Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Helen  Mcevilly

Holden & Mcevilly Limited

Representatives

Mr. Simon Deane Joseph T Deane & Associates

No Appearance

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00024464-001

28/12/2018

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1st April 2008. The Complainant’s employment was terminated on 30th June 2018, with the present complaint being reffered on 28th December 2018.

A hearing in relation to this matter was convened for 21st March 2022. This hearing was conducted by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and SI 359/20206, which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearing.

Prior to the hearing, the former solicitor for the Respondent advised that the Respondent company had been dissolved, and as such could not engage in the process. At the hearing, the solicitor representing the Complainant requested that this matter be stand adjourned. Further information regarding this request was received following the hearing.

On the “Complaint Specifics” section of the complaint form, the Complainant alleged that the process by which a former colleague acquired his share of the business was unlawful. As a consequence of the same, the Complainant alleged that the decisions made by this person were unauthorised. These decisions included the winding-up of the company, a process that naturally included the termination of the Complainant’s employment. The Complainant accepted that the Respondent had since been dissolved, but alleges that this was done unlawfully.

In subsequent correspondence, the Complainant alleged (through their partner) that they received written confirmation from the Central Bank to the effect that the restructuring was not authorised. The Complainant’s partner also averred that he received legal advice from numerous sources to the effect that the corporate restructuring of the Respondent was subject to approval by the Central Bank, which was not obtained.

As matters stand, the Complainant submitted that they were awaiting a response from the relevant government officials regarding the actions leading up to the dissolution of the Respondent. On foot of the foregoing, the Complainant requested an adjournment to allow the response to be received, and the next steps considered.

As the Respondent was a corporate entity that was dissolved on the date of the hearing, they did not attend that same.

In the instant matter it is accepted that the Respondent is registered on the Companies Registration Office as being “dissolved”. In the matter of Michael Gannon Landscaping Ltd. v. Janis Golubevs MWD 126, the Labour Court held that,

“The Court was informed that the respondent company has been dissolved. Consequently, the respondent company in this case has ceased to have any legal existence and its assets, (if any), have been vested in the Minister for Finance by virtue of Section 28 of the State Property Act, 1954. In the absence of any statutory provision giving a dissolved company a legal status for the purpose of proceedings under the Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Court determines accordingly”.

I note that this approach has been followed by the Court more recently in the matter of Whartons Travel -v- John Browne PERD 211. In applying the above-mentioned principle and dismissing the complaint, the Court held that,

“It is not disputed that this entity (the Respondent) no longer exists. There is no case before the Court involving any other Respondent. Therefore, the Court is being asked to make a Determination in respect of an entity that has ceased to exist.”

I further note that this approach has been followed in this forum on numerous occasions. Most notably, in the matter of Head Barman -v- Public House, ADJ-00002329, the Adjudicator found that they had no power to investigate a complaint in circumstances whereby a Respondent existed on the date of termination of employment, but had subsequently been dissolved.

In the present case, the Complainant has raised significant issues with the manner in which the Respondent was dissolved. They have also outlined that they have received advices on this point and are awaiting a response from a government minster regarding the same. In light of the foregoing, the Complainant requested that the matter be adjourned pending the consideration of the next steps.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Complainant has not outlined any legal basis by which this complaint may continue. In the above-mentioned matter, the Court held that jurisdiction must be declined, “in the absence of any statutory provision giving a dissolved company a legal status for the purpose of proceedings under the Act”. As neither the Complainant nor their representative has referred to such a statutory provision, I find that I must decline jurisdiction regarding the present complaint.

I find that I do not have jurisdiction under the Act to hear the present complaint.

Corporate Dissolution