Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Noel Flood

Metropolitan Films International Limited

Representatives

Liz Murray, Irish Film Workers Association

Ciarán Loughran, Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 14 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003

CA-00032908-001

11/12/2019

Mr Flood worked as an advance rigger on films and television programmes developed by an employer who he refers to as “Metropolitan Film Productions” with an address at Ardmore Studios, Bray, County Wicklow.  He said that he worked for the company and subsidiary companies since he commenced working at Ardmore in 2015 on a series called “Penny Dreadful.”  He worked on “Into the Badlands” and the last production he worked on was the sixth season of “Vikings.”  A document included in the respondent’s book of documents shows that his hourly rate of pay was €25.12.  He and his colleagues were employed for the duration that a film was in production, and then they stopped working and waited for a new film to start.  Mr Flood said that he has been given no work since he was laid off on March 16th 2018 at the end of a production of “Vikings 6.”  Although work started up again in November 2019 on a series to be shown on Netflix called “Valhalla,” he was not offered work.  He believes that the reason he was not called back to work is because of his membership of IFWA.

The register of the Companies Registration Office (CRO) shows that Metropolitan Film Productions Limited was established in July 1997 by James Flynn and Juanita Wilson.  Octagon Films Limited is registered as a company set up in September 2001 by Morgan O’Sullivan and James Flynn.  Another company, Octagon (LR) Films Limited was incorporated in April 2013 with James Flynn and Ronan Flynn as directors.  All three companies have as their registered address, Ardmore Studios, Bray, County Wicklow.  Filings to the CRO show that, in May 2013, Octagon (LR) Films Limited changed its name to Octagon Films International Limited and, in January 2014, Mr O’Sullivan became a director, with James Flynn and Ronan Flynn.  On June 9th 2015, the company changed its name to Metropolitan Films International Limited.

The company’s website states that,

“…Metropolitan Films, through its international and production entities, develops, produces and provides production services to international film and television projects that locate in Ireland…”

Sadly, James Flynn died in February 2023 at the age of 57.  For the previous 25 years, he and his co-directors were the driving force behind a raft of acclaimed television and film productions that helped to establish Ireland as film-making location. 

Government Support for Film Production

Section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 was enacted to encourage investment in the Irish film industry.  Originally, the “section 481” scheme was an incentive to individuals who could avail of tax relief by investing in approved film projects.  In 2015, the investment relief model changed and section 481 relief now operates as a corporation tax credit.  A credit of 32% may be offset against eligible expenditure, 80% of the cost of production or €70 million, whichever is the lower.  To qualify for section 481 relief, a qualifying company must be set up for the purpose of producing and distributing a single film or TV series.  The qualifying companies are established as designated activity companies or “DACs,” similar to what were formerly referred to as special purpose vehicles or “SPVs.”  The DAC must be a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent production company.  Once a film or TV programme is finished production, the DAC is audited, a compliance report is submitted to the Revenue Commissioners and the DAC is dissolved. 

This requirement for production companies to establish a DAC for every separate film or TV series is at the heart of a dispute between IFWA and Metropolitan Films.  Employees are recruited at the beginning of every production and dismissed when the production is finished, or when the aspect of the work on which they are engaged is completed.  Mr Flood and his colleagues have worked for many years on dozens of film and television productions, but, because they were treated as if they were employed by a newly established DAC each time a film went into production, they were not considered to be permanent employees.

Departure from Custom and Practice in the Engagement of Workers

Correspondence submitted by IFWA revealed that, in September 2018, notice of industrial action was issued to the employer on the production of the Vikings series and it appears that there was a brief work stoppage.  The respondent owns the qualifying company that produced Vikings and between November 2018 and March 2019, the late Mr Flynn had four meetings with IFWA to discuss the terms and conditions of its members, and according to Ms Murray, to consider a mechanism whereby their service would be recognised.  On November 25th 2018, Ms Murray wrote to Mr Flynn, summarising their discussions at a meeting the previous week and expressing concern about the departure from the “longest service first” practice for hiring IFWA members.  At a meeting in February 2019, the complainant said that Mr Flynn undertook to speak to the heads of departments and managers about the service of the workers.  However, on March 9th 2019, Ms Murray received a letter signed by several IFWA members informing her that they were resigning from the association.  The letter states:

“We the undersigned wish to formally notify you that we are resigning our membership with the union. 

We feel that membership of IFWA will be detrimental to any future employment.

Please accept this letter as our official notice of resignation effective immediately.”

The complainant said that the construction workers who resigned from IFWA and who were willing to forego their entitlements were called back to work.  IFWA continued to engage with Mr Flynn to have the service of its members recognised and the complainant thought he would be called back.  In April 2019, Mr Flynn became ill and he wasn’t able to participate in further discussions.

The complainant said that when production was starting up again on a new film he contacted the construction manager to ask him about a date to return to work.  He said that he was told that he wouldn’t be called back and that the construction manager refused to explain why.  Up until that film, he said that he was always called back when construction was starting on a new production.  It is his belief that he has been “blacklisted” because he is a member of IFWA. 

On behalf of the respondent, Mr Loughran raised two preliminary issues.  Firstly, he submitted that Mr Flood was not employed by Metropolitan Film Productions Limited and that his complaint is against the wrong respondent.  Secondly, he argued that Mr Flood’s complaint has been submitted outside the statutory time limit at s.41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

While the parties are named in this decision, for the remainder of this document, I will refer to Mr Flood as “the complainant,” and to Metropolitan Films as “the respondent.”

The Respondent was not the Complainant’s Employer

For the respondent, Mr Loughran submitted that the complainant was not employed by Metropolitan Film Productions Limited but, by a succession of designated activity companies, the most recent of which was VK Six TV Productions DAC.  A Certificate of Incorporation submitted in evidence by the respondent shows that VK Six TV Productions DAC was established on May 5th 2017.  A copy of a fixed-term contract shows that the complainant’s start date with that company was September 25th 2017.  The contract states that his hourly rate was €25.12 and that he was at the grade of “rigger.”  A third document is a letter to the complainant from a line producer on December 8th 2017, telling him that his previous notice is rescinded until December 15th.  A final letter is dated March 9th 2018, informing him that his employment would be terminated a week later, on March 16th. 

It is the respondent’s position that VK Six TV Productions DAC was an entirely separate legal entity from Metropolitan Film Productions Limited.  Mr Loughran acknowledged that, in accordance with s.41(16) of the Workplace Relations Act, I, as the adjudication officer, may exercise discretion to substitute one party for another where the wrong party has been named on the WRC complaint form.  However, referring to the decisions of the Labour Court in the cases of in Starrus Eco Holdings trading as Greenstar Wastepal v Calvin Partner[1]and Sylwia Wach v Travelodge Management Limited[2], he said that it is not appropriate to do so where the naming of the wrong respondent is not an administrative or clerical error.  Mr Loughran also referred to the decision of the Labour Court in an appeal of a decision of an adjudication officer in Patrick Boland v World 2000[3], where the Court held that the complainant did not produce evidence to establish a relationship between him and World 2000, and, for that reason, the appeal failed.

In his submission, Mr Loughran explained that “the film and television industry operates under a unique set of practices underpinned by a specific statutory regime.”  He said that it is a freelance industry, not just for cast and crew, but also for producers.  He referred to the requirement for production companies to establish special purpose vehicles, or, more recently, designated activity companies, “DACs” for each individual production, and only that production.  Once a production is completed and delivered to its financiers, a compliance report is submitted to the Revenue Commissioners and the DAC is dissolved.  The DAC must exist solely for the purposes of producing one and only one film or television programme and funding is targeted at that production.

The respondent’s submission notes that the complainant was engaged on a number of film and TV productions on specified purpose contracts, the last of which was VK Six TV Productions DAC.  His employment ended on March 16th 2018, when the production of season 6 of Vikings ended. 

Mr Loughran submitted that “the application of the requirements under section 481 is in no way a circumvention of what would otherwise be employment rights of persons such as the complainant” and that “no employment relationship ever existed between the parties herein,” meaning between the complainant and Metropolitan Films Productions.  Apart from the regulations around section 481 relief, it is necessary for a DAC to be established for each production, because each project is financed differently.  Financiers will only want to contract with a newly incorporated company that is not affected by any other business in the producer group or which might have pre-existing security registered over it.

The Complaint has been Submitted Outside the Statutory Time Limit

Mr Loughran said that the complainant was last engaged with VK Six TV Productions DAC, a company that shares a director with the respondent, and that his employment with that company ended on March 16th 2018.  As this complaint was lodged with the WRC on December 11th 2019, more than 12 months since the complainant last worked with VK Six, it has been submitted outside the time limit set out at s.41(6) of the Workplace Relations Acts and, it is the respondent’s position that it should not be heard.

The Complainant’s Argument that the Respondent was his Employer

Ms Murray asked me to reject the respondent’s arguments in the absence of any evidence in support of their position.  She submitted that the fact that IBEC has entered an appearance on behalf of Metropolitan Film Productions is fundamental in determining the outcome of this case.  In the absence of sworn evidence, Ms Murray argued that the respondent’s position must be rejected, as must any documents submitted by third parties who are not before this hearing.  She asserted that the documents are not properly in the possession of the respondent unless they give sworn evidence to that fact.  Referring to the decision of my colleague adjudicator, Úna Glazier-Farmer in her decision regarding Siobhán Flahive and Muirdrum Limited Auctioneers and Estate Agents[4], Ms Murray asserted that a failure by a respondent to deliver a defence means that judgement in default must be given against the respondent.

Without prejudice to these arguments, Ms Murray said that the respondent is one of a group of companies that are associated.  To avail of tax relief under section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, the respondent is required to set up subsidiaries for the making of each film or television series.  A producer company cannot make an application for section 481 relief unless a certificate is issued by the Minister for Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sports and Media.  There are two conditions associated with an application, referred to as “the culture test” and the “quality employment test.”  Ms Murray argued that the reference to quality employment must refer to secure employment.  Contrary to this provision, she said that the respondent’s policy is that “the employment relationship cannot survive the lifetime of the DAC.”  She said that the undertaking to be given by a producer company specifically refers to compliance by that company with s.9(2) of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2004:  

(2) Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

It is the complainant’s case that his employer was Metropolitan Film Productions and that he was employed on various film and TV projects since 2012.  He was employed on a series of fixed-term contracts which had no end-date.  He was laid off when each film or TV project was finished and re-employed when the next one was starting up.  In this regard, Ms Murray referred to the decision of the Labour Court in Beary v the Revenue Commissioners[5].  Between 2004 and 2008, Mr Beary was employed as a temporary clerical officer on nine separate contracts, mainly covering for staff on maternity leave.  The Court held that, in accordance with the First Schedule of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, Mr Beary’s employment was continuous and that the breaks of between two and 24 weeks between his contracts must be regarded as periods of lay-off.  

Evidence of the Complainant

The complainant gave evidence of his experience as an “advance rigger,” which involves building sets before the carpenters, plasterers and electricians start work.  He said that he did courses in basic rigging and then became an advance rigger.  He said that the production company paid for his training and he thought that this indicated that they were investing in him working with them in the long term.  He said that he was “on and off” on the standby crew, working on “Into the Badlands,” and then a small film in between, before he worked on “Vikings.”  He said that sometimes he would work on three film sets in one week and he was paid by different companies.  He said that this caused problems with his tax.  It is apparent from the document issued to the complainant by the respondent that he was required to work at two sites, because on page 1, it states that, “Ashford Studio is treated on the same basis as Ardmore Studios.”  I understand that “Vikings” was produced in Ardmore Studios and that “Into the Badlands” was produced in Ashford.

Over period of six or seven months, the complainant said that he noticed that people with less experience than him were being recruited on sets.  He said that it was clear to him that the company didn’t want to deal with IFWA, and non-union people were being hired.  The complainant said that he enjoyed the work but that the environment was “toxic.”

When he wasn’t called back to work in 2019, the complainant said that he got a job in construction.

On the form he submitted to the WRC, the complainant stated that his former employer was “Metropolitan Film Productions.”  In his submission on behalf of the respondent, Mr Loughran argued that the complainant has never been employed by a company named or trading as “Metropolitan Film Productions Limited.” 

Publicly Available Information

On the website of the Companies Registration Office (CRO), the financial accounts for the year ending on July 31st 2018 (the complainant’s last year of employment) for Metropolitan Film Productions Limited shows that the company had an average of seven employees in that year, including the directors.  The CRO also provides a listing for Metropolitan Films International Limited and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as the “Group”).  In the financial statement of that business up to April 30th 2018, VK Six TV Productions DAC is listed as one of 16 subsidiary companies.  The complainant’s evidence is that the last film on which he worked was Vikings 6 and that he finished up on that production in August 2018. 

The financial accounts for Metropolitan Films International Limited, up to April 30th 2018, shows that the average number “employed by the Group in its production company subsidiaries” was 1,301, of which, 1,283 were employed in production.  The report shows that the cost of wages and salaries for 2018 was just under €40 million.  The report also notes that,

“The above employee numbers are the average monthly number of employees as calculated by reference to Section 371(5) of the Companies Act 2014.  The nature of the Group’s trade resulted in the majority of employees being contracted for a condensed period.  Therefore, a significantly higher number of employees than the average reported were employed by the Group.”

Based on the filings in the CRO and the evidence of the complainant, I am satisfied that, until April 30th 2018, when he was registered as an employee of VK Six TV Productions DAC, the complainant was one of 1,301 employees of “the Group” of companies comprising Metropolitan Films International Limited and its Subsidiaries.  He continued to work on Vikings 6 until December 2018 and I am satisfied that he was one of the 332 production staff employed by the Group in the financial year 2019.  Over the course of these hearings, it became apparent that, for most of 2019, no films were in production and this is the reason for the difference in the numbers employed between 2018 and 2019.  The financial report for the Group for 2022 which Ms Murray included in her submission shows that by 2022, the employee numbers had risen to 785, of which, 783 were engaged in production. 

The Effect of Section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997

Section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (“the 1997 Act”) was an acknowledgement by the government of the importance of film making to the promotion of Irish culture, the development of tourism and the growth of jobs.  The 1997 provisions were amended by section 26 of the Finance Act 2018.  The Revenue Commissioners published a series of Film Regulations governing the application for a section 481 certificate with the latest issued in Statutory Instruments (SI) 119 and 358 of 2019.  SI 358 is concerned with an uplift in tax relief for films made in the regions and the main regulations are set out in SI 119 of 2019.

In his submission on behalf of the respondent, Mr Loughran explained that “section 481 relief” was intended to promote investment in film production by granting individual tax-payers relief on their investment.  Until December 31st 2014, the relief was available as a personal tax credit to investors.  Section 481 is now referred to as the film tax credit and is only available to producer companies in the film production industry.  The financial statement for 2018 shows that, in that year, the Group received €25,483,667 in corporation tax credit under section 481.   

The website of the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sports and Media (“the Department”) has a useful Guidance Note on the Regulations and on the procedure for applying for relief.[6]   The Regulations provide that a producer company applying for section 481 relief must, in the first instance, apply to the Minister for Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sports and Media (“the Minister”) for a qualifying certificate.  When the Minister issues a certificate in relation to a qualifying film, and all the other provisions of section 481 have been complied with, a producer company may make a claim for film corporation tax credit.  The relief may be claimed against the company’s corporation tax liabilities and is given at 32% of the lower of:

a) Eligible expenditure

b) 80% of the total cost of production, or

c) €70,000,000

We know that, to avail of this relief, a qualifying company must be established so that the cost of production is ring-fenced and can be audited by the Revenue Commissioners.  Section 481 of the 1997 Act defines a qualifying company as a company which –

(a) is incorporated in the State,

(b) is resident in the State and not resident elsewhere,

(c) exists solely for the purposes of the production and distribution of only one qualifying film, and

(d) does not contain in its name registered under either or both the Companies Acts, 1963 to 1990, or the Registration of Business Names Act, 1963, the words “Ireland”, “Irish”, “Éireann”, “Éire” or “national.”

From the perspective of the issue under consideration here, the important component of this definition is sub-section (c), that the qualifying company exists solely for the purpose of the production and distribution of one film. 

“Producer company” is not defined in the 1997 Act, however, Regulation 2 of SI 119 of 2019 states that,

“film group” means the producer company, the qualifying company and all businesses that are regarded as partner or linked business of either company[.]

I am satisfied that Vikings TV Productions DAC, being a subsidiary of Metropolitan Films International Limited, is an associated company of Metropolitan Films International Limited.  I am further satisfied that the qualifying companies which the respondent claims were the complainant’s employers from 2012 were all associated companies and, before they were dissolved, were components of the Group known as Metropolitan Films International Limited. 

In accordance with the European Commission Communication on State aid for films and other audio-visual works, the Revenue Commissioners publishes the names of the recipients of section 481 tax credit.  In the documents she submitted at the hearing, Ms Murray included a copy of the list of companies who have benefited from section 481 credit.  This shows that, between 2016 and 2022, Metropolitan Films International Limited availed of tax relief of more than €150 million in respect of 25 individual productions.  Included in the list of productions are Vikings and Vikings series 3, which the complainant worked on until August 2018.

To support their case that the complainant was not employed by them, the respondent relies on the Revenue requirement for a producer company to establish a qualifying company to apply for tax credit for each individual film, arguing that “this is in no way a circumvention of employment rights…”  It would be an entirely irrational outcome if, as a consequence of the government’s policy to provide Exchequer funding to the film industry, employees were deprived of security of employment.  To this end, I have examined the 2019 Regulations and the Department’s Guidance Note (footnote 6).  It is apparent to me that the Regulations are intended as compliance measures to ensure that workers employed in film production have the same entitlements under employment law as employees in all other sectors of business. 

In the directors’ report for 2018 (and subsequent years), under the heading, “Principal risks and uncertainties,” the directors note that,

“A principal risk which could materially and adversely affect the Group’s future operating profit or financial position is compliance with the conditions set out in certificates issued under Section 481 Taxes Consolidation Act,1997 (as amended).”

The report gives no indication which condition or conditions of the section 481 certificate presents a risk and it does not state that they have not complied with the conditions. 

The Guidance Note refers to the application process for a section 481 certificate comprising “Tabs A to M.”  Section 4 of Tab A requires the producer company to,

“…demonstrate how, in promoting, developing and enhancing culture, the film acts as an effective stimulus to film making in the State through, among other things, the provision of quality employment and training opportunities.”

I agree with Ms Murray’s assertion that quality employment means secure employment.  This is underlined by the condition at Tab M of the application process:

“Tab M is an Undertaking in respect of quality employment. It should be completed and signed by a director of the producer company and a director of the qualifying company.

Quality employment is employment which complies in all material aspects with all applicable laws including but not limited to all obligations in the field of environmental, social and employment law that apply at the place where the Services are provided, that have been established by EU law, national law, and collective agreements in particular the provisions of the following as may be amended from time to time:

i. the Terms of Employment (Information) Acts 1994 to 2014

ii. the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005

iii. the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 and in particular section 9(2) thereof

iv. The Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

v. The Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2011

vi. The Equal Status Acts 2000-2015

vii. The Payment of Wages Act 1991

viii. The Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996

Quality employment also requires that the employer is in compliance with employment, remuneration, taxes, immigration and work permits for all personnel and has in place written policies and procedures on Grievances, Discipline and Dignity at work (including harassment, bullying and equal opportunity) as well as ensuring that any Workplace Relations Commission findings relating to the employer and to any related companies are being followed.

In her submission, Ms Murray noted the reference to s.9(2) of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2003 which is listed at sub-section iii above and which provides that,

(2) Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years. 

It is apparent that Metropolitan Films International Limited and its subsidiaries is a Group comprising, in different years, a varying number of qualifying companies, each of which is set up to produce one film and one film only, so that the producer company (as distinct from the qualifying company) can apply for section 481 tax credit in respect of each individual film. 

The Group’s financial report for 2018 list 16 subsidiaries and the report for 2022 lists 12 subsidiaries, of which, only two were listed in 2018.  This demonstrates the short life of the subsidiaries and the inability of these companies to comply with the conditions of the section 481 certificate regarding quality employment.

Contrary to the respondent’s assertion that it was necessary to assign the complainant to a succession of qualifying companies, the 2019 Film Regulations provide that workers must be employed in accordance with section 9(2) of the Fixed-term Work Act, meaning that they must be employed on a continuous basis and not on a succession of fixed-term contracts.  A qualifying company, because it “exists solely for the purpose of the production and distribution of one film,” cannot provide continuous employment and therefore, I am satisfied that the only rational and lawful employment relationship is between the complainant and the producer company, in this case, Metropolitan Films international Limited and Subsidiaries, collectively referred to in the Directors’ Reports as “the Group.” 

Collective Agreement Between the Respondent and the Complainant

The respondent submitted a copy of a contract of employment between the complainant and VK Six TV Productions DAC.  In his evidence, the complainant said that contracts were issued when production was completed, and holiday pay was conditional on employees signing contracts which named the qualifying company as the employer.  The document included in the respondent’s book of papers contains the following statement:

“This production will operate under the Local Construction Agreement dated 9th June 2017.  A copy of this agreement is available for review in the Production Office and any queries can be addressed to the Producer.”

At the hearing, Ms Murray referred to this “Local Construction Agreement” between Metropolitan Films and IFWA which was to run from January 2017 until December 2020.  The Agreement sets out basic terms and conditions for film construction workers.  I understand that the 2017 Agreement was a successor to a deal agreed in 2012, when IFWA members agreed with the late Mr Flynn that they would give up subsistence allowances of €300 per week and accept a pay reduction of 12.5%.  In return, Ms Murray said that they were promised that their service would be recognised and that a profit-sharing scheme would be set up.  In January 2020, IFWA was informed that the respondent was treating the 2017 Local Construction Agreement “as at an end.” 

Ms Murray referred to a letter sent by Morgan O’Sullivan on April 24th 2012 to representatives of film construction workers regarding local arrangements “for crew at Ashford on Vikings and Octagon / World 2000 projects 2012.”  Ms Murray argued that the concluding of a collective agreement that governed terms and conditions of IFWA members from 2012 until 2020 demonstrates that there existed a legal employment relationship between Octagon / Metropolitan Films and IFWA members.  In support of this position, she referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger[7], where, considering the agreement between the company and the trade unions in that company, Mr Justice Kenny held that,

“It seems to me that the six-point agreement was intended to create legal relations and was intended to be a contract between the plaintiffs and the unions engaged in the negotiations…When an apparent agreement in relation to business relations is entered into the onus on the party who asserts that it was not intended to have legal effect is a heavy one.  In my opinion, the six-point statement and its acceptance created a valid enforceable contract between the plaintiffs and the unions who took part in the negotiations.”

Leaving aside the end of the Agreement in 2020, it is apparent that between 2012 and 2020, Metropolitan Films International Limited, and before that, Octagon Films International Limited, conducted itself as the employer of the complainant and his colleagues and engaged in negotiations regarding their terms and conditions. 

Error in the Naming of the Employer

The complainant submitted these complaints against “Metropolitan Film Productions.”  I am satisfied that that the correct name of the respondent is Metropolitan Films International Limited.  Therefore, on the form he submitted to the WRC on December 11th 2019, the complainant did not state the correct name of his employer.  Mr Loughran pointed out that s.41(16) of the Workplace Relations Act provides that,

An adjudication officer may, by notice in writing given to the parties to a complaint or dispute to which this section applies, correct any mistake (including any omission) of an administrative or clerical nature in a decision under this section in relation to that complaint or dispute.

In my determination about whether to allow this complaint to proceed, I must give some consideration to the fact that the complainant has not named a wrong legal entity, but that he has made an error in the naming of his employer.

Mr Loughran referred to the case of Sylwia Wach andTravelodge (footnote 2) as an argument against amending the name of the respondent.  It is my view that this precedent is not useful to the respondent because the Labour Court determined that the issue in Travelodge was not a formal or verbal error, but that the wrong respondent was impleaded.  Based on his understanding that his employer was “Metropolitan Films” or “Metropolitan Film Productions Limited,” the complainant has made an error by neglecting to provide the full legal name of his employer.  It is my view that the respondent intentionally withheld from the complainant the correct name of his employer and that they relied on the technicality provided by section 481 of the 1997 Act to give the impression that he was employed by a qualifying company.

In its decision on Ballarat Clothing Limited and Ann Aziz in 2015[8], the Labour Court addressed the issue of an error in the naming of the employer.  Ms Aziz was not legally represented and, on the form she submitted to the former Equality Tribunal, rather than the name of the company she was employed by, she named two company directors.  In its finding that the respondent suffered no prejudice by being incorrectly named, the Labour Court referred to the decision of the High Court in O’Higgins v University College Dublin & Another[9], where Mr Justice Hogan held that,

“Even if the wrong party was, in fact, so named, no prejudice whatever was caused by reason of that error (if indeed, error it be)…In these circumstances, for this Court to hold that the appeal was rendered void by reason of such a technical error would amount to a grossly disproportionate response and deprive the appellant of the substance of her constitutional right of access to the courts.”

I am satisfied that, in the case under consideration, the respondent was always on notice of these complaints and in a position to defend them.  The office manager of Metropolitan Films International Limited attended the hearing and they suffered no prejudice by being incorrectly named.

Ms Murray referred to the decision of Mr Justice Barrett in Capital Food Emporium (Holdings) v John Walsh[10], where the judge drew a distinction between the jurisprudence in Sandy Lane Hotel Limited -v- Times Newspaper Limited[11]and the Capital Emporium case on the basis of the legal advice available to the parties, stating,

“Whereas in the within proceedings Ms Stewart is a so-called ‘ordinary’ person who was acting with the benefit of trade union assistance: she is not a sophisticated commercial group acting with the benefit of ‘blue chip’ legal and tax advice.”

The complainant is an ordinary person, acting with the benefit of trade union assistance.  Over many years, the respondent, “a sophisticated commercial group,” relied on a provision in section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act to contrive that he was employed by a sequence of subsidiaries.  Focussed on arguing against this false proposition, neither he or his trade union representative could be expected to know precisely the correct, legal name of his employer, although they were always aware of who the employer was.  In these circumstances, and, taking guidance from Mr Justice Hogan in his decision in O’Higgins v UCD, I find that it would be grossly disproportionate not to allow these complaints to be heard.   

For the respondent, Mr Loughran asked me to consider the decision of the Labour Court in Patrick Boland v World 2000 (footnote 3) as authority for a conclusion that the complainant was not employed by Metropolitan Films International Limited.  World 2000 is a film production company established by Morgan O’Sullivan in 1995.  Finding against Mr Boland in that case, the Court decided that IFWA produced no evidence to establish that he was an employee of World 2000.  In the case under consideration here, I am satisfied that the submission presented by Ms Murray, the evidence of the complainant and the publicly available information on the database of the CRO is entirely unambiguous, leading me to a conclusion that the complainant was employed Metropolitan Films International Limited. 

Conclusion

I have concluded that the complainant was an employee of Metropolitan Films International Limited, referred to in the directors’ report as the “Group.”  I find that he made an error in the naming of the respondent and that, in accordance with s.41(16) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, I have jurisdiction to correct this error.  I reject the respondent’s case that the complainant was “last engaged” by VK Six TV Productions DAC.  It is clear to me that this is a technical response, intended to divert from the reality of the employment relationship.  I am satisfied that the complainant was one of 1,301 of the Group’s employees during 2018 and that he was employed for three years previously by the same Group which, until June 2015, operated as Octagon Films International Limited, a company incorporated in September 2001, as Octagon Films Limited.

The respondent’s position is that “the employee relationship between the complainant and VK Six TV Productions DAC ended on March 16th 2018” and that his complaint has been submitted outside the statutory time limit set out at section 41(7) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”).  Ms Murray argued that the complainant was laid off between March 16th 2018 and December 1st 2019 and that he could not have known he was dismissed until he wasn’t called back when construction work commenced on “Valhalla” in late 2019.  

On March 16th 2018, the complainant finished up working on a TV series, “Vikings 6,” produced by VK Six TV Productions DAC, one of Metropolitan Films International Limited’s group of companies.  We know that the respondent made no films during most of 2019.  The complainant said that in November 2019, he heard that production was about to commence on a new film and he phoned the construction manager, asking when he would start back.  When he was informed that he wouldn’t be called back, he concluded that he was dismissed.  On December 11th 2019, he submitted these complaints to the WRC.

The issues for consideration are: 

1.       Was the complainant laid off between March 16th 2018 and December 1st 2019?

2.       If he was laid off, when was his employment terminated?

3.       With the date of termination established, are his complaints within the statutory time limit at s.41(6) and (8) of the 2015 Act?

In his evidence, the complainant said that in the three years he worked with the respondent, he was laid off when production on a film ended, and he was called back when production commenced on a new film.  He said that sometimes, he was laid off in the morning, but that evening, he might be told to come in the next day.  On other occasions, he was laid off for a week or several weeks.  When he was laid off, he got a letter from the construction manager stating that the company had no more work and the purpose of this was to apply for unemployment benefit.  He said that did other work when he was laid off and he waited to be called back by the construction manager when a new film was starting up. 

The concept of “lay-off” is defined at s.11(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 as follows:

(1)  Where an employee’s employment ceases by reason of his employer’s being unable to provide the work for which the employee was employed to do, and -

(a)  it is reasonable in the circumstances for that employer to believe that the cessation of employment will not be permanent, and

(b)  the employer gives notice to that effect to the employee prior to the cessation, that cessation of employment shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as lay-off.

The facts show that, over a period of three years of employment with the respondent, the complainant’s employment ceased intermittently when the respondent was unable to provide work for him to do.  Each time production ended, he received a letter from the construction manager stating, “production is now coming to an end and we have no further work.”  It is evident that, over the years, the cessation of work was temporary, because the respondent called the complainant back when work was available again.  It is apparent that the complainant and the respondent co-operated based on the expectation that, when there was no work, the complainant’s employment would cease, and when work was available again, he would resume working on a new film.  While s.11(1)(b) above requires the employer to give notice that the cessation will not be permanent, it has generally been held that this is not essential and notice can be implied from the practice in the workplace and the understanding of the parties.

I am satisfied that, on March 16th 2018, the complainant was laid off with the same letter and in the same manner as he had been since 2015.  While his employment ceased, he was not dismissed and he had a legitimate expectation that he would be called back to work when construction started on a new film.  Although no films were in production in 2019, IFWA, represented by Ms Murray and the shop steward, John Arkins, were in talks with the late Mr Flynn about terms and conditions for their members.  The talks ended around April 2019, when Mr Flynn became ill. 

In support of the complainant’s case that he was laid off for 20 months, Ms Murray referred to the 2011 decision of the Labour Court in Beary v the Revenue Commissioners (footnote 5).  Between 2004 and 2008, Mr Beary was employed by the Revenue Commissioners as a temporary clerical officer.  When he was not called back to work after November 1st 2008, he argued that, as he had been employed for more than four years on a succession of fixed-term contracts, in accordance with s.9(2) of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2003 (“the Act”), he was entitled to a contract of indefinite duration.  Finding against Mr Beary, the Court concluded that, in accordance with s.7(1) of the Act, there were objective grounds for not offering him a contract of indefinite duration, those grounds being the requirement for the Revenue Commissioners to have recourse to a panel of relief clerical officers. 

From the point of view of the instant case, the important outcome from Beary is not the Court’s finding in relation to him not being entitled to a contract of indefinite duration, but, its examination of the meaning of “continuous fixed-term contracts,” used at s.9(2) of the Act, and the phrase “successive fixed-term contracts” used in clause 5 of Council Directive 99/70/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work.  Having considered that the objective of section 5 of the Directive is to prevent the abuse of fixed-term contracts, the chairman, Mr Duffy, concluded that, to interpret the meaning of “continuous fixed-term contracts” at s.9(2) of the Act as meaning successive and continuous was incompatible with and would limit the rights enshrined in the Directive: 

“There can be no doubt that on a literal construction of the language used in the Framework Agreement and the Act there is incompatibility.  While all periods of employment which are continuous are necessarily successive, not all employment which is successive is necessarily continuous.  Prima facie, at least, s.9 is, therefore, unduly limited in its ambit in that it excludes from the protection of the Act successive periods of employment which are not continuous.”

In support of this conclusion, Mr Duffy referred to the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in case 2-212/04 Adeneler and others v Ellinkos Organismos Galaktos[12], which concluded that a provision in Greek law in which fixed-term contracts separated by more than 20 days of lay-off were not continuous was incompatible with clause 5 of the Directive.  The decision of CJEU in case C364/07 Spryidon Vassilakis and others v Dimos Kerkyras[13], held that fixed-term contracts separated by less than three months can be regarded as successive.  Mr Duffy found that this is authority for the proposition that a member state may provide in domestic law that contracts separated in time by more than three months may not be regarded as successive.  While it was open to the Oireachtas to enact such a provision, it did not do so and Mr Duffy concluded that it was not open to the Labour Court to import such a provision into the statute.

Having reached this conclusion, Mr Duffy noted that the statutory provision regarding the definition of continuous employment is s.9 of the Act and the First Schedule of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.  This provides that the service of an employee is deemed to be continuous unless they are dismissed or voluntarily leave their job.  S.3 of the Schedule provides that,

“A lay-off shall not amount to the termination by an employer of his employee’s service.”

On similar grounds to the argument put forward by Mr Loughran on behalf of the respondent, counsel for the Revenue Commissioners in Beary argued that each time his fixed-term contract came to an end, he was dismissed.  Mr Duffy found that such a literal interpretation of the First Schedule of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act would mean that there could be no continuity between fixed-term contracts unless the expiry of each was followed by immediate renewal.  He held that “such a result would be at variance with the object pursued by the Directive and could not be adopted.”  He went on:

“The alternative and better approach is to construe the First Schedule of the 1973-2005 Act so as to produce the result envisaged by the Directive.  In that regard, it would seem that the concept of successive employment arises where a person is engaged to do the same job intermittently.  Hence it could be reasonably said that where a person’s employment is terminated because there is no longer work available for him or her to do, and it is envisaged at the time of the terminations that his or her service will be required again in the future, and they are in fact re-engaged, the employment could be regarded as continuous.” 

The complainant was engaged to “do the same job intermittently” over a period of three years, being laid off each time construction finished on the film to which he was assigned.  I accept that from March 2018 until December 2019 was an unusually long period not to be offered work by the respondent.  However, the complainant’s evidence in this regard was not challenged and the respondent presented no contradictory evidence, and I must therefore accept his version of events.  Based on the definition of continuous service at paragraphs 1-3 of the First Schedule of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 and, taking my authority from the decision of the Labour Court in Beary, that, “a lay-off, regardless of its duration, does not break continuity of service,” I am satisfied that, between March 17th 2018 and December 1st 2019, when he was not called back to work, the complainant was laid off and that the effective date of his dismissal is December 1st 2019.  As he submitted these complaints to the WRC on December 11th 2019, they have been submitted within the statutory time frame and I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to proceed with my enquiries.

I intend now to consider the substantive complaint under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2003.  The respondent was on notice of this complaint, a member of their management team attended the hearing, but, adhering to their position that I have no jurisdiction to hear the complaint, they produced no witnesses and Mr Loughran did not cross-examine the complainant.  I have therefore reached the conclusions set out below based on the uncontradicted evidence of the complainant.

Ms Murray submitted that the respondent has failed to recognise the complainant’s right to a contract of indefinite duration, giving rise to a claim of penalisation which is prohibited at s.13(1)(d) of the Act.  In breach of s.7, she argued that, by renewing his fixed-term contract between 2015 and 2017, he was treated less favourably than a permanent employee.  In this regard, she referred to the decision of the Labour Court in NBK Designs Limited and Marie Inoue[14] where the Court held that, for the reasons for renewing a fixed-term contract to be objectively justified, they must,

(a)    correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking,

(b)    are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective pursued, and,

(c)     be necessary to that end.

Ms Murray referred to the decision of the decision of the CJEU in Adeneler (footnote 12), which addressed the conditions attached to the objective reasons for renewing a fixed-term contract:

“…the concept of ‘objective reasons,’ within the meaning of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work must be understood as referring to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity, which are therefore capable in that particular context of justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts.  

“Those circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks for the performance of which such contracts have been concluded and from the inherent characteristics of those tasks or, as the case may be, from pursuit of a legitimate social policy objective of a Member State.

“On the other hand, a national provision which merely authorises recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts in a general and abstract manner by a rule of statute or secondary legislation does not accord with the requirements as stated in the preceding two paragraphs.”

I will return to this important decision in the section below under the heading “Findings and Conclusions.”

Without prejudice to the complainant’s position that he was never a fixed-term worker, between 2015 and 2017, in breach of s.7 of the Act, he was issued with fixed-term contracts.  Given that he was employed by the respondent for three years, Ms Murray asserted that the work he provided amounted to an ongoing and permanent need.  Since he has been excluded from the respondent’s workforce, others have been recruited to do the work he was formerly employed to do.

Ms Murray submitted that, in breach of s.8(1), the respondent failed to provide the complainant with a statement in writing of the objective condition determining the contract, whether the condition is the arrival at a specific date, the completion of a specific task or the occurrence of a specific event.  She argued also that the respondent breached s.8(2) which provides that an employer proposing to renew a fixed-term contract must inform the employee in writing of the objective grounds justifying the renewal of the fixed-term contract and the reason for not offering a contract of indefinite duration, at least by the date of the renewal of the first fixed-term contract.  Ms Murray referred to the decision of the Labour Court in the case of Galway City Council and Mackey[15]in whichs.8(2) of the Act was characterised as “a mandatory provision admitting of no exceptions.”  She cited the conclusions of the Labour Court in HSE and Ghulam[16], where the Court stated that the failure to provide a written notice before renewal of the contract even where this is due to inadvertence rather than wilful non-compliance “can neither be overlooked nor excused.”  As a rationale for not employing the complainant on a contract of indefinite duration, the respondent’s reliance on the provisions of s.481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act and the requirement to set up a separate DAC for each film or TV series, is according to the complainant, a form of “wilful non-compliance” with s.8(2) of the Act.

Addressing the respondent’s assertion that, due to the uncertain nature of its workstream, it does not employ full-time production crew such as painters, electricians or actors, Ms Murray submitted that an employer cannot use fixed-term contracts as a pre-emptive safeguard against having too many permanent employees.  She said that, if the risk associated with uncertain workstreams were to emerge, the respondent has recourse to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, an issue considered by the Labour Court in its decision in The National Gallery of Ireland and Coyne[17]:

“A desire to avoid a contingent liability to the complainant that might arise at some point in the future could not of itself be a legitimate objective of an employer for the purposes of the Act nor could it justify the use of successive fixed-term contracts of employment.  Avoiding legal liability to a worker is not a legitimate objective of an employer.”

Concluding her submission under this heading, Ms Murray pointed to the relevance of the decision of the CJEU in Angelidaki v Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Rethimnis[18]where the Court of Justice concluded that,

“…the use of a succession of fixed-term contracts which, having been intended to cover the fixed and permanent needs of the employer must be regarded as constituting an abuse.”

No witnesses were called by the respondent to defend this complaint.  In the submission he presented at the hearing, Mr Loughran asserted that, “There is no record of the Claimant being engaged by the respondent and the Claimant has clearly not submitted his claim within the period of six months beginning on the date of termination and therefore his claim should not be heard.”

The Relevant Law

Section 6(1) of the Act provides that,

…a fixed-term employee shall not, in respect of his or her conditions of employment, be treated in a less favourable manner than a comparable permanent employee.

Section 6(2) permits less favourable treatment of fixed-term employees if such treatment can be justified on objective grounds.  Section 7(1) provides that,

A ground shall not be regarded as an objective ground for the purposes of any provision of this Part unless it is based on considerations other than the status of the employee concerned as a fixed-term employee and the less favourable treatment which it involves for that employee (which treatment may include the renewal of a fixed-term employee's contract for a further fixed term) is for the purpose of achieving a legitimate objective of the employer and such treatment is appropriate and necessary for that purpose. 

The complainant argues that there were no objective grounds for renewing his fixed-term contracts.  In breach of s.8(2), he claims also that the respondent failed to provide him with a written explanation of the reason for renewing his fixed-term contracts.

Section s.8(2) of the Act provides that,

Where an employer proposes to renew a fixed-term contract, the fixed-term employee shall be informed in writing by the employer of the objective grounds justifying the renewal of the fixed-term contract and the failure to offer a contract of indefinite duration, at the latest by the date of the renewal.

Finally, in breach of s.9(2), the complainant submitted that, having worked for the respondent for more than four years, he was entitled to a contract of indefinite duration.

Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

We know that the genesis of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act is Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work.  Clause 1 of the Directive states that the Social Partners have agreed that its purpose is to,

(a)  improve the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination;

(b)  establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships.

A review of decisions of the Labour Court concerning appeals under the Act[19] demonstrates the importance of the findings of the CJEU in 2004 in Adenelerand others v Ellinkos Organismos Galaktos (footnote 12), a case referred to by Ms Murray at this hearing.  I referred to this decision in my examination of the importance of the Beary decision regarding the effect of periods of lay-off on continuous service (page 15).  Mr Adeneler and others were employed by a Greek dairy business, “ELOG,” on several fixed-term contracts lasting for eight months, with breaks in between of from 22 days to almost 11 months.  They sought a ruling from their national court that their contracts must be regarded as contracts of indefinite duration.  The issue was referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  Finding that breaks of more than 20 days did not break their continuity of service, the Court of Justice held that the basic premise of the Framework Agreement is that contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship.  Ms Murray quoted the following section from the decision of the CJEU in Adeneler:

Thus, to admit that a national provision may, automatically and without further precision, justify successive fixed-term employment contracts would effectively have no regard to the aim of the framework agreement, which is to protect workers against instability of employment, and render meaningless the principle that contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship.

The decision in Adeneler underlines the principle enshrined in the Directive that, when there is an ongoing requirement for work to be done, a contract of indefinite duration is the standard norm according to which workers ought to be engaged.  An ongoing requirement does not exclude the right of an employer to lay off employees when there is no work.  When the same work is available again, and when it can be done by the same employees, then, an ongoing need is established. 

Objective Reasons for Renewing a Fixed-term Contract

The respondent’s position is that the complainant was not their employee and that he was employed on a specified purpose contract by a separate legal entity.  I have addressed this position early on in this Decision, finding that the complainant was an employee of the respondent, Metropolitan Films International Limited.  Based on the complainant’s evidence, I am satisfied that he was employed by the respondent from 2015 until December 2019 on successive specified purpose contracts, which were in effect, fixed-term contracts.

It is the complainant’s case that, in breach of s.7 of the Act, there was no legitimate objective for keeping him employed on successive fixed-term contracts and no evidence that such treatment was appropriate or necessary.  In breach of s.8, he claims that he was not informed of the reason for issuing him with a fixed-term contract, whether that reason was related to the arrival at a specific date, the completion of a task or the occurrence of some event.  He also claims that he was not informed in writing of the objective grounds justifying the renewal of the contracts and the failure to offer him a contract of indefinite duration. 

Returning to Adeneler, this decision also provides valuable guidance concerning an interpretation of the concept of “objective justification” for the renewal of a fixed-term contract:

Where objective reasons are necessary to justify the renewal of successive fixed-term contracts, the concept of “objective reasons” (in clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement) requires the use of fixed-term contracts to be justified by the presence of specific factors relating, in particular, to the activity in question and to the conditions under which the activity is carried out.

“Objective reasons” refers to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity. These circumstances must be capable, in their particular context, of justifying the use of successive fixed-term contracts. The circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks being carried out, from the inherent characteristics of the work, or from the pursuit of a legitimate social policy objective of a Member State.

In 2007, the decision of the CJEU in Angelidaki (footnote 18) held that clause 5(1) of the Directive precluded successive contracts which were, in fact, found to be meeting the employer's “fixed and permanent needs.”

The respondent argued that s.481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act made it necessary for the qualifying company to be the complainant’s employer and, necessary for him to be employed on short, specified purpose contracts.  Based on the objective of Directive 1999/70/EC, and the jurisprudence in Adeneler and Angelidaki, I find the respondent’s position in this regard to be fundamentally wrong.  Ireland has decided that it is a legitimate social policy to provide exchequer funding to the film industry.  However, in so doing, the government has also sought to protect the rights of workers by inserting into the Film Regulations 2019 an objective which specifically provides that, a company availing of s.481 relief must employ people in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

The complainant’s evidence is that, that, when he was not called back to work for the respondent, others were employed to do the work that he was employed to do.  I must conclude therefore, that there was a “fixed and permanent need” for the work he was employed to do as a rigger.  I must also conclude that, in breach of s.7 of the Act, there was no legitimate reason for him to be employed on successive specified purpose contracts.  By failing to provide a written statement of the reasons for employing him on a specified purpose contract, the respondent is also in breach of s.8.

Entitlement to a Contract of Indefinite Duration

The complainant said that he commenced working for the respondent in 2015.  I have concluded that he was dismissed on December 1st 2019, and, following the authority of the Labour Court in Beary (footnote 5), I find that lay-off did not break his continuity of service.  I am satisfied therefore, that he completed four years of service with the respondent.  Section 9(2) of the Act provides that, where a fixed-term employee is employed on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts,

“…the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.”

The meaning of the phrase “aggregate duration” was considered by the Labour Court in its decision in the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht and Rebecca Dobson[20].  Ms Dobson commenced working for the Department on a fixed-term contract in February 2010 and this was followed by a further six fixed-term contracts, the last of which ended in December 2014.  The Court held that the periods of lay-off should not be included in the calculation of Ms Dobson’s “aggregate duration” of service.  The chairman explained his conclusion as follows:

“In the court's view the wording of the Act envisages the prospect that a worker may, over a period of, say, five years, be employed on a series of successive fixed-term contracts of employment, the aggregate duration of which may or may not exceed four years.  Where the duration of those contracts exceeds four years, s.9(2) of the Act is triggered.  Where it does not, s.9(2) has no effect. Had the Oireachtas intended otherwise it would not have included the term “aggregate duration” in s.9(2).  It could have used the term four years' “service” and omitted the term “aggregate” from the statute.  It did not do so and accordingly the court finds that that term must have some meaning. The only logical meaning the court can discern in this case is that periods of lay-off may be included for the purpose of determining whether a series of contracts of employment are continuous for the purposes of the Act but are not included for the purpose of calculating the aggregate duration of those contracts.” 

As he commenced employment with the respondent in 2015, the complainant had four years of continuous service by December 2019.  However, based on his evidence that he was laid off intermittently, he has not established that he had an aggregate of four years of service for the purpose of s.9(2) of the Act.  For this reason, he cannot claim that he had an entitlement to a contract of indefinite duration.

Conclusion

I have concluded that there were no objective grounds for employing the complainant on a succession of specified purpose contracts and I have also concluded that the respondent failed to provide him with an explanation in writing of the reason for employing him on specified purpose contracts.  I therefore find in favour of the complainant in relation to his claims under ss.7 and 8 of the Act.  I find that his complaint under s.9(2) is not well founded.

I have decided that this complaint is, in part, well founded and I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €5,000 for the breaches of ss.7 and 8 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2003.  In accordance with s.192A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, this award is for a breach of an entitlement under a relevant Act and is not subject to deductions for tax, PRSI or USC.

Notice of objective reasons for renewing a fixed-term contract