FULL RECOMMENDATION
SECTION 83 (1), EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS, 1998 TO 2015 PARTIES : AN EMPLOYER (REPRESENTED BY IRISH BUSINESS AND EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION) - AND - A WORKER (REPRESENTED BY LARS ASMUSSEN B.L. INSTRUCTED BY ORMONDE SOLICITORS) DIVISION :
SUBJECT: 1.An appeal of an Adjudication Officer's Decision No(s)ADJ-00007638 &ADJ-00009592 2 This is an appeal by an employee (hereinafter referred to as “the Complainant”) against the Decisions of an Adjudication Officer ADJ-00007638 and ADJ-0009592 under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 (the Acts) against his former employer, an organisation caring for the persons with Intellectual Disabilities (hereinafter referred to as “the Respondent”). The Complainant claimed to have been discriminated against on the disability ground contrary to section 6(2)(g) of the Acts. He alleged that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment and his employer had failed to provide him with reasonable accommodation leading to his dismissal for failure to carry out his duties. He also claimed that he had been victimised for raising complaints in relation to the alleged discrimination. In view of the nature of matters referred to, the names of the parties to these proceedings have been anonymised in this Determination. The Adjudication Officer held that he was not discriminated against and was not victimised and accordingly, held that his complaints failed. The Complainant referred his claims to the Workplace Relations Commission on 10th March 2017 and 14th July 2017. An Adjudication Officer heard the case on 3rd November 2017, and his Decision was dated 2nd November 2018. The Complainant appealed the WRC Decision on 15th November 2018. The appeals were heard by the Court on 26th January 2021and 2ndMarch 2021. Background The Respondent is a voluntary, not for profit, organisation which provides a range of day and residential services designed to meet the varying needs of adults and children with Intellectual Disabilities in over 70 locations. The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Care Assistant from 20th March 2006 to provide care assistant duties to persons with challenging behaviour in a residential setting. His employment was terminated by the Respondent on 8th June 2017. The Complainant has a phobia in relation to providing intimate care to those in his care, described by his Consultant Psychiatrist as a mental condition associated with his“specific phobia related to faeces/faecal matter”. The Complainant initially worked at the Respondent’s facility at Cairdeas, a service for service users with severe to profound difficulties. Then he moved to Parkside, a service for those with mild to moderate disability and in 2012 he moved to Milestone House, a service for severe to profound dependency service users. On a number of occasions in 2012, the Complainant advised management that he had difficulties with providing intimate care to the service users in Milestone House and on 27thSeptember 2013, he made a formal request for redeployment to a position that did not require intimate care. In February 2014, he was offered redeployment to Hollyhurst, where there were two service users who were wheelchair users and one of whom needed to have intimate personal care needs attended to by staff. Following a one-day induction, he declined the transferas it catered for service users with profound disabilities, who require intimate care. Management advised him that“all care assistant posts require intimate care. Personal care duties are in all care assistant’s job description”.It informed him that the Respondent had currently exhausted all possibilities regarding his requestfor redeployment. On 28th May 2014, the Complainant commenced sick leave. In July 2014, he was referred to the Respondent’s Occupational Health Physician, Dr McBrinn, who identified that the Complainant’s condition was due to his duties including“exposure to faecal matter, which occurs in a routine basis in his current employment.”It concluded“I do not know of any particular medical intervention that would result in a complete resolution to the physical reaction”.Dr McBrinnstated that exposure to soiled pads can be commonplace in many of the care assistant tasks undertaken in the Respondent’s services,“Hence the difficulty in a satisfactory return to work in his current role as a care assistant.” In November 2014, following a meeting with the Complainant, IMPACT the Complainant’s Trade Union and management, the Respondent offered the Complainant a trial placement at Riverview, part of the Parkside Services, the Complainant undertook this role for two days but declined the trial as it involved working with severe to profound disabilities which would require intimate care and exposure to faecal matter. Around this time the Complainant was confronted by Management about alleged inappropriate telephone calls he made to co-workers on 28th, 29thand 31st October and 17th November 2014 regarding health matters unrelated to his attempts to return to work. He was advised by Management that these calls were inappropriate, constituted misconduct and that he would be the subject of disciplinary action once the Complainant was medically fit. On 26th May 2015, the Complainant’s GP wrote to Management, stating that the Complainant was“fit to resume work as a care assistant provided that his duties do not include the requirement to provide intimate care to clients that is to say the handling of faeces and soiled nappies.”The letterstated that“….there is no solution other than re-deployment to an area in which the clients do not require this level of care.”The contents of this letter were repeated again by the GP by letter dated 15th June 2015. In October 2015, IMPACT wrote to Management and outlined Dr McBrinn’s diagnosis and reiterated the GP’s advice and sought the redeployment recommended by the GP. It stated that the Complainant was anxious to get back to work and that he would attend the Respondent’s Occupational Health Physician as requested. Following the assessment, Dr McBrinn reported on 15th October 2015 that the Complainant was now fit to return in a capacity that would not expose him to faecal matter in nappies, if such a position was available. On 10th November 2015, Management informed IMPACT that the Complainant’s existing role was held open for him when he is fit to return to work, therefore the question of redeployment did not arise. It stated that the stressor identified was an essential and core duty of all Care Assistants and that there were no vacant posts which did not require intimate care. It stated that the Complainant’s role could not be held open for him indefinitely. At a meeting on 12th November 2015 between the Complainant, IMPACT and Management, it was agreed that a rehabilitation plan would be put in place to facilitate him return to work. The Respondent offered him a temporary position to rehabilitate him back to work at the Blue Door Services, a facility for service users with autism and profound ranges of disabilities. It was agreed that Management would“….meet the Milestone House team to arrange how the duty of dealing with soiled nappies of the people we support can be accommodated by the team and not by you.”However, following an exacerbation of his mental health difficulties, where he attempted to take his own life, the Complainant declined the plan as the service required exposure to faecal matter and sometimes, he would be on his own in the House. A further assessment took place with Dr McBrinn on 19th February 2016. The report stated that as the exposure to the Complainant’s stressor at work had not been resolved, therefore he was unable to determine a return to work. In its conclusion, it stated“The prognosis for the Complainant to return to work in a satisfactory capacity, even in the absence of his stressor, is in my opinion very guarded given his prolonged absence from the workplace.” On 1st March 2016, management advised him by letter that as he was out on long term absence since May 2014 the Services could not keep his contract open indefinitely and therefore his job was at risk. A meeting took place on 7th April 2016, attended by the Complainant, IMPACT and Management, to discuss the Complainant’s absence from work and he was offered a phased return to work or reduced hours on a phased basis, but that all service users had intimate care needs and that this was part of all Care Assistant’s duties. Again, he was advised that his job could not be kept open indefinitely. In May 2016 the Complainant served a claim under the Industrial Relations Act to the WRC, stating that the Respondent had failed to accommodate his return to work. Another assessment took place with Dr McBrinn on 11th August 2016. His report again concluded that the Complainant remained absent for nearly three years and said that he would be fit to return if he was not exposed to his stressor at work. He said that the exposure at work to his stressor had not yet been resolved due to various barriers encountered in trying to do so. The hearing before an Adjudication Officer under the Industrial Relations Act took place on 10th October 2016 at the WRC. The hearing was adjourned for two weeks as an agreement was reached that the Complainant would apply for early retirement on the grounds of permanent infirmity. On 15th October 2016 the Complainant wrote to management and said:-
The Complainant also furnished the Respondent with a report from Dr Darran Flynn, Consultant Psychiatrist dated 7th October 2016, which outlined the Complainant’s mental condition associated with his“specific phobia related to faeces/faecal matter”and concluded as follows:-
By letter dated 15th December 2016, the Complainant, through his Solicitor, withdrew the option of early retirement and instead sought a suitable position to accommodate his disability. This letter drew attention to an advertisement for a vacancy in Parkside Services which the Complainant had brought to management’s attention and he was informed that he would need to apply for the role through open competition. By letter dated 7th February 2017, the Respondent responded stating that it had been agreed that the Complainant would proceed to claim early retirement on the grounds of permanent infirmity. It also stated that there were no current Care Assistant vacancies in Parkside Services that do not require the duty of intimate care. The Complainant lodged a complaint of failure to provide reasonable accommodation and victimisation with the WRC on 10th March 2017. On 27th March 2017 the Respondent wrote to the Complainant regarding his absence from work and outlined that due his incapacity to carry out the duties associated with his post that his employment with the Respondent was at risk. By letter dated 28 April 2017, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant stating that as it had not received the requested medical evidence to show that there had been an improvement in his medical prognosis, it was left with no option but to terminate his employment on the grounds of incapacity. His termination date was 8th June 2017. The dismissal was the subject of an appeal, which was carried out by an independent facilitator who upheld the decision to dismiss. On 10th March 2017, the Complainant submitted a complaint to the WRC alleging, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, discriminatory dismissal and a claim for victimisation was referred on 14th July 2017. Summary of the Complainant’s Case Mr Lars Asmussen, B.L., instructed by Séan Ormonde & Co. Solicitors, on behalf of the Complainant, stated that the Respondent’s attitude in refusing to consider whether the distinct task of providing intimate care to service users might be reassigned to a different employee or whether the Complainant might be redeployed to Parkside Services, which he sought in March 2014, where the same task was not fundamental due to the milder to moderate disabilities of the service users. He contended that this refusal amounted to a failure on the part by the Respondent to properly assess and provide reasonable accommodation to the Complainant. He maintained that the Respondent failed to act on Dr McBrinn’s suggestion that the Complainant would be fit to return to work if he was redeployed to tasks which did not involve exposure to faecal matter. Mr Asmussen said that trial placement offered to the Complainant in Riverview was not a suitable placement for redeployment and that management had also concluded that the Complainant was“definitely not suitable to work in Riverview”. Mr Asmussen stated that the Respondent failed to appropriately act on the recommendations made by the Complainant’s GP to facilitate his return to work. Furthermore, he stated that it failed to act in response to the Trade Union’s suggestion in October 2014 to eliminate that task from his role and return him to work. It also failed to implement similar recommendations made by Dr McBrinn in his reports of 15th October 2015, 19thFebruary 2016 and 11th August 2016. Mr Asmussen submitted that this was demonstrative of the Respondent’s view that it was not obliged to consider whether the distinct task of intimate care could be removed from the Complainant’s role and reallocated to another employee, in order to provide him with reasonable accommodation. He contended that this single task was not an essential task to the Complainant’s position. Counsel stated that the offer of redeployment to the Blue Door Services was not an appropriate offer as it entailed intimate care of service users and was a temporary role, following which he would be expected to return to Milestone House. He said that at the meeting on 7th April 2016, the Respondent failed to consider his request to return to Parkside where he would not be exposed to faecal matter and that it repeatedly stated that he must return to Milestone House. With reference to the advertised vacancy in Parkside Services in November 2016, Counsel stated that it was nonsensical for the Respondent to expect the Complainant to apply for the position through an open competition. He submitted that this was an attempt by the Respondent to obstruct the Complainant’s accommodation and his return to work, particularly in circumstances where he had served at Parkside Services for over 5 years. He maintained that the Respondent’s statement regarding vacancies at Parkside Services was again demonstrative of its continued failure to consider whether an existing role could be tailored, and the distinct task of intimate care reallocated to a different employee, in order to accommodate the Complainant. Therefore, he submitted that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant in failing to provide him with reasonable accommodation. Mr Asmussen contended that two weeks after the Complainant lodged a complaint of discrimination under the Acts with the WRC on 10th March 2017, the Respondent victimised him by unfairly dismissing him, when it deliberately mischaracterised his health by selectively relying on older medical reports from Dr McBrinn and a global reading of Dr Flynn’s report. He maintained that the Complainant was not properly consulted in relation to alternatives and contended that by removing his exposure to faecal matter, as agreed by the medics, his return to work would have been viable. He contended that the Respondent penalised the Complainant for raising such a complaint, amounting to victimisation under the Acts. He contended that the Complainant was not unfit for work, but only unfit for his role in its current guise. Moreover, he claimed that the Respondent sought to justify the dismissal in circumstances where it had not properly consulted him on alternatives and where it knowingly mischaracterised, no less than seven medical reports to justify its decision. Whereas all medical reports deemed him fit to return to work and perform all tasks, except the single distinct task of providing intimate care. This he maintained, amounted to discriminatory dismissal. Counsel also alleged a second instance of alleged victimisation. that the Complainant was victimised when he was informed of a disciplinary investigation which was due to be held when he returned to work, following an incident which occurred in October/November 2014. Mr Asmussen said that this caused distress to the Complainant at a time when was out sick and in a vulnerable emotional and physical state. He said that this threat of later disciplinary action was made even greater by the fact that the Complainant was already on a final written warning. The Court notes that this second claim of victimisation was withdrawn at the hearing of the appeal before the Court. Counsel for the Complainant referred toNano Nagle School v Daly[2019] IESC 63, where the Supreme Court overturned the Decision of the Court of Appeal anddecided that the assessment of reasonable accommodation does not just involve distinguishing between essential duties and non-essential tasks.He said that the Supreme Courtheld that reasonable accommodation could involve the redistribution of duties subject to the condition that this would not place a “disproportionate burden” on the employer and as such placed an obligation on an employer to consider this before it could refuse to provide such accommodation. In determining whether the relevant measures would impose a burden, account should be taken of the cost involved, the resources of the employer and the possibility of obtaining public funding or assistance Mr Asmussen referred to the fact that the Supreme Court departed from the Court of Appeal with regard to the obligation on an employer to consult with an employee.The Circuit Court inHumphries v. Westwoodhad held that an employer must consult with an employee and allow a full opportunity to participate at every level. The Court of Appeal decision appeared to suggest that, in assessing whether an employee was capable of performing their role with reasonable accommodation, it was not necessary for an employer to consult with the employee. The Supreme Court did not go so far as to hold that there is a mandatory duty to consult with employees in each and every case, however, it did note that“in this State … our courts have always attached importance to fair procedures where employment is at stake” before noting that “a wise employer will provide meaningful participation in vindication of his or her duty under the Act”. Therefore, while MacMenamin J. held that there was no free-standing obligation on an employer as perWestwoodhe still held that consultation was intertwined with its obligation regarding the provision of reasonable accommodation. Relying on MacMenamin J’s judgement, Mr Asmussen contended that in the instant case, the question that the Court must examine is whether the Respondent properly considered a redistribution of tasks and/or a transfer to a different service, to accommodate the Complainant’s disability. He maintained that in the three years that the Complainant was out on sick leave, that the Respondent did not consider these options until November 2015, which offer was then withdrawn, and the Complainant was subsequently dismissed. He said that when a redistribution of tasks was considered in November 2015, the Complainant was not in a position to take it up due to a severe exacerbation of his condition at the time. He said that it was then withdrawn by the Respondent without any participation by the Complainant and no consideration was given to allocating alternative tasks to the Complainant in lieu. Mr Asmussen argued that the withdrawal came about, not from significant consideration and assessment of the possibility but when the Staff nurse on duty in the Milestone House indicated that“the situation had altered somewhat…. and there were now at least three people there who required changing, i.e., who soil regularly”.Finally, Mr Asmussen submitted that serious consideration was not given to a possible transfer to another service, one where the Complainant would not be required to carry out intimate care. He said that redeployments were fairly common and that this option was not appropriately considered. Summary of the Respondent’s Position Mr Robin Mc Kenna, Ibec, on behalf of the Respondent, denied that the Complainant had been discriminated against. He said that the Complainant’s employment was terminated in June 2017 on the grounds of capability. The Complainant had been on sick leave for more than three years due to his medical issue. During this time the Respondent provided continuous support and offered him work opportunities in several different locations, but none were suitable to him as they all involved providing intimate care. This was to facilitate his return to work while also ensuring that he was able to carry out the core duties of a Care Assistant and uphold the welfare and dignity of those service users with intellectual disabilities that he was there to support. Mr McKenna stated that with all medical reports stating that the Complainant could not return to work and carry out his full range of duties, his contract of employment was terminated on the grounds of incapacity. He denied that the Complainant’s dismissal was a form of victimisation and argued that it was solely due to his inability to carry out the core duties of a Care Assistant and having been on sick leave for in excess of three years with no visible or potential date for a return to work. Mr McKenna contended that the Complainant has failed to discharge the evidential burden necessary to establish aprima faciecase of discrimination, as the Court set out inMary Margetts v. Graham Anthony and Co Ltd., (EDA038):-
Mr McKenna submitted that the Complainant was afforded considerable time to be able to return to work, he was given opportunities to transfer to different areas within the Service, to rehabilitate back to the workforce and to return to a residence where his team members would deal with any intimate care involving faecal matter. He had also been offered and had availed of counselling to deal with his condition. On each occasion he was offered alternative services to work in, he declined to return, or they did not work out. He said that at the meeting held with the Complainant, IMPACT and Management in November 2015, the Complainant was offered a temporary Care Assistant post in the Blue Door for a period of 4 – 6 weeks in order to get him back to his permanent post in Milestone House, where a meeting would be held with the team in Milestone House“to arrange the duty of dealing with soiled nappies of the people we support can be accommodated by the team and not by you.”However, he declined that offer as“sometimes he would be alone in the house.”Mr McKenna said that this one point alone shows that the Complainant was no longer able to carry out the role for which he was employed, and no amount of support would resolve the matter. Therefore, Mr McKenna argued that the Complainant acknowledged that he could no longer do his job. Based on the medical reports from medics with different specialities, Mr McKenna said that it was clear that the Complainant was given every opportunity to return to work, however, the prognosis indicated that“to return to work in a satisfactory capacity, even in the absence of his stressor, is in my opinion very guarded given his prolonged absence from the workplace”Dr McBrinn, February 2016. Dr Flynn in October 2016 reported“I am of the strong opinion that he is incapable of carrying out the duties associated with such post due to his mental health difficulty”. In conclusion, Mr McKenna citedBolger v Showerings [1990 ELR 184]and submitted that the Respondent had more than satisfied the principles set by the High Court. The Complainant was advised that his employment was at risk, it took reasonable steps to establish the Complainant’s medical condition which prognosis remained consistent throughout and he was given every opportunity to participate in the process, he was given continuous support and work opportunities in several different locations in order to return to work. He said that the Respondent had always dealt with the Complainant in a fair, open, transparent and respectful manner. Mr McKenna said that the Complainant’s employment was terminated solely due to his inability to carry out his core duties, as well as a period of sick leave exceeding three years with no visible or potential date for a return to work. He maintained that to suggest the Complainant was victimised due to lodging a complaint under the Acts was illogical. With reference to the Supreme Court Decision inNano Nagle, Mr McKenna relied upon paragraph 106:-
Summary of the Complainant’s Evidence The Complainant gave evidence to the Court. He outlined the different services provided by the Respondent.
The witness was asked what percentage of time would be spent on intimate care while he was in Milestone House. He said there were seven residents, initially three needed intimate care, then a fourth, he guessed around 15% to 20%. In February 2014 he was redeployed to Hollyhurst, which falls under the Comeragh Service, and caters for severe to profound service users, those with challenging behaviour. Two to three of which were confined to wheelchairs and required intimate care. He spent one day in Hollyhurst, however as he could not cope with the difficulties, he encountered in providing intimate care, therefore he declined the offer of a transfer. In November 2014 he was offered a two-week trial in Riverview where there were three Care Assistants supporting one service user, who was autistic with very challenging behaviour, he did not wear a pad but did soil and smear. The witness said that he agreed to take up that position and did so for two days, however, he said that Mr T, Parkside Services Manager, notified him by email that he was unsuitable for the role. In November 2015, he said he was offered a 4-6-week position in the Blue Door Service, however he declined as his clinical depression condition exacerbated around that time and he was not capable of taking up the role. He said that he was so anxious about the possibility that there may be an occasion when he would be on his own with no support that it caused him to have a very severe mental breakdown. He said that even with the support of his colleagues he feared that he would still be required to perform intimate care and could not see how this task could be redistributed. As his condition was so serious, his GP referred him to a Consultant Psychiatrist. The witness was asked about the letter dated 23rd February 2016 from Mr S to HR, which stated that Mr S had contacted a staff nurse in Milestone House to ascertain the current requirements of the service users. He said that he did not but accepted that there were 3-4 services users in that house requiring intimate care. However, he said that the team in Milestone were quite supportive of him. However, he said that it was his decision due to his mental health not to avail of the rehabilitation plan. He said due to his disability he could not work in any service where he would be required to carry out intimate care. When asked if the Complainant’s phobia was unusual in the organisation, she said that in her experience it was unique for a Care Assistant to have such a phobia. She said that in Parkside there are two high dependency support users, in any event there might be some element of intimate care needs. While she said that she was not overly familiar with that service she said that it would be surprising if intimate care needs were not required in that service. With reference to the offer of a rehabilitation plan as outlined to the Complainant in the letter dated 12th November 2015, the witness said that this was a well thought out plan, with his team colleagues willing to support him with the intimate care needs of the service users, there were only two service users who required should care, however, there was always the possibility that he may be alone and it would be problematic if he could not do it as the ethos of the organisation is to provide dignity, respect and care to its service users. Ms T, Human Resources Manager, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. She has been employed with the Respondent for 23 years. She said that the Complainant’s phobia came to her attention in May 2012 when Mr S had discussions with the Complainant regarding the problem. She said that the first time she became aware of his referral to Dr Akhtar Syed, Clinical Psychologist in April 2006 was at the hearing before the Adjudication Officer. She said that Dr Syed is the Clinical Psychologist who deals with the Respondent’s service users, staff are never referred to him. Section 16 of the Acts provide:
The duty imposed on an employer by Section 16 of the Acts, is to allow a person with a disability to work on an equal basis with others. That duty is limited only by what is reasonable and proportionate and whether it would place a disproportionate financial cost on an employer. It is common case that the Complainant suffered from a disability within the meaning of the Acts and remained so as of the date of his dismissal, he was unfit to perform a crucial task associated with his role for which he was employed. The Complainant’s case is that the Respondent discriminated against him on the disability ground by its failure to make appropriate reasonable accommodation for his disability. The manifestations of the Complainant’s disability placed him at particular disadvantage in employment relative to workers without that disability, in that he was unable to carry out a crucial task in attending to service users, as certified by the medical profession.
It is not disputed that the Complainant is incapable of fulfilling the entire range of his duties by reason of his condition. The Complainant's case in essence is that if he suffers from a disability then the Respondent must reasonably accommodate this disability and that this reasonable accommodation involves moving him to a position in which he would have no contact with service users who require intimate care needs. The purpose of Section 16(3) is to provide a person with a disability with “appropriate measures” or “reasonable accommodation” in order to render that person fully capable to undertake the full range of duties associated with their posts. InNano Nagle, MacMenamin J held:-
In arriving at its determination in this appeal the Court has taken account of all the evidence adduced and has carefully examined the submissions and extensive documentation supplied by both parties. The Court finds as follows:- The Court is satisfied that the Respondent was informed of the Complainant’s problems with dealing with the intimate care needs of its service users. The Complainant himself brought it to the attention of his Service Manager, Mr S in May 2012 when he was in Milestone House. At the time, Mr S suggested various remedies to assist him which did not alleviate his difficulties. However, it was not until 7th October 2016 that Dr Flynn, Consultant Psychiatrist referred to the Complainant’s mental condition as a“specific phobia related to faeces/faecal matter”. In any event, the Court notes that the Respondent did not dispute that the Complainant had a disability with the meaning of the Acts, and it made efforts to address the Complainant’s difficulties and his request for a transfer, when in March 2014 he was offered a transfer to Hollyhurst. The Complainant completed an induction day in Hollyhurst but turned down the offer as the service users required assistance with intimate personal care needs. He continued to carry out his role in Milestone House with difficulty until 28thMay 2014 when he went out on sick leave. He was offered and availed of the services of the Employee Assistance Programme and a number of counselling sessions. As a result of a referral by the Respondent’s Occupational Health Nurse in July 2014, the Complainant was referred to Dr McBrinn, Respondent’s Occupational Health Physician for assessment. On 31st July 2014, Dr McBrinn, reported that the Complainant was suffering from occupational stress and his prognosis was:
He stated that:
Following a number of postponed dates for meetings due to the Complainant/his trade union representative’s unavailability, a meeting to discuss the Complainant’s absence did not take place until 23rd October 2014. At that meeting Mr S explained that management had explored various transfer options for the Complainant however, it stated that personal care was a common duty and as its service users were getting older, they require even more personal care, however, it was agreed that management would continue to explore alternatives for the Complainant. The Complainant was then offered an opportunity to trial working in Riverview, part of the Parkside Farm Services on 10th and 11th November 2014, however, having shadowed staff for the two days, he declined the offer due to the level of intimate care service needed. A follow up meeting was held on 24th November 2014 at which he was represented by two trade union officials. At that meeting, the Complainant informed management that he was having panic attacks in the middle of the night and in phone calls he made to members of staff he mentioned having suicidal thoughts due to the stress he was under. With his permission, management contacted his GP who explained the seriousness and reality of his condition and discussed treatment, diagnosis and prognosis. In agreement with his trade union representatives, it was agreed at the meeting to review the situation in January 2015, to refer him again to Dr McBrinn and if deemed fit to return to work, he would require up-to-date training, in the meantime. He was again offered the counselling services of the EAS Service and the services of the Occupational Health Nurse. On 26th May 2015, the Complainant’s GP provided a report on his condition to the Respondent. It stated that he was now fit to resume work provided that his duties did not include the requirement to provide intimate care to clients. A similar report was issued on 15th June 2015. On 9th October 2015 the Complainant’s trade union representative wrote to the Respondent, seeking his return to work, based on the medical reports and sought a redeployment position for him where he would not be exposed to soiled pads, however, no mention of a transfer to Parkside was made. Yet the Complainant continued to supply medical certificates on a fortnightly basis to the Respondent stating that he was unfit to work due to stress and anxiety, these continued to be supplied up to 18th November 2016. The Respondent referred the Complainant to Dr McBrinn in October 2015. Dr McBrinn’s reported that he agreed with the GP’s assessment was the Complainant was fit to return to work however, again stated that he would have to be redeployed to a position that would not expose him to faecal matter in pads, if such a position is available. The Respondent replied that his post remained open for him to return to, however, as all care assistant posts required intimate care there were no positions that could be offered to him. It organised to meet with him again to explore further reasonable accommodation that could be made. It was at this meeting in November 2015 that along with his trade union representatives, an agreed rehabilitation plan was put in place to accommodate him to return to work. Following which the Complainant contacted management to state that his GP would not sign off on him returning to work as he could not face the possibility of having to deal with intimate care needs. He said that although the plan had included his team carrying out these duties for him, he said that he did not want to impact on the team and that sometimes he might be on his own in the house. He said that his GP was referring him to a Consultant Psychiatrist. Management informed him that the offer continued to be open for him. Then in February 2016, he was again referred to Dr McBrinn for an assessment, his prognosis at that stage was:
On 23rd February 2016 Mr S reported that having received Dr McBrinn’s report he carried out further research on the position in Milestone House and was informed that the situation had changed regarding the residents and there was now an increase in the number of users requiring intimate care. He reported that should the Complainant return to work as planned, his exposure to “stressor at work” was unavoidable. Shortly thereafter, management wrote to the Complainant enquiring how specifically he could be accommodated as he was incapable of returning to his full role as Care Assistant. He was advised that his job was at risk due to his long-term absence. A further meeting was set up for 16th March 2016. On 11th August 2016 the Complainant was sent for another assessment by Dr McBrinn, who similarly reported that he was fit to return if he was not exposed to soiled pads, he concluded:
On 7th October 2016 Dr Darran Flynn, the Complainant’s Consultant Psychiatrist, produced a report for the Respondent in the context of the Complainant’s application for retirement on permanent infirmity (ill health) grounds and to outline from a mental health point of view his difficulties and how they impact/effect his ability to carry out the duties of his post. He stated that the Complainant suffers from a specific phobia related to faeces/faecal matter. He concluded:
Following discussions which took place at an Adjudication Officer hearing on 10th October 2016 involving management, the Complainant and his trade union representative and based on Dr Flynn’s report, it was agreed that the Complainant would apply for retirement on the grounds of permanent infirmity. On 15th October 2016, the Complainant wrote to the Respondent stating
Before his application was approved by HSE Pensions Management, the Complainant through his Solicitor withdrew the application and again sought redeployment. At this point a redeployment to Parkside was specifically mentioned and it referred to the recently advertised position for a vacancy in that service. Management responded enquiring if the Complainant’s prognosis had improved and seeking an update medical assessment. It also stated that having made further enquiries, there were no Care Assistant vacancies in the Parkside Services that did not require the duty of intimate care. By letter dated 27th March 2017 the Complainant was again advised that as the available medical reports indicated that he was incapable of carrying out the duties associated with his post that his employment was at risk and looked for any further information he may wish to bring to management’s attention to do so by 7th April 2017. On his behalf, his Solicitors wrote to management on 7th April 2017 alleging that no proper consultation had taken place with regard to alternative positions where he would be removed from intimate care requirements. By letter dated 28th April 2017, the Respondent stated that as there had been no further medical evidence to show that there had been an improvement in his medical prognosis as requested by the Respondent, the Complainant was informed that it had no option but to terminate his employment. This decision was appealed on 8th May 2017, the appeal was heard by an independent HR consultant who upheld the decision to dismiss on the grounds of incapacity. In order to determine whether the Respondent discharged adequately its responsibilities under the Act at Section 16, the Court must give consideration to the efforts made by the Respondent to objectively evaluate whether reasonable adjustments to the work arrangements of the Complainant could be made so as to render him fully capable of carrying out his duties. The Court finds that the Respondent make efforts throughout the Complainant’s absence to be updated on his condition and took into account the medical reports related to the Complainant’s capacity to return to work. In all the circumstances of this case and in what would appear to be the peculiar circumstances related to the Complainant as a Care Assistant who cannot carryout intimate care needs of the service users he cares for; the Court has reached the following conclusions:-
In all the circumstance of this case, the Court is satisfied that the Respondent madebona fideefforts to engage with the Complainant in relation to facilitating his return to work and to make, where possible, reasonable accommodation for his disability, as required under the Act. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that it can rely on the defence provided by section 16(1) of the Act. Therefore, the Court does not find that the Complainant was discriminated against on grounds of his disability contrary to Act.
Having received this report, the emphasis changed from seeking an alternative position for the Complainant to discussing his retirement on ill health grounds as he himself accepted that he was not going to return to his role as a Care Assistant with the Respondent. While that position may have changed with the intervention of his legal advisers, it is clear that the medical prognosis did not change. The Court notes that the Respondent met with the Complainant and his representatives on a number of occasions and afforded him an opportunity to be heard and to put forward proposals that would assist him to return to work. At that point he was on notice that the question of his dismissal for incapacity was being considered as he remained medically unfit to return to work. The only proposal put forward by the Complainant was that he should have been allocated a position with no intimate care requirements. Having heard the evidence and examined the documentation supplied, the Court is satisfied that the Respondent was in possession of all of the material facts concerning the Complainant’s medical condition before a decision was made to dismiss him on the grounds of incapacity. It had fully engaged with him and his representatives on a regular basis throughout his three-year absence. The Court is also satisfied that there was no practical way to redistribute the task of intimate care in such a way as to guarantee that he would never have to attend to the intimate care needs of the service users. In any event the Complainant failed to trial the rehabilitation plan, which was specifically designed to attempt to alleviate his stressor. Having heard the Complainant’s evidence that the mere possibility of having to carry out these duties caused such an exacerbation of his condition that he considered taking his own life. Faced with this fact and coupled with no prognosis of a return-to-work date, the Court finds that the Respondent was left with no option but to terminate his employment due to his incapacity to carry out the duties for which he was employed. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the Complainant’s ill-health was the reason for his dismissal, it was the substantial reason, the Complainant received fair notice that the question of his dismissal for incapacity was being considered and he was afforded an opportunity of being heard. Thereby meeting the four criteria set out by Lardner J. inShowerings.On that basis the Court does not find that the Complainant was discriminatorily dismissed by the Respondent. Victimisation Claim The Law: Section 74(2) of the Act defines “victimisation” in the following terms: -
In Determination EDA1017,Department of Defence v Barrett, this Court held that in order to make out a claim of victimisation under the Act it must be established that: -
In identifying a protected act for the purpose of advancing his claim of victimisation the Complainant states that he referred a complaint of discrimination on the ground of his disability to the Workplace Relations Commission on 10th March 2017, he contended that his dismissal on 28th April 2017 was in retaliation for the making of that complaint. In the letter of dismissal to the Complainant dated 28th April 2017, the Respondent outlined the reasons for the termination:
On the basis of the facts as found, the Court is satisfied that the Complainant’s dismissal was the culmination of events where he had been on sick leave for over three years with no prospect of a return-to-work date. The Court cannot find evidence to suggest that the Complainant’s dismissal was a reaction to the referral of a complaint under the Acts. His employment had been under consideration for some time, he had been informed that it was at risk and no medical evidence had been proffered to suggest that his condition was ever likely to improve. Accordingly, the Court finds that sufficient evidence has not been adduced to establish aprima faciecase of victimisatory dismissal of the Complainant by the Respondent. Therefore, the Court cannot find that the Complainant was victimised within the meaning of the Act. Determination For all of the reasons set out herein the Court is satisfied that the Respondent has discharged its duty to provide the Complainant with reasonable accommodation in terms of Section 16(3)(b) of the Acts. Therefore, the Decision of the Adjudication Officer is affirmed, and the appeal fails. The Decision of the Adjudication Officer that the Respondent did not discriminatorily dismiss the Complainant on the disability ground pursuant to Section 6(2)(g) of the Acts is upheld and the appeal fails. The Decision of the Adjudication Officer that the Respondent did not victimise the Complainant within the meaning of Section 74(2) of the Acts is upheld and the appeal fails. The Court so Determines.
NOTE Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to David Campbell, Court Secretary. |