FULL RECOMMENDATION
SECTION 28 (1), ORGANISATION OF WORKING TIME ACT, 1997 PARTIES: ROSCOMMON COUNTY COUNCIL (REPRESENTED BY LGMA) - AND - MR JAMES GANNON (REPRESENTED BY SERVICES INDUSTRIAL PROFESSIONAL TECHNICAL UNION) DIVISION:
SUBJECT: 1.Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No(s) ADJ-00019900 CA-00026349-001. Mr. Gannon, ‘the Complainant’, was a retained Firefighter with Roscommon County Council, ‘the Respondent’. He made a complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997, ‘the Act’ alleging breaches of Ss. 11,12,13,14,16,16,17,20 and 21. The claim was lodged on 25 February 2019, so the cognisable period is from 26 August 2018 to 25 February 2019, as per s. 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Adjudication Officer decided that the claim was not well founded. Other relevant cases. The CJEU ruling in the case of Ville de Nivelles v Rudy Matzak, Case C-518/15 was the basis for the case made by the Complainant. This case gave rise to a number of similar cases in which retained Firefighters sought to have all time in which they were on stand-by regarded as working time for the purpose of the Act. This Court referred the case of MG v Dublin City Council Case C-214/20 to the CJEU seeking clarification of the criteria to be applied in determining working time. In the instant case, the Court convened a case management conference and the parties were asked to address the CJEU judgement in the ‘MG’ case in supplementary submissions. Both parties did so prior to the hearing of the appeal. For ease of reference the CJEU cases referred to above are called the Matzak and MG cases in the text below. Summary of Complainant arguments. The Complainant was a retained Firefighter from 1 October 2001 and at the time of his retirement he was a Sub Officer in the retained fire service. In the cognisable period, he was required to be on-call on a 24/7 basis on all days that he was not on annual leave. He was required to live within 2 miles of the station in order to be able to respond to alerts within 7 minutes. He was paid a quarterly retainer and hourly rates only when he attended an incident or training. In order to determine if time on stand-by is working time the Court must consider the time limit in which the Complainant must arrive at the fire station, the frequency of call outs and the duration of call outs in order to establish if the Complainant is objectively and very significantly constrained in pursuing other interests. In the cognisable period, there were 8 retained Firefighters at the station, 1 Station Officer and 7 Firefighters. All 8 were alerted each time there was an incident, unless they were on sick leave or annual leave. There must be at least one officer and 5 Firefighters on an appliance when called out. The Complainant was expected to attend within 7 minutes of an alert or, if delayed, within 12 minutes. He was required to attend at least 75% of call outs in a 13 week period and he never attended less than this unless he was on sick leave. Firefighters who do not meet this 75% minimum are subject to a loss of 50% of their retainer and 100% for a second failure. It is not the case, despite the Respondent’s argument, that the Complainant could opt out of 25% of call outs as he would have been unaware of how many of his colleagues were unavailable for call out. The Complainant had to respond to all alerts even if he had approved time off. The Respondent has not provided detail to substantiate its figure that suggests that the average frequency of alerts and attendances is 1 hour and 27 minutes per week. The Complainant was required to remain physically present within a very limited parameter in order for him to achieve attendance within the restrictive turnout time, so it is clear that the definition of working time is applicable to him. Summary of Respondent arguments. As per the MG case, the Court is required to assess the facts of a case in order to determine if a period of stand-by time can be regarded as working time. In doing so, the Court is required to have regard to certain considerations. The Court is required to have regard to the time limit for the Complainant to return to his professional activities. There was no legal obligation on the Complainant to attend at the station or in any other place while on stand-by, the only constraint being that he had to be able to respond to call outs within the prescribed time. This does not, in principle, constitute working time. The Court is required to have regard to the average frequency of required activities. In the MG case, the CJEU placed emphasis on the fact that the Complainant was not required to attend all alerts. In the instant case, the staffing complement was 9 and an appliance can be mobilised with 5. The average number of calls per annum in the past 6 years was 68. Allowing for four weeks’ holidays, the average number that the Complainant could attend was 62 and the minimum requirement on him to attend 75% of call outs required him to attend 46 calls per annum. It was also open to him, if he was unavailable, to contact the Station Officer and so advise and other arrangements could be made to ensure cover. The average duration of calls over a number of years was 1 hour 27 minutes. This shows that the Complainant was required to attend an average of 66.7 hours per annum or 1.39 hours per week. In the cognisable period, the Complainant attended 21 out of 24 incidents and he was in training when 2 of the other incidents occurred. If he decided to attend all incidents, that would be a matter for him but he was not obligated to do so. The time when the Complainant was called upon to act was limited and could not be said to constrain objectively and very significantly his ability to manage his time when his attendance was not required. The Complainant had his own business and has involvement in local community activities and the Reserve Defence Forces. The CJEU noted in D.J. v Radiotelevizija Slovenija, Case C-344/19 and in RJ v Stadt Offenbach am Main C-580/19 that working time only exists if, due to the restriction imposed on a worker when he is not working, that time cannot be used by the worker according to his/her interests. As the CJEU noted in the MG case, the Court must have regard to the extent to which the person concerned may use the stand-by period for other professional activities. The CJEU described this as an ‘important indication’. It has to follow that it is impossible for a worker to engage in ‘working time’ for two separate employers contemporaneously. In the instant case, the Complainant was a self-employed audio visual service engineer. Accordingly, the Complainant’s time on stand-by does not meet the definition of working time in s 2(1) of the Act. The Court’s attention is drawn to the cases of Kurz v Land Baden Wurttenberg (2002) EC1-10691 and Case66/85 Lawrie-Blum (1986) ECR2121 in which the CJEU emphasised the need for a worker to be under direction in return for remuneration and to the exclusive nature of the activity when defining the concept of a ‘worker’. Clearly, a retained Firefighter who is free to be self employed or to work for another, while on stand-by, cannot be said to be at the employer’s disposal or to be working for the employer’s benefit. Only the time linked to actual work can constitute working time. The periods spent on stand-by should be regarded as rest time. Witness evidence. Mr. James Gannon. Mr. Gannon is the Complainant. The witness stated that minimum crews of 6, one officer plus five Firefighters, were required on all call outs. The witness outlined that he was active in the Tidy Towns’ committee and a refugee support group, all within 2 miles of the station, in accordance with his contract. He stated that he only attended Reserve Defence Force activities away from the town once every year, while on annual leave. The witness said that he had run an audio visual repair business for about ten years but that the restrictions on his movements had curtailed his ability to grow the business, so that he had to close it down. He was unemployed in the cognisable period and drawing social welfare. The witness described the role in the fire service as one of peaks and valleys where call outs arrive without warning requiring prompt response. He denied that he had discretion not to respond to 25% of calls and said that it was necessary to respond to calls when available. In cross examination, the witness accepted that no colleague had been disciplined for having attended more than 75% of call outs. While he said that frequency of call outs can vary, he accepted that, over time, the averages cited by the Respondent were probably accurate. In response to questions about his community activities, the witness reiterated that these occurred within two miles of the station, as required by his contract. The witness disagreed that a crew of one officer plus 4 Firefighters was allowable. He also disagreed with the suggestion that the role did not prevent outside activities. In response to questions from the Court, the witness acknowledged that he could be more than 2 miles from the station, provided he could get there, if required, within the specified time. The witness agreed that if insufficient crew answered the call to the station, the next nearest station was called out. The applicable law. Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997. 2. “working time” means any time that the employee is— (a) at his or her place of work or at his or her employer's disposal, and (b) carrying on or performing the activities or duties of his or her work, and “work” shall be construed accordingly. 11.—An employee shall be entitled to a rest period of not less than 11 consecutive hours in each period of 24 hours during which he or she works for his or her employer Rests and intervals at work. 12.—(1) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without allowing him or her a break of at least 15 minutes. (2) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 6 hours without allowing him or her a break of at least 30 minutes; such a break may include the break referred to in subsection (1). (3) The Minister may by regulations provide, as respects a specified class or classes of employee, that the minimum duration of the break to be allowed to such an employee under subsection (2) shall be more than 30 minutes (but not more than 1 hour). (4) A break allowed to an employee at the end of the working day shall not be regarded as satisfying the requirement contained in subsection (1) or (2). Weekly rest periods. 13.—(1) In this section “daily rest period” means a rest period referred to in section 11. (2) Subject to subsection (3), an employee shall, in each period of 7 days, be granted a rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours; subject to subsections (4) and (6), the time at which that rest period commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (3) An employer may, in lieu of granting to an employee in any period of 7 days the first-mentioned rest period in subsection (2), grant to him or her, in the next following period of 7 days, 2 rest periods each of which shall be a period of at least 24 consecutive hours and, subject to subsections (4) and (6)— (a) if the rest periods so granted are consecutive, the time at which the first of those periods commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period, and (b) if the rest periods so granted are not consecutive, the time at which each of those periods commences shall be such that each of them is immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (4) If considerations of a technical nature or related to the conditions under which the work concerned is organised or otherwise of an objective nature would justify the making of such a decision, an employer may decide that the time at which a rest period granted by him or her under subsection (2) or (3) shall commence shall be such that the rest period is not immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (5) Save as may be otherwise provided in the employee’s contract of employment— (a) the rest period granted to an employee under subsection (2), or (b) one of the rest periods granted to an employee under subsection (3), shall be a Sunday or, if the rest period is of more than 24 hours duration, shall include a Sunday. (6) The requirement in subsection (2) or paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (3) as to the time at which a rest period under this section shall commence shall not apply in any case where, by reason of a provision of this Act or an instrument or agreement under, or referred to in, this Act, the employee concerned is not entitled to a daily rest period in the circumstances concerned. Sunday work: supplemental provisions. 14.—(1) An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely— (a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (b) by otherwise increasing the employee’s rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs. (2) Subsection (3) applies to an employee where the value or the minimum value of the compensation to be provided to him or her in respect of his or her being required to work on a Sunday is not specified by a collective agreement. (3) For the purposes of proceedings under Part IV before a rights commissioner or the Labour Court in relation to a complaint that this section has not been complied with in relation to an employee to whom this subsection applies (“the first-mentioned employee”), the value or the minimum value of the compensation that a collective agreement for the time being specifies shall be provided to a comparable employee in respect of his or her being required to work on a Sunday shall be regarded as the value of compensation to be provided under this section to the first-mentioned employee that is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances: Provided that if each of 2 or more collective agreements for the time being specifies the value or the minimum value of the compensation to be provided to a comparable employee to whom the agreement relates in respect of his or her being required to work on a Sunday and the said values or minimum values are not the same whichever of the said values or minimum values is the less shall be regarded, for the purposes aforesaid, as the value of compensation to be provided under this section to the first-mentioned employee that is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. (4) Unless the fact of such a value being so specified has come to the notice of the rights commissioner or the Labour Court, as the case may be, it shall be for the person who alleges in proceedings referred to in subsection (3) that a value of compensation of the kind referred to in that subsection is specified by a collective agreement mentioned in that subsection to show that, in fact, such a value is so specified. (5) In subsection (3) “comparable employee” means an employee who is employed to do, under similar circumstances, identical or similar work in the industry or sector of employment concerned to that which the first-mentioned employee in subsection (3) is employed to do. (6) References in this section to a value or minimum value of compensation that is specified by a collective agreement shall be construed as including references to a value or minimum value of compensation that may be determined in accordance with a formula or procedures specified by the agreement (being a formula or procedures which, in the case of proceedings referred to in subsection (3) before a rights commissioner or the Labour Court, can be readily applied or followed by the rights commissioner or the Labour Court for the purpose of the proceedings). Weekly working hours. 15.—(1) An employer shall not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours, that is to say an average of 48 hours calculated over a period (hereafter in this section referred to as a “reference period ”) that does not exceed— (a) 4 months, or (b) 6 months— (i) in the case of an employee employed in an activity referred to in paragraph 2, point 2.1. of Article 17 of the Council Directive, or (ii) where due to any matter referred to in section 5, it would not be practicable (if a reference period not exceeding 4 months were to apply in relation to the employee) for the employer to comply with this subsection, or (c) such length of time as, in the case of an employee employed in an activity mentioned in subsection (5), is specified in a collective agreement referred to in that subsection. (2) Subsection (1) shall have effect subject to the Fifth Schedule (which contains transitional provisions in respect of the period of 24 months beginning on the commencement of that Schedule). (3) The days or months comprising a reference period shall, subject to subsection (4), be consecutive days or months. (4) A reference period shall not include— (a) any period of annual leave granted to the employee concerned in accordance with this Act (save so much of it as exceeds the minimum period of annual leave required by this Act to be granted to the employee), (aa) any period during which the employee was absent from work while on parental leave, force majeure leave or carer’s leave within the meaning of the Carer’s Leave Act, 2001, (b) any absences from work by the employee concerned authorised under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994, or the Adoptive Leave Act, 1995, or (c) any sick leave taken by the employee concerned. (5) Where an employee is employed in an activity (including an activity referred to in subsection (1) (b) (i))— (a) the weekly working hours of which vary on a seasonal basis, or (b) as respects which it would not be practicable for the employer concerned to comply with subsection (1) (if a reference period not exceeding 4 or 6 months, as the case may be, were to apply in relation to the employee) because of considerations of a technical nature or related to the conditions under which the work concerned is organised or otherwise of an objective nature, then a collective agreement that for the time being has effect in relation to the employee and which stands approved of by the Labour Court under section 24 may specify, for the purposes of subsection (1) (c), a length of time in relation to the employee of more than 4 or 6 months, as the case may be (but not more than 12 months). Nightly working hours. 16.—(1) In this section— “night time” means the period between midnight and 7 a.m. on the following day; “night work” means work carried out during night time; “night worker” means an employee— (a) who normally works at least 3 hours of his or her daily working time during night time, and (b) the number of hours worked by whom during night time, in each year, equals or exceeds 50 per cent. of the total number of hours worked by him or her during that year. (2) Without prejudice to section 15, an employer shall not permit a night worker, in each period of 24 hours, to work— (a) in a case where the work done by the worker in that period includes night work and the worker is a special category night worker, more than 8 hours, (b) in any other case, more than an average of 8 hours, that is to say an average of 8 hours calculated over a period (hereafter in this section referred to as a “reference period ”) that does not exceed— (i) 2 months, or (ii) such greater length of time as is specified in a collective agreement that for the time being has effect in relation to that night worker and which stands approved of by the Labour Court under section 24. (3) In subsection (2) “special category night worker” means a night worker as respects whom an assessment carried out by his or her employer, pursuant to a requirement of regulations under section 28 (1) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989, in relation to the risks attaching to the work that the night worker is employed to do indicates that that work involves special hazards or a heavy physical or mental strain. (4) The days or months comprising a reference period shall, subject to subsection (5), be consecutive days or months. (5) A reference period shall not include— (a) any rest period granted to the employee concerned under section 13 (2) (save so much of it as exceeds 24 hours), (b) any rest periods granted to the employee concerned under section 13 (3) (save so much of each of those periods as exceeds 24 hours), (c) any period of annual leave granted to the employee concerned in accordance with this Act (save so much of it as exceeds the minimum period of annual leave required by this Act to be granted to the employee), (cc) any period during which the employee was absent from work while on parental leave, force majeure leave or carer’s leave within the meaning of the Carer’s Leave Act, 2001. (d) any absences from work by the employee concerned authorised under the Maternity Protection Act, 1994, or the Adoptive Leave Act, 1995, or (e) any sick leave taken by the employee concerned. Provision of information in relation to working time. 17.—(1) If neither the contract of employment of the employee concerned nor any employment regulation order, registered employment agreement or collective agreement that has effect in relation to the employee specifies the normal or regular starting and finishing times of work of an employee, the employee’s employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in each week that he or she proposes to require the employee to work, of the times at which the employee will normally be required to start and finish work on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, of that week. (2) If the hours for which an employee is required to work for his or her employer in a week include such hours as the employer may from time to time decide (in this subsection referred to as “additional hours”), the employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in that week on which he or she proposes to require the employee to work all or, as the case may be, any of the additional hours, of the times at which the employee will be required to start and finish working the additional hours on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, of that week. (3) If during the period of 24 hours before the first-mentioned or, as the case may be, the second-mentioned day in subsection (1) or (2), the employee has not been required to do work for the employer, the time at which the employee shall be notified of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall be not later than before the last period of 24 hours, preceding the said first or second-mentioned day, in which he or she has been required to do work for the employer. (4) A notification to an employee, in accordance with this section, of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall not prejudice the right of the employer concerned, subject to the provisions of this Act, to require the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the additional hours referred to in subsection (2) at times other than those specified in the notification if circumstances, which could not reasonably have been foreseen, arise that justify the employer in requiring the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the said additional hours at those times. (5) It shall be a sufficient notification to an employee of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2) for the employer concerned to post a notice of the matters in a conspicuous position in the place of the employee’s employment. Times and pay for annual leave. 20.—(1) The times at which annual leave is granted to an employee shall be determined by his or her employer having regard to work requirements and subject— (a) to the employer taking into account— (i) the need for the employee to reconcile work and any family responsibilities, (ii) the opportunities for rest and recreation available to the employee, (b) to the employer having consulted the employee or the trade union (if any) of which he or she is a member, not later than 1 month before the day on which the annual leave or, as the case may be, the portion thereof concerned is due to commence, and (c) to the leave being granted— (i) within the leave year to which it relates, (ii) with the consent of the employee, within the period of 6 months after the end of that leave year, or (iii) where the employee— (I) is, due to illness, unable to take all or any part of his or her annual leave during that leave year or the period specified in subparagraph (ii), and (II) has provided a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of that illness to his or her employer, within the period of 15 months after the end of that leave year. (2) The pay in respect of an employee’s annual leave shall— (a) be paid to the employee in advance of his or her taking the leave, (b) be at the normal weekly rate or, as the case may be, at a rate which is proportionate to the normal weekly rate, and (c) in a case in which board or lodging or, as the case may be, both board and lodging constitute part of the employee’s remuneration, include compensation, calculated at the prescribed rate, for any such board or lodging as will not be received by the employee whilst on annual leave. (3) Nothing in this section shall prevent an employer and employee from entering into arrangements that are more favourable to the employee with regard to the times of, and the pay in respect of, his or her annual leave. (4) In this section “normal weekly rate” means the normal weekly rate of the employee concerned’s pay determined in accordance with regulations made by the Minister for the purposes of this section. Entitlement in respect of public holidays. 21.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an employee shall, in respect of a public holiday, be entitled to whichever one of the following his or her employer determines, namely— (a) a paid day off on that day, (b) a paid day off within a month of that day, (c) an additional day of annual leave, (d) an additional day’s pay: Provided that if the day on which the public holiday falls is a day on which the employee would, apart from this subsection, be entitled to a paid day off this subsection shall have effect as if paragraph (a) were omitted therefrom. (2) An employee may, not later than 21 days before the public holiday concerned, request his or her employer to make, as respects the employee, a determination under subsection (1) in relation to a particular public holiday and notify the employee of that determination at least 14 days before that holiday. (3) If an employer fails to comply with a request under subsection (2), he or she shall be deemed to have determined that the entitlement of the employee concerned under subsection (1) shall be to a paid day off on the public holiday concerned or, in a case to which the proviso to subsection (1) applies, to an additional day’s pay. (4) Subsection (1) shall not apply, as respects a particular public holiday, to an employee (not being an employee who is a whole-time employee) unless he or she has worked for the employer concerned at least 40 hours during the period of 5 weeks ending on the day before that public holiday. (5) Subsection (1) shall not apply, as respects a particular public holiday, to an employee who is, other than on the commencement of this section, absent from work immediately before that public holiday in any of the cases specified in the Third Schedule. (6) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in the proviso to subsection (1) to a day on which the employee is entitled to a paid day off includes a reference to any day on which he or she is not required to work, the pay to which he or she is entitled in respect of a week or other period being regarded, for this purpose, as receivable by him or her in respect of the day or days in that period on which he or she is not required to work as well as the day or days in that period on which he or she is required to work. Directive 2003/88 Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: 1. "working time" means any period during which the worker is working, at the employer's disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practice; Deliberation. In looking at the CJEU judgements in the Matzak and MG cases, this Court observed in the case of Kerry County Council v David Walsh, DWT2252 as follows; It appears to the Court from reading the Matzak judgment….. that the ratio of that decision was based on a requirement on Mr Matzak during standby time to be at a place determined by his employer (his home), to attend all calls and to be able to reach his place of work within 8 minutes and also the fact that these requirements imposed significant restrictions on opportunities for him to engage in other activities. The Court went on to quote paragraph 34 of the CJEU judgement in the MG case, in which the CJEU distinguishes the Matzak case from the MG case and states “ The situation which led to that judgment, (‘Matzak’), should, however, be distinguished from that at issue in the main proceedings, since Dublin City Council does not require MG to be at a particular location when on stand-by and , in addition, permits him to work on his own account- which he does as a taxi driver- or to work for another employer”. In the MG case, the CJEU went on to state at paragraph 48; ‘…Article 2 (1) of Directive 2003/88 must be interpreted as meaning that a period of stand by time according to a stand-by system served by a retained firefighter, during which that worker with the permission of his or her employer, carries out a professional activity on his or her own account but must, in the event of an emergency call, reach his or her assigned fire station within 10 minutes, does not constitute working time within the meaning of that provision if it follows from an overall assessment of all the facts of the case, in particular from the scope and terms of that ability to carry out another professional activity and from the absence of obligation to participate in the entirety of the interventions affected from that fire station, that the constraints imposed on the said worker during that period are not of such a nature as to constrain objectively and very significantly the ability that he or she has freely to arrange during the said period, the time during which his or her services as a retained firefighter are not required”. The facts of the instant case are that the Complainant is required to be on stand by and must reach his assigned station within 7 minutes. Apart from the time requirement, there is, in the view of the Court, little to distinguish the circumstances of the Complainant from those of MG. The Complainant ran a business in a self employed capacity for about 10 years, he participates extensively, and most commendably, in activities within his community and, unlike in the Matzak case, he was not required to stay in any one place while awaiting call out. While the very nature of standby requirements are restricting, nothing in the facts of this case could be said to show that the Complainant was constrained objectively and very significantly in his ability to carry out other activities, including alternative employment. While there was some debate between the parties as to the nature of the requirement to attend for 75% of calls, the Court accepts that this is a contractual minimum requirement and that the Complainant consistently exceeded the minimum. However, there was no real dispute about the figure for average attendance requirements of the order of 1.4 hours per week that was outlined for the Respondent. By any standard, the Complainant had plenty of available time to pursue his other interests and the facts show that he did so. Accordingly, as per the terms of paragraph 48 of the CJEU judgement in the MG case, as quoted above, the Complainant’s periods on stand by cannot be regarded as working time. That being the case, it is not necessary for the Court to consider further the specific issues of rests and intervals at work, (s.12 of the Act), weekly rest periods, (s.13),weekly working hours, (s.15), nightly working hours, (s.16), times and pay for annual leave, (s.20) or entitlement to public holidays, (s.21). No argument was put to the Court regarding the provision of information on working time, (s.17) and no argument was made to refute the statement in the Adjudication Officer’s Decision that the required premium was paid for Sunday work, (s.14). The Complainant’s case has not been established. Determination The Decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld.
NOTE Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Therese Hickey, Court Secretary. |
