Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Detective Garda

An Garda Síochana

Representatives

James Mc Evoy, Work Matters Ireland

Brian Conroy B.L. instructed by the Chief State Solicitor's Office

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00052091-001

04/08/2022

CA-00046044-001 Claim pursuant to Section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended).  

The Complainant claims that he was discriminated against by the Respondent in relation to his terms and conditions of employment on the grounds of disability within the meaning of those terms in the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. He also claimed that he had been subjected to victimisation within the meaning of that term in the same Acts. The Complainant made no claim for financial loss but rather sought a recognition of and compensation for the discrimination and victimisation allegedly suffered.

The Complainant provided written submissions and further oral submissions were made on behalf of the Complainant at the hearing as follows:

The Complainant has been employed by An Garda Siochana since 2007. He was appointed to the rank of Detective Garda in 2017.

The Complainant has a condition which affects the inner hear. The Complainant has had this condition since his early teens and it was known to the Respondent at the commencement of the employment relationship and hence at the time when he applied and was assessed for motorcycle use.

The Respondent, on the advice of the office of the Assistant Chief Medical Officer (ACMO), disallowed the Complainant access to a motorcycle while carrying out his duties.

The Complainant, along with a number of his colleagues, had successfully completed a motorcycle training course, provided by their employer, in September 2013. As part of this process each candidate underwent a hearing test, which assessed hearing levels only. The test did not assess any risk associated with exposure to sound, of either firearms or motorcycle engines, for any of the members. This test is referred to in the Garda Code, as a “Baseline Audiogram”; the purpose of which is to provide a static reference point for future audiometric tests for a specific individual to allow a trained medical professional document any changes in hearing capabilities over time. It is used to monitor whether or not an employee's hearing level is decreasing or being maintained, so that any hearing loss can be detected early. Such a test does not measure the risk posed to the individual by exposure to noise.

Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Complainant is at any greater risk than his colleagues, when exposed to the sound of motorcycle engine noise.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Complainant’s ability to use a motorcycle is any way reduced because of his disability and this has not been raised as a concern by the Respondent.

It was alleged that the denial by the Respondent to allow the Complainant access to the use of motorcycles in the line of duty, is an act of discrimination. This is a cause of stress and embarrassment to him, particularly in the company of his colleagues who are aware of his qualifications.

Since his appointment in November 2017, the Complainant has sought but has been refused access to the use of a motorcycle to successfully carry out the duties of his role.

This decision was made on the advice of the Respondent's Assistant Chief Medical Officer despite information from the Complainant’s treating Consultant, that the condition might act to protect the Complainant from noise induced hearing loss.

This decision of the ACMO was appealed by the Complainant. The ACMO upheld his own decision.

The Complainant requested that the matter be referred to an external specialist, to provide an expert view to facilitate a fully informed decision on his use of a motorcycle. However, despite several requests, and assurances from the employer that this would be considered, there was no progress, and the most recent requests for information went unanswered.

The Complainant’s colleagues are now very aware, and unnecessarily so, of his condition, which is an added cause of stress to him.

Furthermore the Complainant contended that the unexplained failure of the Respondent to attend to this matter in line with internal policy and procedure is a form of Victimisation by the Respondent for his raising the complaint, which is now ongoing for a number of years.

The Complainant has a disability as defined under the Employment Equality Acts. His complaint is that the Respondent has discriminated against him, because of that disability. Furthermore, the Complainant alleged that the Respondent victimised him for making a Complaint in relation to that discrimination.

The Complainant has been treated differently and less favourably than his colleagues, who do not have a disability, and consequently has been subjected to direct discrimination by his employer.

The Respondent has not raised any concern in relation to the Complainant’s ability to drive a motorcycle. The issue is the Respondent considers he is at greater risk of noise induced hearing loss, because of his disability. However, he has not been in assessed in this regard and there is no medical comment or evidence provided to support this view. This decision was first made in 2013, when the Complainant underwent an Audiogram test. The decision was unchanged following a request to the CMO in 2017 and again in 2018, following an unsound appeal process conducted by the ACMO, in a review of his own decision.

The Labour Court has held that that for an employer to form a bona fide belief that the employee was not fully capable of performing the duties for which they were employed an employer would normally be required to make adequate enquires to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee’s capacity. No such inquiries were made and requests for independent medical examination have been ignored.

The Respondent has made its discriminatory decision to disallow the Complainant the use of motorcycles, based simply on the fact that he has a disability. The Respondent has failed to ensure that the Complainant was properly and correctly assessed in relation to his condition and the noise produced by motorcycle engines, in order to make an informed decision. Hence, he has been denied access to an aspect of his role and to develop additional skills.

The Respondent failed to conduct an impartial Appeal of the CMO’s decision in relation to his use of motorcycles. The Respondent failed to engage with the Complainant’s treating consultant, in a timely manner. The Respondent failed correctly to interpret and act on communications from the Complainant’s treating consultant.

There is no evidence to support the Respondents position. Any information in this regard contradicts the view of the Respondent. The Complainant maintains that for the Respondent to exclude him from using a motorcycle cannot be justified and is an act of Discrimination.

It was submitted that the manner in which the Respondent has treated the Complainant’s complaint amounts to Victimisation by virtue of the failure to acknowledge his Complaint and engage with the internal Dispute Resolution Process together with unexplained and excessive time periods which have occurred where no communication has been forthcoming from the Respondent.

The Respondent provided a written submission and oral submissions were made by counsel at the hearing as follows:

The Complainant, has been a member of An Garda Síochána (AGS) since 2007.  He underwent a medical assessment in the context of his recruitment and was passed fit to enter training at the Garda College notwithstanding a significant hearing impairment in his left ear.

The Complainant suffered chronic infection and associated discharge from his left ear as a child.  He had mastoidectomy surgery carried out in the Mater Hospital at the age of 14 for cholesteatoma.  He had significant middle ear surgery – known as a middle ear ossicular reconstruction - carried out on his left ear in the Mater Hospital in 2014.  Upon audiological testing in November 2017 the Complainant was found to have moderately severe conductive hearing loss involving all frequencies in his left ear.

The Complainant was assessed by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of AGS on a number of occasions beginning in 2013 with regard to his fitness for firearm duties.  On each occasion he has been passed fit for firearms duties on the basis that ear protection is worn for such duties, that noise exposure on firearms duties is episodic, and that firearms duties occur very infrequently – approximately 3 times per year.

The Complainant first sought clearance for motorcycle duties in 2013.  The then CMO - while permitting the Complainant to undergo motorcycle training – took the view that he was unfit for more regular motorcycle duties on the basis of the risk to his health and safety in light of his pre-existing condition.          

The Complainant was appointed to the rank of Detective Garda in September 2017, and thereafter sought to be reassessed as to his fitness for motorcycle duties.  The Complainant was referred by the Assistant Chief Medical Officer (the “ACMO”) for formal audiological testing and for review by a Consultant ENT Surgeon who furnished a report date the 30th of November 2018 including  audiological testing results. That Consultant ENT Surgeon noted that the Complainant had suffered chronic infection and associated discharge from his left ear as a child.  He had mastoidectomy surgery carried out in the Mater Hospital at the age of 14 for cholesteatoma.  He had significant middle ear surgery – known as a middle ear ossicular reconstruction - carried out on his left ear in the Mater Hospital in 2014.  The Consultant ENT Surgeon noted that, upon audiological testing in November 2017 the Complainant was found to have moderately severe conductive hearing loss involving all frequencies in his left ear. The Consultant ENT Surgeon concluded that, having regard to the fact that an earplug would be in place only for a short period of time during firearms training, there was no contraindication to the Complainant participating in the firearms training course and using earplugs as part of an earplug / muff regime.

On the 18th of December 2017 The ACMO concluded that the Complainant was fit for firearms training in the circumstances.  

The ACMO separately considered the Complainant’s fitness for regular motorcycle duties.  The Complainant was not considered fit for motorcycle duties given that the noise exposure would not be an episodic short-term exposure as would arise in firearms training.  The ACMO noted that the standard hearing protection for driving motorcycles is the wearing of earplugs and a requirement to wear earplugs for a continuous period is considered a risk factor.  The ACMO concluded in September 2018 that the Complainant remained unfit for motorcycle duties.  Reliance was placed on the fact that – unlike firearms duties – motorcycle duties would involve regular daily / weekly, fairly continuous noise exposure.  These conclusions were set out in an internal letter dated 11 September 2018 and subsequently relayed by HR to the Complainant on the 8th of October 2018.

On 27th of May 2019, the Complainant submitted a communication confirming his wish to appeal the decision deeming him unfit for motorcycle duties.

In response to a request for information from the ACMO regarding the precise nature of the Complainant’s motorcycle duties, a report dated 28th of  May 2019 was submitted by a Detective Superintendent providing a narrative regarding the nature of the Complainant’s duties.

The Complainant’s Consultant Otalaryngologist, provided a letter dated the 11th August 2020.  The letter confirmed that the Consultant felt that “the conductive hearing loss on the left would actually protect against any noise induced component”. In light of this letter, the ACMO wrote to the Complainant’s consultant in September 2020 outlining from an occupational health perspective the concerns arising.  Following this correspondence, the Complainant’s consultant wrote to the ACMO on the 19th of November 2020.  He stated that he had reviewed the information provided and appreciated the complexity of the situation from an occupational health perspective and an otologic perspective.  He noted his hypothesis that the conductive component in the left ear actually protects the Complainant from noise induced hearing loss. He concluded:

“I would agree that prolonged noise exposure is more likely to result in noise induced hearing loss.  I will leave any final occupational health up to your good self.” 

On the 27th of January 2021 the ACMO to confirmed that his advice continued to be the same as given on the 11th of September 2018. 

It was submitted that the Complainant had not satisfied the requirement to identify a comparator or that he had identified the wrong comparator. Reliance was placed on the decision in Minister v Education and Science v A Worker EDA087

The Respondent contended that Complainant is not deemed capable of undertaking the duties at issue. To the extent that the Complainant may establish that he is being denied experience in relation to his position by being deemed unfit for regular motorcycle duties (which was denied), it was contended that the situation falls squarely within the exclusion in Section 16(1)(b) of the 1998 Act.  An extensive medical assessment has taken place and it has been concluded that the Complainant is not medically capable of undertaking motorcycle duties because of the risk to his hearing from the continuous noise exposure involved in such duties. The Complainant has not adduced any satisfactory medical evidence to rebut this conclusion, where his treating doctor expressly deferred to the judgement of the ACMO in this respect.

It is well established that Section 16(1)(b) can provide a complete defence to a claim of discrimination on the disability ground if it can be shown that the employer formed the bona fide belief that the complainant was not fully capable of performing the duties for which he or she were employed. The Labour Court has stressed that, before coming to that view, the employer would “normally be required to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee's capacity”: Humphries v Westwood Fitness Club [2004] E.L.R. 296, 300.

The Court (whose decision - EED 7/2003 - was upheld by Judge Dunne in the Circuit Court) went on to say:

“The nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer should ensure that he or she is in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee's condition and that the employee is given fair notice that the question of his or her dismissal for incapacity is being considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the employer's decision. In practical terms this will normally require a two-stage enquiry, which looks firstly at the factual position concerning the employee's capability including the degree of impairment arising from the disability and its likely duration. This would involve looking at the medical evidence available to the employer either from the employee's doctors or obtained independently. Secondly, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable, section 16(3) of the Act requires the employer to consider what, if any, special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable. The section requires that the cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. Finally, such an enquiry could only be regarded as adequate if the employee concerned is allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level and is allowed to present relevant medical evidence and submissions.”

In Shannon Regional Fisheries Board v. A Worker EDA 18/2013, the Labour Court said that the general principles set out in Humphries require an employer to make a bona fide and informed decision concerning a disabled employee's capabilities before concluding that he or she is unable to perform the duties of their employment. The test was an objective one “to be applied by reference to the range of responses to be expected of a hypothetical reasonable employer, faced with similar circumstances, seeking to reach a fair and balanced conclusion having full regard to the right of a disabled person to work and earn a livelihood within the constraints occasioned by their disability”.

It was submitted that, on any view, the Respondent had satisfied the criteria set out in the case law.  The Complainant’s fitness was assessed on multiple occasions by the Respondent.  The ACMO referred the Complainant for formal audiological testing, sought the opinion of an ENT Surgeon, and engaged with the Complainant’s treating surgeon.  The bona fide conclusion reached by the ACMO that the Complainant was not fit for regular motorcycle duties is not reasonably capable of being set aside.  It was noted that in this respect, there is no countervailing medical evidence, where the Complainant’s Specialist expressly noted the complex nature of the issues arising and deferred to the ACMO in relation to the occupational health issue as to whether the Complainant was fit to carry out the duties.

As regards a potential claim in relation to Reasonable Accommodation the Respondent submitted that no reasonable accommodation was available which would have permitted the Complainant to carry on regular motorcycle duties safely. The Respondent cited Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63

It was submitted that the Complainant had failed to satisfy the requisite burden of proof as provided for in Section 85A. In this regard the Respondent cited

Graham Anthony & Company Limited v Mary Margetts EDA 038

Valpeters v Melbury Developments Ltd [2010] 21 ELR 64:

Posladek v Applegreen Petrogas Ltd ADJ-00038045

With regard to the claim of victimisation the Respondent noted that In his written submissions, the Complainant made a sweeping complaint of victimisation, without identifying any specific incident of victimisation.  The Respondent submitted that there is simply no evidence to substantiate the allegation of victimisation.  The Complainant’s medical review was dealt with fairly and thoroughly, as is attested to by the fact that the ACMO took the time to liaise with the Complainant’s treating doctor.  There is no evidence of any form of penalty or other form of retribution being exacted against the Complainant arising out of his complaint.  The complaint of victimisation it was contended is a baseless assertion. 

The timeline of the relevant events and the correspondence were not in dispute albeit that each party sought to interpret the events in accordance with their respective points of view. The Complainant’s representative clarified in oral submissions at the hearing that the issue of the provision or otherwise of reasonable accommodation was not for determination in the present application but rather that the Respondent, in its decision not to permit the Complainant to use a motorcycle, discriminated against the Complainant on the grounds of disability in that his disability, it was contended, was not such as to render him unfit for those duties and/or that the process whereby that decision was reached by the Respondent was discriminatory. It was further contended that the delay in processing the Complainant’s “appeal” against that decision constituted victimisation.

The Respondent denied any discrimination and relied primarily on Section 16 (1) and contended that the process whereby the decision was reached was fully fair and lawful. It was contended that there was no evidence of any victimisation of the Complainant by the Respondent.  

Section 8 (1) (b) of the Acts prohibits discrimination against an employee in relation to conditions of employment.

Section 6(1) states that discrimination: -

“shall be taken to occur where

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as “discriminatory grounds”) which-

(i)    exists,

(ii)   existed but no longer exists;

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned”

Section 6 (2) sets out the grounds in respect of which discrimination, as defined above is prohibited. Of relevance to the present case is ground (g) the “Disability Ground” which is set out as follows:

“(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”)”

Even where discrimination on the disability ground exists Section 16 provides a defence to any such discrimination. The provision where relevant, is as follows:

“(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring any person to recruit or promote an individual to a position, to retain an individual in a position, or to provide training or experience to an individual in relation to a position, if the individual—

(…)

(b) is not (or, as the case may be, is no longer) fully competent and available to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, the duties attached to that position, having regard to the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be, performed”

The Medical Issues

Several letters were submitted throughout the process from the Complainant’s Consultant Otolaryngologist/Head and Neck Surgeon. The latter wrote directly to the ACMO on the 19th of November 2020 as follows:

“I have reviewed the information provided and appreciate the complexity of the situation from an occupational health perspective and an otologic perspective. I feel there is no current evidence of noise induced hearing loss on [the Complainant]’s audiogram. I would hypothesis[e] that the conductive component in the left ear actually protects him from noise induced hearing loss.

I would agree that prolonged noise exposure is more likely to result in noise induced hearing loss. I will leave any final occupational health up to your good self”

Subsequently on the 13th of July 2021 the Complainant’s consultant stated that his opinion (as above) is hypothetical and that the issue as to whether the Complainant can or cannot ride a motorcycle lies outside of his expertise, and that it is best to seek the

“input of an occupational health physician who has experience in measuring the noise generated by a motorcycle engine and potential effects on hearing protection when wearing a helmet”.

The ACMO in his evidence given on affirmation, accepted that the condition of the left ear was such that the hearing loss was stable and further that motorcycle noise did not present a significant risk of exacerbating the pre-existing hearing in that ear. Whilst he did have a residual concern regarding a possible risk presented by wearing ear plugs where the left ear was already prone to accumulations of fluid, he clarified that his principal concern was and remains the risk to the normal - right - ear in that any hearing loss to that ear would be more serious in the case of a person who had pre-existing damage to the left ear. He made a distinction as between firearms training and riding a motorcycle. In the case of firearms training the noise would be of a short duration and special precautions had also been suggested and implemented to mitigate the risk of hearing loss by standing to the extreme right of the firing range and wearing double ear protection. However, when using a motorcycle, the noise is not intermittent but constant for the duration of the use of the vehicle and this is so even where the duties of the Unit where the Complainant serves, only involves intermittent or occasional use of motorcycles. Thus, although the use of a motorcycle was not regular in the unit to which the Complainant is attached (unlike other units where it might be very regular) he maintained that unlike with firearms training, which is predictable and can be regulated and controlled in the manner prescribed, the ACMO has no way of managing or monitoring the intermittent and unpredictable operational use of a motorcycle and in particular the duration of such use.   

In cross examination it was put to the ACMO that there was no actual increased risk to the right ear by riding a motorcycle with the usual ear protection beyond that presented to any other person. He accepted that this was the case, but he regarded as self-evident that any risk to the right ear where the left was already damaged rendered the use of a motorcycle more hazardous for this particular Complainant in that any potential hearing loss in his unaffected right ear would have a far greater impact upon him.

It is clear from the documentation on file that the ACMO consulted fully with the Complainant’s specialist and there is no evidence that any information provided by the latter was disregarded. The Complainant’s specialist proffered a hypothesis that the condition of the left ear would in fact protect against noise exposure. However he also made two important concessions. Firstly, he accepted that prolonged noise exposure is more likely to result in noise induced hearing loss. Secondly, he indicated that he would leave any final occupational health related decisions to the ACMO.

The ACMO dealt with the above issues in his evidence. He explained that his concerns for the Complainant related not to his left ear but to the risk of hearing loss to his right ear. He explained that he was unable to measure or predict the time-period when the Complainant would or might use a motorcycle even though such use was not constant but rather was intermittent. Finally he clarified that his professional medical opinion, that the risk to the Complainant was too great, was based on his expertise and experience as an occupational health physician - a discipline to which the Complainant’s specialist deferred as he does not himself specialise in this area of medicine.

It is most significant that no further medical evidence was submitted by or on behalf of the Complainant. This being the case, the Complainant nonetheless sought to challenge the decision taken on the basis that there was no evidence of increased risk to the Complainant but such a challenge was not based on independent expert opinion from another occupational health specialist. In such circumstances I do not accept that the ACMO was obliged to permit a review of his decision since no medical opinion taking issue with this decision was put forward by or on behalf of the Complainant.

The Complainant’s case had three essential limbs:

1. That medical information was ignored or misconstrued and

2. That the ACMO wrongly reviewed his own decision.

I find that all medical information touching or concerning the Complainant including all of the information provided by the Complainant’s doctor (with whom the ACMO consulted) , was considered and taken into account.

I find that the ACMO was obliged to review his decision given that his function was to provide expert occupational health advice to the Respondent to enable the latter fully to comply with its duty of care to ensure the health and safety of its serving members. The decision made by the ACMO was ultimately one made by an expert in occupational health and the Complainant’s specialist (who was not an expert in this area) specifically deferred to the expertise of the ACMO with regard to that decision. No further challenge was made to that decision by any medical expert acting on behalf of the Complainant. Accordingly, the issue of an appeal or a referral of the matter to another medical expert does not arise since there was no conflicting expert evidence of an occupational health nature in that the Complainant did not seek, obtain or communicate any medical evidence to challenge the occupational health decision made by the ACMO.

For the reasons stated, I find that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Complainant in the manner alleged.

3. Victimisation

The Complainant contended that the Respondent victimised the Complainant by delaying the processing of his challenge to the decision of the ACMO.  

Section 74 subsection (2) of the Acts defines victimisation as follows:

“For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a complainant,

(c) an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

(d) the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

(e) an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

(f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

(g) an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”

Victimisation is a stand-alone cause of action which requires specific proofs in that there must be evidence that the alleged adverse treatment occurred as a reaction to any of the situations listed at (a) to (g) of Section 74 (2). In the present case the Complainant sought to challenge the opinion of the ACMO but in so doing he did not specifically allege that the decision was allegedly discriminatory, nor did he threaten proceedings or give notice of his intention to do so. The Complainant initiated his initial challenge by communication dated the 27th of May 2019 stating “I wish to confirm that I wish to appeal the decision deeming me unfit for motorcycle duties”. The Complainant subsequently submitted a more formal internal complaint on the 29th of June 2021. The text of these communication does not appear to engage any of the paragraphs of Section 74 (2) and in particular (a), (b) or (g) which are the most apposite to the present case.  

If the foregoing interpretation is overly restrictive and the Complainant’s actions can be interpreted as engaging Section 74 (2) (a) and/or (b) and/or (g), a consideration of whether there was “adverse treatment would be required. The term ‘adverse treatment’ is not defined in the Employment Equality Acts. Although there is no express mention of motivation or intention in the section, the Labour Court in the case of ESB International v MumtazEDA1935,has indicated that the process of assessing liability under this provision “involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment”. As to what has been held to constitute adverse treatment, a review of the decisions made where adverse treatment has been found to have taken place reveals a common theme where the impugned conduct involved the taking of a positive detrimental act by the employer.  Such conduct has included the unilateral alteration of terms of employment, an alteration to the location of employment, the withdrawal or curtailment of benefits, the making of detrimental remarks or comments about the employee or unfairly questioning his/her qualifications or, in extreme cases, dismissing the employee. None of these occurred in the present case. 

In the present case the sole basis of the alleged adverse treatment is a delay in processing and finalising the Complainant’s challenge to the adverse medical assessment. I find that If there was a delay, the same cannot reasonably be attributed either directly or by inference to a deliberate act or failure to act constituting “a reaction to” the raising of the an equality complaint or a threat to initiate proceedings within the confines of victimisation as defined by the Employment Equality Acts.

In summary, I find that the case for victimisation as contended for by the Complainant does not meet the requirements of Section 74 subsection (2). 

In such circumstances I find that the Complainant was not victimised.

The Respondent did not discriminate against the Complainant

The Respondent did not victimise the Complainant

Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended) Minister v Education and Science v A Worker EDA087 – Section (8), Section (6), Section 16(1)(b) - Humphries v Westwood Fitness Club [2004] E.L.R. 296 - Shannon Regional Fisheries Board v. A Worker EDA 18/2013 - Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63 - Graham Anthony & Company Limited v Mary Margetts EDA 038 - Valpeters v Melbury Developments Ltd [2010] 21 ELR 64 - Posladek v Applegreen Petrogas Ltd ADJ-00038045 – Victimisation – Section 74 Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended)