ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00020547
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Roberto Alamazani | The Hon. Mr Justice Seamus Noonan |
Representatives |
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Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00027037-001 | 13/03/2019 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing:
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Hugh Lonsdale
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and firstly considered as a preliminary matter if I have jurisdiction to hear the complaint and if the claim is properly before me for investigation.
The complainant states that he has been discriminated against by a person, organisation, company who provides goods, services or facilities. Specifically, he brings a complaint against a High Court Judge. He states that: “I am offended to be victim of unfair treatment on 5th day of February 2019. You have humiliated me and have treated me this way simply because of my human attributes or my ethnic, racial, social or religious background. This is completely and utterly unacceptable. I feel demeaned, insulted and discriminated. It’s against the Law discriminating people as clearly stated under the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015. The way I have been treated is discriminating against me and victimizing because I am black. I strongly believe that if I was white, the treatment will be different.” |
Jurisdiction:
The complaint is made against the respondent in his capacity as a High Court Judge. The complainant relies upon the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015 to ground his complaint against the Adjudicator who the complainant states is a person, organisation, company who provides goods, services or facilities and that when providing that service he was discriminated on the ground of race. Section 2 of the Equal Status Act 2000 as amended defines a service as: “ service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes— ( a) access to and the use of any place, ( b) facilities for— (i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, (ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment, (iii) cultural activities, or (iv) transport or travel, ( c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and ( d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 ) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies; Judy Walsh in the Equal Status Acts 2000-2011, 2012 edition, Blackhall Publishing, at page 43 states: “Equivalent UK provisions have been subject to fairly extensive interpretation (McColgan, 2005, pp 255-285; Monaghan, 2007, pp 505-508). In a number of cases UK courts concluded that ‘services’ were confined to acts of similar kind to acts that might be carried out by a private person. Therefore, functions that are of a public law nature (i.e. enforcement, regulatory and control functions) have fallen outside the scope of that country’s non-discrimination legislation.” The matters complained of relate to the conduct of court proceedings and they do not constitute a service as defined under the Equal Status Act 2000, as amended. This claim is misconceived as it is incorrectly based in law. Furthermore, the exercise of judicial decision making is immune from suit. In Kemmy v Ireland [2009] IEHC 178 the principle of Judicial Immunity and its purpose was comprehensively addressed: 'This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual is given by the law to the judges, not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be.'" 30. In Desmond & Anor v. Cornelius Riordan [2000] 1 I.R. 505, at p. 507, Morris P. stated: "It is, in my view, well settled that the immunity from suit enjoyed by the judiciary exists not for the benefit of the judge but for the benefit of the community as a whole. This immunity is perceived to be necessary and desirable so that a judge may perform his functions the better, freed of concern that in the course of performing his duties he may defame a third party and be required to be answerable to that party in damages." 31. (Endorsed by Geoghegan J., in the Supreme Court in Beatty and Beatty v. the Rent Tribunal and Anor [2006] 2 I.R. (S.C.), 191, at 212 where he said: "The immunity of judges is based on public policy considerations.") 32. In an earlier case, Macaulay & Company Limited v. Wyse-Power [1943] 77 I.L.T.R. 61 at 63, McGuire J. held that: "The people were entitled to have the opinion of a judge without fear of his words being challenged elsewhere. It was salutatory and beneficial privilege." Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 as amended provides that a claim maybe dismissed at any time if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter. The alleged conduct referenced in this complaint occurred during a Court hearing. Judicial decision making is not a service or facility available to the public and does not constitute a service as defined under the Equal Status Act 2000 as amended. The Judge in exercising judicial decision making is immune from suit. This claim is misconceived as it is incapable of achieving the desired outcome and is not a service as defined under the Act. I find that I have no jurisdiction to investigate this complaint as the matters complained of are not properly before me. I therefore find that the complaint is misconceived and dismiss the complaint. |
Decision:
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act. However, section 22 of the Act provides that a complaint may be dismissed at any time if an opinion is formed that the claim is misconceived.
This complaint relying upon the Equal Status Acts to bring an action against a Judge arising from alleged unfair treatment during a Court hearing is not properly before me. Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 as amended provides for a complaint to be dismissed at any time if an opinion is formed that the complaint is misconceived. As I have formed the opinion that the complaint is misconceived pursuant to section 22, I dismiss the claim and determine that I have no jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate on the matter. |
Dated: 30th August 2021
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Hugh Lonsdale
Key Words:
Claim dismissed misconceived – not a service - Judicial Immunity - Jurisdiction |