ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00028788
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Niamh Kennedy | Ebay Europe Services Irl Ltd |
Representatives | Self represented | Avril Daly, Mason Hayes & Curran |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005 | CA-00038403-001 | 28/06/2020 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 04/08/2021
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Gaye Cunningham
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint .
Background:
The complaint is that the Respondent penalised the Complainant for having made complaints and raising concerns about her health and safety in the workplace. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant stated at the outset that she was aware that the complaint was not submitted within the six month time period outlined in the Workplace Relations Act 2015. She requested an extension of time. She submitted that the reasons she did not submit the complaint in the time period were that a) she had experienced a significant delay in receiving her data following her request to the employer and when she did receive the data it contained a data breach under GDPR, b) she had suffered anxiety disorder and had to undergo months of counselling and medication to cope with the stress she experienced as a result of the treatment she received in the employment and c) the Covid-19 pandemic delayed matters. In relation to the issues concerned in her complaint, the Complainant stated that she lodged a grievance against her team leader on 20 June 2019. She had experienced a lack of support from him and an unprofessional manner in his dealings with her. She was on stress related sick leave for a period of six weeks. The Complainant stated that when she returned to work on 18 June 2019, her Team Leader acted in a most unprofessional manner which she found distressing. He stated that he was hungover. He then raised the issue of alleged call avoidance and that as there was an investigation, she would not be paid for sick leave. She then submitted a grievance against him and his treatment of her on 20 June 2019. She stated that her grievance, having been submitted on 20 June 2019, still was not resolved or closed in September 2019. She had no option but to resign her job and she informed HR by email on 11 September 2019. She was asked to reconsider but on 16 September 2019 she confirmed her decision to resign. The Complainant stated that the treatment she had received, including misleading information from her Team Leader about sick leave entitlements and the long drawn out process in the handling of her grievance left her feeling that she was badly mistreated by the Respondent and effectively penalised for having raised a matter of concern for her own health and safety. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent argues that the complaint is out of time as the alleged protected act and penalisation occurred more than twelve months before the Complainant submitted her complaint form. The Complainant submitted a grievance on 20 June 2019 and her complaint form was submitted to the WRC on 28 June 2020. Even if, though it is firmly disputed, the date of the Claimant’s resignation is taken as the relevant date of contravention, this is still well outside the six month time limit in the 2015 Act, and the Claimant has failed to show any reasonable cause for the delay in bringing her complaint. The Respondent cites the established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by the Labour Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338, Cementation Skanska v Carroll. While the Respondent respectfully acknowledges that there was a delay in providing the Claimant’s personal data, it respectfully submits that this is not a valid reason for the significant delay in lodging the complaint. Put simply, the submission of a data access request does not pause or impact upon the statutory time limits set out in employment legislation, to include the 2005 Act. Moreover, the Claimant made it clear on 16 September 2019 that she would be consulting with a legal advisor as she felt she was entitled to her sick pay. While she did not have access to all of her data until 28 February 2020, she evidently believed, as far back as September 2019, that there was a possibility of bringing a claim in some shape or form. Notwithstanding that, the Claimant’s complaint form was not lodged until four months after she received the data. Notwithstanding this, should this claim proceed, the Claimant has failed to show any causal connection between a protected act and subsequent detriment as required under section 27. In fact, the Respondent submits that the Claimant has failed to point to any protected act and/or penalisation at all within the meaning of section 27. In relation to the Complainant’s complaint that she had been misled regarding her sick leave entitlements, it is submitted that the Claimant was well aware, from the beginning of her employment, of the terms that applied to the payment of sick pay. The Company does not usually pay discretionary sick pay to employees if the Company has commenced any Performance Improvement or Disciplinary process or have notified the employee of their intention to do so. The Complainant would be aware of this from the Employee Handbook. On 5 May 2019 the Claimant went on certified sick leave, initially for a period of two weeks, later extended to six weeks. As part of an internal review in May 2019 the Respondent became aware that a number of employees were tampering with consumer contact numbers, in order to avoid having to complete customer calls. The review concluded that in total, twenty employees were involved - the Claimant was identified as one of them. During the month of May and early June 2019 all employees involved were subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Respondent’s disciplinary procedure. The outcome of these proceedings ranged from a verbal warning to dismissal. Because the Claimant was on sick leave at this time, she was not yet invited to a disciplinary hearing. However, before going on sick leave, she was aware that other employees had been spoken to in relation to the Respondent’s concerns regarding the customer calls. The Claimant was assessed by the Respondent’s occupational health specialist on 13 June 2019 and deemed fit to return to work on 18 June 2019. On her return to work on 18 June 2019 the Claimant’s team leader informed her of the internal review and findings and explained that the Respondent would be commencing a formal disciplinary process to examine the findings. There is no dispute as to the fact that this conversation took place. For the avoidance of doubt, the Team Leader denies telling the Claimant that she was only entitled to 3-4 weeks’ sick pay and submits that the Claimant was simply confused about social welfare payments. In any event, the Claimant once again went on sick leave on 18 June 2019. On 19 June 2019, the Team Leader sent an email to the Claimant to check in with her and to explain the support available to her. On 20 June 2019 the Claimant filed a grievance under the grievance procedure. The grievance was against her team leader in respect of his alleged lack of support and the cessation of her sick pay. The grievance was investigated by the Operations Manager. As the Team Leader and Operations Manager were themselves out on sick leave, and the Claimant was away for a period, the grievance was delayed. However, as is clear from the correspondence, the investigator and HR kept in regular contact with the Claimant to keep her abreast of developments. Prior to the outcome of the grievance the Claimant resigned on 8 August 2019 by email. The Respondent asked that she reconsider her resignation which she did. The Claimant received the outcome of the grievance on 12 September 2019 and resigned later that day after once again being asked to reconsider. The grievance outcome found that the Claimant’s sick pay had been correctly ceased in line with Company policy. It also recommended that the Claimant be moved to a new team leader, in a different building, with a structured support plan and that the call avoidance allegations should be progressed through the Respondent’s procedures on her return. In fact, the proposed new team leader tried to make an introductory telephone call to the Claimant to discuss a return to work plan but the Claimant refused the call. On 16 September 2019 she confirmed her resignation with immediate effect by email. The Respondent accepted and acknowledged the Claimant’s resignation by email at on 16 September 2019. The email stated that the Respondent would pay her four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice as well as any outstanding accrued annual leave.
It is submitted that in order for the Complainant to succeed in her claim, she must have i) acted in accordance with one of the protected acts set out in Section 27(3), ii)suffered a detriment within the meaning of Section 27(1) or Section 27(2) of the 2005 Act and iii) there must be a clear causal link must be established between the protected acts and the penalisation.
The Claimant has failed to articulate what exactly she believes amounts to a protected act. The Claimant makes reference to raising informal concerns with her team leader in relation to workload and his lack of support. This is denied by the Team Leader, who, as part of the grievance investigation, was asked to respond to the allegations in writing.
Although it is not entirely clear what detriment the Claimant claims she has suffered, it is assumed she is concerned with the cessation of her sick pay. The fact that the Claimant’s sick pay ceased does not, in itself, amount to a detriment within the meaning of the 2005 Act. The Claimant must be able to point to a specific, independent, detriment, and not simply a failure by the Respondent to fulfil its duties under the 2005 Act. The wording of Section 27 of the 2005 Act is very specific. It defines penalisation as: “any act, or omission, by an employer, or a person acting on behalf of an employer, that affects to his detriment an employee with respect to any term, or condition, of his employment.”
In the case of An Garda Siochana v Hazel Delahunt [2014] ELR 130 the Labour Court held that the simple fact that Ms Delahunt has been invited to attend a disciplinary investigation did not in itself amount to a detriment. In the current claim, the cessation of the Claimant’s sick pay was solely the result of the instigation of the disciplinary process which is clearly permitted as part of the Respondent’s Attendance and Timekeeping Policy. The Claimant cannot dispute this clear contractual provision and therefore the cessation of her sick pay does not amount to a detriment within the meaning of Section 27(1) or Section 27(2) of the 2005 Act.
|
Finally, notwithstanding that it is submitted the Claimant cannot succeed in meeting the
criteria at (i) and (ii), for the sake of completeness, we will explore the criteria at
number (iii).
The Claimant must show that but for the protected act, the detriment would not have
happened.
In Paul O’Neill v Tony & Guy Blackrock Limited [2010] ELR 21, the Labour Court
made the following comments in relation to the “but for” test:
“The detriment giving rise to the complaint must have been incurred because of, or in
retaliation for, the Claimant having committed a protected act. This suggests that where
there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment
complained of, the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the
sense that “but for” the Claimant having committed the protected act he, or she, would
not have suffered the detriment. This involves the consideration of the motive, or
reasons, which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment.”
Therefore in order for the Claimant to sustain a complaint of penalisation it is essential
that the detriment complained of, which in this case it is assumed is the instigation of the
disciplinary process and/or the ceasing of her sick pay, be connected to the fact that
she brought a complaint about her team leader.
The decision to discipline the Claimant and the cessation of her sick pay had nothing
whatsoever to do with her grievance or her relationship with her team leader. The
cessation of sick pay was simply as a result of the instigation of the disciplinary process
and would have occurred irrespective of the Claimant raising any concerns. In any
event, the sick pay was stopped long before the Claimant brought her grievance.
Therefore, the Claimant has failed to establish a causal link between the detriment
suffered and her protected act.
CONCLUSION
The Claimant has failed to meet any of the criteria set out in section 27 of the 2005 Act
and therefore her claim for penalisation under section 28 of the same Act must fail.
Findings and Conclusions:
|
Time Limits
Section 41 (6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2016 provides:
“Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.
Section 41 (8) provides:
“an adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause”.
The complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 28 June 2020. In order for the complaint to be entertained as provided for in Section 41 (6), the contravention must have occurred on or after 29 December 2019. In order for the complaint to be considered as provided for in Section 41 (8), the contravention must have occurred on or after 29 June 2019. As the Complainant resigned on 16 September 2019 and her employment ended on 18 October 2019, the complaint is clearly out of time under Section 41 (6).
The Complainant requested that the time period be extended in accordance with Section 41 (8). In her complaint form that Complainant stated : “I believe I was penalised for going on work related stress leave and raising concerns regarding lack of support from my TL and the Health and Safety of the work place.” and “The stressors were still there so I informed him of my intent to take more time off. It was after this that he raised the call avoidance claim and told me that a HR case would be raised against me, therefore suspending my sick pay if I was to take more time. This is part of the basis of my complaint as this and actions taken by the company in the following months lead to me handing my resignation in September 2019 under a constructive dismissal.”
As the suspension of sick pay took place on 19 June 2019 and Complainant’s grievance was submitted on 20 June 2019 the complaint is clearly out of time, and I have no jurisdiction in the matter.
Decision:
The complaint is out of time.
Dated: 4th October 2021
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Gaye Cunningham
Key Words:
Complaint out of time. |