Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Suleman  Kayani

Aldi Stores (Ireland) Limited

Representatives

  Self Represented

Kiwana Ennis BL instructed by  Vincent & Beatty Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-001

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00035417-002

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00035417-003

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-005

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-006

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-007

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-008

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-009

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00035417-010

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00035417-012

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

CA-00035417-013

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00035417-014

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00035417-015

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00035417-016

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00035417-017

24/03/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule 2 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014

CA-00035417-018

24/03/2020

The Complainant is employed as a Store Manager and submitted 15 claims to the Workplace Relations Commission against his current employer as follows:

Seven claims pursuant to the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997;

Two claims pursuant to the Payment of Wages Act, 1991;

One claim pursuant to the Terms of Employment (Information) Act,

1994;

Three claims pursuant to the Employment Equality Act, 1998;

One claim pursuant to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act,

2005; and

      One claim pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014.

The Complainant commenced employment on March 14th 2006 and was promoted to the position of Store Manager on July 1st 2017. The Complainant went out on certified sick leave on July 22nd 2019 and has remained on certified sick leave at the date of the Hearing, August 11th 2021. The Complainant submitted his Complaints to the WRC on March 24th 2020 and therefore the cognisant period under the Acts is from September 25th 2019 to March 24th 2020, a period when the Complainant was not at work.  (Each of the above acts require a compliant to be made within six months of the date of the infringement). The Complainant as a lay litigant, was advised at the Hearing by the Adjudicator of the six-month time limit for complaints and advised of his right to apply for an extension of time to twelve months. The Respondent objected to the extension of time to twelve months on the basis that no grounds were provided to support the request. The Complainant advised that he first received legal assistance with the preparation of his complaints in early 2020. The Complainant sought an extension of time to twelve months on the basis of medical grounds and that he was stressed but no evidence was provided, at any stage, to support this reason for an extension.

The Adjudicator advised the Parties that he was reserving his decision on the application for an extension of time at the Hearing until the issue of the Decisions on the complaints and the Complainant was allowed detail his complaints on that basis.  The Complainant submitted his complaints to the WRC with very little detail and the Respondent, while having a full defence prepared and read into the record of the Hearing, objected to the lack of detail in the complaints which limited their ability to respond to the complaints in detail. The Complainant was not in a position to detail the exact claims at the Hearing and by consent was given further time to provide this detail after the hearing and the Respondent also had the opportunity to reply to this further submission.

 The Complainants Complaint form stated the following complaints;

CA00035417-001 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he was not given compensation for working on a Sunday.

CA00035417-002Payment of Wages Act 19991

The Complainant stated the Respondent had made an unlawful deduction from his wages.

CA00035417-003 Payment of Wages Act 1991

The Complainant stated the Respondent had paid him less than the amount due to him of 2,000 Euros wages and 1,700 Euros holiday pay due for payment on October 28th 2010.

CA00035417-005 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he did not get a daily rest period.

CA00035417-006 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he did not get breaks

CA00035417-007Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he did not get weekly rest periods

CA00035417-008 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he was required to work more than the maximum permitted number of hours between July 2017 and July 2019 and worked 50 hours a week.

CA00035417-009 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he did not get his paid annual leave entitlement.

CA00035417-010 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he did not receive his public holiday entitlements.

CA00035417-012 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

The Complainant stated he did not receive notification of changes to his terms of employment in writing

CA00035417-014 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant stated he was discriminated by the Respondent due to his Religion, Race, by not promoting him in the past, by victimising him, harassing him and in a condition of employment. At the Hearing the Complainant stated he was by passed in 2015 for a promotion and an Irish person promoted instead of hm. He stated he was promoted in 2017 but on different rate of pay and he claimed this was discrimination on the basis of his nationality and religion and some people had different sales bonuses.

CA00035417-015 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant stated he had not received equal pay due to his religion and race. He stated he was promoted in 2017 but on different rate of pay and he claimed this was discrimination on the basis of his nationality and religion.

CA00035417-016 Safety Health and Welfare Act 1998

The Complainant stated he was penalised for complying with or making a complaint under the Act. The Complainant could not specifically give a date when a complaint was made. He referred to issues in 2012/2013. He mentioned moving to another store and being under pressure. He stated he was told that he was struggling and had to get the job done. He felt under stress and affected his medical condition. The Complainant said he got a letter in July 2019 that made his life worse.

CA00035417-017 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant stated he was victimised for taking an action under Section 77 of the Act

CA00035417-018 Protected Disclosure Act 2014

The Complainant stated he was penalised or threatened with penalisation for having made a protected disclosure under Schedule 2 of the Act. The Complainant said he was involved in a grievance procedure and this put him under duress. The Complainant could not specifically site an act or statement which would fit the description of a protected disclosure. He stated some procedures were not being followed in the Stores and hours were deleted or changed and the issue was not revisited. He stated some Managers hours were being deleted or changed.

The Complainant submitted a substantial amount of back up paperwork prior to the Hearing.

Subsequent to the Hearing, the Complainant provided further written details regarding loss of Pay, Sunday premium payment, unlawful deduction, sick pay, holidays, public holidays and loss of income. 

The Complainant provided no further evidence to support his claim for an extension of time due to reasonable cause.

The Respondent made substantial arguments in defence of each complaint but given the decision regarding the application for a time limit extension (below in Findings) many of the Complaints are moot as the Complainant did not work during the cognisant period.

Despite bearing the initial onus of proof in respect to all claims lodged, the Respondent argued that the Complainant had failed completely to provide details of his claims and did not set out a credible or stateable basis for the claims made. The Respondent objected to having to defend vague and generalised claims thereby denying the Respondent its right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Respondent argued that any claims in respect to which the Complainant fails to make out an initial prima facie case should be dismissed.

In accordance with the Aldi management system, a store manager's direct leader is the area manager with responsibility for that store and the store manager's personnel leader is the next level of management, being the store operations director, responsible for that store.

The duties of the store manager are referred to in clause 2 of the contract and are set out in more detail in the job description attached to the contract. Clause 2 confirms that the store manager is responsible for managing the store efficiently ensuring company targets relating to standards, inventory control and productivity as outlined in the job description are achieved. The store manager is also responsible for training and developing the staff in the store; for ensuring that hours of work of all staff are accurately recorded and for ensuring compliance with standard company procedures and legal requirements, in particular food law, due diligence and health and safety legislation.

Clause 3 provides that the normal hours of work will average 45 hours per week. A store manager is given time in lieu in respect to any hours worked in excess of 45 hours per week, It is the store manager's responsibility to draw up the staff rosters for the store and as a consequence the store manager is in control of setting out his or her own hours of work. It is recommended that a store manager works one weekend in three but this recommendation does not specify the particular day of the weekend and therefore there is no requirement for a store manager to work Sundays.

In 2017 there was a change to the remuneration of store managers from a basic salary plus productivity bonus to basic salary only. The basic salary duly increased at this time to compensate for this change. In effect, in less busy stores the new remuneration package was significantly more beneficial. In stores with very high productivity levels, this might not be the case. All employees appointed to the store manager position from 2016 onwards (including the Complainant) were placed on the new remuneration package.

The Complainant commenced his Store Manager role on the Year 3 salary in order to ensure that he received a significant pay rise on his promotion.

In respect to sick pay, clause 8 provides for an entitlement to one-month's sick pay per year for the first two years of employment thereafter the entitlement increases to three months' sick pay per year. Clause 8(d) confirms that where an employee is absent for more than seven days, the employee must notify the Area Manager at the start of each subsequent week of absence. The sick pay scheme is set out in the Employee Handbook where it is stated that sick pay will be calculated on the same basis as holiday pay. Calculation of holiday pay is also set out in the Handbook and regarding salaried employees (such as the Complainant) it is stated:

"For salaried employees holiday pay entitlement will be equivalent to your current contracted rate, including bonus where applicable.

However, holidays paid in arrears (e.g. in the event that you leave the company) will be calculated based on your daily average in the last 3 calendar months "

Clause 14 of the store manager contract confirms that the grievance procedure is set out in the Handbook and the Handbook contains both an informal and formal grievance procedure in this respect

For his first two months of working as a store manager, the Complainant was located at the X  store. He was then transferred to the L store which was closer to the Complainant's home but was a busier and more challenging store compared to X.

By letter of 31 st May 2019 the Complainant set out a number of issues of concern he had with MOS (his immediate Supervisor) which he sought to discuss. This letter was dealt with as a formal grievance. The mater was dealt with by the Operations Director, CW.

The Complainant attended a grievance meeting with CW on 20th June. He attended a second grievance meeting on 8th July 2019. From these meetings the Complainant's issues with MOS  were as follows:

The Complainant alleged that MOS prevented him from completing his duties by giving instructions to him with which he disagreed.

He alleged that MOS engaged in threatening behaviour towards him by giving him instructions with which he disagreed and in a manner he did not like.

He alleged that MOS made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system (the hours recording system for employees) in respect to the hours of a trainee area manager which negatively impacted the C store's productivity.

He alleged that MOS made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate recording of the said trainee area manager's hours affecting her pay.

He alleged that MOS made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate payment of the Complainant's salary. The only example provided here concerned an alleged adjustment to his hours for 25th September 2017 from six hours (9.30am to 3.30pm) to two hours (10.30am to 12.30pm) on a day he said he had attended training for two hours but had worked in the store both before and after the training.

He alleged that MOS made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate recording of working hours for various members of staff. The Complainant did not provide either names of staff allegedly affected or any dates in respect to which these alleged adjustments related,

In the course of investigating the Complainants grievance, CW interviewed MOS on 10th July 2019.

By letter of 16th July 2019, CW communicated the outcome of the grievance to the Complainant. In respect to the six matters arising from the two meetings with the Complainant (as set out above), CW found as follows:

There was no evidence to suggest that MOS had prevented the Complainant from doing his store manager job. The evidence demonstrated that MOS was assisting the Complainant in the successful performance of his duties.

There was no evidence to suggest that MOS was threatening towards the Complainant.

Regarding the allegation that MOS made incorrect adjustments in respect to the hours of the trainee area manager which negatively impacted the store's productivity, CW was familiar with this incident which involved the incorrect allocation of hours of the trainee area manager to "off prod" instead of "on prod." CW explained to the Complainant in the meetings that this incident had the effect of increasing the overall productivity of the store as this trainee area manager's hours were not being counted towards the store's overall employee hours and that this was done in error, CW explained that when the issue came to MOS's attention, she realised that correcting the error in full would have negatively impacted the store's productivity for which the store manager is responsible and therefore she discussed it with CW. It was agreed between CW and MOS that the hours would be aligned to the store's current productivity target to ensure the store did not suffer unduly because of this error. In not upholding this complaint, CW noted that it was clear MOS had tried to minimise the impact of another person's recording error so as not to overly penalise the store.

This matter was upheld and it was found that MOS had incorrectly adjusted the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate recording of the trainee area manager's hours. However, it was noted that this did not result in any loss of income to the employee in question. CW confirmed that MOS's direct leader would discuss the importance of accurate recording of hours within stores.

The Complainant's allegation that MOS had incorrectly adjusted the smart time system in respect to his hours was found to be unproven. It was noted that there was no supporting evidence regarding this allegation. However, as a gesture of goodwill, CW confirmed that the alleged incorrectly adjusted hours for the 25th September 2017 would be added to the Complainant's management control hours balance,

The allegation that MOS had made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate recording of working hours for various members of staff was not upheld. It was noted that the Complainant had provided neither names nor dates in respect to this allegation, Notwithstanding this, CW that he had undertaken a preliminary investigation into a sample of shifts for all Assistant store managers working in the L Store between January 2017 and July 2018 and no evidence was found of any amendments to working hours having been made by MOS.

The letter confirmed that CW intended to take no further action other than as set out above. The Complainant was also notified of his right of appeal.

The Complainant appealed against the grievance outcome to NOC Managing Director, by letter dated 22nd July 201. The Complainant appealed against the findings at numbers (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (iv). There was no appeal against the finding at no. (iv). At the conclusion of this letter, the Complainant stated that he believed that since raising his grievance he had been "put under pressure" but provided no further details in support of this allegation.

The Complainant commenced sick leave on 22nd July 2019.

The appeal meeting took place on 28th August 2019..

The appeal outcome was communicated by letter of 7th October 2019. In respect to the five issues under appeal, the findings were as follows:

It was noted that the only examples provided of the allegation that MOS prevented the Complainant from carrying out his store manager duties concerned (a) training new starters and (b) the allocation of employees to manage the special buy area. NOC  found that MOS's requests that the new starter would be trained by the Complainant and that the Complainant would allocate three employees to the special buy area rather than two were reasonable instructions and it fell to the store manager to carry them out to his best ability. This complaint therefore was not upheld.

In respect to the allegation of threatening behaviour by MOS, it was noted that this related to the Complainant having disagreed with a number of instructions/decisions made by MOS in relation to the running of the store. NOC acknowledged that MOS could have highlighted to the Complainant the option of raising a grievance in circumstances where he felt the requests being made of him were unreasonable. However, as the Complainant did not provide any other evidence to support his claim of being threatened, this complaint was not upheld.

This allegation related to the adjustments made to the allocation of the trainee area manager's hours from "off prod" to "on prod." NOC noted that the Complainant had clarified that his complaint here was that MOS had falsified the company records in relation to the recording of employee hours by changing them after month end. NOC further noted that the hours were partly corrected when the error was discovered and that a full correction would have resulted in the store missing its target for April. NOC found that there was no evidence to suggest that MOS had acted maliciously or fraudulently in her audit responsibilities for the store and therefore he concluded this complaint was not upheld. It was noted that the Complainant as store manager had not been proactively notified by MOS in respect to the changes made but notwithstanding this, NOC concluded that no falsification of records was involved.

A complaint related to the 25th September 2017 when the Complainant alleges he had his hours reduced from six to two by MOS on a day he attended training for two hours but had worked in the store for another four hours. NOC noted that the Complainant had not clocked in on the day in question and instead had made manual entries to the time records. He noted that there was no evidence that this was done maliciously or with the intent to enhance the results of the store or to understate the Complainant's hours. Therefore, this complaint was not upheld. It was noted that as a gesture of goodwill the hours in question had already been returned to the Complainant.

This concerned the Complainant's allegation that MOS had made incorrect adjustments to the smart time system resulting in the inaccurate recording of working hours for various members of staff. NOC noted that, unlike during the initial grievance process, on appeal, the Complainant had identified four individuals allegedly affected. NOC stated that he had reviewed all the manual adjustments made by MOS for these individuals for the period from April 2017 until July 2018 and confirmed there were no suspicious or unexplained adjustments. This complaint was therefore not upheld.

NOC stated that he trusted the explanations set out in the letter would give comfort to the Complainant that his area manager had not acted inappropriately as suspected by him. NOC also thanked the Complainant for bringing the matters to his attention. He noted that this now closed the matter.

For the duration of the Complainant's grievance investigation and subsequent appeal, another Manager (AOR) took over the area manager role for the C store. MOS resumed responsibility for the C store after the appeal process had concluded. This was communicated to the Complainant by letter from CW of 15th November 2019.

In October 2019, the Respondent became aware that the Complainant's Garda National Immigration Bureau ('GMB H) Card was due to expire on 10th October 2019. The Respondent's control measures to ensure compliance with work permit and visa requirements had recently improved and as a consequence the Respondent conducts monthly checks on all employees who require a valid GNIB card. This is because the Respondent cannot legally employ any person who is not in possession of a valid GNIB card. It is the responsibility of the employee to maintain the validity of the card. In this case therefore, AreaManager AOR wrote to the Complainant by letter of 3rd October 2019 and requested proof from the Complainant of his updated GNIB stamp. The letter confirmed that the Complainant was to contact AOR  if he required any assistance. As the Complainant did not reply to this letter, CW sent a further letter dated 30th October 2019 in which it was noted that the Complainant had not provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the Respondent that he was legally entitled to work in Ireland and therefore the Complainant's employment was "currently suspended, until such time as you provide sufficient evidence that you have the legal entitlement to work in Ireland" The Complainant was requested to attend a meeting on 8th November 2019 in order to discuss the matter and to ensure the Complainant understood the situation and to determine if the Respondent could provide any assistance.

By letter of 6th November 2019 the Complainant replied noting that on previous occasions when his GNIB stamp had expired, he had not been suspended. (This was correct and was as a consequence of a less effective system in place to monitor this issue). He noted there was no start date on the suspension. He stated he had updated AOR  on 14th October 2019 in relation to his GNIB stamp which he confirmed had been sorted out from 5th November 2019 until 8th January 2022. He confirmed he would not have his GNIB card for another three weeks and that the immigration office could be contacted for verification purposes. He apologised for not being able to attend the proposed meeting on medical grounds and that he hoped to be able to attend another meeting when arranged.

CW replied by letter of 14th November 2019  acknowledging that the Respondent was satisfied that the Complainant was in possession of the valid GNIB card and that the Complainant would revert to sick pay from 5th November 2019. It was acknowledged that there were occasions in the past when the Complainant was permitted to work without a valid GNIB card. CW referred however to the recent improvements in the internal control measures and the monthly checks that are carried out. He noted that it was unfortunate that this had occurred during a period of absence when all correspondence was via letter. He stressed that the Complainant must maintain a valid GNIB card into the future and that the Respondent would endeavour to support him in this. He confirmed the Complainant was suspended from 1 1 th October 2019 until 5th November 2019 which meant he was only paid for 11 days in October. However, his pay had resumed on 5th November 2019 (at which point the Complainant was put back on sick pay which he could receive for a total of three months per annum).

The Complainant wrote again by letter of 1 0th December 2019  in which he raised issues with the level of communication regarding his suspension from pay stating that he believed there had been no prior notice, He queried CW’s statement that he received only 1 1 days' pay in October and he sought confirmation of the days of sick pay paid to him per month and the rate of pay. He stated that it was very stressful to be suspended and wanted to know if the suspension would remain on his personnel file and if so for how long. He also asked about the procedure to view his personnel fi

le.

By letter of 23rd December 2019 CW sent the Complainant a copy of his payslips from July to December noting that it clearly stated on each payslip the number of days of sick pay received in each calendar month with one month in arrears. Attached to this letter was also the Respondent's privacy notice which sets out how employees can access and view their personnel file. CW confirmed that in relation to the Complainant's workplace concerns, he was available to meet and discuss these and any other matters and that the Complainant should make an appointment with his assistant if he wished to do so.

Next, on behalf of the Complainant, McMahon O'Brien Tynan Solicitors ("MOT") wrote by letter of 24th March 2020 and referred to the Complainant's grievance. (MOT subsequently came off record for the Complainant prior to the Hearing). In this letter, reference is made, for the first time, to the Complainant's alleged discrimination on the grounds of religion and race and his alleged penalisation for making a protected disclosure regarding the smart time system being incorrectly adjusted. No factual basis underpinning these allegations is contained in the letter. The letter concluded by stating that if the Respondent failed to respond satisfactorily within seven days, MOT would have no option but to advise the Complainant of the options available to him including making a complaint to the WRC.

The Complainant's claims with the WRC were lodged on 24th March 2020.

On behalf of the Respondent, Vincent & Beatty Solicitors replied to MOT, by letter of 16th April 2020 noting that the Complainant had not made a complaint of discrimination under the equal opportunities and prevention of discrimination policy and confirming that the Complainant had not made a protected disclosure.

MOT further replied by letter of 13th May 2020  stating that the Complainant asserted he had made a protected disclosure initially by his letter of 31 st May 2019 to CW indicating that your client's records of hours worked were the subject to manipulation, falsification and alteration by your client's servants or agents. " The letter stated that the Complainant has been victimised as a result of having made this disclosure. Again however, no details of the alleged victimisation were included.

The Complainant has remained on sick leave since 22nd July 2019. He sends in regular monthly medical certificates. By letter of 5th December 2019 MOS reminded the Complainant of his contractual obligation to notify his Area Manager at the start of each week of his continued illness. The Complainant has duly complied with this obligation since this time.

In accordance with his store manager contract, the Complainant receives three months of sick pay each year. Whilst on sick leave, the Complainant has sent correspondence querying payments to which MOS has replied clarifying the issues raised.  It can be seen from the correspondence that some errors were made in respect to the Complainant's pay due to software issues not discovered in time. However, these errors were corrected and the Complainant has received his full sick pay entitlement since the commencement of his absence on 22nd July 2019. There are no outstanding amounts due to the Complainant. The calculation of sick pay (as set out in the contract of employment and Handbook and referred to above) was also explained to the Complainant by MOS in the above referred correspondence.

As the Complainant lodged his complaint form on 24th March 2020 the cognisable period covered by his claims runs from 25th September 2019.

Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 ("the 1997 Act"). There are seven claims under this legislation:

Not receiving compensation for working on Sundays (001).

Not receiving daily rest periods (005).

Not getting rest breaks when working between six and 15 hours and receiving 15 to 20 minutes rest (006).

Not getting weekly rest periods (007).

Working 50 hours per week in the reference period from July 2017 until July 2019 being in excess of the permitted maximum number of hours (008).

Not receiving paid annual leave entitlement (009).

Not receiving public holiday entitlement (010).

 No further details of any of these claims have been provided. There are no specific allegations contained in the claim form and no factual basis whatsoever underpinning these claims has been provided. Further, there are no dates on which the breaches are alleged to have occurred other than the claim of working in excess of the maximum weekly hours but the reference period here of July 2017 to July 2019 is clearly outside the cognisable period of the claims. Notably, the Complainant has been on sick leave since 22nd July 2019 and therefore no breaches of the 1997 Act could possibly have occurred during the cognisable period. There is no basis for the Adjudication Officer to conclude that he or she has  jurisdiction to hear this claim. In ISS Ireland Ltd v. Gfencheva DWT 1157 in analysing the burden of proof under the 1997 Act, where there was an obligation on an employer to maintain records, the Labour Court stated the following: 'This suggests that the evidential burden is on the Claimant to adduce such evidence as is available to support a stateable case of noncompliance with a relevant provision of the Act. It seems to the Court that, as a matter of basic fairness, the Claimant should be required to do so with sufficient particularity as to allow the Respondent to know, in broad terms, the nature of the complaint and the case that they are expected to meet. As was pointed out by Lord Devlin in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland [19631 A.C. 386 an evidential burden is satisfied where the evidence adduced is sufficient to 'suggest a reasonable possibility". '

The Complainant clearly failed to meet the evidential burden in respect to any of these claims and further has failed to establish that any of the claims relate to alleged breaches within the cognisable period. As a consequence these claims should all be dismissed.

Payment of Wages Act, 1991. There are two claims under this legislation.

That there was an unlawful deduction from the Complainant's wages of €2000 on 28th October 2019 (002).

That the Complainant was not paid €2000 in respect to wages and €1700 in respect of holiday pay on 28th October 2019 (003).

No further details are provided of these claims. It is not possible for the Respondent to know the basis for these claims. The Respondent categorically denies that the Complainant is owed any outstanding wages. Although some errors were made in his pay whilst on sick leave, as set out above, these were all corrected and the Complainant has been fully reimbursed, No unlawful deductions have been made to the Complainant's wages,

Therefore these claims should be dismissed.

Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The claim under this legislation is that the Complainant was not notified in writing of a change to his terms of employment (012).

No further details are provided of this claim and the alleged change to his contract is not identified. Therefore, the Respondent cannot know the basis for this claim, In any event, the Complainant's signed contract of employment has been referred to above.

Therefore this claim should be dismissed.

Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 ("the EEA"). There are three claims under this legislation:

That the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of religion and race in respect to promotion; victimisation; conditions of employment and harassment and the most recent date of discrimination is 1 I th October 2019 (014). The only details provided in respect to this claim are that on 1 1 th October 2019 the Complainant was suspended from work and not told until 5th November 2016.

That the Complainant did not receive equal pay on the grounds of religion and race (015) two named staff are given as comparators. The details provided in respect to this claim are that the Complainant was passed over for promotion in 2015 and promoted in June 2017 but received a lower salary compared to other store managers. He states that he formally raised a grievance regarding inappropriate adjustments to employees' hours made by the Area Manager. He states he made a "further' protected disclosure regarding deputy store managers not being given their entitlement to premium pay when acting as store managers. He states that the grievance was investigated by CW and that since making it, he has been "put under enormous work pressure, harassed, bullied and victimised." He states he was penalised for making protected disclosures and has been treated unfairly by his employer. He states he became unwell due to the stress and has been on certified sick leave since 22nd July 2019. He states he was suspended without his knowledge from 1 1 th October 2019 until 5th November 2019 "due to a visa issue. He then states: "My employer wrote a vague letter dated the 30th of October 2019 stating that I was suspended but with no details of the dates." He states that over the course of this time his pay was reduced without explanation. He states he attended numerous meetings with his employer and doctors when required, He states that he believes he has been treated unfairly by his employer and that this treatment amounts to discrimination, bullying and harassment. He states he has been penalised and victimised for the protected disclosure he made which related to the loss of pay to other staff members.

That penalised for taking an action set out in section 74 of the EEA (017). No further details are provided of this claim. In particular the Complainant has not identified any action set out in section 74 taken by him in respect to which he was allegedly penalised.

Several of the details set out above would appear more correctly to relate to the claim made under the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014.

The issues of his suspension (covered both here and under the Protected Disclosures Act) and his allegations of not receiving equal pay are addressed as follows:

The details of the Complainant's suspension from pay are set out above. This arose because the Complainant had failed to ensure that his GNIB card was up to date. As a matter of law the Respondent is not permitted to employ someone who is not in possession of a valid GNIB card. The Complainant makes no reference to the initial letter sent to him of 3rd October 2019 informing him that his GNIB stamp was due to expire on 10th October 2019. As soon as the Complainant complied with his legal obligation to update his GNIB card, he was restored to the payroll. In circumstances where the Complainant was on sick leave in excess of three months in 2019, as a matter of fact, the Complainant did not suffer any loss of income as a result of the period of his suspension from pay from 1 I th October 2019 until 5th November 2019.

As noted above, employees appointed to the store manager position from 2016 onwards were put on the new remuneration package (as attached to the contract of employment). This remuneration package had a higher basic salary. The two comparators named by the Complainant were store managers before 2016 and therefore were on the previous remuneration package with a lower basic salary and a productivity bonus. As a result, they are not appropriate comparators for the Complainant's claim, Any difference in pay between the Complainant and the named comparators arises as a consequence of the date of recruitment to the store manager position. The Court of Justice of the European Union held in Horgan and Keegan v. Minister for Education and Skills and Anors C AI 54/18 that a difference in rates of pay arising on the basis of the date of recruitment does not amount to discrimination.

Section 85A of the EEA sets out the burden of proof in respect to cases of discrimination whereby the onus is initially on the complainant to establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination and only having done this does the burden move to the respondent to prove the contrary. Therefore it is for the Complainant in the first instance to raise an inference of discrimination before the burden can shift to the Respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment. In order to raise an inference, the Complainant must prove the primary facts on which he is relying.

In Melbury Developments Limited v, Valpeters EDA09•17 the Labour Court stated as follows:

"Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported bv evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule. " (Emphasis added).

Moreover, in Intesa Sanpaola Life Ltd v. Nowak EDA180 the Labour Court stated:

"It is settled law that, in circumstances such as this, the mere coincidence of nationality and a perceived detriment is not sufficient to ground a complaint of discrimination. Something more must be established that would suggest the possibility that there is a relationship between these two facts. "

The Complainant's claims regarding not receiving equal treatment are based entirely on "speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence" and therefore "cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn," failed completely to provide any link between his perceived detriment on the one hand and his religion and/or race on the other. There is simply no substance to the Complainant's claim of not having received equal treatment on the basis of his religion or race.

As a consequence, the Complainant's discrimination claims should be dismissed,

The Complainant's claim that he was penalised for taking an action set out in section 74 of the EEA (017) is mistaken. In this respect, he has not identified any action taken by him as set out in section 74 in respect to which he is saying he was penalised. The action identified is section 74(2) is as follows:

"(a) a complaint of discrimination _made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a complainant,

(c) an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this

Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

It is clear the Complainant took none of the above actions resulting in his alleged penalisation. Although he lodged a claim for discrimination, this occurred after the alleged penalisation on which he is relying. As a consequence, it is clear that this claim is misconceived.

Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005

The claim under this legislation is that the Complainant was penalised for complying with or making a complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare

No further details are provided of this claim. The Respondent cannot know to what this claim is alleged to relate and is misconceived as no health and safety complaint was ever made by the Complainant.

Therefore this claim should be dismissed.

Protected Disclosure Act, 2014 ("the 2014 Act")

The claim under this legislation is that the Complainant was penalised or threatened with penalisation for making a protected disclosure under the 2014 Act (018).

No further details are provided of this claim. In this regard however, it is noted that under the claims made pursuant to the EEA, reference is made to the Complainant having been penalised for making an alleged protected disclosure.

The necessary proofs to succeed in a claim of penalisation under the 2014 Act can be summarised as follows:

That the worker has made a disclosure of relevant information being information which tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings (as defined at section 5(3) of the 2014 Act) and which came to the attention of the worker in connection with the worker's employment.

That the worker has been penalised by the employer as per section 3 of the 2014 Act as a consequence of making the protected disclosure and that the worker has suffered a detriment due to the penalisation.

That there is a causal connection between the making of a protected disclosure and the detriment suffered.

In respect to (i), the definition of protected disclosure at section 5 of the 2014 Act refers to the disclosure of "relevant information" and relevant information is then defined at section 5(2) as information that "in the reasonable belief of the worker...tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings." Relevant wrongdoings is defined at section 5(3) as follows:

"The following matters are relevant wrongdoings for the purposes of this that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed,

that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker's contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services,

that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged,

that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement, or

that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed. "

To come within the definition of protected disclosure at section 5 of the 2014 Act, the relevant information must relate to the disclosure of facts and not be mere allegations or opinions. In Connemara Marble Industries Ltd v. Murphy (PDD206) the Labour Court stated as follows:

"A disclosure of relevant information under the 2014 Act must relate to the provision of specific facts rather than an allegation, or expression of opinion or state of mind of the worker. The information provided must be of facts which in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure tends to show wrongdoing. "

The Complainant has not made out any case that he made a protected disclosure as defined in the 2014 Act. In this respect the allegations he made during his grievance were not based on facts but rather were based on his unsubstantiated opinions. Further, he has failed to identify how any of the allegations against MOS could even come within the definition of relevant wrongdoing as defined in section 5(3).

In respect to (ii) and showing that the employee has been penalised as a consequence of making a protected disclosure, penalisation is defined at section 3(1) of the 2014 Act as follows:

'"penalisation' means any act or omission that affects a worker to the worker's detriment, and in particular includes— (a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), (e) unfair treatment,

coercion, intimidation or harassment,

discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment,

injury, damage or loss, and

threat of reprisal.

 Significantly, the Complainant has not identified any alleged detriment suffered by him within the definition of penalisation contained in the 2014 Act. The only specific issues he raises here concern his suspension during the period he did not have a valid GNIB card (as also relied upon by the Complainant in respect to his claims under the EEA) and an allegation that his pay was reduced. Firstly, his suspension occurred due to his own failure to maintain an up to date GNIB card as a consequence of which the Respondent was legally required to suspend him. Secondly, there was no reduction to the Complainant's pay and any errors made in respect to his sick pay have been all corrected.

In respect to (iii), to succeed in a claim under the 2014 Act the Complainant must show a causal connection between the making of the protected disclosure and the detriment suffered.

The test for determining whether a worker has been penalised for having made a protected disclosure was set out by the Labour Court in Aidan & Henrietta McGrath Partnership v. Monaghan PDDI 62 as follows:

"The Act is a new piece of legislation with limited case law, however, the provisions regarding penalisation are broadly similar to those provided in the Safety Health and Welfare Act, 2005. As this Court pointed out in O'Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock Limited [2010] EL.R. 21, it is clear from the language of Section 27 of the 2005 Act that in order to make out a complaint of penalisation it is necessary for a complainant to establish that the detriment of which he or she complains was imposed "for' having committed one of the acts protected by Section 27(3) of the 2005 Act. Thus the detriment giving rise to the complaint must have been incurred because of, or in retaliation for, the Complainant having committed a protected act. This suggests that where there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment complained of the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the sense that "but for' the Complainant having committed the protected act he or she would not have suffered the detriment. This involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment."

Regarding errors made by an employer in respect to payments, Mountrath Amalgamated CEP Ltd v. McNamee (PDD202) (16th January 2020) concerned an allegation of penalisation arising when the respondent did not pay the complainant his outstanding annual leave on the termination of his employment. The respondent stated that the issue arose over a misunderstanding over the accrual of annual leave during sick leave and that the issue had been resolved and all outstanding monies paid. Accepting the respondent's position, the Labour Court noted that the complainant had not met the 'but for test as the issues regarding the payment of his annual leave would have occurred even if no alleged protected disclosure had been made.

The Complainant has not established that "but for" making his grievance he would not have suffered any alleged detriment. The only specific detriment identified is his suspension and an alleged reduction in his pay. In this respect, his suspension occurred exclusively because the Complainant had not maintained his GNIB card and it is incorrect that he ever had his pay reduced. Further, as noted above, all errors in his payment during his sick leave have been fully reimbursed and no wages are outstanding to the Complainant,

Therefore, even if the Complainant is found to have established that he had made a protected disclosure under the 2014 Act (which is denied) and further if he were found to have established that he had suffered penalisation as defined in the 2014 Act (which is also denied) it is clear that the alleged penalisation would have occurred even if no alleged protected disclosure was

ever made by him and as a result the Complainant cannot satisfy the "but foe test and his claim cannot succeed.

Based on the foregoing, the claim under the 2014 Act should be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, and in particular on the Complainant's failure to meet the evidential burden in respect to the claims made or to advance a statable case, that the Complainant should not succeed in any of his claims herein.

 The relevant Sections in relation to the Presentation of complaints and referral of disputes are contained in Clause 41 of the 2015 Workplace Relations Act.

“41. (1) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

(8)        An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

The established test of “Reasonable Cause” was set out in CementationSkanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v CarrollDetermination WTC0338. The test was set out in the following terms “It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons. Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time. Here the Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.”

The test formulated in CementationSkanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dun Laoghaire Corporation[1991] ILRM 30. Here Costello J. stated as follows “The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.”

The issue of Reasonable Cause has been considered in a number of Labour Court cases and the onus is on the Complaint to satisfy the Adjudicating Body of the grounds for Reasonable Cause. In DWT209 the Labour Court concluded as follows “The Court is satisfied that the Complainant’s complaint was presented to the WRC outside of the statutory time limit. The Complainant’s last date in work was 11thJuly 2017. The Court is satisfied that, if there was a contravention of the Act, that date is the last date when such a contravention took place. As the Complainant’s claim was not presented to the Workplace Relations Commission until 10thMay 2018, it was outside of the statutory time limit. It was the Complainant’s submission that the unfortunate sequence of events that befell him prevented him from lodging his claim in time. However, by his own submission those unfortunate events ended when he returned to Australia in January 2018, yet he waited a further four months before he lodged his claim. The Court finds that the reason proffered by the Complainant does not explain the delay, nor does it afford an excuse for the delay. For all the reasons set out above, the Court finds that the complaint under the Act is outside the statutory time limits and therefore must fail. In these circumstances, the Court cannot proceed to hear the substantive matter.”

In UDD213 where the issue of an Application for an extension of time was considered the Labour Court noted  in refusing the application that  “Furthermore, the Court notes that no evidence of the representative’s absence or the dates of such absence have been furnished to the Court.” This is somewhat similar to this case where no documentary evidence was provided by the Complainant to justify his request for an extension for Reasonable Cause.

It clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Complainant for an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay. Secondly, the onus is on the Complainant to establish a causal connection between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, the Adjudicator must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Hence, if the factors relied upon to explain the delay ceased to operate before the complaint was presented, that may undermine a complaint that those factors were the actual cause of the delay. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on a Complainant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account. In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in ILRM30, quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the applicant requests it.

Having Considered the application for a time extension to twelve months I am satisfied that there is not sufficient “reasonable cause” to justify the extension primarily on the basis that the Complainant has provided no credible grounds for an extension or medical evidence to support his position that he was not “in a good place” at that time. The application for an extension of time is refused and therefore the cognisant period remains from September 24th 2019 to March 23rd 2020 and as the Complainant did not attend work during this six month timeframe the following complaints are not advanceable for Decision on the facts of the complaints; 

CA00035417-001 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-002 Payment of Wages Act 19991

CA00035417-005 Organisation Of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-006 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-007Ornanisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-008 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-010 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-012 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1997

CA00035417-014 Employment Equality Act 1998

CA00035417-016 Safety Health and Welfare Act 1998

The following complaints fall within the scope of the Act based on the nature of the complaint and when the final liability became due (as in it could have occurred within the cognisable period);

CA00035417-003 Payment of Wages Act 1991

The Complainant stated he was due 2000 Euros wages. The basis for this claim is that the Complaints employment was temporarily suspended while he could not produce a legal permit to work in the country.  This action by the Respondent was not unreasonable and therefore the Complainants wages were not properly payable and the claim is not well founded.

CA00035417-009 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant stated he was due 1,700 Euros holiday pay. Subsequent to the Hearing the Respondent provided a detailed breakdown of the situation and confirmed that the Complainant received 13 days annual leave and 5 Public Holidays in 2019 before going on sick leave.  Since the Complainant is on sick leave his remaining entitlements will be paid to him on return to work. The Respondent stated that this annual leave entitlement would cease on March 31st 2023 but did not define on what basis the entitlement would cease on that date.  I see no grounds why the entitlement should cease on that date. The Complainant lost his entitlement to Public Holidays after 26 weeks of being out of work which took effect on January 2020.

CA00035417-014 and CA00035417015 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Respondent introduced a new system of paying all Store Managers in 2016 and the scheme applies to all Managers hired after that date. Managers hired before that date are on a different system.  This is not an unusual situation. The change applied to all Managers irrespective of race or religion and the Complainants attempt to state it was unequal solely to him has no basis in fact or law and is a totally misconceived complaint. The change applies to all Mangers hired after the change date (approximately 14). The Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the complaints are not well founded.

CA00035417-017 Employment Equality Act 1998 (Note: Compliant number CA00035417-016 was similar and either could have been chosen for Decision). The Complainant stated he was victimised for taking a grievance. The Complainant was a newly promoted Manager, given a large store to manage, his grievances were completely and fairly investigated, he had the right of appeal, was suspended for just cause (not having a valid work permit) and went on sick leave shortly after the conclusion of the grievance procedure. The Complainant has failed  to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the complaint is not well founded.

CA00035417-018 Protected Disclosure Act 2014

The Complainant alleged he made a protected disclosure and suffered the “detriment” of being suspended for having no valid visa as a result. No date of disclosure was contained in the complaint form.  In the course of the Hearing the Complainant referred to a letter dated 31/10/2019. I found no evidence of this letter in the data submitted by the Complainant but for the sake of avoiding doubt accept it may be just a slight date difference. Further reference was made to a protected disclosure in letter dated May 31st 2019 (in the correspondence from MOT). This is the grievance letter from the Complainant and does contain allegations of alleged inappropriate changes in recording of time for one staff member. Even if a protected disclosure could be construed by any fo the above correspondence (taking the more broader view since the Supreme Court judgement in Baranya v Rosderra Meats Ltd)  the Complainant could not make out a claim that “but for” this disclosure he would not have been suspended as a result of his failure to have a legal work permit. For the Adjudicator to accept this claim would be to accept that the Complainant should/could have worked illegally which would not be a reasonable justification for accepting the complaint was well founded. I find that the complaint is not well founded.

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint(s)/dispute(s) in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

I find the following complaints not well founded;

CA00035417-001 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-002 Payment of Wages Act 1991

CA00035417-003 Payment of Wages Act 1991

CA00035417-005 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-006 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-007Ornanisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-008 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-010 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA00035417-012 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1997

CA00035417-016 Safety Health and Welfare Act 1998

CA00035417-018 Protected Disclosure Act 2014

With regard to CA00035417-009 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997  the Respondent stated that this annual leave entitlement would cease on March 31st 2023 but did not define on what basis the entitlement would cease on that date.  I see no grounds why the entitlement should cease on that date. However, should there be a term of employment which governs this situation than the applicable term should be applied. The portion of the complaint related to annual leave is well founded on the above basis.

Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.

CA00035417-014 Employment Equality Act

The Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against.  

CA00035417-015 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against.

CA00035417-017 Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against.