 – Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

Jurisdictional Issue – Time Limits

The Respondent raised a preliminary issue contending that the Complainant’s complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1997 to 2015 were referred to the Workplace Relations Commission outside of the time limits prescribed in Section 8(2) of that Act. The Complainant did not dispute that the instant complaint was not referred within the prescribed time limits and made an application for an extension of the relevant time limits in accordance with the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts.

The Complainant has put forward a number of reasons to explain the delay in referring the instant complaint to the WRC, namely that he was suffering from stress arising from the termination of his employment, his wife was ill at the material time in question and that he was unaware of the statutory time limits governing the referral of complaints.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant has failed to establish that his failure to refer the complaints to the WRC within the prescribed time limits was due to reasonable cause. The Respondent submits that the Complainant has failed to submit any medical evidence to confirm how either his, or his wife’s medical conditions, impacted on his ability to refer the instant complaints to the WRC within the statutory time limits. In this regard, the Respondent submits that the Complainant was in a position to commence alternative employment in March, 2019 and that this fact is not consistent with the reasons propounded by him for the delay in referring the instant complaints to the WRC.

I am satisfied that the instant complaint was referred to the WRC outside of the statutory time limits. The Complainant’s employment was terminated on 20 February, 2019. As the Complainant’s complaint was not referred to the WRC until 19 September, 2019, it was therefore clearly outside of the six-month time limit but within the period of twelve months. I will therefore proceed to examine the Complainant’s application for an extension of the time limit.

Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, provides: -

“(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 to the Director General —

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or

(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause”.

The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that enunciated by the Labour Court in the case of Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT0338. The Labour Court set out the test in the following terms: -

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The Complainant has put forward a number of reasons to explain the delay in support of his application for an extension of time. They relate, in the main, to a claim that he was medically unfit to attend to his affairs during the material period in question and that he was not aware of the statutory time limits for the referral of complaints. I am satisfied that the Complainant has failed to adduce any cogent evidence concerning the issue of how his medical condition impacted on his capacity to refer a claim within the time limit.

It is a matter for the Complainant to establish that there is reasonable cause for the delay. It is well settled that an application for an extension of time must both explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. Having considered the evidence and submissions of both parties, I am satisfied that the Complainant has failed to satisfactorily explain the delay in referring the complaint under the Act. I am satisfied that I have not been presented with any reasons from which I could reasonably conclude that the Complainant was impaired due to a medical condition in referring these complaints within the statutory time limits. Furthermore, while I accept that the Complainant may not have been aware of the statutory time limit, it is well settled that ignorance of one’s legal rights and responsibilities cannot be accepted as an excuse.

Having regard to foregoing, I find that the Complainant has neither explained the delay in referring the instant complaint nor has he put forward a justifiable basis upon which an extension of time could be granted in this case. Therefore, I find that the Complainant has failed to comply with the relevant time limits provided for within Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissal Acts. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint.

CA-00031029-005 – Dispute under the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

The Worker has claimed that he was subjected to bullying and harassment in the workplace during his period of employment and has referred this matter for investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969.

I have given careful consideration to the written and oral submissions of the parties in relation to this dispute.

The Worker has made a number of allegations of bullying/harassment against the Yard Manager, Mr. A which he claims occurred during his period of employment. It should be noted that my role, as an Adjudication Officer, in investigating a trade dispute under Section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969 is not to carry out an investigation or make any findings of fact into the allegations of bullying and harassment. However, I am obliged in reaching my conclusions and making any recommendation on this matter to take cognisance of the rights of all parties to the natural justice and fair procedures.

In this regard, I note that it was not in dispute between the parties that the Employer has established internal dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing grievances and disputes of an industrial relations nature. The Worker did not dispute the fact that he was fully aware of these internal procedures and that he did not invoke an internal grievance prior to the referral of the present dispute to the Workplace Relations Commission.

In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Employer was not afforded any opportunity to deal with the Worker’s allegations of bullying and harassment prior to the termination of his employment and therefore, it was not possible for the Employer to do anything about the said allegations.

Having regard to the foregoing, I find that I cannot recommend concession of the Worker’s claim in relation to this dispute.

CA-00031029-001 – Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

I find that the Complainant has failed to comply with the relevant time limits provided for in Section 41(5) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint.

CA-00031029-002 – Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

I find that the Complainant has failed to comply with the relevant time limits provided for in Section 41(5) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint.

CA-00031029-04 – Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with Section 7 of the 1977 Act.

I find that the Complainant has failed to comply with the relevant time limits provided for within Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissal Acts. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint.

CA-00031029-005 – Dispute under the Industrial Relation Act 1969

Section 13 of the Industrial Relations Acts, 1969 requires that I make a recommendation in relation to the dispute.

I find that I cannot recommend concession of the Worker’s claim in this dispute.

Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – Section 3 – Written Terms and Conditions – Section 5 – Change to Written Terms and Conditions – Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 to 2015 – Section 1 – Constructive Dismissal – Jurisdiction – Name of Respondent - Time Limits – Industrial Relations Act, 1969 – Section 13 – Trade Dispute – Bullying and Harassment