Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Eileen Kelly  McCarthy

Castlemartyr Community Council Company Limited by Guarantee

Representatives

  Appeared In Person

 Sean Scott Baird

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00047613-001

09/12/2021

On 9 December 2021, the Complainant, a Member of a Community Council submitted a number of documents to the WRC. These documents consisted of:

1 Equal Status Notification form dated December 7, 2001

2 Equal Status Notification form dated 6 November 2021.

These documents were accompanied by a 4-page handwritten correspondence to WRC.

The document referred to the complainant’s difficulty in the context of her role on a Community Council. She submitted that she believed that she had been discriminated against on family and disability grounds in relation to her participation in the Council business.

The Complainant attached the Community Council response to the ES1 form, recorded as December 1, 2021, which is worthy of mention at this stage. The Council disputed that the matter was a matter for the WRC as the Council was a voluntary community group and not an employer.

The Complainant submitted a comprehensive dossier of documents in advance of the hearing. These were shared with the Respondent.

I had some concern on reading this dossier. Many of the inclusions were undated and attributed to people not party to the case or whose relevance to the hearing was not immediately discernible.

On 14 November 2022, I wrote to the complainant and requested that she forward a chronological outline submission in the case with detail son witnesses she intended to call on or before November 17, 2022. I emphasised that I would not be able to accept documentation on the day of hearing.

The Complainant submitted a revised outline submission in the requested period, which was shared with the Respondent.

The Respondent did not provide an outline submission in response.

Both parties attended the hearing. The complainant was accompanied by a friend. The Respondent was accompanied by two Community Council members.

The Complainant gave evidence by affirmation and while two members of the Community Council took the oath, one member, Ms Orla Mc Govern, gave direct evidence.

 At the conclusion of the hearing, I required further clarification on whether this was a claim submitted by an individual or a group. I requested a specific email relied on by the complainant as a precursor to the ES1. This was promptly furnished. This was shared with the Respondent, who submitted comments on December 8, 2022.

On 9 December 2021. The Complainant, a lay litigant, submitted a complaint of discrimination to the WRC reliant on three submitted documents. These documents did not incorporate the WRC complaint form.

Clarification on composition of the complaint:

Given the statutory notification requirements under Section 21. of the Equal Status Act, 2000, I needed to take some time at hearing, to ascertain if I had a bona fides complaint before me?

I was also required to address the very strongly expressed viewpoint of the Respondent that this claim was wrongly directed at their Community Council.

Section 21 sets out the two-step approach necessary in submitting a complaint of discrimination under Equal Status Legislation. This is in place to encourage both parties to a dispute, who may, in fact, be strangers to each other in the context of a provision of services, time to seek to resolve matters through a record of the complaint, with provision for a response within an ES2 form, or equivalent.

Both the WRC and IHREC offer very clear guidance documents/ advisory notes to guide both parties in this situation.

The first step is a notification of the complaint via the ES1 form or equivalent document.

There is a clearly worded guidance for this in the WRC booklet “Guide to the Equal Status Complaint for the complainant “

“You must write to the respondent within 2 months of the alleged incident, setting out the nature of the complaint and saying that if you are not happy with their reply, you may seek a remedy under the Equal Status Acts. Your complaint is not valid unless this is done. “

The Guide to the Equal Status Act for the Respondent expands on the role and function of the Equal Status Acts

“These Acts make it unlawful to discriminate when providing goods and services. All services that are generally available to the public, whether provided by the State or the private sector are covered “

“If you want to reply to the notification, you should reply directly to the person making the complaint. The WRC provides form ES2 to help you do this ….”

Redress in respect of prohibited conduct.

21.— (1) A person who claims that prohibited conduct has been directed against him or her may, subject to this section, seek redress by referring the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission.

(1A) If the grounds for such a claim as is referred to in subsection (1) arise—

(a) on the gender ground, or

(b) in any other circumstances (including circumstances amounting to victimisation) to which the Gender Goods and Services Directive is relevant,

then, subject to subsections (2) to (7) and (8) to (11), the person making the claim may seek redress by referring the case to the Circuit Court instead of referring the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission under subsection (1) (and, if the case is referred to the Circuit Court, no further appeal lies, other than an appeal to the High Court on a point of law).]

(2) Before seeking redress under this section, the complainant—

(a) shall, within 2 months after the prohibited conducted is alleged to have occurred, or, where more than one incident of prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, within 2 months after the last such occurrence, notify the respondent in writing of—

(i) the nature of the allegation,

(ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act,

and

(b) may in that notification, with a view to assisting the complainant in deciding whether to refer the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commissionor, as the case may be, the Circuit Court], question the respondent in writing so as to obtain material information and the respondent may, if the respondent so wishes, reply to any such questions.

(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2) the date of notification is the date on which the notification is sent, unless it is shown that the notification was not received by the respondent.

The Complainant was dissatisfied by the response to the November ES1 notification   received from the Community Council on December 1, 2021. She proceeded to lodge another ES1 form on December 7, 2021, before lodging the instant complaint to the WRC dated 9 December 2021.

Section 21(4) has immediate relevance to this chronology, as my jurisdiction in the case is provided here.

4) The Director of the Workplace Relations Commissionor, as the case may be, the Circuit Court shall not investigate a case unless the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or the Circuit Court, as the case may be, is satisfied either that the respondent has replied to the notification or that at least one month has elapsed after it was sent to the respondent.

In applying a strict application of Section 21(4) to the complaint presented to WRC on 9 December 2021, I am permitted to investigate the circumstances surrounding the ES1 notification dated November 4 ,2021, sent November 6, 2021.

 I am satisfied that the Respondent furnished their response on December 1, 2021, notwithstanding that this constituted a rejection of the claim. I am satisfied that at least a month had passed since the ES1 was sent to the Respondent.

I am not permitted to investigate the circumstances of the ES1 dated December 7, 2021, as it is not compliant with the terms of Section 21(4) as outlined above.

  I recognise and accept that the complaint properly before the WRC is comprised of the 4-page document attached to ES1 sent on November 6, 2021.

I thank the parties for their candour in this preliminary issue.

Substantive case:

The Complainant has framed her complaint as a democratically elected member of the named Community Council. She has submitted that she has been discriminated against on family and disability grounds. This arose in the context or her being unable to attend the Council meeting times held on Tuesdays or Wednesdays at 8pm. The Complainant stated that she had study and family commitments at these times.

The Complainant submitted that the Council is registered under CRO and availed of public funding.

The Complainant raised this concern on behalf of herself and others and submitted that proposals to be accommodated on Zoom type platforms had been denied by the Council.

The Complainant submitted that Council members, who had expressed a difficulty in fulfilling the attendance commitment were “told to reconsider/resign their position “The Complainant expressed a dissatisfaction at the exclusionary rules.

The Complainant submitted that she had been discriminated against on family status and disability grounds. She explained that she was living with a Mental Health condition, details of which had been shared with Council leaders. This condition “often makes social interactions or the need to attend face to face meetings difficult “and “no reasonable accommodation has been made for anyone living with similar conditions “

The Complainant said that she had expressed a preference for external Mediation with the Community Council, but this had been refused or ignored.

On the hearing day, the complainant outlined that she was a resident in East Cork and a keen member of her local community council. She was the sole carer for her 3 children. She stated that she had a mental health condition of Aspergers and Borderline Personality Disorder, which constituted a disability for her.

Her case was that she had been prevented from receiving a service as she could not comply with the community council meeting times for family reasons. She had been refused an accommodation of an alteration of the hours of the meeting.

The Complainant expressed her preferred outcome and resolution in the case would be acceptance of her family status on the Community Council. The Complainant submitted a written chronology of her complaints dated November 16, 2022. She referred to this document throughout the hearing.

Evidence of the Complainant by affirmation:

The Complainant outlined that she had moved to live in the East Cork area in 2018. As a mother, she was struck by the lack of community facilities and had a strong “desire to improve “these.

She became a member of the executive of the community council some time during 2019. She understood that she was not bound to attend meetings and as a former chairman had told her to attend when she could. The Complainant submitted that she commenced Committee work on November 16, 2020. Meetings were online in respect to the Covid 19 pandemic.

She had concerns regarding procedural documents at the Council and engaged in a clarification exercise with the Council leaders, only to be told that the “Memo “stood.

On January 6, 2021, the Complainant proposed that the Council should have a new Constitution. This was not voted on or adopted. The AGM was cancelled and replaced by Zoom, which was a positive meeting, which permitted a communication of the complainants’ ideas for improvements in the area.

The Complainant took external legal advice and sought to assemble a subgroup within the committee.

The Complainant understood her ideas were met by some anxiety from a cohort of Council Members.

The Complainant proposed mediation following the April 2021 meeting. This was not accepted.

The Council meeting in May 2021, constituted the first face to face meeting of the community council as covid waned.

The Summer break followed, and the complainant experienced a difficulty in attending the autumn /winter schedule of meetings which were scheduled for a Tuesday / Wednesday evening at 8pm. She submitted that this meeting time conflicted with her disability, and she sought accommodation for an alteration of attendance times to 6pm, which was refused. The Complainant submitted that her partner worked as a chef and had 5 am starts, which placed pressure on her availability for meetings.

The Complainant confirmed that she had sent a personal email to the Chairman of the Council in November ,2021 to that end.

When the complainant was absent from meetings, she did not benefit from updates or minutes.

The Complainant submitted that she had been clearly informed that if she missed 3 consecutive meetings, she would be removed from the council.

She was disappointed that the Council had not responded to the ES1.

The Complainant recalled that an EGM had been called to amend the constitution of the council in April 2022.

During cross examination,

The Complainant accepted that the Community Council was a voluntary body, but affirmed her disappointment that her submissions on seeking procedural reviews were not supported. she understood that rules on attendance were fluid.

The Complainant confirmed that she had run for the position of Chair at the AGM of the Council in 2021 but was unaware if she held status as a current council member as she had not attended a meeting since the AGM. The complainant clarified that she had not resigned.

The Complainant answered the Respondents request for clarification on her attendance at meetings by affirming that the respondent was operating a service and it was impossible for her to attend meetings at 8pm. She had returned to full time online education.

The Complainant disputed that the Respondent had already accommodated council members via online and congregating after mealtimes.

The Complainant confirmed that she had neither attended nor voted at the meeting of October 16, 2021.

She confirmed that she had informed the previous chair of her “anxiety “in July 2021 during an online meeting.

The Complainant accepted that she had engaged in an extensive social media campaign and had attended a public meeting in a local establishment aside from her affiliation to the Council.

The Complainant described relations between the Council and her as “fractured “ She submitted that  the refusal of her request to alternate meeting times  to 6pm was discriminatory .She submitted that two other members insistence that this was” tea time” constituted a difference in treatment towards her as she had not been afforded an avenue by which to appeal .The Meeting did alter from Tuesday to Wednesday, but the time remained constant .

The Complainant clarified that her tenure as a Council member runs for 3 years to 2023.

Summary of email to the elected members of Castle martyr Community Council November 2, 2021

1 The complainant wrote this email on behalf of the families of a three-area grouping of which she was a member.

2 The Complainant sought support in obtaining information and funds held by a Sports Hall in addition to seeking support for the election of a new board/ joint venture in the management of those funds.

2A The Complainant sought support for compensation from the Diocese of Cloyne for removal of community facilities.

3 The complainant recounted a past endeavour to seek mediation with Castleberry and the Sports Hall group and called on community council members who held a conflict of interest linked to the Sports Hall group, not to be included in decision making.

The Complainant appended the response she had received from the Council Chairman dated 4 November 2021

1 The Chairman reminded the complainant that she was an elected member of the council and opened the council procedures on progressing issues to her.

2 The Complainant was invited to attend a Council meeting “if you have issues with other members of this council or feel the need to question their integrity, pleas have the decency to come and raise those issues to their face. 

3 The Respondent emphasised the objective of inclusivity and attendance at meetings. He wrote that “if you are unable to attend any meetings then you are unable to represent the residents to any significant degree and should consider if your position might be better used by someone else “

The chronology of the occurrences in this case places the compilation of the ES1 and its subsequent submission within days of this inter party correspondence.

The Respondent operates a Community Council and has denied the claims of discrimination directed at that Council.

The Respondent Chairman outlined the origin of the Community Council, comprised of 20-25 voluntary members, which met 10 times per year, attendance was not mandatory. He described the Council as “productive “. He submitted that the complainant had raised an unfair attack against the Council on social media but did not exhibit supporting documentation. He outlined that the complainant maintained an active presence in parallel community groups.

Overall, the Respondent adopted the position of surprise at having to attend a hearing in this matter and expressed a high level of bewilderment in that regard. The Respondent denied knowledge of the Complainants stated disability or request for reasonable accommodation.

He submitted that the Complainant had made an unsuccessful bid for Chair of the Council at the annual AGM in May 2021.

He outlined the Council aims and objectives to support the community, which were not encompassed in a formal mission statement. He distinguished this from the Complainants work in operating her own social media and community groups, which he said were at variance with the council aims and objectives.

He stated that the Council “actively chased diversity “

In addressing the claims before the Council, the Respondent outlined those relations between the Community Council and the Complainant “were hostile “

I have been requested to make a decision in the complaints of discrimination on family and disability grounds. In arriving at my decision, I have carefully considered both parties oral and written documents. I have reflected on the evidence adduced at hearing.

I have also had regard for the Complainant post hearing declaration of the inter party correspondence dated November 2, 2021, and the response dated 4 November 2021.

I have also had regard for the Respondents response, which incorporated an email the Council received from the complainant in October 2021.

I am unable to attend the meeting of October 19th due to previous educational commitments.

I am unable to attend mid-week evening meetings after 6pm for this reason. I am available, any day or weekend to attend meetings.

Can you advise what arrangements are in place for elected committee members who are unable to attend meetings due to various reasons?

Can you forward a copy of the minutes of last month's meeting or advise where they can be located?

The Complainant has referred to occurrences between the parties during the year 2022. These occurrences post date the complaint to the WRC, which is dated 9 December 2021.

The concept of Equal Treatment is a recognised legal principle. Article 18 TFEU.

Council Directive 2000/43, the Racial Equality Directive was adopted by the EU member states in June 2000.

Council Directive EC 2004/113 implemented the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.

In the Judy Walsh book, Equal Status Act, 2000-2011, at Chapter 3, emphasises that section 3 of the Equal Status Act, 2000 prohibits less favourable treatment of a person on any of the 9 grounds.

“It tackles detriments experienced by people “because of “age, civil status, disability, family, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, or membership of the travelling community “a later ground of housing need has been added to the legislation.

Ms Walsh outlines that:

“The prohibition of less favourable treatment is known as direct discrimination “This can be overt, but also unconscious or unintentional.

Section 3 of the Act provides:

 Discrimination (general).

3.— (1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur—

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

The complainant is placed on proof of this in Section 38A of the Act. The seminal case in this regard remains Mitchell v Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201

(2) A claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. (3) Only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, does the onus shift to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment. Wallace v. South-eastern Education and Library Board [1980] NI 38; [1980] IRLR 193 followed. (4) Gender imbalance in an interview board, although highly undesirable, does not, in itself, lead to prima facie finding of discrimination in every case. Nonetheless, such a practice is potentially discriminatory and can form part of the evidential chain on which a claim of discrimination could be made out. Gleeson v. Rotunda Hospital [2000] ELR 206 considered.

Burden of proof.

38A.— (1) Where in any proceeding’s facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.

(2) This section is without prejudice to any other enactment or rule of law in relation to the burden of proof in any proceedings which may be more favourable to the person.

The spirit and intention of both the Directive and the domestic legislation is that facilities exist to allow a complainant to make a complaint regarding prohibited conduct, which they believe they have experienced. While I fully appreciated the responsibilities held by the Council leaders in this case, where the wheels of the council were oiled by voluntarism and philanthropy. I am also struck by the clearly articulated exasperation uttered by the Respondents representatives in response to their perceived “tireless “attack adopted by the Complainant towards the integrity of the Community Council. They requested that I look behind the claim made and to capture their perceived reality that the complainant had not recovered from losing out to become chair of the Community Council at the 2021 AGM. In this, I was very much struck by the evidence submitted by Ms Orla Mc Govern.

The Complainant has vehemently denied that allegation throughout my encounter with her and asked to be heard on the facts she presented.

A prima facie case of direct discrimination establishes three things-based on the balance of probabilities.

1 The Complainant is covered by the relevant discriminatory ground.

2 There was specific treatment by the respondent.

3 the treatment of the complainant was less favourable than the treatment that was or would have been afforded to another person (the comparator) in similar circumstances.

1 Ground of Complaint:

There was a noted disparity in the context of the complaint in ES1 and on the material complaint to the WRC. The Complainant has sought an investigation by the WRC on discrimination on grounds of family and disability. The definition of both grounds is set out in Section 2 of the Act.

The Complainant has contended that she was excluded by the community council on family and disability grounds and therefore denied service when she was unable to attend meetings in Autumn 2021. The cognisable period for this claim is 6 months prior to December 9, 2021, i.e., June 10- December 9, 2021.

I accept that the Community Council constitutes a service under the Equal Status Act, 2000. It is not a club, but rather a professional service with facilities for cultural and recreational activities.

As Judy Walsh, in Equal Status Acts 2000-2011, details

This legislation does not provide an automatic right to obtain a particular item or service but rather that provision of goods and services is “cleared of bias “against members of social groupings.

“service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a) access to and the use of any place,

(b) facilities for—

(i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit, or financing,

(ii) entertainment, recreation, or refreshment,

(iii) cultural activities, or

(iv) transport or travel,

(c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and

(d) a professional or trade service,

What I have included here is a statement of the law that governs my investigation.

I now wish to summarise what I found as I listened to both outlines and both parties’ evidence in the case.

I accept that the complainant, while relatively new to the area, was strongly motivated by a change agenda and had immersed herself in affiliations with various support groups in the neighbourhood. She clearly held a defined vision that a tri partite arrangement with the family group, the community group and the sports hall was in the communities’ best interests. She sought to maximise the effectiveness of her elected position on the community council to steer that change agenda. For me, she exhibited a “converts zeal “and made a number of approaches personally and as a group member to effect that change with the Council. She was unsuccessful.

I also accept that the Respondent did not share the tri partite goal as it carried a long organisational memory of the obstacles to such a plan. Instead, the governance of the Organisation had changed in June 2021 and the Community Council had identified a different pathway forward.

The Community Council had a strong article of association and Operational Document. Unfortunately, these were silent on an Equality Policy for the Organisation complete with internal conflict resolution mechanisms.

I accept that the Complainant possessed a disability by means of her borderline personality disorder. I accept that she placed the respondent on notice of this condition but did not request a specific accommodation in that regard. Her request for an alteration of meeting times in October 2021 was linked to the overlap of commitments to education.

I am unable to attend the meeting of October 19th due to previous educational commitments.

I am unable to attend mid-week evening meetings after 6pm for this reason. I am available, any day or weekend to attend meetings.

Can you advise what arrangements are in place for elected committee members who are unable to attend meetings due to various reasons?

Can you forward a copy of the minutes of last month's meeting or advise where they can be located?

A very careful consideration of the chronology of the interparty communication during the cognisable period is loaded with the complainant advancing an ambitious change agenda that the overall Council seemed to struggle with against a stated position of intimidation by the approach adopted by the complainant.

I accept that a high level of rivalry and discord ran as a sub plot for both parties in this case.

I would have preferred if both parties had addressed this discord and rivalry privately.

I could not identify anywhere, where the complainant was excluded from the Council Meetings or “managed out “as she contended. I was struck that the complainant did not give herself time to reflect on what she had heard or read before forming a particular view that discrimination had occurred. The ES1 was directed at collective issues.

 Instead, I found a “clear bewilderment from the respondent “that the complainant had accelerated a social media campaign against them, yet, neither party exhibited remnants of that campaign.

The Complainant had begun to distance herself from the Council during the cognisable period of the claim. Her affiliations with parallel community groups seemed to get bolder and stronger as her affiliation with the community council faded. She made repeated and concerted efforts to effect change and resolve the historical legacy of the sports hall. The Respondent did not have mandate to pursue this path.

Instead, I found that the complainant lacked organisational knowledge of the Council rules on quorums and attendance. She had a very poor recollection of the sequence of events and a very strong recollection on the “hybrid “change she wished to see the Council participate in.

Both parties accepted that a chasm had descended on their relationship.

However, my role here is broader than social commentary and summation. For this complaint to succeeded at the primary stage of the burden of proof, I must be satisfied that the respondent directed specific treatment to the complainant and that treatment was less favourable that was or would have been given to another person in similar circumstances.

The comparator put forward by the complainant was the married couple who were accommodated to maintain their “protected teatime “when Meetings of the community council were scheduled at 8 pm.

I had some difficulty with these comparators. That difficulty, in the main emerged from the complainant’s reference to a group complaint rather than an individual complaint. The burden of proof refers to “a person”.

 I raised this with the parties at hearing and referenced and canvassed views on the former Equality Tribunal case,

 Gloria (Ireland) Lesbian and Gay Choir v Cork International Choral Festival ltd DEC -S2008-078.

 Here, the former Equality Officer held that the choir was an unincorporated association of persons, which did not have locus standi to proceed in claim of discrimination on sexual orientation grounds in respect of the respondent’s removal of the description of Gloria as Irelands gay and lesbian choir from promotional material for a festival.

While the term person is usually interpreted broadly to include corporate and unincorporated bodies, I am satisfied that a contrary intention is evident from the Equal Status Acts ………. I am therefore of the view that the legislative intent in this regard was to protect individuals and not bodies from discrimination.

I am grateful to the complainant for her full disclosure of the email referenced on the ES1 but not exhibited on earlier submissions by her.

This email dated November 2, 2021, commenced with:

“I am writing to Castlemartyr Community Council on behalf of the families of Castlemartyr Mogeely and Ladysbridge group to which I am a member. This letter made several proposals for change, through a motion to the Council meeting on November 10, 2021, predicated on “We “rather than “I” and sought a response by November 11, 2021

The Council response scripted by the Chairman was a focussed and framed as a restatement of the complainant’s role as a council member “It is not this committee practice to trade emails with members, who for which ever reason, do not attend meetings “

The Complainant was invited to address her concerns at the Council.

I have found that the complainant adopted an overly zealous response to this email from the Council. She immediately presumed that it was a personal attack on her and took recourse in the ES1 form forwarded to the Respondent some two days later and framed as a collective complaint.

I understand that the Respondent did not understand the significance of the ES1 form and did not take advice on how best to address this. They framed their response in a total rejection of the complainants stated position.

The Respondent, a service provider should immediately consider training in Equality issues.

However, overall, I am satisfied that the Complainant sought a collective change to the operation of Castlemartyr Community Council and that was her sole objective. She approached the Council to become a conduit for that radical change, rather than as the body she had been elected to. I found this to be a grave error on her behalf. The Respondent interpreted this approach as “an attempted coup d’état”.

I accept that she sought an amended time for meetings, but she did not link this to her disability or family status, but rather active ongoing education. This was at variance with the complainants own evidence at hearing.

Instead, the complainant is seeking to advance collective complaints which do not fit within the provisions of the Equal Status Act, where the complaint must emanate from an individual, “a person” rather than a collective grouping.

 For information, the Respondent is allowed to comprise of an individual or a group. The Complainant has demonstrated that she was actively engaged in community change agenda and has mistaken this as an individual complaint of discrimination.

In all the circumstances of the case the complainant does not hold the locus standi to advance these complaints.  She is unable to secure the burden of proof necessary in the case. The complaint of discrimination on grounds of disability cannot succeed through lack of locus standi. The complaint on grounds of family status cannot succeed through lack of Locus standi. Gloria, applied.

Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.

The Complainant has approached this case as an active member of a collective community grouping. I have found that she has framed her complaint in the vein of that collective and as a consequence, she lacks the locus standi to advance her case as a “person “under the Equal Status Acts.

The complaint of discrimination on family status must fail. The Complaint of discrimination on disability grounds must fail.

The complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent on either ground.

Locus standi in an Equal Status Case