Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Eileen Grimes

St Marks GAA Club

Representatives

Self-represented

Cathy McGrady BL

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00046889-001

29/10/2021

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00046889-002

29/10/2021

Ms Grimes worked in the bar in St Mark’s GAA Club on a voluntary basis for seven years and in October 1997, she was employed as the assistant bar manager.  In 2006, she was promoted to the position of bar manager.  In October 2019, Ms Grimes was informed that the bar manager job would be made redundant and replaced with a new role of Clubhouse Manager.  Discussions then ensued between Ms Grimes’s solicitor and the Club’s solicitor, but by March 15th 2020, and the commencement of the lock-down due to Covid-19, Ms Grimes was still the bar manager.

At the end May and in early June 2020, Ms Grimes went to the Club to let the beer suppliers in to collect kegs.  She discovered that some kegs had been “tapped” since she the last time the club was open before the lock-down.  Ms Grimes looked at the CCTV footage and observed some members of the executive and some club members drinking on the premises over two weekends in May 2020.  She reported her findings to the Chairman.

On June 4th 2020, in a telephone call from the Chairman, Ms Grimes was informed that her job was redundant.  In a letter on June 30th, the Club Secretary confirmed that her employment was terminated on that date.  He gave the following reason:

“The Covid 19 Pandemic has meant the closure of our Bar and therefore we no longer need a Bar Manager.  Should the Bar re-open at any stage in the future, our Committee has decided unanimously to run the Bar on a voluntary basis.”

Ms Grimes received a statutory redundancy payment of €27,423 plus €4,769 in lieu of notice.  Although the Chairman’s letter of June 30th informed Ms Grimes that she could appeal against the decision to make her job redundant, she did not appeal.  On October 29th 2021, 16 months after the termination of her employment, she submitted this complaint to the WRC regarding her dismissal and also, a claim for holiday pay and public holiday pay for 2020.  As a first principle, before moving to consider the substance of these complaint, I must establish that I have jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. 

At the hearing, Ms Grimes said that, in June 2020, when she was informed that, if the bar re-opened, it would be run by volunteers, she accepted that her job was redundant.  In July 2021, she discovered that the Club advertised for a new job of Clubhouse Manager.  She claims that the decision to recruit for this job is contrary to the reason given for the redundancy of the Bar Manager.  The advertising of this new job is the contravention that she complains about, and she argued that the submission of this complaint on October 29th 2021, is within the six-month time limit.

On behalf of Ms Grimes, Ms Dunne argued that the restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic were extenuating circumstances that prevented Ms Grimes from submitting a complaint within the legal time limit.

The time limit for submission of a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act (“the Act”) is set out in section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.  This provides that a complaint must be submitted no later than six months after the date of the contravention to which it relates.  Section 41(8) provides that, for reasonable cause, an extension of the time limit of up to 12 months may be permitted.  The same time limit applies to the complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act regarding holiday pay.

The substantial contravention complained of here is the dismissal of Ms Grimes due to redundancy.  In her evidence at the hearing, she argued that the contravention occurred when a job was advertised for a new role of Clubhouse Manager.  She claims that the recruitment for this role means that the reason given for the redundancy of her job – that it would be done by volunteers – is no longer true. 

In the documents she submitted in advance of the hearing, I note that, in October 2019, when Ms Grimes was informed that the job of Bar Manager would be made redundant, she was informed of the Club’s intention to recruit a Clubhouse Manager.  When she was dismissed, Ms Grimes must have been aware that this was, or had been under consideration and it cannot have been a complete surprise when the Club proceeded with this plan in July 2021.

I have given this matter serious consideration and I do not accept Ms Grimes’s argument that the contravention under the Unfair Dismissals Act occurred in July 2021.  A complaint under the Act must be about the fact of dismissal, and not an event that occurs after the dismissal.  If the time limit was to be extended to include events occurring in the years and months after dismissal, the time limit would be irrelevant and employers could be faced with the possibility of having to defend claims on an indefinite basis.  There is no doubt that this is not the intention of the Unfair Dismissals Act or the Workplace Relations Act.

While Ms Grimes argued that her concern about her redundancy manifested itself as a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act only in July 2021, when her former employer advertised to fill a vacancy for a new Clubhouse Manager, the same explanation cannot be given regarding her complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act regarding holiday pay.

Ms Grimes’s argument that she was prevented from submitting her complaints because of the extenuating circumstances of Covid-19 is related to the fact that, while the job of Clubhouse Manager was advertised in July 2021, she didn’t submit these complaints to the WRC until October that year.  While the time delay between July and October 2021 is immaterial, it seems to me that the time off work and the limits on social outlets provided more opportunity than would have been normally available to most people to submit a complaint to the WRC.  I do not accept therefore, that the Covid-19 restrictions impeded Ms Grimes in her effort to submit a complaint within the statutory time limit.

I note from Ms Grimes’s submission and the documents included as appendices, that, at the time of her dismissal, she refused to sign a non-disclosure agreement, and that her solicitor suggested that she would make a complaint to the WRC.  It is apparent therefore, that she had the benefit of legal advice at the time of her dismissal, and that her solicitor contemplated making a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act but did not do so.

In conclusion, as they were submitted to the WRC on October 29th 2021, 16 months after her dismissal, these complaints have been presented four months after the latest possible date for the presentation of a complaint.  I find therefore, that I have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on these complaints.

I have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on these complaints because they have been submitted outside the time limit prescribed at section 41(6) and 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

Complaint submitted outside the six-month time limit.