Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Alan  McNamara

Offaly Local Development Company Limited by Guarantee

Representatives

  The complainant’s father

 Respondent Team Leader. Respondent HR and Finance Officer

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00031687-001

20/10/2019

The complainant submits that he was discriminated against on the grounds of his disability and contrary to sections 3(1)(a), 3(2)(G) and section 4(1) of the Equal Status Acts 2000 -2018, when the respondent refused to facilitate and fund his access to the Social Farming Ireland programme in July 2019.

He submitted his complaint to the WRC on 20/10/2019.

The complainant has been diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum. The complainant has a learning disability.

There are two limbs to this complaint:

A complaint of discrimination on the grounds of disability

and

a failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

Witness 1. The complainant’s father.

The complaint of discriminatory treatment.

The complainant’s father spoke on behalf of the complainant.

The act of discrimination was the refusal of the respondent, Offaly Local Development Company (OLDC), to arrange a Social Farming Ireland (SFI) placement for the complainant. SFI is a programme that allows individuals availing of health service supports, the opportunity to participate in farming on a typical working farm or in horticultural activities in the local area. Both the participant and the farmer gain from this endeavour. Funding for this programme is available through the Social Inclusion and Community Activation Programme (SICAP). SICAP is funded by the Department of Rural and Community Development and administered by Pobal and the Local Community Development Committee. This fund was the route which could and should have been used to enable the complainant to access the SFI programme. It operates to fund farmers willing to engage in SFI by making a payment of €80 a day to a participating farmer.  The complainant’s father had identified a farmer in Co Offaly who was willing to accept his son on his farm to the respondent.

The complainant’s father states that the respondent team leader with the Social Inclusion Programme (SICAP), the person with discretion as to how this programme’s fund of €760,000 is to be disbursed, and to whom, advised the complainant’s father on the 22 July 2019 that the complainant would not be considered for any training under this budget of €760,000 which the respondent receives from Offaly County Council. The respondent, instead of proceeding to plan for the placement of the complainant on a farm as part of a training/job readiness programme, recommended the referral of the complainant to a local mental health centre. The complainant needed a GP referral. The complainant’s father states that the GP was puzzled at the proposed referral of the complainant to the mental health centre and recommended his placement on the SFI programme. Also, the alternative options that the respondent identified for the complainant – a Farm Services assignment, training courses in horticulture or agriculture in nearby colleges   – were noisy and unsuitable for the complainant.

The respondent is one of the few counties not providing individuals with access to the SFI programme. Three hundred applicants in other counties got on the SFI programme, through nomination from their particular Local Development Committees, and through funding from the Social Inclusion and Community Activation Programme fund in their respective counties. The respondent can choose to add a target group to be helped by SICAP, such as those seeking access to SFI in their area if they think it’s necessary.  One particular county, Co Westmeath, has advised the witness that his son will have priority on the next SFI course in their county.

The respondent is applying very blunt and restrictive rules so as to withhold the SFI option from the complainant because of his disability.

Failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

Incident of 5 February.

 The witness believes that his son, the complainant, went to the OLDC office on 5 February, and got upset as he got nowhere with his enquiries concerning a placement on a farm. While in the respondent’s office, the complainant exhibited some physical signs of stress, known as ‘stimming ‘, which entails repetitive, flapping movements of the hands, an action associated with persons on the autistic spectrum who when stressed or confronted with bright lights display this behaviour. The respondent called the Gardai who in turn called to the complainant’s home. The Gardai advised the witness that the complainant needed assistance. The Gardai would not have called to his home had he sustained a broken arm. This only aggravated the problem. The complainant became very fearful. Any time there was a knock on the complainant’s door, the complainant feared the Gardai were coming to detain him.

No reasonable accommodation was provided for him on the 5 February. The respondent should have sent him to a quiet room to settle down.

No contemporaneous account of what happened on the day was provided to the complainant’s father. There was no indication of any complaint from any third party about the complainant’s behaviour on the 5 February until the complainant received the respondent’s submission on the 13 October2021. The gardai made no allegation against the complainant and it is unfair to throw in a complaint two years later.

Failure to assist the complainant access the SFI programme.

The respondent failed to dispense with their rigid procedures which impeded the complainant from accessing the Social Farming Ireland programme.

Legal authorities.

The complainant referred to the Supreme Court decision of Kim Cahill V Department of Education and Science, 2017 IESC 29, where McMenamin J, stated that Section 4 of the Act of 2000 tilts the balance in favour of the respondent taking appropriate measures to assist a disabled person to access a service. The complainant states that even though the (SICAP) fund which the respondent administers is discretionary, meaning that they can use it for the purposes which they see as most beneficial to their clients, they still must administer the scheme within the law.

The complainant also refers to the Court of Appeal decision in Nano Nagle School v Marie Daly, IECA -11, which acknowledged that all available options must be considered for a person with a disability.

This did not happen for the complainant. The respondent refused to adjust the rules without which the complainant was unable to access the SFI scheme.

The complainant states that it is difficult to reconcile the refusal of the ODLC with the decision of the Supreme Court

The complainant’s father also asks the Adjudicator to factor in the stress suffered by the complainant as a result of the respondent’s actions, both in sending the garda to his home on 5 February 2019 and in refusing to offer the Social Farming option to the complainant.

The respondent denies that they discriminated against the complainant on grounds of disability or that they have any case to answer in relation to an alleged failure to make reasonable accommodation for the complainant. The complainant is complaining about a service that the OLDC, the respondent, does not offer.

The respondent is a partnerships of local agencies and groups representing the community, statutory and private sectors. The respondent is funded by a number of Government departments and agencies to deliver a variety of programmes and supports to individuals, communities and businesses in Co Offaly aimed at combating disadvantage and social exclusion and supporting the development of enterprise. SICAP funds these programmes.

The complainant’s father asked the respondent to use the SICAP to fund a placement on a farm in Co. Offaly. The respondent explained that the use of this fund is subject to various controls and that the respondent did not have the authority to use the fund in the manner requested by the complainant’s father.

This SICAP fund passes through many filters. It flows from the Department of Rural and Community Development to, in the first instance, Offaly Local Community Development Committee (OLCDC),( a sub-committee of Offaly County Council) which is the contracting authority  for SICAP. The OLCDC has responsibility for reviewing and approving the SICAP Annual Plan and the Mid and End of Year Financial and Monitoring reports.  OLCDC then co-ordinates and manages the delivery of SICAP at local level and directs funding to the respondent, OLDC, the programme Implementer, P1. Any discretion to be exercised by them must be in accordance with what they have tendered for and what they have agreed in their plans.

Witness 2. SICAP Team leader in OLDC 

The complaint of discrimination: refusing the complainant access to the SFI placement.

The witness stated that any funds disbursed on behalf of any person or any group are subject to strict scrutiny by Pobal who audit their activities and expenditure to see that it conforms to their pre-approved plans.

 They work with 65 groups engaged with community planning, inclusion and equality services. They supervise the Offaly Disability Network.  They provide labour market supports to improve work readiness. They engage with employers to ensure better quality jobs. They have discretion to select the most appropriate types of supports and interventions in line with agreed plans and contract. That discretion is also exercised to see that the supports benefit the individuals.

The respondent is one of 40 local development companies established across the country, contracted to provide SICAP –funded programmes. Different counties use their discretion to select different programmes. So, for example, Leitrim, quoted by the complainant as an example of a county offering SFI placements, is heavily involved in SFI as there is a need for support on small farms. In contrast, the respondent had no real relationship with SFI. The respondent never organised or funded any placement of a client to farms nor explored this option for service users. Nor was there any provision for this activity in their tender document or pre-approved plans as agreed between them and OLCDC- plans to which they must strictly adhere. 

 The complainant did not meet the criteria for a funded placement as he was not connected to any support service who would nominate him for a placement and would support him throughout the assignment - a prerequisite for nomination the SFI programme.

In Westmeath which the complainant cites as an example of a Local Development Company which participates in the SFI programme, all of the people placed on the farms were clients or service users of Mullingar Resource Centre.

The respondent met the complainant ‘s parents on the 27 March 2019. The respondent suggested the option of the complainant working with a local equine centre. The complainant was very happy to take up this option. The respondent also notified for the first time of his disability, suggested an engagement with a local mental health facility.

On 22 July 2019, the complainant’s father asked the SICAP programme team leader to release funding from SICAP to enable the complainant to access a Social Farming Ireland placement. The team leader advised the complainant’s father that the respondent did not give individual grants and that they did not run social farming courses but that they would try and source a support organisation to assist him in getting a placement. There was no budget in Co. Offaly’s SICAP programme for social farming placements, but by late July 2019, the respondent was actively seeking funding sources and a support organisation for the complainant should he be assigned to the SFI programme.

The complainant lodged a complaint with Pobail who have oversight role in how the SICAP fund is deployed stating that the complainant had been discriminated on the grounds of disability in being refused a placement on a farm. After the complainant complained to Pobail, the SICAP team established that SFI could provide 50% financial support. In addition, the respondent was actively seeking funding sources for the remaining 50% of the monies to be paid to a participating farmer.

 The respondent invited the complainant’s father to attend a meeting on the 25 July to advise the complainant of the availability of up to 50% funding for placement on a farm and to further explore options to get a   Social Farming Ireland placement. Neither the complainant nor his family attended the meeting to progress this matter.

The complainant did not meet the SFI programme requirements; he was not linked to a support organisation who could nominate him for the placement and could support and assist him for the duration of the placement on the farm.

The number of individual grants issued by OLDC in 2019 was zero. So, by not providing a grant to the complainant, they cannot be accused of discrimination on grounds of disability or any grounds.

Failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

Referral to Gardai in February 2019.

The complainant engaged with his SICAP support worker in the OLDC office on 5 February. He requested assistance with finding farming work. The respondent printed a list of farms for him. She also explored construction and other options; the complainant declined these option. After he had left the office, a young woman attending one of the respondent’s other courses reported to reception that a young man was preventing her from leaving the building. The incident did not happen in their offices. It happened inside the front door of a building housing a number of organisations, their own included. The SICAP team leader contacted the Gardai who called to the complainant’s home. Afterwards the Gardai advised the SICAP team leader that the complainant needed assistance They respondent did not make any formal complaint or report to the Gardai. . A meeting was convened between the complainant, his parents, the team leader and the Gardai in 27 March 2019. At this meeting the parents informed the respondent that the complainant had a learning disability, a fact not disclosed to them previously. The complainant when asked previously why he was on a disability benefit stated that he did not know the reason. 

Refusing the Complainant access to the SFI programme.

The respondent disputes the complainant’s contention that this amounts to a failure to provide reasonable accommodation in addition to his identification of this issue as an act of discrimination.

The work undertaken in July 2019 with the complainant and his family was looking at organisations who might support the complainant while he was engaged on the SFI project

The respondent discussed the referral process to SFI with Regional Development Officer of SFI. She advised that a placement to SFI must be a commissioned placement, supported by a service provider or support agency with up to 3 participants on a farm day. The complainant was not attending or linked to any service within the remit of OLDC during the period February -July 2019 who could have referred him on to SFI. The payment goes directly to the farmer and not to the person who is placed.

Witness 3. Finance and HR officer.

The witness stated that the respondent never offered the option of SFI to any person irrespective of whether they had a disability or not.

The respondent drew up a plan for 2019-2022. The plan approved by OLCDC and Pobail contained no provision for SFI placements. If the respondent spends outside of what has been agreed in their plan, they pay a penalty.

In cross examination the respondent witness stated that they did not revise their plan to include SFI placements in 2020 or in 2021, after the complainant had sought their assistance in getting placement on a farm. The witness stated that they use statistics to determine client needs. Other counties may provide social farming while OLDC provide other options not available in other counties, like MOJO, a 12-week programme for unemployed men.

The witness again stated they do not give grants to individuals.

The witness stated that they never finally refused the complainant a placement. They were trying to source support organisations who would nominate the complainant and who would support him for the duration of his assignment to a farm.

The witness sated that the respondent is still open to exploring the SFI option for the complainant.

The matter for decision is whether the respondent discriminated against the complainant in the provision of services, because he had a disability.

Relevant law.

Section 5(1) of Act provides as follows:

 “A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.” 

I am satisfied that the respondent is providing a service within the meaning of section 2 of the Equal Status Acts 2000-2018.

Discrimination is defined in section 3(1) of the Act of 2000 as follows:

 For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur

(a ) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation  on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B) ,

and section 3(1)(c) of the Act of 2000 as amended provides

“where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”

Section 3(2) (g) of the Acts prohibits discrimination in circumstances where:

“one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (the “disability ground”),

The Burden of Proof.

Before identifying any breaches of the Act of 2000, I must first consider if the complainant has met the probative burden as required by section 38A of the 2000 Act, as amended.

Section 38A.  states

 “(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

The Labour Court in the case of Cork City Council v Kieran McCarthy, EDA 0821 set out the obligations which a complainant must meet.

“The law provides that the probative burden shifts where a complainant proves facts from which it may be presumed that there had been direct or indirect discrimination. The language used indicates that where the primary facts alleged are proved it remains for the court to decide if the inference or presumption contended for can properly be drawn from those facts. This entails a consideration of the range of conclusions which may be appropriately be drawn to explain a particular fact or set of facts which are proved in evidence”

InHallinan v. Moy Valley Resources DEC-S2008-25, a complaint taken under the Equal Status Act, 2000, the equality officer in interpreting the obligation which a complainant must meet by virtue of section 38 A, held that in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination the following must be established:

(a) The complainant must establish that he or she is covered by the protected ground;

(b) Establish the specific treatment has allegedly taken place

(c) The treatment was less favourable than was or would be afforded to a person not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground.

Applying the above long-established tests to the circumstances of the instant complaint, I will consider if these tests have been met.

It is accepted that the complainant has a disability – as per section 2 (d) and (e) and is therefore covered by the protected ground.

 The alleged, discriminatory treatment complained of occurred during the period 5 February to 22 July 2019.

 The complainant’s father sought direct funding from SICAP for the placement of the complainant on the SFI programme. SFI is a programme that allows individuals who are socially, physically, mentally or intellectually disadvantaged and who avail of a range of therapeutic day support services, the opportunity to engage in farming and horticultural activities in a supportive environment.

I find that respondent had the discretion to collaborate with organisations who could have facilitated the complainant’s passage onto the SFI programme.

I find that on the 22 July 2019, the respondent refused to agree to the release and use of SICAP funds to make a grant to a participating farmer in the SFI programme, in Co Offaly and that this decision stalled the complainant’s progress on to the SFI programme.

Was the treatment less favourable than was or would be afforded to a person not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground, that is a person without a disability or a person or who had a different disability?

In order for the complainant to raise an inference of discrimination, he must demonstrate that he was treated less favourably than a person without a disability or a person with a different disability.

No evidence was advanced to show that the respondent facilitated the access of any individual without a disability or with a different disability on to the Social Farming Ireland programme.  No evidence was adduced to show that that the respondent facilitated the direct access of any individual without a disability or with a different disability on to any of the other SICAP -funded programmes / training experiences / on the job experiences /provision of labour market supports to improve work readiness, offered by the respondent other than via the agreed and established pathway. This established pathway to a SICAP- funded intervention or programme requires that the client has to be identified as in need of intensive one to one support which is one of the criteria for accessing his preferred programme. A client cannot participate in a programme such as SFI without being nominated by a support organisation or a service provider who can support the participant for the duration of his engagement with the farm. This did not happen in the complainant’s case.

The kernel of this case is that by July 2019 the respondent had not partnered with a support organisation to facilitate the complainant’s entrance into the SFI programme but was beginning to do so. The uncontested evidence is that a person could not self- select a programme as the complainant did in the absence of a nomination from a support organisation. That was the route onto all the SICAP funded programmes.

The process employed by the respondent may be rigid but if it is rigid and inflexible, its rigidity and inflexibility impacts equally on all applicants irrespective of whether the applicant has a disability or a different disability to that of the complainant.

Based on the evidence, I do not find that the complainant has raised a prima facie case of discrimination on the grounds of disability in accordance with the established tests..

Failure to offer reasonable accommodation.

Relevant law.

“4.— (1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination includes a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail himself or herself of the service.

(2) A refusal or failure to provide the special treatment or facilities to which subsection (1) refers shall not be deemed reasonable unless such provision would give rise to a cost, other than a nominal cost, to the provider of the service in question.”

 Section 4(6) of the Act states

“provider of a service” means—

(b) the person responsible for providing a service in respect of which section 5(1) applies.

I am satisfied that the respondent is providing a service within the meaning of section 2 of the Equal Status Acts.

This complaint of a failure to offer the complainant reasonable accommodation centres on two instances:

1.The failure of the respondent to make reasonable accommodation for the complainant on 5 February 2019 when they called the Gardai following the complainant’s demonstration of distress in failing to secure the necessary information.

2.The refusal in July 2019 to agree to the suspension of the normal processes for gaining access to the SFI programme. The complainant views this as a failure to provide reasonable accommodation in addition to identifying it a s an act of discrimination.

February 2019 incident.

The complainant submitted his complaint in 20/10/2019 which is 8 months after the February 2019 incident and outside of the 6-month time limit set out in section 21(6) of the Act of 2000. However, section 21(11) of the Act provides a follows:

For the purposes of this section prohibited conduct occurs —

(a) if the act constituting it extends over a period, at the end of the period,

(b ) if it arises by virtue of a provision which operates over a period, throughout the period.

I find that the incident of the 5 February is not a stand-alone incident but connected with the incident of the 22 July 2019, the date of the last incident of alleged discrimination, in that the complainant was seeking the same service on both occasions (access to SFI) from the respondent over a period of time. I find this incident complies with the statutory time-limits.

The complainant submitted that rather than calling the Gardai on the 5 February, the respondent should have provided reasonable accommodation by way of offering the complainant a quiet, dimly -lit room so as to assuage his anxiety. The uncontested evidence is that the complainant’s family only advised the respondent on the 27 March 2019 of the complainant’s specific disability. The Equality Officer in A Complainant v A Supermarket DEC -S2010-013

“I am also satisfied that the complainant has established that a person who became reasonably acquainted with him, but who hadn't been told by him directly that he had a disability, nonetheless might reasonably become aware of his disability over time, through observation and/or inquiry of third parties. Conversely, I am satisfied, based on all the evidence presented to me regarding the present complaint that, in general, a person whose contact with the complainant was infrequent and/or only in passing would not necessarily conclude that he had a disability. I also note that, while the complainant did not keep his disability a secret, equally he did not advertise it widely.”

I accept that the respondent who offers their services to people with particular needs and who had engaged with the complainant in a job- readiness club previously, must have been aware that the complainant had needs requiring supports. I find that the measures recommended by the parent are associated with persons who are on the autistic spectrum. I find this specific diagnosis had not been relayed to the respondent by February 2019.

Aside from the respondent’s lack of knowledge as to the complainant’s specific diagnosis, section 4 of the Act is designed to enable a person with a disability to access a service. The absence of an offer from the respondent for a quiet room in which the complainant could dispel his anxiety did not impede his access to a service. By that stage, he was outside of the respondent’s premises, had already availed of the respondent’s services and had not been impeded in any way from gaining assistance from the respondent.

While the respondent may have been heavy handed and ill-considered in its response to the complainant’s behaviour, I do not find the absence of a quiet room and the engagement of the Gardaí amounts to a failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

 I do not find that this incident is evidence of a failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

The second example which the complainant offers as an example of the respondent’s failure to make reasonable accommodation for the complainant’s needs is the refusal of the respondent on the 22 July to agree to the complainant’s father’s request for direct funding for a Social Farming Ireland placement. Without this funding being provided to the farmer by the respondent, the complainant could not be placed on a farm. Discrimination includes a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail himself or herself of the service".

The evidence indicates that up until mid-July, the respondent maintained that they were hidebound by the fact that they had made no provision for Social Farming Ireland placements in their plan, nor had they made any provision for the funding associated with this and that, therefore, they had no authority to deviate from their approved plans. Section 4 allows for a respondent to alter and change the rules so as to enable a person with a disability to access a service particularly if these same rules constitute the sole barrier to accessing the service.

The SICAP funded programmes allow discretion to the Programme Implanter, the OLDC, to consider what training courses, job readiness programmes would best serve the needs of their clients and they had signposted other options to the complainant.

The pathway to SFI placement for all clients irrespective of the presence or absence of a disability or the existence of a different disability is the same. It requires a commissioned placement by a support organisation. You cannot be a ‘free agent’.

The uncontested evidence is that in the counties where Social Farming Ireland did operate, participants were nominated and supported throughout by, for example, a resource centre or some other body.

The uncontested evidence of the respondent was that no individual grants were awarded in the 2019 year.

The uncontested evidence of the respondent is that they had offered the complainant other options: they had prepared his CV and supported the complainant in his application to Farm Relief Services, which offers jobs on farms; signposted training courses in horticulture and manual handling, Animal and Nature Studies. He declined these options. in training. The respondent has discretion to select the most appropriate types of supports and interventions in line with agreed plans and their contract.

 It is accepted that the respondent invited the complainant’s father to attend a meeting scheduled for the 25 July to explore funding possibilities and a placement with the support of organisations who could commission his placement and support him for the duration of his SFI placement. Health and Social Care providers have the opportunity to partner with social farmers. It is accepted that neither the complainant nor his parents attended that meeting.

The respondent at the hearing stated that they were still willing to explore how they could facilitate the placement of the complainant on a farm in Co Offaly. They maintain that they never finally refused the complainant’s request.

The complainant asked that I consider the authorities cited by him. The complainant cites the statement of McMenamin J in Kim Cahill V Department of Education and Science, 2017 IESC 29.  who in examining the responsibilities which section 4 imposes on a service provider, stated that the balance must tilt in favour of the person with a disability. That is a correct principle, but that statement cannot be dislodged from the facts of the case. The appellant who had dyslexia, was very embarrassed and distressed by the presence of a notation on her Leaving Certificate which she felt put her at a disadvantage relative to candidates who did not have dyslexia, put persons seeing it on enquiry as to what it meant and notified persons (including prospective employers), otherwise unaware of the fact, that she had a disability. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision that the annotation of Ms Cahill’s Leaving Certificate marks in some language subjects did not constitute a breach of their obligation to provide reasonable accommodation even where she had sought different measures to those suggested by the Department of Education and Science.

 The complainant referred to Nano Nagle School v Marie Daly, IECA -11, On appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed that an employer is under a mandatory duty to explore the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance when considering all reasonable accommodation measures which might be put in place. But that case was remitted back to the Labour Court; the Supreme Court reached no conclusions as to whether that complainant, a special needs assistant in a secondary school, had been denied reasonable accommodation.

 Given the above evidence, I find that the respondent was slow off the ground in exploring ways of assisting the complainant to gain a pathway on to the SFI. I do not find that the complainant was ultimately refused access to the SFI programme. I consider that the complainant acted prematurely in concluding that the respondent had refused to provide reasonable accommodations as  to ensure that the complainant’s needs could be met.

On the basis of the evidence and the authorities, I do not find that the respondent failed in its obligations to provide reasonable accommodation within the meaning of Section 4 of the Equal Status Acts.

 I find he complainant was not discriminated against on the disability ground pursuant to sections 3(1) and 3(2)(a) of the Equal Status Acts, and

I find that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the disability ground in terms of Sections 3(1), 3(2)(g) and 4(1) the Equal Status Acts 2000-2018.

 I do not find that the complainant was discriminated against on the disability grounds.

Disability; failure to raise a prima facie case of discrimination.