Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Dr. Joanne  Mancini

National University of Ireland, (Maynooth University)

Representatives

Des Courtney SIPTU

Lauren Tennyson BL instructed by Arthur Cox LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00060160-001

21/11/2023

The Complainant alleged she was discriminated against in a promotion competition for Professor B role due to her gender. The Respondent denied that any discrimination occurred and maintained the complaint was out of time.

The Complainant contended that she was both victimised and discriminated against by her employer in relation to two processes for promotion, the first of which commenced in late 2019 and the second which commenced in late 2021.

The Complainant is seeking to be promoted to the grade of Professor B with effect from October 2020.

The Complainant has worked for the Respondent for almost twenty years. During this time, she has worked very hard and has developed a national and international reputation that reflects very well on her employer. For example, in 2022 the Complainant was elected to the Royal Irish Academy, Ireland's highest academic honour, an honour that has only been bestowed on a handful of Maynooth employees over many decades.

In November 2019, the University announced a process for promotion to the grade of Professor B, with a deadline for applications of 24th January 2020. On 4th December 2019, in advance of the deadline for the competition, the Complainant attended a meeting in relation to the process, which was convened by Professor A, President of the Respondent at the time and Chair of the Promotion Board. At this meeting the Complainant articulated her concerns that the competition, as described, might disadvantage women due to the inclusion, as a headline criterion in category R5, of Leadership/Establishment of a Research Institute. In December 2019, the Complainant wrote directly to Professor A thanking him for listening to her concerns at the previous day's meeting and made herself available to meet with Professor A to discuss her concerns further. The Complainant received no reply

At this time, there were no women in the Complainant's faculty (Faculty of

Arts, Celtic Studies and Philosophy) in such leadership posts and the Complainant raised her concerns directly with Professor A about the low representation of women in the Respondent, compared to men, at the rank of Professor B or higher, who had been promoted internally.

On 30th June 2020, the Complainant received word that the Respondent had rejected her application. On 12th August 2020, she wrote seeking copies of the notes taken by all members of the Promotions Board. On 17th August 2020, the Complainant sought more specific information on outcomes, including data on gender breakdown of applications rated 'excellent' or 'outstanding' in R5 and on gender breakdown of applications rated 'outstanding' in RI/R2. She received no response.

Amongst other things the Complainant was concerned about the potential for gender bias in the process and, on 4th September 2020, she lodged an appeal. In her appeal the Complainant referenced her interaction with Professor A and her concerns on the right to freedom from bias.

The Complainant believes that, as a direct result of registering her concerns both prior to the commencement of the 2019 process and through her appeal, Professor A  displayed a prejudicial attitude towards her and that she was victimised. Specifically, the Complainant alleges that her appeal was deliberately frustrated and that a hostile climate was promoted towards her among other senior staff with roles in the promotions process.

0n 10th May 2021, the Chair of the Academic Promotions Appeals Committee (APAC) and the Bursar, wrote to Professor A advising him that the Complainant's appeal had been upheld. Although APAC conveyed the upholding of the Complainant's appeal to Professor A  in May 2021, the Complainant was not informed that APAC had upheld her appeal until seven months' later, on 3rd December 2021. The Complainant was advised through a copied version of internal correspondence to Professor A, which had been re-dated to 1 st December 2021.

In such circumstances the Respondent rules clearly state, that 'Where an appeal is upheld, the Promotions Appeals Committee shall require the Promotions Board to reconvene and reconsider the application, taking into account any observations and rectifying any procedural defects identified by the Promotions Appeals Committee '. However, Professor A did not reconvene the Promotions Board as the rules required. Instead, the appeal process was frustrated for a further two years.

The complainant engaged in continuous correspondence with the involved parties for some time.

Notwithstanding the requirement to reconvene the Promotions Board, the correspondence confirms that Professor A's reaction to APAC's decision was to seek 'Advice/proposals re course of action ' to which Mr B (the Bursar) initially responded by quoting the rule to reconvene. However, rather than comply, the Complainant's appeal was thwarted still further.

0n 10th August 2021, Professor A wrote to the Chair of APAC. In his correspondence, Professor A advised that the Complainant's appeal was conditional upon APAC providing both 'further information ' and 'an explanation of APAC's decision' to uphold the Complainant' s appeal. Professor A also requested, that APAC provide him with 'all the legal advice and input that APAC may have received in relation to the promotions process ', before which [he] 'will consider the matter further in light of that legal advice, including the questions posed in the request. '

The Promotions Board did not reconvene until the autumn of 2022, some twenty-five months after the Complainant lodged her appeal and almost three years after the process had initially commenced.

0n 27th October 2022, Professor E (who had, by then, replaced

Professor A as President) wrote to Dr M, the Bursar  to advise that the Promotions Board had overturned APAC's upholding of the Complainant' s appeal..

However, for some inexplicable reason, it took a further six months for this

decision to be conveyed to the Complainant, who wrote to Professor E on 21 st December 2022 seeking a timeline for resolution of her appeal but who learned of the decision only in May 2023 and only following an intervention on her behalf by her SIPTU representative.

Meanwhile, on 2nd December 2021, (and whilst the Complainant's protracted appeal process was still ongoing) the Respondent announced the 2021 round of Professor B promotions process with a deadline for applications of 28th February 2022.

Because the Complainant's previous application/appeal was not resolved, she was placed in a difficult and stressful position of having to complete a second onerous promotions application without full knowledge of the outcome of the first competition (when other candidates knew their outcomes).

The Respondent knew of the Complainant's difficulty and could have resolved it by either reconvening the Promotions Board to deal with her previous appeal or by granting her an extension to the deadline for the new competition, which she requested on 17th December 2021. MU (the Respondent) failed to take either course of action. Moreover, the committee which made this decision included three people, neither of whom recused themselves despite their roles in frustrating the Complainant's 2019 appeal

.

After refusing the Complainant's application for an extension, MU also rejected her second application for promotion. She appealed this decision to APAC, citing the refusal to grant an extension along with other grounds, including the Promotions Board's failure to consider her election to the Royal Irish Academy.

0n 2nd June 2023, APAC, which had upheld the Complainant's first appeal in 2021 , denied her second appeal. However, in relation to her specific request for an extension of the 2021 deadline, APAC rejected this ground on the basis that 'the prior established normal practice was not to allow extensions in such circumstances '. Subsequent correspondence from MU would confirm that this was not, in fact, correct and that such extensions had been granted to male candidates in previous processes.

This indicates, in addition to victimisation, that MU directly discriminated against the Complainant by refusing to grant her a deadline extension when they had done so previously for male colleagues in similar situations.

Legal Submission:

Victimisation

Section 74(2) of the Employment Equality Acts provide:

For the purposes of this part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

any proceedings by a complainant,

an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. '

Subsections a) to g) above are considered 'Protected Acts ' and are thus protected from adverse treatment by the employer. It was submitted that the Complainant's bringing to the attention of Professor A her concerns on potential gender bias within the process on 4th December 2019 represents a 'complaint of discrimination ' as outlined at Subsection a). The Complainant suggested that they believe that her written correspondence of 5th December, was a protected act, in line with g) above, as it gave Professor A notice of an intention to take such an action.

The key elements of victimisation provided for in section 74(2) of the EEA are as follows:

The employee had taken action of a type referred to at section 74(2) of the Acts (a protected act),

The employee was subjected to adverse treatment by the Respondent, and

That the adverse treatment was in reaction to the protected action having been taken by the employee.

The adverse treatment received by the Complainant, as a direct result of her raising her concerns, included:

She received no reply from Professor A to her correspondence of 5th December 2019.

She received no reply to her correspondences of 12th and 17th August 2020.

Although her appeal had been upheld on 10th May 2021, the Complainant was not advised until 3rd December 2021. The correspondence sent to the Complainant was re-dated to 1 st December 2021, to make it appear that the APAC decision had only just been made.

The requirement to reconvene the Promotions Board to reconsider the Complainant's appeal was disregarded.

Rather than comply with the rules, Professor A made the Complainant 's appeal conditional upon the provision by APAC of certain information and legal advice which it may have received. None of this was made known to the Complainant until she acquired the information/correspondence through a SAR request.

The Promotions Board did not reconvene until the Autumn of 2022.

The Complainant's appeal process was frustrated for almost three years .Although Professor E wrote to the Bursar, to advise that the Promotions Board had overturned APAC's upholding of the Complainant' s appeal on 27th October 2022, it took a further six months for this decision to be conveyed to the Complainant and only following an intervention on her behalf by her SIPTU representative.

The Complainant submitted she believed this treatment was in reaction to the Complainant having carried out a protected act within the meaning of S74(2).

Discrimination:

The Complainant also believes that she was discriminated against by her employer on the gender ground.

The Employment Equality Acts, S,6, define discrimination:

(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where-

A person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the 'discriminatory grounds ')

In correspondence from Dr B dated 2nd June 2023, the Complainant was advised that her appeal against the decision not to grant an extension for the deadline for her 2021 application had been refused. The grounds for this refusal are set out as follows:

'.... this [Promotion] board would be cognisant of normal practice to date and the prior established normal practice was not to allow extensions in such circumstances '. However, in a subsequent list of questions set out in an EE2 Form, the employer confirmed that this was not, in fact, the case.

Q12: 'Can you clarify whether any male was ever granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed? '

Response: 'We are aware that two male candidates under the 2020 promotion scheme to the grade of Associate Professor were granted an

(sic) deadline extension '

In answer to the same question (Q13) in relation to female candidates, MU responded as follows:

'Not during the period in question. The Promotion scheme was revised in 2019. In 2021, the HR Director notified all applicants to apply for the next round of promotion while their appeal was outstanding '

It will be noted that, despite the Promotion scheme having been revised in 2019, the Complainant's male colleagues were granted their extensions under the 2020 promotion scheme. This suggests direct discrimination.

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination:

"Where in any proceedings, facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant, from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary".

This requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which discrimination may be inferred. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised.

In Mitchell -v- Southern Health Board [20011 ELR 201, the Labour Court emphasised that, in the first instance, the Complainant "must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination ". It continued:

"It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment ".

1n Melbury -v- Valpeters EDA/0917, the Labour Court elaborated further that Section 85A: "Provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule".

The Labour Court in Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Robert Sheehan (EDA0416) found that: "In order to shift the probative burden it is not necessary for the Complainant to adduce direct evidence of discrimination on either the gender or the age ground "

The Complainant believes she satisfies the requirements to establish a prima facie case in accordance with her obligation under the Act and the case law precedents as set out above. The Complainant believe the facts of the case confirm that there has been discrimination on the gender ground. We would respectfully suggest, therefore, that the burden of proof unequivocally shifts to the Respondent. In accordance with S 85A of the Act it is up to the Respondent to prove otherwise.

MU's responses to the questions posed in Form EE2 appear to show that of all the people in the Complainant's Dept., who have attained the rank of Prof B or higher, none are women who have been promoted internally (but that there are several men in this position). Also, MU did not answer the question seeking to find out the date when a woman was last promoted to Professor B in the Complainant's Dept. Their answers also showed that, in both the 2019 and 2021 promotion competitions, the proportion of women who achieved 'Excellent' or 'Outstanding' in R5 was lower than the proportion of men (as would be predicted by her initial complaint to Professor A), and that the proportion of women who achieved 'Outstanding' in either RI or R2 was zero (but that this was a positive figure for men).

Time Limit:

The Complainant contends that she was both victimised and discriminated against by her employer, Maynooth University (MU), in relation to two processes for promotion, the first of which commenced in late 2019 and the second which took place in early 2021.The Complainant, having first raised potential discriminatory issues in relation to the promotional process in December 2019 and, having submitted her application ahead of the deadline of 24th January 2020, only learned of the decision to overturn her appeal outcome in relation to her application in May 2023 following representations from her union. Dr, Mancini's case is that the withholding of this information was the last act of victimisation, with the other acts of victimisation as set out earlier in this submission extending over the intervening period and commencing in December 2021.

0n behalf of the Complainant, it is submitted that the facts are very clear.

The Complainant applied in good faith for promotion in both 2019 and 2021. She was unsuccessful in both.

Following her raising of concerns in relation to potential gender bias in the promotions process on 4th and December 2019, The Complainant was subjected to the adverse treatment set out above. This treatment was both difficult and very stressful for the Complainant and was known to be so by MU management. However, when she applied for a deadline extension in 2021, she was refused, despite extensions having been granted to two male colleagues within the previous year.

The Complainant submitted that, in line with the Labour Court's pronouncements in Melbury v Valpeters, they have established facts on credible evidence from which discrimination may be inferred.

The Complainant asked the AO to consider the effects of the discrimination on the Complainant who suffered stress, indignity, and significant financial loss.

The Complainant stated she has served this employer diligently and professionally for almost 20 years. In light of the above, and in all the circumstances, the Complainant requested a decision  in favour of the Complainant and promote her to the grade of Professor B with effect from October 2020. In support of this request, the Complainant relied upon the Equality Tribunal case DEC-E2014-078 Micheline Sheehy Skeffington v National University of Ireland, Galway.

The University is satisfied that the Complainant’s application for promotion was treated fairly, and in line with the procedures outlined in the University’s Academic Promotion Scheme - Professor B (2021) (the “Policy”). .Accordingly, the University rejects any accusations of discrimination and believes that the Complainant’s complaint should not be upheld. 

These submissions are in response to the WRC Complaint Form and the Submission on behalf of the Complainant dated 6 March 2024.

Temporal Scope of the within proceedings – preliminary issue relating to time limit 2.1                Section 41(6) of the 2015 Act states that: 

Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

Section 77(5)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts provides: -

Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

It is clear from the provisions of both Acts that a complaint must be referred to the WRC within a period of 6 months from the date of the occurrence of discrimination or victimisation to which the complaint relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence. 

Prima facie the relevant time period for this complaint is from 22 May 2023 to 21 November 2023  i.e. six months prior to the Complainant lodging her complaint with the WRC. 

By way of reference:

The only event referred to in the Complainant’s Complaint Form or Submission that falls within the requisite time period is the letter dated 2 June 2023 which concluded that her appeal of the 2021 Application was not upheld..  There is no detail of any other alleged discrimination within the cognisable period. 

The Complainant’s Submission lists allegations of “adverse treatment”, none of which occurred or could have occurred within the cognisable period. 

Of particular relevance for this case is the decision of the Labour Court in Cork County VEC v. Hurley whichconcerned a teacher who alleged that she was the victim of discrimination in the workplace.  A preliminary issue was raised by the respondent concerning whether any of the alleged acts complained of by the Complainant were within the 6 month period prior to her claim being issued before the Equality Tribunal (as it then was). The Labour Court accepted this was an issue which should be addressed as a preliminary one stating at the outset of its decision:- “It was clear from the written submission filed by the Respondent that it would be contending that many of the incidents relied upon by the Complainant as constituting victimisation occurred outside the time limit prescribed by s. 77 of the Act and were therefore statute barred. The Court suggested that this point could be considered as a preliminary matter. In that regard the Court suggested that occurrences outside the time limit could only be considered if the last act relied upon was within the time limit and the other acts complained of were sufficiently connected to the final act so as to make all of them part of a continuum. A further issue arose as to whether occurrences not referred to in the Complainant’s original complaint, and occurrence after the complaint had been presented, could be relied upon.”

Thereafter the Labour Court embarked on a preliminary hearing on the time issue by hearing evidence limited to the extent to which the matters complained of within the cognisant time period and that if, those alleged occurrences were not found to have involved victimisation the complaint relating to the earlier occurrences could not be entertained having regard to section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act, as the most recent occurrences would have been outside the time limit. 

Following a hearing of the evidence (and subsequent written submissions from the appellant in that case) the Labour Court determined that there was no evidence of any alleged victimisation or unlawful discriminatory treatment within the cognisable 6 month period and accordingly the provisions of section 77 subsections (5)(a) and (6A) did not avail the Complainant and her claim was dismissed. 

In the current claim, the Complainant has failed to provide any evidence of any discrimination within the cognisable period (or at all).  

Therefore, this matter should be rejected. 

Background

The Complainant is employed by the University as an Associate Professor in the Department of History. 

The Complainant was unsuccessful in the 2019 Application and her 2021 Application.  

On 21 October 2022, The Complainant was notified by the HR Director (Interim) that her 2021 Application for promotion to the grade of Professor B was unsuccessful.

On 2 June 2023 she was informed her appeal was not successful.  This is the only alleged infringement within the cognizable time period and the Complainants Submission provides absolutely no information whatsoever how this could amount to discrimination. 

On 14th September 2023, a grievance was received from SIPTU on behalf of the Complainant.. 

The grievance concerned alleged treatment during the 2019 and 2021 promotions processes. 

SIPTU asked the University, by way of Form EE.2, to answer 18 questions.

Between 25 September 2023 to 28 September 2023, the University’s Employee Relations Manager exchanged emails with SIPTU.

On 6 October 2023, the Respondent answered 16 of the 18 questions posed by the Complainant..  Of particular relevance to the current claim, are the questions and answers at 12 and 13: 

Q: 12. Can you clarify whether any male was ever granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed?  

A: We are aware that two male candidates under the 2020 promotion scheme to the grade of Associate Professor were granted a deadline extension

Q13: Can you clarify whether any male was ever granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed? 

A: Not during the period in question.  The Promotion scheme was revised in 2019.  In 2021, the HR Director notified all applicants to apply for the next round of promotion while their appeal was outstanding. 

The University responded to the remaining two questions on 3 November 2023.

Inaccuracies in the Complainant’s Submission

The Complainant makes a number of assertions in her submission which are factually inaccurate. As such, any complaint of discrimination based on these erroneous contentions cannot be not well-founded.

Paragraph 5

At paragraph 5 of the Complainant’s submission, it is asserted that,

“The Complainant articulated her concerns that the competition, as designed, might disadvantage women due to the inclusion, as a headline criterion in category R5, of Leadership/Establishment of a Research Institute”.

As set out in the Policy, R5: Research Funding & Leadership is defined in the Promotion Scheme as a criterion which “recognizes the value to the university of seeking and securing funding to support research and scholarship, including collaborative activities and projects, and leadership of major research programmes”. The Scheme specifically states that,

“these achievements include, but are not limited to (emphasis added by Respondent):

Establishing and directing active Research Institutes, Research Centres or research teams;

Leadership in enhancing the research culture of the University;

Success in seeking research funding;

Funding attracted by the candidate to support her/his research, which could include individual research fellowships, travel grants, and postgraduate student awards, postdoctoral researcher awards and individual project grants;

Significantly contributing to or leading successful applications for major collaborative research funding awards and programme grants from national or international sources;

Serving as Principal Investigator in national or international collaborative research projects;

Initiating and sustaining funded interdisciplinary, inter-institutional and international high quality research collaborations;

On that basis, it is not accurate to assert that “Leadership/Establishment of a research institute” is a “headline criterion in category R5”.

At paragraph 8 of the Complainant’s Submission, it is alleged that The Complainant “received no response” from her emails dated 12 August 2020 and 17 August 2020.  However, as noted in the timeline above, this is incorrect and she received responses with statistical analysis on 31 August 2020 and on 3 September 2020 which she subsequently relied upon in her appeal. 

At paragraph 10 of the Complainant’s submission, the Complainant makes serious and entirely baseless allegations against an individual who is a third party to these proceedings.  . 

At paragraph 18, The Complainant claims:  “On 27 October 2022, Professor E (who had, by then, replaced Professor A as MU President) wrote to Dr B to advise that the Promotions Board had overturned APAC’s upholding of the Complainant’s appeal”.  

The Complainant’s appeal of the 2019 Application was upheld on the basis “a failure to provide due process has occurred, is informed by the refusal to provide her with a copy of the individual summary notes taken by the members of the Promotions Board and referenced in the Approved Record of the Professor B Promotions Board (May 2020) notwithstanding her formal request for same.  On this basis the Committee has formed the view that the failure to provide a copy of the summary notes constitutes a procedural defect.”

The Board concluded: “The Board has concluded, for the reasons outlined above, that the University’s refusal in late 2020 to release members’ notes to the appellant had no influence on the decision that was reached by the Board at its meeting in June 2020.  The Board gave all the applications materials full and fair consideration at and in advance of its meeting in June 2020, and finds no basis to vary its original consensus judgment on the application.”

The Complainant was not elected to the Royal Irish Academy until May 2022, which was after the deadline for promotion to the grade of Professor B (2021 call). Accordingly, the Complainant’s election to the Royal Irish Academy could not have formed part of her formal application. 

Response to the Complainant’s Submission

In the Workplace Relations complaint form dated 21 November 2023, the Complainant claims that she was discriminated both indirectly and directly when she was not successful in her application for promotion to the grade of Professor B. 

The onus of proof is on the Complainant to prove that discriminatory treatment occurred. The EEA provides, at section 38a, that facts must be “established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her …”. 

In Valpeters v Melbury Developments Limited,[1] a case concerning alleged discrimination on grounds of race, the Labour Court stated: 

“section 85a of the act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85a places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.”

Moreover, the Labour Court case of Graham Anthony & Co Limited v Margetts,[2] is helpful in considering whether a person has been treated less favourably than her comparators.  The Labour Court stated:

“…the mere fact that the Complainant falls within one of the discriminatory grounds laid down under the Act is not sufficient in itself to establish a claim of discrimination. The Complainant must adduce other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination has occurred.”  

In the current case, the Complainant has not provided any facts that demonstrate that there has been discrimination on the grounds of gender. 

In paragraph 25 of the Complainant’s Submission she states that “MU directly discriminated against The Complainant by refusing to grant her a deadline extension when they had done so previously for male colleagues in similar situations” 

However, this is not accurate and was addressed in the answers provided to SIPTU and the Complainant in October 2023, particularly questions and answers at 12, 13 and 14: 

“Q: 12. Can you clarify whether any male was ever granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed?”  

“A12: We are aware that two male candidates under the 2020 promotion scheme to the grade of Associate Professor were granted a deadline extension”

“Q13: Can you clarify whether any male was ever granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed?” 

“A13: Not during the period in question.  The Promotion scheme was revised in 2019.  In 2021, the HR Director notified all applicants to apply for the next round of promotion while their appeal was outstanding.”

Q14: If any applicant was previously granted a deadline extension for a promotions competition when an appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed, as was stated to Dr. Mancini, can you clarify why Dr. Mancini's application for extension was not accepted when her appeal from a previous round of promotions had not been completed.”

“A14: The granting of the 2020 Associate Professor deadline extensions gave rise to procedural issues for the Promotions Board, who subsequently sought formal advice on how it might proceed in the context of future requests. The formal advice that was received was implemented to protect the overall probity of the schemes. Since December 2021, there are no cases whereby applicants who have outstanding appeals have been granted application deadline extensions for any subsequent call.”

Notably, the Complainant’s Submission omits question and answer 14 from its analysis of this at paragraphs 33 - 36.  

There is absolutely no link between the University making this decision on application extensions and the Complainant’s gender.  In fact, there is no link between the University making this decision and the Complainant.  The decision was made months before the Complainant even sought an extension.   

The Labour Court in O’Higgins v UCD, which was upheld on appeal by the High Court, summarised the applicable principles in claims of alleged discrimination in selection processes as follows: 

“It is for the Complainant to prove the primary facts upon which she relies in seeking to raise an inference of discrimination.

If the Complainant dischargesthat burden it remains for the court to decide if those facts are of sufficient significance to raise the inference contended for. 

It is not necessary to establish that the conclusion of discrimination is the only, or the explanation, which can be drawn from the proven facts. It is sufficient if it is within the range of presumptions that can be properly drawn from those facts. 

In cases concerning the filling of a post it is not the role of the court to substitute its views on the merits of candidates for those of the designated decision makers. Its only role is to ensure that the selection process is not tainted by unlawful discrimination. 

The court will not normally look behind a decision in relation to appointments unless there is clear evidence of unfairness in the selection process or manifest irrationality in the result. 

A lack of transparency in the selection process combined with an absence of any discernible connection between the assessment or qualifications of candidates and the result of the process can give rise to an inference of discrimination. 

Where a prima facie case of discrimination is made out and where the respondent fails to show that the discriminatory ground was anything other than a trivial influence in the impugned decision the complaint will be made out. 

The court must be alert to the possibility of unconscious or inadvertent discrimination and mere denials of a discriminatory motive, in the absence of independent corroboration, must be approached with caution.”

The Complainant does not provide details sufficient to reach the threshold set out by the Courts. 

The University submits that the Complainant has not been able to prove, by reference to the criteria in Mitchell v Southern Health Board. The Mitchell test provides that:

“(a)    It is for the Complainant to prove the primary facts upon which he/she relies in seeking to raise a presumption of discrimination.

If the primary facts relied upon are proved, it is for the Adjudication Officer/Labour Court to evaluate those facts and to consider if they are of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.

If the primary facts proven are considered of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, the onus of proving that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment then passes to the respondent.”

The Complainant has not been able to establish by reference to this three-limbed test that there is prima facie evidence of discrimination. 

Furthermore, the decision of the Labour Court in Moore Walsh v Waterford Institute of Technologydemonstrates the court’s unwillingness to be overly involved in the promotion/ filling of posts process:

“On the evidence the Court is satisfied that the interview board was properly constituted and conducted its business in line with accepted good practice. Where this is found to be the case, and in the absence of clear evidence of unfairness or manifest irrationality in the result, the Court will not seek to undertake its own assessment of the candidates or substitute its views on their relevant merits for those arrived at by the interview board.

On the evidence adduced the complainant has not established to the satisfaction of the Court that the marks awarded by the interview board as between her and the successful candidate were irrational or unfair. Moreover, the Court is satisfied that the interview board were entitled to take the view that the successful candidates qualifications were superior to the acknowledged excellent qualifications of the complainant. Finally, it has not been established as a matter of probability that the interview process was carried out unprofessionally in the manner alleged by the complainant or at all..”

In the absence of the Complainant being able to demonstrate a prima facie case that there is evident discrimination in the Respondent’s promotion process, the Respondent submits that there is no cause for the courts to interfere in the Respondent’s internal processes. Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the above submissions of the Respondent, should a prima facie case for discrimination be established, the Respondent submits that its internal process in fair and objective. 

In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission in Eithne Lannon v Board of Management, North Bay Educate Together National School the Complainant was unsuccessful in her application for promotion to the position of school principal. The Complainant alleged that one of the criterion cited in her unsuccessful application was that the successful applicant had “planned a career path towards being a principal (while she) had not” The Complainant argued, amongst other things, that this raised an inference of gender discrimination, given that the Complainant had taken time out of work to raise her children and was job-sharing for a time. In examining the Complainant’s claim, the Adjudication Officer gave consideration to the fact that:

there was a consistent list of questions asked in each interview with each of the applicants;

each of the interviewers consistently scored the successful applicant higher when ranked using the objective criteria; and 

the assertion that the Complainant was indirectly discriminated against by not having planned a career path to principal (because she was raising children) was refuted, and the evidence accepted was that the successful candidate was ‘thinking about what would be required in a principalship and was able to convey that very well in his answers at interview’.

The Adjudication Officer ultimately found in favour of the respondent.

                 Promotion Scheme to Grade of Professor B  

Prior to the conclusion of this submission, the Policy will be set out to demonstrate the clear and objective criteria the University relies upon for promotion. 

As set out in the Complainant’s Submission, the Complainant asks of the Adjudication Officer: 

“Should you find in The Complainant’s favour she is seeking to be promoted to the grade of Professor B with effect from October 2020”

Effectively, the Complainant is seeking for the Adjudication Officer to entirely disregard the Policy.  The Policy is an extensive process with many safeguards and is effectively a decision by peers on the promotion of an academic.

As set out in the Policy Statement: 

“The schemes, in their design and implementation, are informed by the Universities commitment to equality diversity and inclusion, its strategy and action plans for progress in these areas, and the public sector duty to promote equality, prevent discrimination and protect the human rights of its employees. The promotion schemes and processes shall not discriminate and shall promote equality of opportunity on the grounds of gender, civil status, family status, socio-economic status, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, race, and membership of the traveller community. The promotion schemes and processes shall treat equitably those candidates with part-time or fixed term contracts, and candidates who have taken periods of statutory leave. Specifically, in these circumstances, where a criterion for promotion specifies a benchmark volume or quantity, if it provides for more equitable treatment the Promotions Board may adjust the benchmark. The same quality standards shall apply to all candidates.”

The Policy explains the eligibility to apply for promotion as follows: 

“Candidates for promotion to the grade of Professor B ’will normally have already achieved the grade of Associate Professor and have served at that grade for at least three to five years.  Nonetheless, all academic staff at Lecturer and Associate Professor grades, who, by the closing date for applications will have five or more years of service at Lecturer grade or above at Maynooth University or a university or higher education institution of similar standing and ’will have completed the probationary period in the post, are eligible to apply for promotion to the grade of Professor B.”

Criteria for promotion 

The Policy thereafter sets out the assessment criteria being (1) Research, Scholarship and Innovation; (2) Teaching and Educational Development; (3) Service to the University and the Profession.

As set out in page 3 of the Policy: 

“Within each of these broad areas of activity there are a number of specific areas or domains in which candidates are assessed against specified benchmarks and standards. The evidence presented by the candidate is assessed against these benchmarks and standards a judgment made as to the performance of the candidate according to the following rubric:

Outstanding

Excellent

Very good

Good

Satisfactory

Not achieved”

The Policy further provides that: 

“The Promotions Board will consider the achievements of the candidate since their appointment to the grade of Lecturer or equivalent, including periods of employment at other universities or higher education institutions of similar standing, but vail require evidence of significant achievement since promotion to Associate Professor (or equivalent grade) for performance in any area to be judged excellent, and ongoing commitment and achievement in the period leading up to the application for promotion.”   

The membership of the Promotions Board consists of:

“the President, (Chairperson);

the Vice-President Academic;

the Vice President for Research;

Four Professors (A or B) elected by the Academic Council including at least two females and

one member from each of three Faculties;

Two Professors (A or B) nominated by the President;

For stated reasons, up to three co-opted members, nominated by the President and co-opted by the Promotions Board”

The Promotions Board will invite an Independent External Senior Academic to attend all of its meetings as process auditor and to prepare a report.

The Independent External Senior Academic for the 2021 Process was Professor G, LRIA Former Registrar and Senior Vice President Academic, UCC and the Report from the Independent External Senior Academic on the 2021 Promotion Scheme to Grade of Professor B was provided.

Application 

In order to apply for promotion to grade of Professor B the following documents are required: 

Application form; 

A list of the candidates publications; 

Teaching portfolio; 

Five examples of peer reviewed published work; and 

Peer Review Reports prepared by: 

Internal Reviewer nominated by the candidate.  This is someone who is familiar with the candidate’s research. 

External Reviewer identified by the Internal Reviewer.  This person is a senior academic external to the University. 

External Reviewers nominated by the candidate.   The candidate nominates at least five senior academics external to the University as potential External Reviewers in order of suitability. The University will seek to secure reports from two of these in order of suitability. 

(A minimum of two external reports must be received for a candidate in order for their application to progress.)

The Professor B Promotions Board then uses the available documentation to assess the candidate against the criteria.

Assessment

As set out in the Policy the assessment is thereafter in three stages: 

individual members of the Promotions Board will review all the applications and form a preliminary assessment of the performance of the candidates against the criteria and benchmarks;

the Promotions Board will convene, in advance of receiving the reports of Internal and External Reviewers, and will work to identify any areas in which clarification or verification might be required; and 

on receipt of the reports of the Internal and External Reviewers, the members of the Promotions Board will form an individual assessment of the performance of the candidates against the criteria and benchmarks. 

The Promotions Board will convene and form a final consensus judgement and a recommendation on whether or not the candidate should be promoted. Where consensus cannot be achieved, the question will be determined by simple majority vote, if necessary the Chair shall have a casting vote.

Outcome

As set out on page 11 of the Policy: 

The President will communicate the list of recommended candidates to the Governing Authority, along with any advice or recommendation the President may wish to make to inform the decision of the Governing Authority. The President will normally propose to the Governing Authority that all qualified candidates be promoted.

However, for stated reasons, the Governing Authority may determine a quota for promotional positions, in which case the Governing Authority will promote candidates by ranking the candidates recommended for promotion according to the number of areas (R1-R5, T1-T4, SI and S2) where the candidate was judged to have met the standard for excellent. The decision of the Governing Authority shall be final.

Appeal 

Finally, as set out in pages 12 – 14 of the Policy, there is a facility to appeal a decision, and this is determined by a Promotions Appeals Committee consisting of: 

A Chairperson, from within or without the University, with experience of academic promotions.

Three academics appointed by the Governing Authority, of the rank of Professor (A or B) and not current members of the Promotions Board. The Governing Authority may establish a panel of alternate members who satisfy the criteria above to substitute for the appointed persons if no more than one is unable to adjudicate on a specific case due to a conflict of interest.

A representative of Maynooth University ASA/IFUT, if requested.

The briefing presentation provided to employees of the University prior to the 2021 Application was provided. 

The rates of success for promotion are relatively low.   As set out in the Statistical Analysis of the 2015 – 2021 Promotion Schemes to Grade of Professor B, the total applicants with success rates over the last number of years is as follows: 

The University is satisfied that it did not discriminate directly or indirectly throughout the Complainant’s application for promotion. 

For the reasons outlined above, The Complainant’s claim should be dismissed.

At the initial hearing in May 2024 into the complaint the Respondent argued that the WRC did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint as it was out of time. The parties were requested to make written submissions on the matter and a hearing into the preliminary matter and the substantive matter was held in October 2024. I have considered the extensive written submissions from the parties and their oral submissions and conclude that the date the Complainant was notified that she was not successful in her appeal application for promotion to the 2021 promotion round, June 2nd 2023, is the last date which she can reasonably rely on as the alleged act of discrimination. This is the date in which the culmination of continuum of events since 2019, alleged to be discriminatory, concluded. The Complainant submitted her complaint to the WRC on November 21st 2023. The Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires complaints to be submitted inside 6 months normally, but 12 months at a maximum for reasonable cause, and as the complaint was submitted inside this time I decide to accept jurisdiction to deal with the substantive issue involved. I accept that this may be a contentious issue for the Respondent but given the continuum of allegations outlined by the Complainant I have given her the benefit of interpreting the events as a continuum of alleged discriminatory acts since 2019. 

In Mitchell -v- Southern Health Board [20011 ELR 201, the Labour Court emphasised that, in the first instance, the Complainant "must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination ". It continued: "It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment ". Therefore, in assessing this complaint the second core issue is if the Complainant has established a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

It was difficult to determine if the Complainants central case was a mix of alleged unlawful events or was there one major unlawful event which was her predominant case. When questioned about the difference in pay between the Complainants current grade and the grade sought the Complainant did not provide the difference and it appeared the promotional position was sought more for the prestige and status than any other criteria. It is worth noting that it is long established practice that the WRC (or indeed the Labour Court) will not insert itself into promotional/appointment situations unless there is an obvious unfair or illegal practice. It is also worth stating that the selectin process in this case was very extensive and with significant input from the applicant, their nominated “reviewers” and is supported by a large group of people independently. There was also an Independent auditor of the process. The success rate for candidates on average is 46%.

The Complainant gave evidence to the Hearing which basically was similar to her written submission. She alleged, without supporting data, that senior management sought to thwart the reconvening of the Board. She advised her appeal was upheld on the basis of procedural inadequacies in not providing her copies of documents. She advised that the University were aware her 2019 process was completed but had delayed in informing her. She advised that 9 men and 1 woman attended the meeting with Professor A prior to the 2019 competition and that 3 men had research experience. She advised her rank is Senior Lecturer. She advised she went to her Dept Head when she got no reply from Professor A to her queries and she sent a follow up email but got no reply or investigation. The Complainant advised that there was a change to the 2024 round and reference to leadership was no longer in the criteria and was no longer relevant. The Complainant maintained that female candidates were less likely to achieve excellent scores due to the structure of the applications. The Complainant sought the notes from the Interview Board but these were not supplied and stated there was no review of scoring in the R5 category. She alleged Professor A was involved in delaying her application for upgrade being re heard and he deliberately slowed the process for an extensive period. The Complainant advised she was primarily working from home at this time due to Covid and her communications were all by email. The Complainant advised she engaged extensively regarding an extension to the 2021 process while the 2019 appeal was ongoing but was denied an extension while a male colleague was allowed an extension. She advised there was no policy prohibiting an extension being granted. The Complainant advised she wrote to the new President but received no reply re who was responsible for her situation.  In September 2022 the Complainant sought a timeline for resolution of the matter but received no timeline. When the Complainants 2021 application was unsuccessful she asked to see her review reports and did receive them. She advised 20 people a year are elected to the Royal Irish Academy and 18 Maynooth staff members in total are elected members. She alleged Professor A victimised her and he was not retrained by the college and he did not go through the required steps to have her appeal heard.  The Complainant believed the delay in resolving the 2019 process affected her 2021 application.

The Complainant was cross examined on her evidence in relation to the 2019 process and requested feedback and was asked to agree she got feedback in August 2020 and when she sought further feedback and that she got some more in September 2020 and statistical feedback. The Complainant agreed there were 11 criteria for evaluation and R5 was only one of them. The Complainant agreed that she was given data which showed 36% of female applicants were successful and 47% of male applicants were successful. The Complainant agreed that the ground in which her appeal was upheld related to her not being provided with summary notes and was not on a gender basis. The Complainant agreed that Professor A left the organisation in September 2021 and had no involvement in her case after that date. The Complainant was asked to agree that the letter that was sent in May 2023 (which should have been sent in October 2022) did not alter the outcome of her appeal. The Complainant was asked to agree that it was an administrative error which delayed the issue of her final outcome letter. The Complainant did not agree. The Complainant was asked to agree that all 21 applicants for the 2021 process were notified together in September 2022 of their outcome. The Complainant stated she was not aware of this information. The Complainant was asked did she agree that when the HR Manager left in October 2022 that this affected communications and follow up on her issues and that the Interim HR Director took over communications with her at that time. The Complainant agreed he took over the communications. The Complainant was asked was she aware no one in 2021 was granted an extension. The Complainant accepted this. It was put to the Complainant that she was querying the promotion decision of the Board which she disagreed with and did she agree that the Board were not required to take into account her entry to the Royal Irish Academy. The Complainant felt that this should have been taken retrospectively into account on hearing her appeal. When put to the Complainant that the R5 category was just one category of 11 she felt certain people value it more than other criteria. It was put to the Complainant that she had no claim of victimisation under Section 74.

Mr. Millar, HR Manager gave evidence to the Hearing. He advised he was familiar with the promotion scheme, that it was administered centrally, that IFUT were involved in the design of the scheme and any possible changes and the scheme was approved by the Governing Body, He stated a formal document sets out the rules for eligibility and for appeals. He advised R5 was only one of 11 criteria and that research was an important criteria but that R1 and R2 criteria were more important. He advised the Complainant was given feedback on her application in August 2020 and further feedback was given in September 2020. He advised it is a voluntary process for Professors to evaluate the applications and that the Respondent wish to provide feedback to all applicants at the one time and this feedback can be delayed for legal reasons or appeals. He advised that concluding some applications can take much longer than others for a variety of reasons. He advised that the Complainant was notified at the same time as her male comparator. He advised appeals are heard at the first opportunity but as Professor A was seconded outside the organisation due to the Covid pandemic there was communication difficulties at that time.  He advised Professor A was not involved in hearing the Complainants appeal. With regard to why the letter was only sent to the Complainant in May 2023 and not October 2022 he advised he was on medical leave for a considerable time during that time and was not present at the University for a lot of the time. He advised that after getting prompts from SIPTU he went searching for correspondence on the status of the situation and he had apologised for the delay. He advised that he had previously told the Complainant that her appeal of the 2019 round and her 2021 application were distinct and that if her appeal of the 2019 round was successful she could withdraw her 2021 application. He advised it is not general practice to provide extensions. He advised the Complainants membership for the RIA could not be considered as part of her appeal as it was obtained after the closure date for applications. He advised there are 40/50 applications per call and that the HR Manager dealing with the process left in October 2022 causing some disruption to the process. He advised the R5 criteria has not been amended as is still the same as previous rounds. He explained they have 3 calls open at the moment with 130 applications and each application has 5 external reviewers and 1 internal reviewer and at every meeting there is an external auditor to report on the probity of the process. (written details were provided of the external Auditors satisfaction with the process involving the Complainant). Mr. Millar was cross examined by the Complainant Representative and confirmed that the reason the leave to appeal was granted was that the failure to provide a copy of summary notes was a defect in the process. He was asked was the delay to notify the Complainant until May 2023 due process and was the decision to not provide notes of the deliberation meeting a defect. Mr. Millar stated the provision of notes had no material impact on the outcome not to promote the Complainant and that the volumes of appeals generally made the situation complex, that they needed to take legal advice in some cases, that lockdown affected the timing of the process and the Chair was unavailable due to being seconded elsewhere during Covid. He advised that when he went to find all the correspondence on the appeal that he had difficulties as some communications between staff was not on file and that he was investigating locating all the correspondence for a number of months up to February 2023.

The Complainant has set out a series of actions which she considered, commutatively, amounted to discrimination. These amounted to her initial interaction with Professor A, the inclusion of research leadership in the selection criteria, discrimination by the Respondent in dealing with her appeal process, not considering her nomination to the Royal Irish Academy in her appeal, allowing a male an extension and not giving one to her, not reconvening the Appeals Board quickly enough and discrimination by the organisation in selecting more men than women for the role of Professor B. The Complainant alleged she was victimised. Specifically, the Complainant alleged that her appeal was deliberately frustrated and that a hostile climate was promoted towards her among other senior staff with roles in the promotions process. There was no evidence provided which would support this assertion. Professor A was not actively involved in her situation from September 2021. The Complainant set out her interaction with Professor A (who is no longer employed with the Respondent and was involved outside the Organisation for a substantial period of time during Covid) and set out her engagement with him at the commencement of the process and her disagreement that the research leadership element should be included in the assessment for the upgrade and could form a bias against women. No evidence was provided that could categorically support the view that this element of evaluation was included to generate a bias towards men. The Complainant advised the Hearing that 6 of the 9 men who attended the information meeting with Professor A did not have experience in this research area thus affecting the core of this argument. There are three overall categories of assessment and 11 different criteria. It is conceivable, depending on a persons background, they could argue some or all of the criteria should not be included if it suited their particular circumstances. I have looked at the 11 criteria and see no bias in their structure and definition towards any particular gender. With regard to the delay in conducting the appeal process Professor A sought certain information prior to conducting the appeal. The delay in both getting this information and conducting the appeal was substantial but it has be considered in light of the time when Covid was in the country and all normal work patterns were severely disrupted with many people working from home. In addition, Professor A was redeployed to assist the national effort to deal with Covid at that time and the HR Manager left the organisation during this time. Mr. Millar had to pick up the pieces on the appeals after his medical issue and establish he had all the correspondence before replying to the Complainant with a final decision. This was an onerous task given both the Chair and HR Director no longer worked for the Respondent. The appeal process was subsequently completed and no justification was found to support the Complainants appeal. While I accept that there is substantial effort involved in applying for the upgrade, I don’t see merit in the Complainants case that she should have been granted an extension of time for her 2021 application.  The circumstances submitted of when a male comparator was granted an extension and the Complainants situation are different and are not a ground to support discrimination. I also note the practice of granting extensions has been discontinued. Also, I do not see validity in the Complainants case that her subsequent admission to the Royal Irish Academy, noteworthy as it is, should have been considered by the Appeal Board. It is not fair or practical for a promotions competition to take into account events achieved after the closure date for applications.  With regard to the assertion that the Selection Board was biased towards men this is not supported based on the outcome information provided for over a long number of competitions. From the analysis provided over a number of years there is a small difference in the number of applicants that are successful from each gender (slightly more male than female) but this cannot be automatically assumed to be caused by a discriminatory bias. It is also not the role of an Adjudicator to “second guess” decision makers in a promotion competition unless there is obvious, evidenced based, discrimination.

The Complainant alleged she suffered a number of acts of victimisation (outlined above) as a result of taking certain protected acts provided for in section 74(2) of the EEA. The Act as amended states the following

“For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a complainant,

(c) an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

(d) the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

(e) an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

(f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

(g) an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”

The Complainant mainly relied on her contact with Professor A prior to the commencement of the 2019 competition as initiating the victimisation. I have examined this correspondence and cannot concur that there is a clear intent by the Complainant to initiate a complaint on the basis of gender bias. It is clear the criteria for upgrade to Professor B level is an extremely detailed and thorough process with involvement of the candidate, her nominees for review, detailed examination by a number of assessors and independent audit. The criteria are a matter for the Universities of Ireland and have input from IFUT. It does not seem unreasonable to include research as one of 11 criteria. I do accept, although, it was not a basis for the Complainants case that the gender make up of the Promotions panel could be more gender balanced, but this is not within my remit to decide upon and there is no evidence to suggest it had a bearing on this case. I have also considered the Sheehy Skeffington v National University of Ireland, Galway case submitted by the Complainant and see substantial differences in the grounds argued for discrimination (grounds for promotion versus bias in grounds for promotion) in that case versus the current case.

I have considered the grounds (set out above) by the Complainant alleging victimisation and conclude that none of the alleged acts stated by the Complainant fall into any of the categories allowed for, (a) to (g) above, in the Act.  The Complainant initiated significant queries about the process and prior outcomes which would have required substantial time to respond to (mainly during Covid) and I see nothing in the correspondence regarding the queries as to whether there was a requirement (or not) to give the Complainant the notes from Interviewers as unusual or discriminatory and one could argue it was prudent by the then HR Director to recommend to Professor A to consider seeking external legal advice on the matter due to the general implications of acceding to the request.. I find that the claim of victimisation is not substantiated.

Overall, I find that the Complainant has not established a presumption of unlawful discrimination or victimisation and her complaint fails.

I find that the Complainant has not established a presumption of unlawful discrimination or victimisation and her complaint fails.

Discrimination