Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Ann  Mc Nicholl

People 1st Employment & Skills Ltd

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

 Donna Crampsie O'Gorman Cunningham & Co., Solicitors

Patricia Rooney Tughans Sols

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00033993-001

26/01/2020

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in December 2015 as an employment advisor. She submitted her resignation on July 22nd, 2019. Her employment ended on 05.08.19. The Complainant submitted a chronology of dates and events or acts which on the complaint form she contended constituted discrimination by her employer selecting gender; not promoting me; victimisation; harassment. She provided dates of the alleged acts of discrimination commencing on 25.02.2016 and continuing into 2018 and again into July 2019 when she submitted her resignation having secured a position in another employment. She felt harassed following her resignation in the period before her last day of work 01.08.2019. Her employment ended on 05.08.2019. The Complainant completed an exit interview form in which she referred to various aspects of dissatisfaction in the employment, which she contended indicated a complaint on her part.

Following her resignation, she contacted and met with a Bernadette Daly in or around November 2019. She submitted a complaint to the WRC on 26.01.2020.

At the in-person hearing, the parties were asked to agree on the span of the ‘normal’ cognizable period of six months for submitting a complaint under the EEA. They agreed with the Chair that the cognisable period in terms of the latest date of an alleged act of discrimination would be, at the outside of that limit 27 July 2019 to 26.01.20 with the twelve-month period extending back to 27.01.2019.   The timeline of the alleged acts of discrimination drawn from the complaint form and subsequently confirmed by the Complainant gave rise to issues which required discussion and consideration. Central to the discussion was whether and to what extent the initial timeline of six months applied to this case, with arguments for and against a continuum of acts and/or whether there were reasonable grounds for extending, where necessary, the initial period of six months to up twelve months as provided for in Section 6 and if so in respect of which of the complaints. Part of the exchanges on these points was concerned with whether the Complainant had made a complaint to the respondent and if so, when.

As requested at the first day of hearing, the Complainant associated the various depictions of discrimination against the dates of alleged acts of discrimination contained in her complaint as follows:

25.02.2016-Gender-access to employment and promotion-male less experienced and qualified appointed-Centre Manager Role

23.08.2018-Gender- Employee engagement role discrimination reflected in subsequent appointment of male candidate

09.05.2018-Gender-Employment Engagement Role-Complainant did not apply

15.04.2019-Gender-less experienced and qualified male applicant appointed Plus Bullying & victimisation-composition of interview panel-Gender-Companies Policy on Fair procedures

15.04.2019         Bullying and breach of equal opportunities -email of 15.04

19.04.2016         Bullying-First Interview feedback meeting

25.04.2019         Bullying-second interview feedback meeting

25.04.2019         Bullying-Contents of meeting

26.04.2019         Bullying-Comments in relation to provision of a reference

April-July 2019-Bullying & Victimisation - Declined to approve annual leave

Undated              Gender Rewards and Bonuses

21 May 2019     Gender -Smoking Breaks introduced

June 2019           Gender - Football Game

22 July 2019 –   Bullying - Resignation Tendered

Undated               Bullying- Performance

Undated               Bullying-Treatment received following my unsuccessful interview

Undated               Victimisation-Failure to address my grievance and no further contact   

Submission on behalf of the Complainant on the preliminary issue-time limits

The Respondent has submitted that some of the complaints were manifestly out of time. The Complainant resigned on 22 July 2020 and submitted her complaint within the usual six-month period. While there are elements of the complaint which could be deemed to fall outside the specified time limits, the Complainant seeks to invoke that section of the Act which allows for an extension of the usual time limit to twelve months. The Complainant cites to the ‘Cementation Skansa’ test-citing that part of the Labour Court Determination referring to a reasonable cause.

ADJ-00017325-Decision No EDA2013 is cited in support of the proposition that a claim which would ordinarily be out of time may be saved by the provision of Section 77(6A) if it can be shown that the complaint is part of a continuum of discrimination.

The EEA at section 77(5) and 77(6 A) are relevant where they refer to the most recent occurrence and also the continuum point at subsection 6 in providing for such a claim which ends at the date of the most recent occurrence. The Complainant seeks to rely on McKechnie J in the case of Louth VEC v Hurley…’In such a case the six month periodinitiating the process will only start to run on when the offending regime or practice ceases; or put another way, the discriminatory act will be regarded for limitation purposes as having occurred only when such basis has ceased to exist. ’The nexus of the Complainants case was that failure to provide her with accommodation in relation to her disability in January 2016 could be regarding as extending over a period constituting a practice of discrimination by the respondent {it was clarified that there is no allegation of discrimination on grounds of disability in this current case].

Victimisation case law demonstrates that the following examples of victimisation have occurred in this instance

A refusal to employ or shortlist or promote

A refusal of a reference or the provision of a poor or hostile reference

Harassment or bullying

In addition, the Complainant was subjected to a refusal to approve and restrict annual leave; the imposition of a restriction on smoking breaks which it is argued were targeted disproportionately towards the Complainant.  For a complaint of victimisation-the Complainant need only show that the adverse treatment was ‘a reaction to a complaint’ which need not have actually made but need merely have given notice of an intention to bring a complaint.

Bullying

The Complainant seeks to rely on the case of Quigley v Complex Tooling and Moulding [2008] ELR 297 in support of the proposition that bullying did occur and was repeated over a prolonged period of time, with clear indicators of the escalation of bullying by her managers. Reference as made to health and safety legislation and the definition of bullying and a lack of response to her complaints leading to the conclusion in that case that the employer’s ground of appeal in that case should be rejected.

Gender

The case was made for the application of Tara McManus ADJ-00028686 in this case to assess if there is evidence of discriminatory treatment on grounds of gender. The legal principles set out by the Labour Court in UCD vs Eleanor Higgins should be applied by the AO and regard should be had to A Government Department v An Employee EDA062.

Witness evidence-the Complainant

The Complainant gave evidence that she gave two and a half weeks notice of leaving the employment. She last worked on August 1st and was on annual leave until August 5th. Addressing the time after she left the employment and the delay in submitting a complaint, she said that she was unaware of the time limit for making a complaint under the EEA-that she had no previous knowledge of dealing with the WRC or a Tribunal. She did speak to her line manager on April 25th and he knew she was unhappy about not being promoted. Asked when she completed the exit interview, she replied 1 August 2019. In her form she strongly disagreed with elements related to discrimination. Asked if she expected to be contacted about the form, she said that she thought the Respondent might be open to some sort of discussion. She submitted a data request and then went to the DP person-Bernadette Daly. Referring to the meeting with Bernie she was trying to come to an amicable solution, trying to have a discussion to see if she knew what was going on (in the workplace). Asked if she discussed her complaint that day she relied briefly-it was not an open discussion. There were some emails back and forth between then and she was trying to come to a mutual conclusion. Asked if matters were resolved, she said no.  She made her complaint to the WRC not long after that meeting. She filtered through the GDPR material. She sought legal advice after she submitted the form to the WRC. She described herself and frustrated and emotional when leaving. After she left, she was not a normal person, she was distraught, which had a bad effect on her.

The Complainant referred to the meeting on 25 April, she was very unhappy with the discriminatory treatment. Asked if she made a complaint through formal channels she replied no, she was not aware that she was supposed to make a formal grievance-she understood that if she had an issue, it was to be raised with Eamon-her line manager. Asked why she did not submit a complaint to the WRC while in the employment, she replied that she did not know that was a thing and she described her fear and a decision to keep her head down after the first unsuccessful interview.

In cross examination, the Complainant said that she did not have legal advice when completing the form, that she had done so herself. A discussion with a solicitor before she submitted the form was about getting representation in her case. Asked about the GDPR request she said that the GDPR request was submitted on August 6th, 2019. The information was sent to her on September 8th/9th and she spent from September to January going through that information. It was put to her that she had a lot of the information already-going back to 2016/2018/2019 she said that she was under a long of emotional distress so it took a long time to go through it. Then she reached out to Bernie who she described as the GDPR person.

Moving onto November 2019 and the meeting with Bernie, it was put to her that now she by now she had all the information and she went to that meeting asking for money to make it go away as she put it.

Regarding the exit interview-it was put to her that in her letter to everyone saying that was leaving that she thanked everyone and referenced presents which does not support her saying that she had complaints about the workplace. The Complainant pointed to the start of the letter where she expresses regret, she was leaving against her will.  She agreed the letter does say she was going to a better position elsewhere.

Regarding the exit interview, she accepted there were positive comments.

She repeated that she did not know it was a thing she could make a complaint of discrimination while she was in the employment. It was put to her that she had experience of the indicators of bullying and harassment from her previous experience and she replied not in this business.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent on the preliminary issue-time limits.

The Respondent maintains that most of the complaints are manifestly out of time. Noting the application to extend the initial six months period to twelve months, the Complainant has not set out any grounds for an extension of the initial sis month period due to ‘reasonable cause’. The Complainant has failed to set out any reasonable explanation for the delay in submitting her complaints until January 2020 when the complaints date back to 2016 and supposedly happened up to July 2019.

Considering the Complainants role as an Employment Advisor and her experience, the Respondent submits that she was aware of her rights. The Complainant did not avail of the internal procedures to submit a grievance or complaint. The delay in submitting the complaint has prejudiced the Respondents ability to gather the documentation necessary to defend against the complaint.

Regarding the ‘Cementation Skansa Determination’-the Complainant has failed to show any causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay in submitting her complaint. She has failed to provide any explanation for the delay in submitting a complaint.

Gender

In referring to Section 77(5)(a) of the EEA as amended the Complainant is alleging that the behaviours of the Respondent as alleged formed a continuum of behaviour. The Respondent denies that the acts complained of between February 2016 to July 2019 are a continuing course of conduct by the Employer. In response to the references to Louth VEC v Hurley the Respondent contends that what is involved in this case is not a pattern of conduct or continuing conduct by the Employer. In Louth VEC McKechnie J was referring to a single act of discrimination on one ground over an extended period of time. In this case the first act of gender discrimination claimed by the Complainant occurred on 25 February 2016 and the next act of alleged discrimination was a recruitment exercise on 9 May 2018 a role for which the Complainant did not even apply. The next act relied upon by the Complainant is a selection process on 23 August 2018. The second and third competitions occurred 15 and 18 months respectively after the first competition. The next act of alleged gender discrimination are matters between 15 April and 22 July 2019, the first of which dates is eight months after the previous act of alleged discrimination.

Victimisation

The Respondent denies that the Complainant was victimised at all. There is no evidence that she raised a complaint about her treatment at any stage. It is denied that the Complainant could have the protection of the Act if she merely gave notice of an intention to bring a complaint and in any event that she gave such notice is denied.

Bullying

The Respondent denies that the Complainant has been bullied as alleged or at all.

The Respondent relies on the submissions in relation to the preliminary matter of time limits in this matter also.

Gender

The Respondent relies on its previous submissions in this matter denying that the Complainant was the subject of gender discrimination.

Absence of Contact

The Respondent denies that there was no contact with the Complainant after her resignation. The Respondents Managing Director met with the Complainant on 8 November 2019 and had a telephone call with her on or about 21 January 2021 [the emails exchanged between the Complainant and the MD were provided post hearing, as requested]

Witness evidence -Bernadette Daly

The witness is the MD of the Company. She would have met with and chatted to the Complainant from time to time when in her office-the MD is based in Belfast. She said that as MD employees do reach out to you from time to time. She received the exit interviews and immediately contacted the line manager to ask what had happened. She di not deal directly with the GDPR request. She responded to the Complainants request for a meeting and confirmed she did take some notes at the meeting. Immediately after the meeting she contacted the line manager. The witness said she felt that she was being threatened, blackmailed at the meeting. She did not recall all the details but acknowledged that there were tears. She was shocked at what was being said. Asked why she did not conduct a formal investigation the witness said the Complainant had left at that stage and her hands were tied in the absence of a formal complaint. The Complainant referred to taking a case against them, that the case would look bad for them when they go for future tenders. She asked for money to make it go away.

Regarding internal grievance procedures they did exist and she assumed that people would be aware of what to do if they had issues.

Regarding the exit interview they regarded this as a survey to inform the business to get feedback and not as a means of making a complaint.

Post hearing material

The emails between the Complainant and Ms Daly were provided as requested. These show exchanges commencing on 18 October 2019 concluding on 11 November 2019. The meeting occurred on November 8th. Many of the emails were about the arrangements for a meeting. One from the Complainant on 3 November refers to direct discrimination a bullying culture and victimisation. The final email provided is dated 11 November-post their meeting. In this the Complainant declines to provide the names of witnesses asserting that the Respondent had sufficient information to form the basis of an internal investigation.

During the hearing there was some emphasis placed by the Respondent on the Complainant having the benefit of legal advice during the period between the end of her employment relationship and the date on which she made a complaint, suggesting that with the benefit of that advice she could have made her complaint in time. Given that the Labour Court in particular has disregarded the failure of a legal or other representative to submit a complaint within a specified time period as providing reasonable grounds for an extension of time, the same logic must apply here. That is to say the inference in the established precedents which are on record, is that the Complainant is the one responsible for submitting or ensuring that their complaint is submitted on time for the purposes of claims before the WRC in the first instance. There may be a separate question in terms of professional practice in some situations but that aspect is not one to be considered by the adjudicating third party. On this basis any argument by the respondent about the involvement or otherwise of a solicitor in advising on the form submitted or the timing of same (emphatically denied by the Complainant solicitor in this case) is deemed irrelevant to the consideration of the time limit question.

Time Limits -Employment Equality Act 1998

The following is the full text of Section 77 of the Act.

The forum for seeking redress.

77.—(1) A person who claims—

(a) to have been discriminated against or subjected to victimisation,

(b) to have been dismissed in circumstances amounting to discrimination or victimisation,

(c) not to be receiving remuneration in accordance with an equal remuneration term, or

(d) not to be receiving a benefit under an equality clause,

in contravention of this Act may, subject to subsections (3) to (9), seek redress by referring the case to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission.

(3) If the grounds for such a claim arise—

(a) under Part III, or

(b) in any other circumstances (including circumstances amounting to victimisation) towhich the Equal Pay Directive or Equal Treatment Directive is relevant,

then, subject to subsections (4) to (9), the person making the claim may seek redress by referring the case to the Circuit Court instead of to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission.

(4) In this Part, in relation to a claim referred under any provision of this section—

(a) “the complainant” means—

(i) the person by whom it is referred, or

(ii) where such a person is unable, by reason of an intellectual or a psychological disability, to pursue it effectively, his or her parent, guardian or other person acting in place of a parent, and]

(b) “the respondent” means the person who is alleged to have discriminated against the complainant or, as the case may be, who is responsible for providing the remuneration to which the equal remuneration term relates or who is responsiblefor providing the benefit under the equality clause or who is alleged to be responsible for the victimisation.

(5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

(c) This subsection does not apply in relation to a claim not to be receiving remuneration in accordance with an equal remuneration term.

(6) Where a delay by a complainant in referring a case under this section is due to any misrepresentation by the respondent, subsection (5)(a) shall be construed as if the references to the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation were references to the date on which the misrepresentation came to the complainant’s notice.

(6A) For the purposes of this section—

(a) discrimination or victimisation occurs—

(i) if the act constituting it extends over a period, at the end of the period,

(ii) if it arises by virtue of a term in a contract, throughout the duration of the contract, and

(iii) if it arises by virtue of a provision which operates over a period, throughout the period,

(b) a deliberate omission by a person to do something occurs when the person decides not to do it, and

(c) a respondent is presumed, unless the contrary is shown, to decide not to do something when the respondent either—

(i) does an act inconsistent with doing it, or

(ii) the period expires during which the respondent might reasonably have been expected to do it.

Section 77 (5) of the Employment Equality Act allows for consideration of a continuum of separate acts of discrimination showing the same disposition to discriminate provided the last act of such behaviour occurs within the cognisable period of six months prior to making the complaint to the WRC. This may be extended up to twelve months due to reasonable cause. As Section 77(6) applies to a single act of discrimination occurring over an extended period, which is not the basis of this complaint, the Respondent is correct in the assertion that the Judgement in ‘Louth VEC v Hurley’ is not relevant to this case. 

On the argument that this was a continuum of discriminatory behaviour for the purposes of Section 77(6) and therefore falls within the extended twelve month period would apply were an extension to be justified, the assessment of this contention is complicated by the nature of the complaints submitted by the Complainant some of which are related to protected grounds under the EEA and some of which are not, some being either unclear as to how they relate to the Act or to each other. The following are the dates of complaints associated under the headings provided by the Complainant:

Gender Discrimination

25.02.2016-Gender-access to employment and promotion-male less experienced and qualified appointed-Centre Manager Role

23.08.2018-Gender- Employee engagement role discrimination reflected in subsequent appointment of male candidate

09.05.2018-Gender-Employment Engagement Role-Complainant did not apply

15.04.2019-Gender-less experienced and qualified male applicant appointed Plus Bullying & victimisation-composition of interview panel-Gender-Companies Policy on Fair procedures

Undated              Gender Rewards and Bonuses

21 May 2019     Gender -Smoking Breaks introduced

June 2019           Gender - Football Game

As can be seen the allegations of discrimination stretch over a period in excess of three years between 2016 and 2019. They are also disparate in nature with those events and alleged acts related to non-promotion occurring between February 2016 and April 2019 and the other three, quite different events, occurring between an unspecified date and June 2019. When the chronology of these alleged acts is examined in this way, certain obvious conclusions follow.

Firstly, whether looking at the first or second sequence of alleged acts they are about quite different complaints of discrimination. One theme is about non promotion based on direct gender-based discrimination while the second theme is concerned with what might be termed discriminatory treatment, some of it indirect. These two disparate sequences do not bear the hallmarks of a continuum of acts of discrimination. They are not related events with the same or similar characteristics. And they are stretched over an extended timeline of around three years with significant gaps in the sequence of events.

In the alternative, if the Complainants contention that these acts represent a continuum of acts of discrimination ending as they do in June 2019 were accepted, then all the individual acts, including the final act fall outside the initial six-month period allowed for the referral of such complaints to the WRC.

These conclusions, that all of the alleged acts of discrimination fall outside the initial six months period for referral to the WRC, leads to the contested issue of a possible extension of the six months’ time limit to twelve months for decision. On this aspect the Complainant side contends that she could not make a complaint while still in the employment. That she was unaware of the time limit issue in any event. Her role in the employment did not include giving such advice to clients. That there was a form of complaint of discrimination made to the Respondent on the exit interview form completed by the Complainant on 22 July 2019. Awaiting the material from data access request and then examining that material and then the exchanges with the managing director all contributed to the delay in submitting the complaint to the WRC. That she tried to resolve the issues directly and informally with the Respondent in November 2019.

None of the contentions on the Complainant side provide a reasonable basis for allowing an extension of the initial six-month period to up twelve months as provided for under section 77(5) even if the argument of a continuum were to be accepted. Frankly, given the different nature of the various alleged acts such a conclusion must be doubtful, at least. It is not however necessary to address the continuum issue further given the conclusion that there was no causal link between the delay and the reason for the delay in submitting a complaint, particularly in the post-employment period. GDPR data was not unduly delayed but even so the facts of non-promotion and the views of other discriminatory acts did not require information from a data access complaint in order to set out the grounds of a complaint to the WRC. No other party caused that delay to occur. The Complainant was very unhappy with her former employer but that did not prevent her submitting a complaint. And neither did it prevent the Complainant seeking a payment from the Respondent in November of 2019 in order to make the complaints go away-a scenario which I found credible based on the evidence of both witnesses at the hearing. Both sides could be said to be at fault for not pursuing the issue post the meeting in November. The Respondent was informed of a culture of bullying and discrimination and effectively ignored it. The Complainant gave an outline of her issues in writing but mainly, I conclude for the purposes of ‘negotiation’ with the Respondent.  And it was only when it became apparent that the Respondent was not prepared to negotiate that the complaint was referred to the WRC.   The reluctance to make a complaint while in an employment relationship is understandable-but it does not provide reasonable cause for the delay of many months before a formal complaint was made after that relationship ended, one which might well have allowed some of the substance of the elements of the complaint to be considered. The Complainant has not established a case for an extension of the time limits in Section 77(5) by reference to the principles set out by the Labour Court in Cementation Skansa.

The next category of complaint is those where the Complainant has used the term bullying.

Bullying

Composition of interview panel-Gender-Companies Policy on Fair procedures

15.04.2019         Bullying and breach of equal opportunities -email of 15.04

19.04.2016         Bullying-First Interview feedback meeting

25.04.2019         Bullying-second interview feedback meeting

25.04.2019         Bullying-Contents of meeting

26.04.2019         Bullying-Comments in relation to provision of a reference

April-July 2019-Bullying & Victimisation - Declined to approve annual leave

There are two considerations here.

 In her submission the solicitor for the Complainant correctly identified both the definition of bullying commonly used in this jurisdiction and made reference to the Health and Safety legislation as the enabling legislation for such complaints to be written into an employment policy. As observed by the Chair at the hearing however, no case was made out as to the connection between the many complaints of alleged bullying behaviour and any protected ground under the EEA. Employees are expected to follow both the employer policies and the terms of the various statutory instruments when making these complaints. And to do so while in the employment, for various reasons.

The items categorised by the Complainant as bullying fall outside the six months’ time limit allowed for under Section 77. Additionally, what the Complainant has set out is a regime of bullying, one which she did not make a complaint about within the employment. The argument that the acts of alleged bullying can be legitimately associated with non-promotion gender discrimination as a continuum of acts of gender discrimination is not accepted. They are discrete and different allegations of a behavioural nature. In her own email to the MD on November 3rd, 2019, the Complainant referred to a culture of bullying as distinct from discrimination and it is reasonable to conclude that both in her complaint and in her representations to the MD, she herself saw the issues as two distinct streams of unacceptable treatment and behaviour. It is respectfully suggested that the complaint of bullying as part of a complaint under the Employment Equality Act is misconceived. And even were it to be accepted that there was a valid ground for making such a complaint under the Employment Equality Act, the Complainant has failed to establish a reasonable basis for extending the time limit provided under the EEA beyond the initial six-month time limit in relation to the acts described as bullying.

Victimisation

Undated               Victimisation-Failure to address my grievance and no further contact   

Victimisation - Declined to approve annual leave

On this aspect there is the question as to whether the Complainant submitted a grievance or complaint or gave notice of an intention to do so. The first point of reference is the exit interview form. Frankly the manner in which the Respondent treats such an exercise -effectively for their own information and for no other purpose is unimpressive. A professional employer, particularly one engaged in recruitment and an employment advisory role would be expected to follow up with an individual who expresses difficulties-especially one related to discrimination and bullying. Otherwise, why bother putting out the form-and why complete the form if it is going to be ignored, or as in this case, dismissed by the MD following her conversation with the Complainants line manager.  That said, the completion of an exit interview form does not constitute submitting a grievance.

The test of victimisation is set out in S.I.No. 337/2001-the Burden of Proof Regulations- characterises victimisation as potentially occurring where - the complainant has sought redress under the EEA, opposed by lawful means any such action(discrimination), given evidence in relation to it in any criminal or other proceedings under the Act or, given notice of an intention to proceed in accordance with paragraph (a) (b) or(c)-as set out. The Complainants allegation of victimisation do not fall to be considered within the terms of the S.I. as her actions did not comply with those requirements at any stage.

The statement that there was no further contact after the employment ended is factually incorrect. The Complainant could well fall under subsection (b) notice of an intention to oppose discrimination by lawful means in her report to and meeting with the MD in November 2019. However, none of the alleged acts of victimisation occurred after that report and meeting and cannot therefore be said to have resulted from a notice of intent under the S.I.

The effect of the forgoing conclusions is that the complaints are mainly or entirely out of time when examined under the six month time limit specified in Section 77(5) even as a continuum of behaviour. Section 77(6) does not apply to the nature of the complaint. The application to extend that time limit due to reasonable cause is not granted as a causal link between the delay and the reasons for the delay has not been made out; elements of the complaint fall well outside the maximum twelve month period; aspects of the complaint submitted under the Employment Equality Act  are  misconceived as complaints under that legislation and those elements related to bullying do not form part of continuum for the purposes of the Employment Equality  and any act of victimisation cannot be related to the definition of victimisation under the relevant statutory instrument.

CA-00033993-001 The complaints brought by the Complainant against the Respondent are not well-founded complaints under the Employment Equality Act 1998, as amended and on this basis no order for redress arises in this case.

Discrimination Complaints- time limits, continuum of discrimination.