Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Aldona Pileckiene

Sillis Green Veg Limited

Representatives

Joe Smith BL

Niamh Ní Cheallaigh, IBEC

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00039691-001

09/09/2020

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00039691-002

09/09/2020

The respondent is a vegetable processing and packaging business, providing prepared vegetables to the catering and retail trade.  The business operates six days a week, from Sunday to Friday.  The majority of the 58 people employed in the company are foreign.

The complainant is from Lithuania and her first job when she came to Ireland was as a general operator with the respondent, cleaning and packing vegetables.  A contract submitted in evidence indicates that she commenced on June 29th 2013, although, at the hearing, she said that she started in June 2012.  When she finished working for the respondent in March 2020, she was earning the minimum hourly rate of €10.10 per hour.  She said that she was out sick just before the outbreak of Covid-19 and she never went back to work with the respondent.

The complainant alleges that, in breach of section 14 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (“the OWT Act”), she got no allowance for working on Sundays.  In breach of section 15, she claims that she regularly had to work more than 48 hours a week and that her average weekly hours were more than 48.  She also claims that her employer breached section 16 of the Act by requiring her to work more than eight hours as night work.  Finally, in breach of section 27 of the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2002, the complainant claims that she was penalised when she informed her manager that she couldn’t continue working long hours because she had a hernia and had to have surgery.

On behalf of the respondent, Ms Ní Cheallaigh said that, as the complainant’s last day at work was March 13th 2020 and, as her complaint was submitted on September 9th 2020, the cognizable time frame for which I can consider a complaint is from March 10th 2020, meaning that only four days can be taken into account in respect of these complaints.

In accordance with the provisions for an extension of the time limit at section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, Mr Smith argued for an extension of the time limit to 12 months.  He said that the complainant is a foreign national with very little conversational English.  She suffered an injury at work and, when she left her job with the respondent, she was unwell and unable to obtain legal advice.  This was compounded by the fact that legal firms were closed for long periods during the Covid-19 pandemic.  As someone who needs the assistance of a translator, Mr Smith argued that it would be unfair to penalize the complainant because of her inability to seek legal advice.

The time limit for submission of a complaint under the OWT Act is set out in section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act.  This provides that a complaint must be submitted no later than six months after the date of the contravention to which it relates.  Section 41(8) provides that, for reasonable cause, an extension of the time limit of up to 12 months may be permitted. 

The established test for deciding if an extension of time should be granted is set out in the Labour Court case of Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll[1].  In this case, the test for reasonable cause for extending the time limit to 12 months was set out as follows:

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say, it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time.  The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present, he would have initiated the claim in time.”

It is clear therefore, that, for an explanation of “reasonable cause” to succeed,

§    The complainant must explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay;

§    The explanation must be reasonable;

§    There must be an objective standard, applied to the circumstances of the case;

§    There must be a causal link between the circumstances and the delay;

§    The complainant must show that, if the circumstances were not present, she would have submitted the claim.

From my observation of the complainant at the hearing, it was apparent that her spoken English is not proficient, and, also, that her understanding of English is not adequate to master the technicalities associated with submitting a complaint to the WRC.  During the Covid-19 restrictions, it was difficult to access advice, other than online or by telephone, and support was not always available in the complainant’s native Lithuanian.  I am also mindful that the complainant was ill, and that she was depressed because of her illness.

It is my view that the complainant has explained the reason for the delay submitting a complaint just a few days before the expiry of the six-month time limit and that her explanation is reasonable.  It is my view that, if the complainant had a better command of English and, if she had been physically and mentally well, and, if the Covid-lockdown had not impacted on her access to support, she would have submitted her complaint sooner.  For these reasons, I have decided to extend the time limit for submitting her complaints to 12 months.  As these complaints were submitted to the WRC on September 9th 2020, the reckonable period is from September 10th 2019 until the complainant’s last day at work on March 13th 2020.

CA-00039691-001:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

In a submission prepared for the hearing, the complainant’s solicitor argued that the respondent was in breach of the OWT Act in relation to Sunday work, the maximum weekly working hours, night working and public holidays. 

Sunday Working

Mr Smith said that the complainant was regularly required to work on Sundays and, in breach of section 14 of the OWT Act, she received no added benefit.  Sunday working is not subject to a collective agreement at the respondent’s company.

Mr Smith referred to the decision of the Labour Court in Park House Hotel Limited and Wlodarczyk[2], where it was determined that an employee who is obliged to work on a Sunday is entitled to compensation in the form of a benefit which he or she would not receive if they were not obliged to work on a Sunday.

Maximum Weekly Hours

Mr Smith said that the complainant started work at 4.00am and sometimes at 3.00am and she was required to work “until finished.”  Finish time could be 5.00pm or 6.00pm, meaning that the complainant regularly worked 13, 14 or 15 hours a day.  Regardless of her finishing time, she was expected to be in work the next day at 4.00am.  

Mr Smith referred to the Labour Court decision in the case of IBM Ireland and Svoboda[3].  Here, the Court determined that the objective of the legislation is to prevent an employee from working more than 48 hours a week and not merely to prevent an employer from instructing or requiring an employee to work more than 48 hours.  The Court considered that there was a strict liability on an employer to prevent an employee from working more than 48 hours a week.  Mr Smith argued that there is no defence for an employer to complain that they did not know that their employee was working excessive hours unless they can demonstrate that they have a system in place to record the hours worked.

Night Work

Section 16 of the OWT Act provides certain protections to employees who are required to work between the hours of midnight and 7.00am.  For one week in a three-week cycle, Mr Smith said that the complainant worked from 9.00pm to 7.00am from Sunday to Friday.  Consequently, he asserted that, for the purpose of the OWT Act, the complainant is a night worker.  She was not paid as a night worker and, in breach of section 16 of the OWT Act, she was required to work more than an average of eight hours each night. 

Public Holidays

The complainant was required to work on the public holidays that fell on days such as Christmas day and New Year’s Day.  In breach of section 21(1) of the OWT Act, she claims that she did not receive an extra day’s pay or an extra day off.

CA-00039691-002:  Complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2002

Mr Smith said that, in 2019, the complainant had a hernia and she told Paula, the production manager who was there at the time, that she needed surgery.  Mr Virlis replaced Paula in 2020, and the complainant told him that she couldn’t work long hours.  Mr Smith said that the complainant was penalised for suffering an injury at work.  When she advised her managers that she had a hernia and that she was depressed, Mr Smith said that she was told that she had to continue to work.  She had to do manual labour and heavy lifting on her own.  At different times, both managers, Paula and Mr Virlis told the complainant that if she didn’t want to work, she could leave.  As she had a young child, the complainant couldn’t leave and she was coerced into working longer hours. 

Evidence of the Complainant, Ms Aldona Pileckiene

The complainant said that her job was to clean vegetables and that “every day was different.”  As part of her job, she had to lift 20kg bags and crates of vegetables.  She said that she worked up to 65 hours per week, starting at 4.00am and sometimes 3.00am.  She finished at different times and, before she finished work for the day, she had to complete the orders that came in. 

The complainant said that “a quiet week” was between 37 and 40 hours and a busy week could be 65, 66 or 67 hours.  The longest she ever worked was 75 hours.  She said that one week would be quiet and the next one would be busy.  Sometimes she worked 17 or 18 hours a day.  She said that her supervisor or a manager brought in the orders and she had to complete them before she could go home.  She said that she got breaks during the day.  The complainant said that she told her manager “thousands of times” that she didn’t want to work more than 40 hours a week.  She said that no one listened to her.  She was told that there wasn’t enough staff to let her work less hours.  When she complained, she said that her manager told her, “If you don’t like it, you can leave.”

The complainant said that she was paid for working on public holidays, in accordance with the hours that she worked.  She said that the number of hours that she worked depended on the orders for vegetables. 

On December 26th 2019, the complainant said that she worked for 18 hours.  She said that she was never informed that she was entitled to a day off for working on a public holiday.  She said that she had two days off on December 27th and 28th and she was back at work on December 29th 2019. 

The complainant said that it was very rare for her not to work on a Sunday.  She got the same pay on Sundays as she got for other days.

The complainant said that she was out sick for two weeks in mid-March 2020 and then she went on the Pandemic Unemployment Payment.  She is now working as a cleaner.

CA-00039691-001:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

In a submission provided before the hearing of these complaints, Ms Ní Cheallaigh said that the complainant has failed to particularise the dates on which the alleged breaches of the OWT Act occurred, and that, as a result, the respondent is prejudiced in its defence of the claims.  Without details of the dates on which the alleged contraventions occurred, the respondent is denied a reasonable opportunity to investigate the complaints.  Ms Ní Cheallaigh referred to the decision of the Labour Court in ISS Limited and Zhivko Mitsov (and 3 others)[4] where the Court held that the evidential burden is on a complainant to present evidence to support a stateable case of non-compliance with a provision of the OWT Act.  In its decision in Mitsov, the Labour Court referred to the decision of the British House of Lords by Lord Devlin in Bratty v the Attorney General for Northern Ireland[5]and remarked that the evidence adduced must be sufficient to “suggest a reasonable possibility” that there has been a breach of the legislation.

It is the respondent’s case that the complainant has failed to satisfy the evidential burden of proving that the respondent breached the OWT Act in respect of Sunday working, excessive working hours, night working and public holidays.

Ms Ní Cheallaigh referred to the medical certificate submitted by the complainant which indicates that she was unable to work from March 16th to 27th 2020.  Her sign-in sheet shows that she was at work on March 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th.  The complainant was rostered to work on March 15th; however, Ms Ní Cheallaigh said that she phoned the production manager, Mr Virlis, and told him that she was ill.

CA-00039691-002:  Complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2002

It is the respondent’s position that the complainant never made a complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005.  Had a complaint been made, Ms Ní Cheallaigh stated that the respondent would have investigated it immediately and thoroughly.  The complainant received a copy of the employee handbook which contains a policy on grievances and health and safety matters.  A copy of the handbook was provided with the respondent’s book of documents in preparation for the hearing. 

Evidence of the Production Manager, Mr Nerijus Virlis

Mr Virlis said that he never heard the complainant making a complaint that she was ill or that she had an injury.  In cross-examining, Mr Virlis said that he wasn’t working in Sillis Green Veg between 2018 and 2019.  The previous production manager was the person the complainant identified as “Paula.”

Evidence of the Payroll Manager, Ms Mairéad Flanagan

Ms Flanagan said that Sillis Green Veg operates six days a week from Sunday to Friday.  To compensate for working on Sundays, she said that employees receive an additional five cents per hour.

Ms Flanagan said that the company operates a rota for their employees’ starting time, but they don’t generally know what the finishing time is.  An employee coming to work in the morning at 4.00am probably wouldn’t know what time they would finish.  She said that Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays are the busiest days.

The company was subject to an inspection by the WRC three years ago and Ms Flanagan said that they were directed to pay employees for working on public holidays based on the hours they worked the previous day.

Ms Flanagan said that their employees clock in for work and they have working time records which they will produce for the purpose of this enquiry.  She said that employees get paid for the hours that they work.  If they work more than 40 hours a week, the average over four months will be less than 48 hours.

In cross-examining, Mr Smith asked Ms Flanagan what measure the company has in place to ensure that employees don’t work more than 48 hours a week, Ms Flanagan said that, around 12 months ago, she introduced a policy to monitor employees’ weekly hours.  She said that they had meetings about the issue, but there is “nothing written down.”

Ms Flanagan described the Sunday premium of five cents per hour as “not as fair as it could be.” 

Mr Smith referred to a week in November 2019 when the complainant worked for 63 hours.  Ms Flanagan said if the complainant worked for 63 hours, she was paid for 63 hours.

CA-00039691-001:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

I have considered the evidence presented by the complainant concerning her hours of work, Sunday working, night work and public holidays.  She submitted copies of her payslips going back to 2014, and these contain a record of the hours for which she was paid, including Sundays and holidays.  I have reviewed the payslips for the period from September 10th 2019 until March 13th 2020 and I have compared the information contained on the payslips with the working time records for the same period which were provided by the respondent.  As expected, the information on the payslips is consistent with the clocked time records.  It is my view that this information is sufficient, as set out by the Labour Court in its decision in the Mitso case, which was referred to by Ms Ní Cheallaigh, to “suggest a reasonable possibility” that the respondent breached certain aspects of the OWT Act.  The burden of proving that breaches did not occur now rests with the employer. 

The OWT Act transposes into Irish law the provisions of Directive 2003/88/EC, previously 93/104/EC. Based on the objectives of Article 31 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on fair and just working conditions, this “framework directive” for occupational safety and health is intended to promote the safety and health of employees and to avoid working conditions that have the potential to cause injury or illness.  I have examined the evidence of the parties to these complaints and I find that the complainant’s working conditions related to Sunday work and her excessively long working hours resulted in serious contraventions of sections 14 and 15 of the OWT Act. 

Section 14 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, Sunday Working

Section 14(1) of the OWT Act sets out the provisions for Sunday working:

(1) An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely—

(a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(b) by otherwise increasing the employee's rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

Although the payroll manager, Ms Flanagan, said that the Sunday premium is not hidden from employees, neither the complainant’s contract of employment nor the company handbook contains any reference to a Sunday premium.  The only evidence provided at the hearing to show that employees know that their hourly rate of pay includes a Sunday premium of five cents an hour, was the weekly payslip, which separates the hours worked on Sundays from the other working days. 

Mr Smith asked me to consider the decision of the Labour Court in Park House Hotel Limited and Wlodarczyk (footnote 2).  In its conclusion on that case, the Court referred to an earlier decision in Viking Security Limited and Thomas Valent[6], where there is a similarity with the instant case:

“In the Court’s view it is insufficient for the employer to simply say (as the Respondent does in this case) that because the rate exceeds the national minimum wage it compensates for Sunday working. If such a contention were to be accepted, the effectiveness of the statutory provision would be seriously undermined in the case of all workers whose pay exceeds the statutory minimum.”

The clocking records provided by Ms Ní Cheallaigh after the hearing show that in the 27 weeks from September 10th 2019 to March 13th 2020, the complainant worked on 19 Sundays.  The records show that, on these days, she generally worked between 10 and 13 hours.  On Sunday, March 8th 2020, she worked from 3.00am until 18.30, a total of 13.5 hours.  Taking account of four breaks of half an hour each, she was on the premises for 15.5 hours.  Her total working time for that week was 54 hours. 

In March 2020, the complainant was paid the minimum hourly rate of €10.10.  Her payslip shows that she was paid €137.00 for working 13.5 hours on Sunday, March 8th, equivalent to €10.15 per hour.  If she had worked the same number of hours on any day except Sunday, she would have been paid €136.35, meaning that the value of the Sunday allowance was 65 cents.  This is entirely inconsistent with the objective of the OWT Act, which provides that Sunday is a premium day for which a reasonable allowance must be paid.

In its decision in Keelings Logistics and 350 General Operatives[7], the Labour Court addressed a claim for a Sunday premium in circumstances where the workers were paid an allowance of €65.07 for working in Saturdays.  The Court recommended that this be split between Saturday and Sunday, giving a premium for each day of €32.50 or around €4.00 per hour.  I accept that Keelings is a larger and probably more profitable company compared to this respondent; however, the employees in both companies work at processing and packing vegetables.  It is my view that, for the complainant, a premium of one third of her hourly rate of pay is reasonable and in line with the aim of the OWT Act.  As she was paid €10.10 per hour, this is equivalent to an allowance of €3.33 extra per hour for working on Sundays.

Section 15 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, Maximum Weekly Hours

Section 15 of the OWT Act provides that,

An employer shall not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours, that is to say an average of 48 hours calculated over a period (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “reference period”) that does not exceed

(a)     4 months, or

(b)    6 months[.]

I understand that the reference period for employees in the food processing sector is four months. 

I compared the complainant’s record of her hours of work with the clocking data provided by the respondent.  In the 17 weeks (four months) before her last week at work, from November 11th 2019 until March 13th 2020, the complainant worked for 818 hours, equivalent to an average of 48.1 hours per week.  I accept that the legislation requires me to disregard time spent on sick leave; however, I note that, on Sunday, December 22nd 2019, the complainant worked for 13 hours, but she was out sick for the previous four days.  If she had worked her normal hours that week, her average over this period of 17 weeks would have been 50.5 hours. 

Mr Smith referred to the Labour Court decision in IBM Ireland and Svoboda (footnote 3), where the chairman, Mr Duffy considered the purpose and intent of section 15 of the OWT Act:

“It is noteworthy that the section provides that an employer shall not ‘permit’ an employee to work in excess of 48 hours per week.  The obligation created by the Act is, therefore, directed at preventing an employee from working excessive hours and not merely at prohibiting an employer from instructing or requiring an employee to work more than the permitted hours.  It further appears from the language of the Section that it imposes a form of strict liability (it does not provide that an employer may not knowingly permit). This construction of the Section is consistent with the object pursued by Directive 93/104/EC, which the Act transposed into Irish law.  That objective, as stated in Article 1 of the Directive, is to lay down minimum safety and health requirements for the protection of those at work.”

The aspect of this complaint which is most disturbing is the fact that the complainant persistently asked not to be rostered for such long hours.  She had family responsibilities and she was suffering from a hernia.  Not surprisingly, her illness and her long hours at work were making her feel depressed.  All the hours were paid at the minimum rate of €10.10, apart from the 5 cents allowance on Sundays, with no overtime premium.

The wording of section 15 of the OWT Act specifically places the onus is on the employer not to permit an employee to work more than an average of 48 hours per week.  Contrary to this provision, the evidence of the respondent’s side was that employees must remain at work until the orders are fulfilled.  No evidence was given of any action taken by the employer to comply with section 15 and to ensure that the health of employees is not put at risk due to long hours.  The purpose and intent of the OWT Act is that a full-time employee should expect to work a standard working week of up to 40 hours, to know their finish time at the start of their working day and to not work regular and excessive overtime. 

Section 16 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, Night Work

The section of the OWT Act concerned with night work provides that,

“night time” means the period between midnight and 7 a.m. on the following day;

“night work” means work carried out during night time;

“night worker” means an employee -

(a) who normally works at least 3 hours of his or her daily working time during night time,

and

(b) the number of hours worked by whom during night time, in each year, equals or exceeds 50 per cent. of the total number of hours worked by him or her during that year.

The respondent’s records show that, on three or four days a week, the complainant generally clocked in for work a few minutes before 4.00am and on one or two days a week, she started work at 3.00am.  On this basis, three or four hours of her daily shift was done at night.  At the hearing, Mr Smith said that the complainant worked one week in every three on night shift from 9.00pm until 7.00am.  However, in the working time records provided by the complainant for the period from September 20th 2019 until she finished working for the respondent in March 2020, there is no evidence that she started work on any day at 9.00pm and she consistently started at 3.00am or 4.00am.  As the complainant generally worked between 10 and 12 hours per day and, as she did not work 50% of her working time at night, I am satisfied that she was not a night worker within the legal meaning of that term.

Section 21 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, Public Holidays

An employee who is required to work on a public holiday is entitled to a paid day off within a month of the public holiday, or an additional day of annual leave or an additional day’s pay.

In the period from September 10th 2019 to March 13th 2020, there were four public holidays.  The records show that the complainant was on holidays for the week of the October public holiday and she was off work on Christmas Day.  On December 26th, she worked for 16 hours and on January 1st, she worked for 11 hours, not including breaks on either day. 

The complainant’s payslip for week 52 of 2019 is missing; however, her payslip for week 1 of 2020 shows that she was paid for working 55.5 hours that week, including the public holiday on January 1st.  She was also paid an extra day’s pay (14 hours) for working on that day.  Based on this evidence, I find that the complainant received her entitlement to an additional day’s pay for public holidays. 

CA-00039691-002:  Complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2002

Section 27(2) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (“the H&S Act”), provides that penalisation includes,

(a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2001), or the threat of suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

(b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

(c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

(d) imposition of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), and

(e) coercion or intimidation.

Section 27(3) provides that, an employer will not penalise an employee for actions described under six sub-headings, one of which, at subsection (c), is described as,

(c)            Making a complaint or representation to his or her safety representative or employer or the Authority, as regards any matter relating to safety, health or welfare at work[.]

In his submission, Mr Smith claimed that the complainant was penalised because she was injured at work, but I find no evidence of any retaliatory action on the part of the respondent because the complainant was ill.  In fact, it is apparent that the managers were unconcerned about the complainant’s health and that they did nothing in response to her claim that she was unwell.  At the hearing, she said that when she told the production manager that she didn’t want to work the long hours and that her health was being affected, she was told that if she didn’t like it, she could leave. 

In its seminal decision in O’Neill v Toni & Guy Blackrock Limited[8], the Labour Court considered the meaning of penalisation for the purpose of Section 27(3) of the H&S Act.  The Court held that, to make out a complaint of penalisation, a claimant must establish that the detriment complained of was imposed for having committed one of the acts protected by section 27(3).   

The complainant was not dismissed or threatened with dismissal, but she was told that she could leave if she didn’t accept the long hours she was required to work.  The failure to give any consideration to the complainant’s request to work 40 hours a week, and being told where the door is, seems to me to meet the definition of intimidation as intended by the H&S Act.  The complainant was attempting to exert her entitlement to safer working conditions.  It is not an easy decision for a foreign national in a rural town to move jobs and the effect of telling her that she could leave if she wasn’t happy was effectively telling her that she had very little choice but to keep working.  She did not contemplate simply going home after working eight hours, but, at a risk to her health and welfare, she continued to work up to 15 hours a day.  I am satisfied that, in the way she was intimidated into continuing to work excessively long hours, in contravention of section 27(3) of the H&S Act, the complainant was penalised.

Conclusions

I find that, in the period from September 10th 2019 until March 13th 2020, in the manner in which the complainant was paid an allowance of 5 cents per hour for working on Sundays, the respondent failed to comply with section 14 of the OWT Act.  I find also that the respondent breached section 15 of the OWT Act by putting the complainant under pressure to work excessively long hours.

I find that, contrary to section 27(3) of the H&S Act, the respondent penalised the complainant when she was intimidated into continuing to work excessively long hours.

Considering the issue of redress, I am guided by the principle established in Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen[9]to the effect that, where rights under EU law are infringed, redress should not only compensate for economic loss, but provide a deterrent against future breaches. 

I have decided that certain aspects of the complainant’s claims under the OWT Act are well founded.   In relation to the breach of section 14, the failure to pay a reasonable Sunday allowance, I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €2,000.  In relation to the breach of section 15, the failure to prevent the complainant from working in excess of 48 hours a week, I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €10,000.

I decide also that the complaint of penalisation is well founded and I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €3,000.

In summary, with respect to her complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 and the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, I direct the respondent to pay to the complainant total compensation of €15,000.

Sunday working, maximum working hours, penalisation