Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Andrew  Stanley

Legs Eleven

Representatives

Peninsula

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00051115-001

13/06/2022

The Complainant stated that there was a shortfall in the amount of money due to be paid to him by the Respondent on 1 July 2020 when he his employment ended. This was disputed by the Respondent.

The Complainant stated that there was a shortfall in the amount of money due to be paid to him by the Respondent on 1 July 2020 when he his employment ended.

The Respondent stated that the Complainant voluntarily resigned from his employment and was therefore not entitled to a redundancy payment.

Although the Complainant’s employment ended on 1 July 2020, his claim for a redundancy payment was not received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 13 June 2022. 

There are time limits on claims for redundancy payments and the relevant provisions in section 24 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (the “1967 Act”) are as follows: -

“(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an employee shall not be entitled to a lump sum unless before the end of the period of 52 weeks beginning on the date of the dismissal or the date of termination of employment –

(a)    the payment has been agreed and paid, or

(b)    the employee has made a claim for the payment by notice in writing given to the employer, or

(c)     a question as to the right of the employee to the payment, or as to the amount of the payment, has been referred to the Director General under section 39.”

and

“(2A)  Where an employee who fails to make a claim for a lump sum within the period of 52 weeks mentioned in subsection (1) (as amended) makes such a claim before the end of the period of 104 weeks beginning on the date of dismissal or the date of termination of employment, the adjudication officer, if he or she is satisfied that the employee would have been entitled to the lump sum and that the failure was due to a reasonable cause, may declare the employee to be entitled to the lump sum and the employee shall thereupon become so entitled.”

The established test for reasonable cause for the purpose of granting an extension of time is that formulated by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT0338 wherein the Court stated:-

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time.  The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

The length of the delay should be taken into account.  A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons.  Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time.  Here the Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.”

The onus is on the Complainant to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon amounts to reasonable cause for that delay.

As no reasonable cause was presented by the Complainant to explain why this claim was referred outside of the time limit set out in section 24(1) of the Act as set out above, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to decide the claim.

For the reasons set out above, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to decide the claim under the Act.