FULL RECOMMENDATION
SECTION 7(1), PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT, 1991 PARTIES: SOUTH DUBLIN COUNTY COUNCIL (REPRESENTED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AGENCY) - AND - ANTHONY MADDEN (REPRESENTED BY IRELAND HUMAN RESOURCES) DIVISION:
SUBJECT: 1.Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No(s) ADJ-00026544 CA-00032455-001. The Factual Matrix There is no material dispute between the Parties in relation to the facts giving rise to the within appeal and they can be summarised as follows. The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Depot Assistant from January 1997 until his retirement on 11 September 2011. Between 1997 and 2008, the Complainant worked an extensive amount of overtime in addition to his normal duties and was paid accordingly for all overtime hours worked. The Complainant received his pension in the normal way following his retirement in 2011. However, in 2017 he instructed a solicitor to initiate an appeal on his behalf under the Superannuation Internal Dispute Resolution process to determine whether the overtime he had worked was reckonable for the purpose of superannuation benefits. The appeal did not succeed as the overtime worked by the Complainant was not deemed to meet the requirements of the relevant Circular (No 12/91). In 2019, the Complainant unsuccessfully escalated the matter to the Pensions Ombudsman. Eventually – on 21 November 2019 – the Complainant initiated a claim under the Act before the Workplace Relations Commission. That claim was upheld by the Adjudication Officer who decided that “overtime payments, for the six-month period ending on the 21stNovember 2019 (sic), should be reckonable for superannuation purposes” and accordingly awarded compensation of €9,744.00 under the Act. Preliminary Issues The Respondent raised two preliminary issues that go to jurisdiction. Mr Irvine of the LGMA confirmed to the Court that both issues had been canvassed before the Adjudication Officer although neither is referred to by him in his written decision. Mr Irvine submits that the within claim was referred to the Workplace Relations Commission on 21 November 2019, in excess of eight years after the Complainant had retired from his employment with the Respondent and must, therefore, be considered to be out of time having regard to section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Secondly, Mr Irvine notes that the Complainant – in his referral to the Workplace Relations Commission - sought a “recalculation of my pension”. Mr Irvine submits that pension is expressly excluded from the definition of wages for the purposes of the Act. By way of reply to these preliminary matters, Ms Ireland for the Complainant submits that the complaint is not about pension but about whether or not the overtime worked by the Complainant whilst an employee is reckonable for superannuation purposes. The Law The Long Title to the Act of 1991 describes the purpose of the Act as follows:
Wages for the purposes of the Act means:
Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides:
Discussion and Decision The Complainant herein ceased to be an employee of the Respondent on 11 September 2011. He has not been in receipt of wages (within the meaning of the Act of 1991) from the Respondent since that date and therefore, by operation of section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, he no longer had any standing to refer a complainant under the Act of 1991 (against the Respondent) from 10 March 2012 onwards. On the other hand, the Complainant has been in receipt of regular pension payments from the Respondent since the date of his retirement. Such payments, however, are expressly excluded from the definition of wages in the Act. It is not in dispute that the Complainant was paid in full for all overtime hours that he worked as an employee. The issue of whether or not those overtime hours should be reckonable for pension or superannuation purposes is not one that falls to be considered under the Act of 1991. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the within appeal on behalf of the Respondent succeeds and the Complainant’s cross-appeal fails. The decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside in full. The Court so determines.
NOTE Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Therese Hickey, Court Secretary. |