Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Complainant

A Respondent

Representatives

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00036321-001

08/05/2020

It is the Complainant’s claim that he was discriminated against and harassed on the ground of race by the Respondent on 6 February 2020. The ES.1 Form was dated 6 April 2020 by the Complainant . The Complainant submitted his claim to the Workplace Relations Commission on 8 May 2020.

The Complainant was party to a personal injury claim before the Circuit Court on 6 February 2020. The Respondent represented the Defendant’s Insurance Company at that hearing.  It is the Complainant’s claim that an expert witness, a Medical Consultant, ‘exaggerated the estimate of car repairs which I provided as “A Thousand Euro” to “Eight Thousand Euro”’ which the Complainant states was false.

The Complainant states that the Respondent was of ‘Caucasian racial or ethnic origin pleaded or caused to be pleaded information’. A further claim is that the Respondent and the witness knew the information to be incorrect.

There was no response to the ES1 provided by the Respondent. Having carefully reviewed the file I am satisfied that the Respondent was on notice of the complaint against it.

Section 5 (1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 provides:-

“5.—(1) A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.”

For completeness Section 2 (1) of the Act defines what constitutes a “service” and “goods”:

“service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a) access to and the use of any place,

(b) facilities for—

(i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing

(ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment,

(iii) cultural activities, or

(iv) transport or travel,

(c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and

(d) a professional or trade service, but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 ) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;”

Goods are defined in as; “means any articles of movable property”

There is a question as to whether the Complainant in this case sought to access a “service” of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Act.

There is an onus on a Complainant seeking redress pursuant to the Act to establish that (a) he sought to access a service of the Respondent that was available to the public generally and (b) he was discrimination against on the stated grounds of discrimination.

The Complainant’s claim relates to solicitor who was defending a claim brought by the Complainant before the Circuit Court. The Respondent was not available to offer a service within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act to the Complainant at the Circuit Court hearing on 6 February 2020. Furthermore, the Complainant failed to adduce any evidence that he was discriminated against by the Respondent. Consequently, the claim falls to satisfy the requirements of the Equal Status Act 2000-2015.

Section 22 of Equal Status Act 2000

In light of the above conclusion it is worth considering whether Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 is appropriate which provides for dismissal of claims:-

“22.— The Director may dismiss a claim at any stage in the investigation if he or she is of opinion that the claim has been made in bad faith or is frivolous or vexatious or relates to a trivial matter.”

It is widely accepted by the Courts that the terms are legal terms which can be often used interchangeably as held by the Barron J in Farley v Ireland, [1997] IESC 60:

“So far as the legality of matters is concerned frivolous and vexatious are legal terms. They are not pejorative in the sense or possibly in the sense that Mr. Farley may think they are. It is merely a question of saying that so far as the plaintiff is concerned if he has no reasonable chance of succeeding then the law says that it is frivolous to bring the case.

Similarly, it is a hardship on the defendant to have to take steps to defend something which cannot succeed, and the law calls that vexatious”.

In 2005, McCracken J reiterated this in Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited & Ors [2005] 2 IR 261, stressing that the ‘real purpose’ of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to dismiss frivolous or vexatious claims was firstly, to ensure that the courts would be used only for the resolution of genuine disputes and not for ‘lost causes’ and, secondly, that parties would not be required to defend proceedings which could not succeed.

The terms “frivolous or vexatious” were carefully considered by the High Court in Patrick Kelly v The Information Commissioner[2014] IEHC 479 instructive as to the meaning of these terms:

“As a matter of Irish law, the term “frivolous or vexatious” does not, as noted by Birmingham J. in Nowak, necessarily carry any pejorative connotations but is more concerned with the situation where the litigation (or, in this instance, application) can be described as futile, misconceived or bound to fail.

Where a person engages in a pattern of litigation (or applications as in the present instance) which not only come within those descriptions but can be said to be actuated by ill-will or bad faith, such conduct may properly be described as vexatious.”

Irvine J in the High Court in Behan v McGinley [2011] 1 I.R. 47 and reiterated by Laffoy J  in Loughrey v. Dolan[2012] IEHC 578, relied on a decision of the Ontario High Court in Re Lang Michener andFabian (1987) 37 D.L.R. (4th) 685 which listed a number of factors which tend to indicate that proceedings may potentially be vexatious in nature and thus amenable to being struck out. These factors, which are not meant to be exhaustive, are:

“• whether the issues in dispute are matters which have already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, i.e. res judicata;

• where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action will lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can expect to obtain relief;

• where the action is brought for an improper purpose, including harassment and oppression of other parties, as opposed to asserting legitimate legal rights;

• where issues sought to be litigated tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented;

• where the person instituting the proceedings has failed to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings;

• where the plaintiff persistently takes unsuccessful appeals against judicial decisions.”

This case cannot succeed where the Complainant did not seek to engage the services of the Respondent. The Respondent was representation an opposing party in a personal injury claim before the Circuit Court. It falls at the first hurdle of the Equal Status Act 2000-2015.  Consequently, this case sits squarely within the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” claim for the purposes of Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000-2015.

Having very carefully considered the complaint before me, I am satisfied that it is a “frivolous or vexatious” claim for the purposes of Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000-2015. Consequently, I am dismissing the claim.

Equal Status – Good and Services- Frivolous or Vexatious- Dismissal of Claim