Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Leon  O'Connor

Marsh & Mclennon Companies Inc

Representatives

Self 

A&L Goodbody LLP

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00054594-001

16/01/2023

The Complainant submitted a complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2021 on 16 January 2023.

On his complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that he had been discriminated against by the Respondent on the religious ground.

The narrative statement in the complaint form includes the following:

“My complaint for breach of employment equality legislation is noted against the Irish Government and affiliated worldwide international Governments who on religious grounds have pursued a highly personalised campaign against me due to my close association with the spiritual workings of the universe and the fact that a virus (COVID 19) emanated out of a valid legal case which I tried to bring before the Irish courts against my employer …”

The Respondent submits that the complaint should be dismissed by the WRC pursuant to Section 77A of the EE Acts which provides that the Director General of the WRC may dismiss a claim at any stage if of the opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter. 

The Complainant alleges in his complaint that the Respondent discriminated against him on the grounds of religion by “enabling, facilitating and carrying into effect directly highly illegal and unethical campaigns” against him which, he alleges, are being orchestrated by “bandit western world powerbroker governments” due to his “close association with the spiritual workings of the universe and the fact that a virus (Covid-19) eminated [sic] out of a valid legal case” he brought against a former employer. The Complainant further states that he has made correspondence available to an Garda Síochána due to the “criminal nature of allegations and spiritually criminal agendas”.

The Respondent submits that the complaint is clearly frivolous, without merit, has no legal basis and has no realistic chance of succeeding and should not be entertained by the WRC. The Complainant has not identified, in his WRC complaint form or otherwise, what religious belief he purports to have. Further it is clear from his correspondence to the Respondent, included with his complaint, that he never identified that he had a religious belief and/or what that religious belief was at the relevant time. It is submitted that permitting this complaint to go to hearing would be a misuse of both the WRC and the Respondent’s time and resources.

It is further submitted that the Complainant is, from all appearances, a serial litigant who has previously made a total of 12 complaints to the WRC and one complaint to the Labour Court in which decisions have been issued, against 13 separate companies of a similarly frivolous nature this year alone. We further understand that the Complainant has not attended any of the hearings scheduled by the WRC or the Labour Court to hear those complaints. This once again emphasises the vexatious nature of his complaint against the Respondent which on the face of it is purely intended to be a burden on the time and resources of the Respondent and the WRC and is not a complaint of substance or merit.

Subsection 77(4)(b) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2021 (the Acts) defines the term “respondent” as the person who is alleged to have discriminated against the complainant.  In his complaint form, the Complainant names Marsh & Mclennon Companies Inc as the Respondent. 

However, in the narrative setting out his complaint, as cited earlier in this decision, the Complainant alleges that: “My complaint for breach of employment equality legislation is noted against the Irish Government and affiliated worldwide international Governments who on religious grounds have pursued a highly personalised campaign against me due to my close association with the spiritual workings of the universe …”.  The Complainant does not allege discrimination on the religious ground against the Respondent named in the Complainant form.

Subsection 77A (1) of the Acts provides that the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission “may dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter”. It is clear that for a complaint to be dismissed as misconceived under Section 77A (1) of the Employment Equality Acts, the Director General must be satisfied that the complaint is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the legislation, or that there is no arguable cause of action or finally, that it is entirely unfounded.  

It is clear from the complaint form submitted in relation to this complaint, that the Complaint is alleging religious discrimination against the Irish Government and numerous unspecified entities which are not named as the Respondent to the complaint.

I note that Birmingham J. provided a legal definition of “frivolous” in Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner [2012] IEHC 499, where he held that: “frivolous, in this context does not mean only foolish or silly, but rather a complaint that was futile, or misconceived or hopeless in the sense that it was incapable of achieving the desired outcome”.  I am of the view that this complaint is clearly encompassed by the legal definition of frivolous articulated by Birmingham J. in Nowak. 

I further note In J. O’N -v- S McD & ors [2013] IEHC 135, Birmingham J, in considering applications made by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and as being frivolous and/or vexatious, described the words “frivolous” and “vexatious” as follows:

“…the words “frivolous” and “vexatious” are terms of art, they are legal terms and they are not used in a pejorative sense. They merely mean that the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of succeeding and that, because there is no reasonable chance of success, it is frivolous to bring the case. By the same token it imposes a hardship on the defendant if he has to expend time, effort and money in defending an action which cannot succeed and that is regarded as vexatious…”

In dismissing the plaintiff’s case, Birmingham J stated as follows:

“…In my view the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of succeeding against the first named defendant and it would be oppressive to require the defendant to have to take on the burden of defending proceedings which are fundamentally misconceived…”

I also note the decision in Goode Concrete v. CRH plc [2012] IEHC 116 where, at para. 36, it was stated: -

“A plaintiff's right of access to the Courts is not absolute and the Court has jurisdiction to prevent the right being abused by, for example, dismissing a case for inordinate delay or as frivolous, vexatious or bound fail in order to prevent injustice to a defendant (see Barry v Buckley [1981] IR 306).”

In light of all of the above, I am satisfied that this complaint is misconceived.  Therefore, I dismiss this complaint in accordance with section 77A (1) of the Employment Equality Acts.

I am satisfied that this complaint is misconceived, and I dismiss this complaint in accordance with Section 77A (1) of the Employment Equality Acts.

Misconceived complaint.