Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

Employee

Employer

Representatives

Michael O'Reilly Michael O'Reilly

Aoife McFadden IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00027105-001

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00027105-002

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00027105-003

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00027105-004

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00027105-005

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00027105-006

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 10 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 131 of 2003)

CA-00027105-007

15/03/2019

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00027105-008

15/03/2019

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 and has submitted that he did not receive any redundancy payment following the termination of his employment (CA-00027105-001)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and has submitted that he did not receive a statement in writing of his terms of employment (CA-00027105-002)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 and has submitted that he did not get breaks (CA-00027105-003)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 and has submitted that he did not receive any holiday pay from 1st January 2005 to the 29th January 2019 (CA-00027105-004)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 and has submitted that he did not receive any pay in respect of public holidays from 1st January 2005 to the 29th January 2019 (CA-00027105-005)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and has submitted that he was discriminated against by reason of his disability, not receiving any appropriate training, the conditions of employment and by being harassed (CA-00027105-006)

The Complainant seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 10 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 131 of 2003) and has submitted that his the Respondent did not ensure his terms and conditions of employment were transferred from his previous employer (CA-00027105-007)

The Complainant is seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973,   and has submitted that he did not receive his statutory minimum period of notice on the termination of his employment or payment in lieu thereof (CA-0002715-008)

The Respondent submitted he commenced employment with a limited company which was incorporated on the 16th April 1996. On the 31st December 2004, a Transfer of Undertaking was completed whereby the business was transferred to the Respondent. This transfer was seamless with no break in service . The Complainants duties were to undertake the role of a disc jockey (DJ) in the provision of entertainment of the Respondents establishment.

In or around January 2005 the Respondent unilaterally sought to dismiss the Complainant as an employee and, despite the fact that his duties/role remained unchanged, to alter his status to that of an independent contractor.

On or around 29th November 2018, the Complainant was advised that a particular establishment he was working in would be closing for a period and that upon reopening he would no longer be required as live music as opposed to a DJ would be a feature of the operation and in effect, it is submitted, he was being made redundant.

It is submitted that despite his long employment association, the Respondent has denied his status as an employee and denied him his statutory rights.It is the Complainant's position that since 1995 he has been an "employee” in that there existed between him and his employers a contract of employment. Since 1995 his duties/roles have remained the same. It is further contended that the work carried out by the Complainant and the manner in which it was carried out between 1995 to 2005 was in all material respect the same as the work carried out by him in the period 2005 to 2019.

It is submitted that the classification of the Complainant as an independent contractor does not reflect the factual situation. Rather this classification was a management/business sham and was a crude and unlawful mechanism to circumvent the law and to deny him of his statutory rights.

The Complainant relied on Denny v The Minister for Social Welfare [1998] 1 IR 34 and Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Limited v. Minister for Social and Family Affairs [2004] 4 IR 150 in support of his complaints.

The Complainant further relied on the Code of Practice for Determining Employment or Self-Employment Status of Individuals sets out a number of factors which, though not necessarily all, would apply in the case of an employee. They included, inter alia, is under the control of another person who directs as to how, when and where the work is to be carried out; supplies labour only; receives a fixed hourly/weekly/monthly wage; cannot sub-contract the work. If the work can be subcontracted and paid on by the person subcontracting the work, the employer/employee relationship may simply be transferred on; does not have the opportunity to profit from sound management in the   scheduling of engagements or in the performance of tasks arising from the engagements; works set hours or a given number of hours per week or month; works for one person or business; receives expense payments to cover subsistence and /or travel expenses and is entitled to extra pay or time off for overtime.

The Complainant submitted that the terms of engagement document relied upon by the Respondent was never signed by the Complainant, it was unilaterally imposed, as it was proffered by the Respondent it must be read “contra preferendum” and there is no exclusionary clause. Furthermore, the Complainant submitted that the use of the second person pronoun is clearly indicative of an employer/employee relationship, there is no provision either express or implied whereby the Complainant was free to sub-contract his engagements and the Complainant did not and does not have employees.

It is submitted that the Complainant was subject to the control of the employer and this control was exercised in relation to hours and days of attendance, performance, duration and terms of the contract, locations, annual reviews and notice of termination. The elements of exclusivity and mutuality were present in the arrangement. There were nightly /hourly/weekly rates of pay. The Complainant did not profit from the sound management of engagements in that he did not schedule the engagement and was pay a fixed amount/wage for same. With the exception of some minor items of personal equipment, which having regard to the particular circumstances of this case would be usual, the Complainant did not provide materials and equipment for the job.

The Complainant submitted that an email, dated the 23rd April 2019, from the Respondents financial controller setting out the total amount of fees paid to the Complainant confirms that he held continuous appointment with the Respondent and in terms of the Revenue criteria for making a determination between employed and self-employed persons supports the proposition that the Complainant is an employed person. The Complainant further relies upon letters sent by former employees of the Respondent confirming, in their opinion, that the Complainant was a full-time employee of the Respondent.

This Complaint was submitted to the Workplace Relations Commission on the 15th March 2019.

The Respondent accepts the background facts and the timeline in relation to the Complainant’s engagement with the Respondent company but has submitted that the aforementioned complaints are without merit and, in particular, that on the Complainants own case between January 2005 and January 2019 he was engaged by the Respondent pursuant to a contract for service. Further, the claims under the Employment Equality Acts and TUPE are out of time.

In support of their position, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant was on business on his own account and provided disc jockey services to the Respondent at its premises. The Complainant was free to sub-contract his engagements to other parties or to use his own employees, if any, to provide the services on his behalf. The Complainant invoiced the Respondent for his services and charged VAT. The Complainant was responsible for his own tax and insurance. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant was free to undertake and conduct work for other companies including competitors of the Respondent.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant was not an employee and provided services to the Respondent pursuant to a contract for services. In that regard the Respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Castelisland Cattle Breeding Society v Minister for Social Welfare (2004) 4 IR 151 and submitted that it is determinative of the Complainants claim.

The Respondent submitted that for a minimum of thirteen years the Complainant made tax returns to the Revenue on the basis that he is a self-employed person and that his income from his business included the fees paid to him by the Respondent. The Complainant invoiced the Respondent for those fees and charged VAT on those invoices. The Complainant, in his tax returns, claimed deductions for expenses incurred in his business including the purchase of equipment.

The Respondent submitted that it cannot be credibly argued by the Complainant that he did not understand the nature of the arrangements into which he entered or that his status as self-employed person was inconsistent with the nature of the services provided by him . In that regard it is submitted that he is in the same situation as the contractors in the aforementioned Castleisland case.

The Respondent submitted that it is well recognized that it is entirely permissible to engage an entertainment professional, such as the Complainant, on an independent contractor basis even if the terms of the engagement are regular and subject to ongoing renewals and in that regard relies upon a decision of the High Court in Dower -v- Radio Ireland t/a Today FM (2000) IEHC 147.

In the circumstances of this case, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s claims should be dismissed.

I have carefully listened to evidence tendered and submissions made in the course of this hearing by both parties.

In the circumstances of this case the main issue for determination is whether the Complainant is an employee or an independent contractor (Contract of service or contract for service).

Complaints CA-00027105-001, CA-0002715-002, CA-00027105-003, CA-00027105-004, CA-00027105-005, CA-00027105-007 and CA-00027105-008

In order to determine whether the Appellant was engaged on a contract of service or contract for service it is necessary to examine the case law on the point in light of the facts available.

In Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorimer(1994) AER 250 where Mummery J (whose decision was on appeal to the Court) stated the following: -

“In order to decide whether a person carries on business on his own account it is necessary to consider many different aspects of that person’s work activity. This is not a mechanical exercise of running through items on a checklist to see whether they are present in, or absent from, a given situation. The object of the exercise is to paint a picture from the accumulation of detail. The overall effect can only be appreciated by standing back from the detailed picture which has been painted, by viewing it from a distance and by making an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole. It is a matter of evaluation of the overall effect of the detail, which is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details. Not all details are of equal weight or importance in any given situation. The details may also vary in importance from one situation to another.”

In Henry Denny –v- Minister for Social Welfare, (1998) 1 IR 34, Keane CJ stated that

"It is, accordingly, clear that while each case must be determined in the light of its particular facts and circumstances, in general a person will be regarded as providing his or her services under a contract of service and not as an independent contractor where he or she is performing those services for another person and not for himself or herself. The degree of control exercised over how the work is to be performed, although a factor to be taken into account is not decisive. The inference that the person is engaged in business on his or her own account can be more readily drawn, where he or she employs others to assist in the business and where the profit which he or she derives from the business is dependent on the efficiency with which it is conducted by him or her."

Keane J quoted Cooke J, in Market Investigations Limited v. Minister for Social Security [1969] 3 All ER 732:

"The most that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole determining factor; and that factors, which may be of importance, are such matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what   degree of responsibility of investment and management he has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from the management in the performance of his tasks.

Edwards, J in Minister for Agriculture –v- Barry (2008) IEHC 216, indicated that the enterprise test is only on a par with the other factors to be taken into account in determining employment status and should not be considered the fundamental test. The Court also introduced the concept of “mutuality of obligation” which essentially means an obligation on the employer to provide work to the employee and an obligation on the employee to do the work provided.

In Brightwater Selection (Ireland) Ltd –v- Minister for Social & Family Affairs (2011) IEHC 510, Gilligan J established firstly that a contract engaging a particular worker does not have to be a contract of service or a contract for service as may be widely assumed. It is possible that an alternative option applies, a contract sui generis. Secondly, the court reaffirmed the principle in the Barry case that in order for a contract of service to exist there must be a mutuality of obligation between employer and employee. Thirdly, the court clarified somewhat the meaning of “control” as a factor in deciding employment status. The court placed emphasis on the fact that control should include the power to direct how work is done by an employee and not just a high level of administrative control. Fourthly, the court pointed out that the important element of the Denny judgment was that each case should be judged on its own facts and circumstances, and that there is no single determinative “test” that can be applied to all situations.

However, Laffoy, J in Neenan Travel Limited –v- Minister for Social and Family Affairs (2011) IEHC 458, attributed more fundamental importance to the “enterprise test” and stated that these principles have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Ltd –v- Minister for Social and Family Affairs (2004) 4 IR 50.

Geoghegan J in giving the judgement, with which the other four members of the Court concurred, stated:

"There is nothing unlawful or necessarily ineffective about a company deciding to engage people on an independent contractor basis rather than on a "servant" basis but as far as this Court has pointed out in Denny and other cases, in determining whether the new contract is one of service or for services the decider must look at how the contract has worked out in practice as mere wording cannot determine its nature. Nevertheless, the wording of a written contract still remains of great importance. It can, however, emerge in evidence that in practice the working arrangements between the parties are consistent only with a different kind of contract or a least are inconsistent with the expressed categorisation of the contract."

In Dower -v- Radio Ireland t/a Today FM (2000) IEHC 147, Carroll J stayed court proceedings instituted by the plaintiff on the basis that he was bound by an arbitration clause contained in the contract for service between the plaintiff and the defendant. The Plaintiff claimed that while he was initially employed pursuant to a contract for service, his position had morphed into that of an employee in circumstances where his engagement was renewed on an annual basis and he was paid a fixed fee for regular appearances on the defendants radio station. Carroll J rejected the Plaintiffs arguments and relied on the fact that he continued to invoice the Defendant for his services and charge VAT on those invoices. Further, Carroll J dismissed arguments by the Plaintiff that various engagements that he had over the years which might have been more consistent with him being an employee were somehow transformative of his status:

“London based consultant. .. said “you are staff” .. it cannot be seriously argued that remark was sufficient to change his employment status…in a similar vein it is the claim when the Plaintiff was called for jury duty the music programme manager wrote to him as an employee and asking that he be excused from duty “as a member of our on air-staff”. This claim has no weight at all neither does the claim that he attends staff parties..”

How the parties view their own relationship and how they behave is also an important factor to consider. In Stringfellow Restaurants v Quashie  (2012) EWCA Civ 1375 the individual’s remuneration came from customers of the restaurant, not from the putative employer, and she was treated (by the employer and by herself) as self-employed for tax purposes. The Court of Appeal (Elias LJ) made the point that:

“The Employment Tribunal’s conclusion [that the claimant there was not an employee] was strongly reinforced by the fact that the terms of the contract involved the dancer accepting that she was self employed, and she conducted her affairs on that basis, paying her own tax. In addition, and again consistently with that classification, she did not receive sick pay or holiday pay. It is trite law that the parties cannot by agreement fix the status of their relationship: that is an objective matter to be determined by an assessment of all the relevant facts. But it is legitimate for a court to have regard to the way in which the parties have chosen to categorise the relationship, and in a case where the position is uncertain, it can be decisive, as Lord Denning recognised in Massey v Crown Life Insurance [1978] 2 All ER 576,578. To similar effect is the following observations of Lord Justice Ralph Gibson in Calder v H Kitson Vickers Ltd [1988] ICR 232, 251:

“the fact that the parties honestly intend that between themselves the contract should be a contract for services and not a contract of service is not conclusive, but it is a relevant fact, and…it may afford strong evidence that that is their real relationship.”

I have further considered, the Code of Practice for Determining Employment or Self Employment Status of Individuals which was prepared by the Employment Status Group (ESG) set up under Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. It was agreed that the Revenue Commissioners, the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs and representatives of the social partners would seek a uniform definition of employee based on clear criteria to determine the employment status of individuals.

“The ESG determined that the criteria for determining if an individual is an employee is as follows:

Is under the control of another person who directs as to how, when and where the work is to be carried out; Supplies labour only; Receives a fixed hourly/weekly/monthly wage; Cannot sub-contract the work. If the work can be subcontracted and paid on by the person subcontracting the work, the employer/employee relationship may simply be transferred on; Does not supply materials for the job; Does not provide equipment other than the small tools of the trade. The provision of tools or equipment might not have a significant bearing on coming to a conclusion that employment status may be appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of a particular case; Is not exposed to personal financial risk in carrying out the work; Does not assume any responsibility for investment and management in the business; Does not have the opportunity to profit from sound management in the scheduling of engagements or in the performance of tasks arising from the engagements; Works set hours or a given number of hours per week or month; Works for one person or for one business; Receives expense payments to cover subsistence and/or travel expenses; Is entitled to extra pay or time off for overtime.

Additional Factors to be considered include an individual could have considerable freedom and independence in carrying out work and still remain an employee; An employee with specialist knowledge may not be directed as to how the work is carried out; An individual who is paid by commission, by share, or by piecework, or in some other atypical fashion may still be regarded as an employee; Some employees work for more than one employer at the same time; Some employees do not work on the employer’ s premises; There are special PRSI rules for the employment of family members and statements in contracts considered by the Supreme Court in the Denny case are not contractual terms and have little or no contractual validity. While they may express an opinion of the contracting parties, they are of minimal value in coming to a conclusion as the work status of the person engaged.

The ESG determined that the criteria for determining if an individual is self-employed is as follows:

While all of the following factors may not apply to the job, an individual would normally be self employed if he or she owns his or her own business; is exposed to financial risk by having to bear the cost of making good faulty or sub standard work carried out under contract; assumes responsibility for investment and management in the enterprise; has the opportunity to profit from sound management in the scheduling and performance of engagements and tasks; has control over what is done, when and where it is done and whether he or she does it personally, is free to hire other people, on his or her terms , to do the work which has been agreed to be undertaken; can provide the same services to more than one person or business at the same time; provides the material for the jobs; provides equipment and machinery necessary for the job, other than the small tools of the trade or equipment which in an overall context would not be an indicator of a person in business on their own account; has a fixed place of business where materials, equipment can be stores; costs and agrees a price for the job; provides his or her own insurance cover, controls the hours of work in fulfilling the job obligations.

Additional factors to be considered include the fact that an individual has registered for self-assessment or VAT under the principles of self-assessment does not automatically mean that he or she is self-employed; an office holder will be taxed under the PAYE system; it should be noted that a person who is a self-employed contractor in one job is not necessarily self-employed in the next job. It is also possible to be employed and self-employed at the same time in different jobs.

The status as an employee or self-employed person will affect: the way in which tax and PRSI is payable to the Collector-General; An employee will have tax and PRSI deducted from his or her income; a self-employed person is obliged to pay preliminary tax and file income tax returns whether or not he or she is asked for them; entitlements to a number of social welfare benefits, such as unemployment and disability benefits; an employee will be entitled to unemployment disability and invalidity benefits whereas a self-employed person will not have these entitlements; an employee will have rights in respect of working time, holidays, maternity/parental leave, protection from unfair dismissal and a self-employed person will not have these rights and protection and public liability in respect of work done.” (Reviewed February 2019).  

In the circumstances of this case, it is noted the Complainant cites in his Complaint form in relation to CA-00027105-006 that “..I was bullied and harassed by the Directors of the Respondent in being forced to assume an arrangement of Contract for Services effective from the 30th January 2005 to the 19th January 2019..”. Further, the Complainant conceded in the course of his submissions that “.. the classification of the Complainant as an independent contractor does not reflect the factual situation…this classification was [a] management/business sham”. Accordingly, the Complainant acknowledges he was on a contract for service from 2005 to 2019. Further, the Complainant accepted that the Inspector of Taxes allowed 50% of phone and broadband costs incurred as a cost for offset against earned income.

In particular it is noted, inter alia, that the Complainant invoiced the Respondent for his services, he charged VAT and he was responsible for his own tax and insurance. Upon consideration of the aforementioned concessions from the Complainant, the relevant case law, the criteria on whether an individual is an employee outlined by the Employment Status Group, the evidence already adduced on the various hearing dates, the submissions provided I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Complainant was under a contract for service and accordingly the relevant complaints fail.

Complaint CA-00027105-006

The Complainant submitted that he was discriminated against in relation to his disability, in providing him with training, in his conditions of employment and by harassing him.

Section 85A of the EEA 1998-2011 sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. It provides, in effect, that where facts are established by, or on behalf of, a complainant from which discrimination may be inferred, it shall be for the respondent to prove the absence of discrimination. The test for applying that provision is well settled and it requires the complainant to prove the primary facts upon which they rely in seeking to raise an inference of discrimination. It is only if this initial burden is discharged and the Adjudication Officer is satisfied that the facts as established are of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the burden of proving that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment passes to the respondent. The appropriate test for determining is that if the complainant does not discharge the initial probative burden required the case cannot succeed.

It is now well accepted that the first requirement for a successful claim lies in establishing a prima facie case. In that regard, I am conscious of the Labour Court’s comments in examining the circumstances in which the probative burden of proof applies in employment equality cases. In the case of Dyflen Publications Limited and Ivana Spasic (ADE/08/7) the Court adopted the approach of Mummery LJ in Madrassy v Nomura International plc [2007] IRLR 246, and stated that

“… the court should consider the primary facts which are relied upon by the Complainant in their

proper context. It also indicates that in considering if the burden of proof shifts the court should

consider any evidence adduced by the Respondent ..”.

In establishing the facts to meet the burden of proof resting on a Complainant, the Labour Court

commented in Cork City Council v McCarthy [EDA 0821] as follows:

  “The type or range of facts which may be relied upon by a Complainant may vary significantly from case to case. The law provides that the probative burden shifts where a Complainant proves facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination. The language used indicates that where the primary facts alleged are proved it remains for the Court to decide if the inference of presumption contended for can properly be drawn from those facts. This entails a consideration of the range of conclusions which may appropriately be drawn to explain a fact or a set of facts which are proved in evidence. At the initial stage the Complainant is

merely seeking to establish a prima facie case. Hence, it is not necessary to establish that the

conclusion of discrimination is the only, or indeed the most likely, explanation which can be drawn

from the proved facts. It is sufficient that the presumption is within the range of inferences which can reasonably be drawn from those facts.”

In Valpeters v Melbury Developments Limited [2010] ELR 64 it is stated as follows:

“Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.

In Southern Health Board v. Mitchell Labour Court AEE/99/E, the Labour Court explained that the onus on the complainant in seeking to establish a prima facie case is: -

“The first requirement is that the claimant must establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise the presumption of unlawful discrimination.”

The Labour Court went on to say that: -

“It is only if those primary facts are regarded…as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

Although it has already been decided that the other complaints fail as it has been found that the Complainant was under a contract for service with the Respondent. For the avoidance of doubt, I am dealing with this complaint in isolation as this type of complaint can be brought against an employer, a prospective employer, employment agency, vocational training or other bodies, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, based on the complainant’s own evidence, together with the submissions filed and the documents tendered into evidence, that the complainant has not established a prima facie case in raising an inference of discrimination in any manner whatsoever. Accordingly, this complaint fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-001) made pursuant to Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-002) made pursuant to section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-003) made pursuant to section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-004) made pursuant to section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-005) made pursuant to section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-006) made pursuant to section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-007) made pursuant to Regulation 10 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 131 of 2003) fails.

I find that the Complaint (CA-0002715-008) made pursuant to Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 fails.

Contract of service - contract for service