UDD2433

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00040744 (CA-00051983-003)

BACKGROUND:

The Employer appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 16 November 2023 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2015. A Labour Court hearing took place on 31 July 2024.

The following is the Decision of the Court:

DECISION:

This is an appeal on behalf of BWG Foods UC (‘the Respondent’) from a decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00040744/CA-00051983-003, dated 6 October 2023) under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (‘the Act’). Notice of Appeal was received in the Court on 16 November 2023. The Court heard the appeal in Dublin on 31 July 2024 along with two connected appeals: UD/23/165, under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, and PW/23/120, under the Payment of Wages Act 1991.

Preliminary Issue

A preliminary issued was raised at the commencement of the hearing on behalf of the Respondent to the effect that the within complaint is statute barred. It is submitted by the Respondent that Mr Eldic’s (‘the Complainant’) employment with it terminated on 28 January 2022 but that his complaint under the Act was not received by the Workplace Relations Commission until 28 July 2022 i.e. one day outside the statutory six-month period allowed.

It is accepted by the Complainant that his complaint falls outside the initial six-month limitation period specified in section 8(2)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. However, the Complainant seeks an extension of time as provided for in section 8(2)(b) of the Act of 1977 where reasonable cause for the delay in referring a complaint has been established. The Complaint relies on the following grounds in support of his application to extend time:

• Following his dismissal on 28 January 2022, he availed himself of the Respondent’s internal appeals procedure, the outcome of which did not issue until 8 March 2022;
• He was disappointed with the outcome of the internal appeal and was “in a difficult mental state”;
• He had to allocate time to find alternative employment;
• He was preparing for the hearing before an Adjudication Officer of a separate complaint that he had initiated in 2021 and which came on for hearing on 4 August 2022;
• He had to consult with a solicitor, engage with the Workplace Relations Commission and familiarise himself with the legislation;
• He made a GDPR data subject request to the Respondent which he alleges was complied with only after a protracted wait; and
• He did not understand when a statutory limitation period is deemed to commence and, accordingly, mistakenly believed that in submitting the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission on 28 July 2022 he was still within time to do so.
  
  

Discussion and Decision

This Court has given extensive consideration to the meaning to be ascribed to “reasonable cause” as used by the legislature in employment statutes as the basis for extending time to initiate complaints under those enactments.

In Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation Limited) v Carroll DWT0425, the Court stated:

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons, which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time.  The claimant’s failure to present his or her claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence, there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

In the context in which the expression reasonable appears in the statute it imports an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. 

The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons. Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time. Here the Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.”

In Salesforce.com v Leech EDA1615, the Court – having referred to the Determination in Cementation Skanska – stated:

“It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the applicant for an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.  Secondly, the onus is on the applicant to establish a causal connection between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, the Court must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented the complaint in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Hence, if the factors relied upon to explain the delay ceased to operate before the complaint was presented, that may undermine a claim that those factors were the actual cause of the delay.”

The Court notes the following in relation to the Complainant’s application to extend time for initiating his complaint under the Act. Firstly, he has not specified how he believes that any one or more of the issues he listed in support of his application “both explain[s] the delay and afford[s] an excuse for the delay”. Secondly, and most tellingly, the Complainant’s final submission asserts that he did not understand how a statutory limitation period is computed and that he believed he was still within time when he submitted his complaint under the Act on 28 July 2022. It is well-established that ignorance of the law does not afford an excuse for a person’s failure to comply with it and, therefore, the Complainant’s misunderstanding of how statutory time limits are calculated does not satisfy the test for establishing reasonable cause.

It follows, however, from the Complainant’s admission that he believed that he was within time when submitting his complaint that he cannot logically now seek to justify that delay on the basis of reasonable cause.

It follows, therefore, that the Court must refuse the Complainant’s application to extend time in this case. The decision of the Adjudication Officer is varied accordingly and the appeal succeeds.

The Court so decides.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Alan Haugh
TH	______________________
1 August 2024	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Therese Hickey, Court Secretary.